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Abstract 
This thesis was precipitated by the observation that little is known about performance 
review activity in this country despite the introduction of a performance review system 
being proffered as one solution to the statutory value for money requirement. 
However, the research was not undertaken merely to fill an information vacuum. 
Delineating what lessons can be learned from current operations should assist local 
authorities embarking on the introduction of review systems in the future, particularly 
the `new' authorities emerging from Local Government Review and most notably in 
Scotland, where the statutory responsibility for ensuring value for money arrangements 
are in place, falls to the unitary authorities becoming operational on the 1st April 1996. 
Additionally, performance review may provide the framework in which policy 
achievements can be demonstrated, thus strengthening local government by reinforcing 
its policy role. This latter characteristic is likely to become critical if the trend towards 
enabling and decentralisation continues within the local government sector. 
An investigation of performance review was thus undertaken with postal questionnaires 
issued to chief executives and council leaders and a series of case studies, being used 
to accumulate research evidence. The findings are far-reaching and encompass the scale 
of review activity, the types of review system being utilised, attitudes to performance 
review, and establishing, operating and sustaining review systems. Insight was also 
gained about performance issues in authorities which had not implemented review 
processes. 
The operation of performance review is associated with significant benefits in many 
local authorities and there are useful lessons to be learned from these experiences as 
well as from those councils in which performance review has been less successful. 
These lessons are delineated within this thesis along with a set of good practice 
recommendations. 
Preface 
This thesis originated from an ESRC project entitled Performance Measurement in 
British Local Authorities (Award Number R000232256). The principal aims of this 
project were: 
(1) To research the progress made by British local authorities in introducing 
effective performance review systems; 
(2) To conduct preliminary investigations into the applicability of data envelopment 
analysis for comparing the performance of local authorities. 
The research embodied in this thesis is concerned with the first of these objectives. 
The research was initiated because of the paucity of information in the public domain 
relating to performance review. Although `performance' has consistently secured a 
place high on the local government research agenda, this has generally been focused on 
the indicators debate and relatively little is known about internally-driven review 
systems used for monitoring and evaluating organisational performance. There is a 
clear demand for such information as evidenced in the creation of a support network for 
practitioners, the Policy and Performance Review Network. Hence, it was felt that an 
investigation of review activity was timely and this thesis embodies the findings of that 
investigation. 
The ESRC grant commenced in January 1991 but after nine months, the person 
originally appointed as research fellow to the project took up an alternative post. I was 
appointed to the research fellow post in January 1992. As well as this other researcher, 
the grant-holder, Dr Rob Ball, also conducted some of the research involved in the 
overall project. However, all the research contained within this thesis, was conducted 
by myself. 
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1.1 The Conservative Agenda 
The election of the first Thatcher Government in 1979 heralded a watershed in 
the history of local government in this country. The Conservative 
administration which took office, exhibited a decidedly hostile attitude 
towards local government attacking it as "wasteful, profligate, unaccountable, 
luxurious and out of control" (Newton and Karran, 1985, p116). Michael 
Heseltine aptly encapsulated the Government's antipathy by proposing that: 
By 1979, local government had become a barely controllable free-wheeling 
employment machine which for year after year had been run largely for the 
benefit of the machine-minders. 
(Heseltine, 1987, p43) 
Scant evidence exists to support this irresponsible, squandering image of local 
authorities. Indeed, a past Controller of the Accounts Commission in 
Scotland, is on record as saying that: 
Local authorities are not the profligate and inefficient bodies many would have 
us believe. They are in the main, well managed bodies run by experienced, 
professional officials. 
(Simpson, 1986, p21) 
Furthermore, as can be seen from table 1.1 overleaf, which maps out both 
local and central government expenditure, the expenditure of local 
government was growing at a more modest rate than that of central 
government. In reality, the IMF loan issued to the United Kingdom in 1976, 
was conditional upon a number of factors. As Flynn reports: 
The government had to promise to reduce the fiscal deficit (the gap between 
spending and tax revenues), hold down wage increases, especially in the 
public sector, and generally stop the expansion of public sector activity in the 
economy. 
(Flynn, 1993, p9) 
Effecting a reduction in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
immediately proved to be less than straightforward. The high unemployment 
levels which characterised the early 1980s, with the UK unemployment rate 
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progressively rising from 4.05% in 1979 to 10.45% in 1983, was putting 
intense pressure on welfare benefits and thus public expenditure, further 
exacerbated by the concurrent diminution of both tax receipts and the tax 
base. The local government sector became the target for expenditure cuts 
and there followed a raft of legislative reforms aimed at "remodelling the 
pattern of local authorities" (Wilson and Game, 1995, p57) with the primary 
intent of curbing local government expenditure. 
TABLE 1.1 GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION 
(£ millions, 1990 prices) 
CENTRAL 
YEAR GOVERNMENT INDEX 
1974 56,166 100.0 
1975 59,156 105.3 
1976 60,458 107.6 
1977 59,752 106.4 
1978 60,437 107.6 
1979 61,243 109.0 
1980 63,207 112.5 
1981 63,725 113.5 
1982 64,260 114.4 
1983 65,604 116.8 
1984 66,146 117.8 
1985 66,241 117.9 
1986 67,277 119.8 
1987 67,122 119.5 
1988 67,588 120.3 
1989 68,836 122.6 
1990 70,108 124.8 
1991 71,950 128.1 
1992 72,189 128.5 
Source: UK National Accounts (London: HMSO) 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT INDEX 
34,606 100.0 
36,552 105.6 
36,549 105.6 
35,645 103.0 
36,988 106.9 
38,008 109.8 
37,791 109.2 
37,535 108.5 
37,868 109.5 
38,692 111.8 
39,030 112.8 
38,856 112.3 
39,547 114.3 
40,736 117.7 
41,024 118.5 
41,303 119.4 
42,826 123.8 
43,847 126.7 
43,813 126.6 
The main features of the Conservatives' attempts to control local government 
finance were: 
*a new approach to grant distribution; 
* the use of grant penalties for overspending; 
* rate-capping powers in cases of `excessive and unreasonable 
expenditure; ' and 
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* general reserve powers of rate limitations; 
and in the first two-terms of post-1979 Conservative office, no fewer than 
forty pieces of legislation relating to local government were passed 
(Midwinter and Monaghan, 1993, p43). Local government responded in a 
variety of ways but shadow-boxing and brinkmanship strategies were more 
commonplace than compliance and a number of authorities, particularly the 
London Boroughs are reported as becoming adept at "the art of creative 
accounting" (Ball and Monaghan, 1993, p34). As a consequence, local 
government expenditure was not significantly abated with modest growth 
continuing throughout the 1980s. Whilst the imposition of further financial 
controls continued and the search for financial `solutions' to the perceived 
excesses of local governments persisted, ultimately bringing the downfall of 
Thatcher following the poll tax saga, the emphasis of the reforms was 
refocused towards the search for improved value for money. By calling for 
improved efficiency in the use of resources, the Government was able to call 
for public expenditure cuts without necessarily advocating service level and 
quality depletion, a move facilitated by the politically irresistible tag `value for 
money. ' As Elcock et al. note "it was difficult to oppose the concept of value 
for money without appearing to defend waste and inefficiency" (1989, p152). 
However, value for money was far from a back door route to budgetary 
control, providing the justification for public expenditure cuts. It was a 
natural product of the New Right, a philosophical school of thought which 
Margaret Thatcher is variously associated with (see for example, Biddiss, 
1987, Kavanagh and Seldon, 1989, Kavanagh, 1990 and Minogue, 1988). As 
Mather has said of the Thatcherite commitment to improved value for money: 
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It is a straightforward concept, based on the underlying premise that monopoly 
services provided free at the point of consumption and untested by competitive 
forces are unlikely to be efficient in the medium and long-term; that they are 
likely to perpetuate restrictive practices and producer-led service delivery; and 
that they entangle the interests of those specifying the service (the authority) 
with those providing them (the direct employees of the authority, who are also 
policy advisors and quantity controllers). 
(Mather, 1989, p213) 
Flynn identifies four themes running through Government policy which are 
influenced by New Right ideas. Namely, that market mechanisms should be 
used wherever possible; that competition should be promoted between 
providers affording consumers more choice; that collective decision-making 
should be replaced with individualism and individual choice; and finally, that 
state provision should be kept to a minimum (1993, p14/15). It appears little 
more than coincidence that such reforms are in accord with the IMF 
conditions since this was not used as a justification or defence by the 
Conservatives for their change agenda. 
In essence, the Thatcher administration considered the private sector to be 
inherently more efficient than the public sector and many of its local 
government policies were designed to stimulate an environment similar to that 
which prevailed in non-public organisations. Policies such as compulsory 
competitive tendering, contracting out, opting out and increased user charges 
were introduced in an attempt to make local authorities more like private 
sector organisations. Within that context, value for money was perceived to 
be a parallel to profitability in the private sector (Midwinter and Monaghan, 
1993, p101). Indeed, the Audit Commission has proposed that: 
Making a profit, or at least avoiding a loss, is thus a convenient performance indicator which covers efficiency, economy and effectiveness in one term .... In local government, on the other hand, there is generally no profit motive to act 
as an indication of performance. 
(Audit Commission, 1986, p3) 
Chapter 1, Introduction, page 5 
This reveals an alarmingly crude and over-simplistic view of the private sector 
but as Olsen observes: 
The image of the private sector is seldom based on empirical observations of 
how that sector actually works. Rather it is taken from how introductory text 
books in business administration say it should work. 
(Olsen, 1987, p3) 
Furthermore, John Stewart has astutely noted that: 
The public domain is not constituted to replicate behaviour in the private sector 
nor to reproduce market conditions, but to build different behaviour. If the 
public domain were constituted to operate as the private sector there would be 
no rationale for the public domain .... the public domain has its own purpose. (Stewart, 1988, p3) 
Despite an apparently clear ideological stance, it has been proposed that 
Thatcher's strategy for local government lacked a grand strategic plan or pre- 
determined philosophy (Young, 1988; Stoker, 1989) and Flynn has observed 
that "there is a school of thought which says that the Thatcher governments 
were not as radical as their increasingly assertive rhetoric implied" (1993, 
p29). Indeed, Gretton, Harrison and Beeton reported in 1987, that by 
international standards, the frontiers of the British State had not been rolled 
back particularly far (1987, p25). In searching for reasons for this, it has been 
noted that: 
Those who would reform local government would be better to start with a clear 
analysis of its failings and from these develop a coherent approach to tackling 
them, rather than starting from ideological assumptions and relying on inappropriate solutions to complex issues. 
(Midwinter and Monaghan, 1993, p 121) 
Additionally, the unpalatability of some of the proposed solutions appears to 
have been a contributory factor: 
When Ministers were presented by the Think Tank with alternative ways of 
significantly reducing expenditure in September 1982 they recoiled in horror 
and had the paper withdrawn. 
(Riddell, 1983, p 132) 
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However, value for money, like many of the Government's favoured 
solutions, did not just receive a polemical treatment. A legislative base was 
also created and as Holtham and Stewart observed, "value for money became 
the new financial orthodoxy of the 1980s" (1981, p2). 
1.2 The Value for Money Initiative 
The Local Government Act 1982 established the Audit Commission for Local 
Authorities in England and Wales and added to the traditional probity/fiscal 
auditing duty of auditors, a requirement to feel satisfied that the local 
authority "has made proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. " Definition of the 3Es, as value for money is often 
colloquially termed, is further discussed in chapter 2. In creating the Audit 
Commission, Michael Heseltine argued that he would be bringing "some of 
the rigours of private sector accountability" to bear on local government. It is 
thus somewhat ironic that in attempting to so do, the auditing requirements 
placed on local authorities have gone beyond those imposed on private sector 
companies where no value for money remit exists. Gyford's observation that 
some Labour authorities perceived the Audit Commission as something akin to 
"a Trojan Horse for Thatcherism within the walls of local government" (1989, 
p10) has an altogether more poignant ring about it. 
The Accounts Commission, the Audit Commission's corresponding body 
north of the border, was established in 1975 as part of the last reorganisation 
of local government. At a symposium on value for money and effectiveness 
auditing in the public sector in 1983, the then Controller of Audit at the 
Accounts Commission, James Troman, said of making value for money the 
statutory responsibility of local authority auditors: 
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In my view these are retrograde steps as we are beginning to define `audit' 
within the statute and this could have the effect of inhibiting what is, and 
should continue to be, a dynamic and continuously evolutionary process. I 
hope therefore, that this duty of the audit is not introduced into Scottish 
legislation and that we can continue to regard value for money as an integrated 
part of the audit of public sector bodies without such statutory specifications. 
(Troman, 1984, p25) 
Contrastingly and quite significantly, by 1986, Bob Simpson the new 
Controller of Audit, felt that a statutory basis for work was required indicating 
that "it is not appropriate to struggle along on a grace-and-favour basis" 
(1986, p20). It was felt that differing statutory provisions between the Audit 
and Accounts Commissions had resulted in dramatic variations in results: 
The Audit Commission has been strident, controversial, demonstrably 
independent and has achieved a high profile. It has spent a great deal of money 
and identified considerable potential for savings .... The Accounts 
Commission 
by comparison has been restrained, non-controversial, has adopted a low 
profile and has spent very little. The impact accordingly has been limited. 
(Simpson, 1986, p20) 
In an organisation concerned with economy, efficiency and effectiveness, to 
infer that success can be equated with the amount of money spent, borders on 
the ridiculous. 
The Audit Commission was not created to enforce public expenditure cuts but 
rather to address value for money issues in local government. However, as 
Gyford notes, the distinction between cost-effectiveness and cost-cutting is 
often blurred (1989, p9). Shortly after its inception, the Audit Commission 
failed to differentiate between the two concepts as demonstrated by their 
claim of having identified £492 million potential savings. This assertion was 
based on dubious inter-authority spending comparisons so it is of little note 
that by 1987, only 16% of this potential had been realised (Audit Commission, 
1987). Despite this, the Accounts Commission felt that it was unfairly and 
unfavourably compared to the Audit Commission and to redress the balance 
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required `the tools for the job' which included not only appropriate 
legislation, but a comprehensive database and adequate resources (Simpson, 
1986). The provision of statutory value for money powers to Scotland was 
also championed on the grounds that in their absence, authorities acting 
wastefully and inefficiently, were not in fact acting illegally (Himsworth, 
1986). 
The amendment of section 99 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act as 
contained in Section 35 (4) of the Local Government Act 1988 remedied this 
and provided auditors of Scottish local authorities with the same statutory 
value for money responsibility as their counterparts south of the border. 
However, concern was expressed about the ability of auditors to discharge 
this particular legal responsibility. As McSweeney observes: 
Belief in the ability of auditors (or indeed anyone else) to step into local 
authorities during a few months each year and comprehensively evaluate in a 
uniform manner their arrangements and accomplishments, recognising what is 
wrong and knowing how to put it right, greatly underestimates the complexity 
of organisations in general, and local authorities in particular. It also ignores 
the cognitive limitations and perceptual bias of auditors. 
(McSweeney, 1988, p38) 
Furthermore, a professor of accountancy concluded that: 
At present, the auditing profession cannot deliver fully on its value for money 
mandates. This is partially due to the fact that the auditor's role is evolving in 
response to changing public needs and expectations. He is a third party 
intermediary in a broadly defined accountability relationship between on the one 
hand, government and management, and on the other hand, politicians and the 
public at large. 
(Glynn, 1987, p119) 
Midwinter comments that the value for money role broke new ground but in a 
field in which expertise was not particularly well developed (1995, p39) and 
there is little evidence of local authority auditors vigorously enforcing value 
for money auditing. However, Section 170 of the Local Government etc. 
(Scotland) Act 1994, also imposes a statutory duty on the new Scottish 
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unitary authorities which come into operation on the 1st April 1996, to make 
proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the 
use of their resources. It seems highly probable that equivalent legislation 
extending the value for money remit to English and Welsh authorities rather 
than just their auditors, will follow some time in the future. The Accounts 
Commission has observed that "this statutory requirement will undoubtedly 
bring into sharper focus the question of what constitutes proper 
arrangements" (1995a, p13). 
In 1988, the Accounts Commission issued an Auditing Guideline which 
proposed that the following management practices should be in place if the 
necessary value for money arrangements are likely to exist in authorities: 
* systems of planning, budgeting and controlling revenue and capital expenditure 
and income, and for the allocation of resources; 
* adequate codification of responsibilities, authority and accountability; 
* manpower management including arrangements for review of staffing and for 
recruitment, training and direction of employees; 
* arrangements for the proper management of all the resources of the authority - land, property (including acquisitions, maintenance, utilisation, and disposal 
of land and buildings), equipment, information technology, finance and 
energy; 
* arrangements designed to take advantage of economies of scale, particularly in 
procurement of goods and services; and 
* regular monitoring of results against predetermined and quantified performance 
objectives and standards. 
(Accounts Commission, 1988, p2) 
In examining an authority's arrangements for securing economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness, the auditor was advised to focus on such areas as: 
existence of commitment and corporate approach to value for money within an 
authority, for example, steering group or performance review machinery; 
* definition and quantification of attainable objectives; 
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* derivation of performance indicators and subsequent monitoring of actual 
performance; 
* incidence of reviews of particular service and activity levels and related costs 
and outputs; 
* evidence of periodic external comparison with the cost of performance applying 
in the private sector for all appropriate services and activities; 
* maintenance of adequate procedures to ensure optimum utilisation of scarce 
resources; and 
* existence of adequate management information, that is, accurate, timeous and 
made available in appropriate detail to levels of accountable management 
(including members). 
(Accounts Commission, 1988, p4) 
Butt and Palmer have more succinctly proposed that value for money "is 
achieved by planning, reporting upon and reviewing performance on the 
basis of clear, unambiguous statements of policy objectives or goals" (1985, 
p9). Such perspectives have led a number of commentators to conclude that 
value for money is a restatement of earlier rational choice models attempted in 
the local government sphere particularly corporate planning and its close 
cousin, Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems (PPBS). Indeed, if 
one examines the processes involved in these latter mechanisms, the 
resemblance is striking. 
The Paterson Report examined the organisation and management structures 
which would be appropriate for the new Scottish local authorities which 
would become operational in 1975. The report strongly advocated a 
corporate management approach the main steps of which were: 
* to identify and as far as possible measure and analyse existing needs and new (and changing) problems within the community served by the authority; 
* to specify the desired objectives for the provision of services to meet those 
needs and to quantify them; 
* to evaluate the various means and in the light of the assessment of resources 
required and benefits expected, to decide on the best means; 
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* in so doing, to examine the inter-relationships and interactions of the different 
departments of the authority; 
* to produce action programmes covering several years ahead to achieve the stated 
objectives; 
* to implement the action programme; 
* to carry out a systematic and continuous review of the programmes in the light 
of progress made and of changing circumstances; and 
* to measure real achievements in relation to stated objectives. 
(Paterson, 1973, pp26-27) 
The Society of County Clerks proposed that: 
Corporate planning in a local government context, is the planning of the 
authority's activities on an inter-departmental basis in such a way as to secure 
the highest practicable degree of integration in its objectives and activities and 
the best possible use of its resources. 
(Society of County Clerks, 1974, ppl4l-142) 
They also concluded that the elements of corporate planning were closely 
related to a system of Planning, Programming and Budgeting which was 
defined as: 
A management system, designed to assist members and officers in taking 
decisions about the use of resources by the monitoring of results and the 
feedback of this information to assist in the updating and revising of plans. It is 
not a technique but a comprehensive system of corporate planning and controls 
which harness analytical techniques to the needs and process of management. 
The emphasis is on providing timely and relevant information rather than a 
specific management structure. 
(LAMSAC, 1974, p157) 
PPBS was presented as a sequence of stages as indicated in Figure 1.1 
overleaf. 
Despite the Society of County Clerks assertion that "to the informed, the case 
for corporate planning may seem self-evident" (1974, p151) or the Greater 
London Council's conclusion that PPBS "is a way of management, good 
management" (1974, p207) neither had a happy or long shelf life in this 
country (Skelcher 1980, Elcock et al. 1989, Midwinter and Monaghan, 
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1993). As Caulfield and Schultz note "confirmation that corporate planning 
has a tarnished reputation is not hard to find" (1989, p9). Indeed, some 
commentators (for example, Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974; Dearlove, 1979; and 
Gray and Jenkins, 1986) considered this to be predictable given experience of 
their application elsewhere. As Rhodes has asked: 
Why has there been such an emphasis on the contribution of corporate planning 
to the solution of the problems of English cities given the demonstrated lack of 
success of such systems in other countries? 
(Rhodes, 1979, p145) 
The failure of such systems would be of limited relevance but for the fact that 
it led to a prediction that value for money was also doomed. As Elcock et al. 
have commented "value for money is not built on a rock of successful 
precedent" (1989, p151). However, this conclusion may be fallacious. 
FIGURE 1.1: THE PPBS SEQUENCE BY STAGES (LAMSAC, 1974, p159) 
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Chapter 1, Introduction, page 13 
The local government sector of the 1970s which witnessed the downfall of 
corporate management and PPBS was very different from that being exposed 
to the value for money initiative. The effects of relentless legislation post- 
1979 has fundamentally changed local authorities. As Rogers notes "the 
almost constant flow of legislation during the 1980s has markedly changed 
the conditions and circumstances within which a local authority performs" 
(1990, p2) with those changes being described as dramatic and sometimes 
traumatic (1990, pl ). Additionally, value for money, unlike its forefathers, is 
underpinned by legislation and certainly during the Thatcher reign, received 
sustained support from the high office of Prime Minister. Indeed, a number of 
previous Government reports had acknowledged the need for improved value 
for money. As Jowett and Rothwell have commented: 
A number of committees were set up (for example, the Management Committee 
in 1967, the Bains Committee which met throughout the 1970s and the Layfield 
Committee in 1976) each of which stressed the importance of obtaining value 
for money in local services. 
(Jowett and Rothwell, 1988, p21) 
Concern with value for money predates Thatcher or as Elcock et al. comment 
"value for money was not discovered in the Adam Smith Institute or the 
Centre for Policy Studies" (1989, p152). However, as Carter observes: 
Although the government was breathing new life into old ideas - ideas 
previously popular in the 1960s - the enthusiasm was unprecedented and infectious. 
(Carter, 1991, p85) 
These combined factors suggest that value for money may not peter out like 
its ancestors. Evidence of this may be found in the observation that some of 
the pressure to develop improved value for money systems has come from 
within local authorities. As Rogers notes: 
The extent and diversity of developments and innovations is quite dazzling.. .. It is quite clear that local authorities are not simply responding to the requirements 
of central government to become more accountable or to be more economic and 
efficient. 
(Rogers, 1990, p 1) 
Chapter 1, Introduction, page 14 
This conclusion is supported by Ball and Monaghan who record a wide range 
of schemes having been developed in response to the value for money 
initiative, many of which "considerably exceed the rudiments of efficiency 
and effectiveness required to satisfy the Audit and Accounts Commissions" 
(1993, p35). Elcock et al. report "important pushes towards efficiency from 
within the local government community itself' (1989, p139). Indeed, Jackson 
and Palmer propose that in response to the challenges of the last decade: 
Public service managers have adopted a variety of coping strategies. Some have 
adopted a minimalist approach by simply accepting the need to implement 
budget cutbacks and to live with the inevitable consequences that this has meant for service quality. The majority have, however, been more positive in their 
responses. They have accepted the challenges that the hostile and uncertain financial environment has presented to them and have introduced new 
management systems. In an attempt to produce more from less, the positive 
minded public services managers have chosen to adopt and implement 
"performance reviews. " 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1992, p8) 
They proceed by providing the following definition: 
A performance review is a detailed critical examination of an organisation's 
existing activities. It seeks to establish answers to some basic questions such 
as, what are we currently doing; why are we doing it; whose interests are being 
served by these activities; why are we doing things in the way that we are; how 
much does it cost; and could it all be done at less cost? 
A review of a public service's performance seeks to establish how well it is 
performing in terms of providing value for money. Performance review is a 
process of finding out, through a detailed process of examination and 
measurement, how actual levels of achievement compare to expected levels of 
achievement. 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1992, p8) 
The Audit Commission have similarly perceived the introduction of a 
performance review system as an appropriate response to the value for money 
agenda and during the 1980s produced a series of publications devoted to the 
introduction of performance review systems in local government (Audit 
Commission, 1986,1988 and 1989). In their 1988 Handbook, the 
Commission outlined the following four stages to performance review: 
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1. to determine performance measures 
2. to set targets for that performance and then monitor achievements against 
them 
3. to review selectively those areas where performance does not come up to 
expectations 
4. to take action arising from the review process 
(Audit Commission, 1988, p 1) 
However, much of the focus both in the Commission's subsequent work and 
in the wider academic and professional community has centred on the first 
stage. As Midwinter and Monaghan have observed: 
The majority of the literature in the VFM field has centred on the use and abuse 
of performance indicators (PIs). This reflects the relative ease of setting and 
monitoring PIs however ill-defined, inappropriate or inadequate. In an attempt 
to be seen to be responding promptly to the VFM remits; auditors, authority 
officials, consultants and commentators alike, have directed their energies into 
the most tangible element of the reforms, with the result that performance 
indicators have a high profile in the VFM field. 
(Midwinter and Monaghan, 1993, p102) 
More recently, this preoccupation with performance indicators reflects the 
Citizen's Charter, John Major's contribution to the value for money debate. 
The Local Government Act 1992 required the Audit and Accounts 
Commission: 
* to give such directions as it thinks fit to each local authority to publish, 
annually, information as to its standards of performance; and 
* to provide the indicators to measure the performance of local authority services - 
indicators that will (in its opinion) facilitate comparison of cost, economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness - from one authority to another and over time. 
Extensive consultation was undertaken both north and south of the border. 
The Audit Commission identified the following key areas of concern: 
* there were too many indicators to be of interest to citizen's, yet too few to 
reflect complex services adequately. In particular, there were insufficient indicators of effectiveness, quality and efficiency; 
* the imposition of centrally-determined indicators could skew local policies and 
restrict local choice; 
* the figures produced would be misused, or not properly understood; and 
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* the cost of collecting and reporting the information would not be worth the 
benefits gained from the exercise. 
(Audit Commission, 1993) 
In response to these concerns, the Audit Commission claims to have: 
* focused initially on fewer services, and detailed the way in which it intends to 
develop the initiative in the future; 
* focused on issues which are of most general interest to citizens, choosing 
indicators which should be readily available; and 
* formulated indicators to relate performance to local policies and targets, leaving 
authorities with maximum discretion to explain the reasons for their policies 
when publishing their performance locally. 
(Audit Commission, 1993) 
The proposed indicators were accordingly revised but a number of technical 
inadequacies still remained. As Ball and Monaghan have observed: 
* many of the indicators are not indicators of performance at all although they may 
represent interesting information. For example, take the unit cost of road 
resurfacing - Is a higher figure unambiguously more or less favourable? A 
higher figure might represent inefficiency but alternatively could represent a 
better quality job; 
* some of the indicators appear bizarre. Take for instance total crimes reported 
per 1000 police officers. Is this a performance indicator for the police force or 
for society? Will such a measure penalise forces who have good relationships 
with their communities and good community policing; 
* there stills appears to be much discussion of using indicators for comparative 
purposes. This is bound to lead to misleading and inappropriate comparisons 
being made. For example, many of the indicators are based on cost. But it is 
inevitable that many services will be delivered more cheaply in densely- 
populated authorities rather than in sparsely populated rural areas whatever their 
relative performance; 
* there is undue emphasis on those aspects of service delivery which are easily 
quantifiable at the expense of more qualitative indicators. Consider for example 
a planning department. The focus is on administrative measures such as the 
turnaround time of planning applications. The quality of the planning decision 
taken is ignored but will have much greater impact in the longer term than a 
delayed response. 
(Ball and Monaghan, 1993, p41-42) 
Similar doubts have been expressed by a number of other authors particularly 
concerning the usage of charter indicators for comparative purposes. 
McSweeney proposes that 
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Like must be compared with like. This is far more problematic than it might 
first appear. The reasons include inconsistencies, inaccuracies, inadequacies, 
and inappropriateness of the indicators. Much input data comes from 
accounting systems that are neither uniform nor neutral. Cost data may not be 
given but may have to be constructed. Significant discretion may exist as to 
what costs to include, how to calculate them and how much to assign, for 
example, to overhead allocation. This introduces diverse method of calculation 
and thus diminishes comparability. Additionally, there is the issue of 
manipulation which can take a variety of forms: smoothing, biasing, filtering, 
focusing and so forth. 
(McSweeney, 1988, p37) 
Flynn (1986) has concluded that there are so many problems with comparative 
data that they may not even be helpful in identifying broad problem areas. 
Indeed, Ed Page has surmised that: 
The safest and fairest conclusion is that performance indicators are invaluable, 
even essential tools of management within institutions; they are misleading and 
unhelpful tools of political analysis between institutions - unfortunately the latter 
are more exciting. 
(Page, 1989) 
There is also a more general argument about whether it is either sensible or 
appropriate to try to evaluate local authority performance by "a whole raft of 
unrelated indicators devoid of any policy context" (Ball and Monaghan, 
1993, p42). As Midwinter purports: 
The notion that authorities' performance can be reduced to a few simple, 
quantifiable indicators which form the basis for comparison of organisational 
efficiency is fallacious... The basis for sensible and equitable comparisons 
between authorities does not yet exist, and therefore the statutory requirement to 
undertake comparisons on the basis of limited information ought to be 
withdrawn. 
(Midwinter, 1995, p51) 
He goes on to suggest that the data generated in the public domain should be 
reclassified as local government statistics and should be used for "internal 
policy analysis in assisting councils to reach decisions on budgetary priorities 
or service developments"(1995, p51). Woodward, in his review of the use of 
performance indicators in the nationalised industries, similarly concludes that 
`performance indicators' presented in annual reports, give limited information 
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except on the loosest definition of performance and provide no insight into 
achievement (1986, p308). 
It certainly seems in some doubt that the publication of the Citizen's Charter 
information will create much public furore. As Ball and Monaghan note 
"councils will collect the information which will be published as required by 
the legislation but the impact will be limited" (1993, p43). This was the case 
with previous similar initiatives. Section 167 (1) of the Local Government and 
Housing Act 1989 required local authorities in England and Wales to present 
an annual list of 40 indicators to tenants. Passmore (1991) conducted a survey 
of tenants in the Welwyn Hatfield District Council area two weeks after the 
authority had circulated its 1990/91 indicators. Few respondents could 
remember details of the publication and there were a number of negative 
comments about the amount of information received. Jowett and Rothwell 
also highlight the limited impact of the 1980 Local Government Planning and 
Land Act which required authorities to produce an Annual Report informing 
ratepayers of the uses to which their money had been put: 
It was hoped that this might galvanise concerned ratepayers into pressurising 
their elected representatives to improve efficiency in those areas where excessive 
expenditure had been identified. Perhaps it is premature to judge, but it would 
so far seem that the publication of these accounts has neither aroused the wrath 
of ratepayers nor promoted positive cost-cutting action by councillors 
(Jowett and Rothwell, 1988, p26) 
It would be premature to conclude that the same fate awaits the Citizen's 
Charter but certainly the publication of the first year's data (Accounts 
Commission 1995b, Audit Commission 1995a) has not created much of a stir 
amongst the great British public. 
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1.3 Performance Review: The Forgotten Dimension 
The hype which has surrounded performance indicators has detracted 
attention from performance review systems which were advocated as a 
suitable response to the need to establish arrangements for securing economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness (Jackson and Palmer, 1992; Audit Commission, 
1988) and little is known about the systems in operation in this country. 
Steve Rogers in his contribution, Performance Management in Local 
Government, highlights a number of systems for managing organisational 
performance which have been adopted by local authorities (1990) and 
Caulfield and Schultz, in their book devoted to strategic planning in the local 
government arena, unveil a number of approaches to performance review 
which they see as an essential element of strategic planning. They quote the 
Assistant Chief Executive of Rochdale Metropolitan Council who proposes 
that "while systematic performance review may have been thought of in the 
past as being `nice to have, ' it now falls into the `must have' category" 
(Caulfield and Schultz, 1989, p61). The Audit Commission echo this sentiment 
proposing that: 
The continued existence of local government depends on its ability to be 
competitive, offer consumer choice and provide well-managed quality services. Councils are increasingly recognising the need to evaluate the effectiveness of their services; to consider outcomes as well as inputs and outputs. The 
performance review process is fundamental to achieving these aims. (Audit Commission, 1988, p l). 
However, the Commission describes the approach of many authorities to 
performance review as "haphazard and unstructured" (1989, pl). In practice, 
there has not been a comprehensive assessment of performance review 
activity in this country to support or deny this assertion. It is largely unknown 
what approaches local authorities have adopted, nor indeed, how many have 
instigated review procedures. Reflecting the need to plug this knowledge 
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gap, the Economic and Social Research Council funded a project, 
Performance Measurement in British Local Authorities, part of the remit for 
which was to research the progress made by British local authorities 
in 
introducing effective performance review systems with the intention of 
identifying good practice (Award Number R-000-23-2256). The findings of 
part of that research project are embodied in this thesis (see preface). 
However, there are reasons other than filling an information vacuum for 
reviewing current performance review practice. A statutory duty is placed on 
auditors, and imminently on Scottish authorities, to ensure that arrangements 
are in place for securing value for money within authorities. The models 
proffered by the Audit and Accounts Commissions in response to this 
legislative requirement which are discussed in chapter 2, are largely untested 
and indeed unsubstantiated and it would seem sensible to examine experience 
to date to unveil examples of good practice and highlight any commonly 
occurring problems. As Monaghan and Ball have commented: 
Whilst no blueprint exists for an effective performance review system, valuable 
insights can be gained from authorities who have already established review 
mechanisms and a number of general observations can be made. 
(Monaghan and Ball, 1993, p12) 
Delineating what lessons can be learned from performance review operations 
to date, should prevent the `new' authorities emerging from the 
reorganisation of local government from reinventing the performance review 
wheel. There is evidence of local authorities seeking such information for 
example by the creation of the Policy and Performance Review Network in 
1989, an organisation devoted to the sharing of experience in the policy and 
performance review field. Indeed, in a study conducted by the Value for 
Money Accounts Commission/Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
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Liaison Group, the need for more information, particularly relating to good 
practice, to be made available in the public domain was evident (Accounts 
Commission, 1991, pl1). 
Performance review has been defined as "the monitoring and evaluation of 
organisational performance" (Rogers, 1990, p16). Whilst the emphasis to date 
in the public domain, has been on operational statistics, performance review 
should also relate to policies since this is a fundamental aspect of the 
performance of local authorities which are after all political organisations 
(Widdicombe, 1986; Gyford, Leach and Game, 1989). There has undoubtedly 
been a trend for increased politicisation and more of a focus on policies within 
local councils in recent years. As Flynn observes: 
While by virtue of being an elected tier of government, local authorities have 
always been political, the last decade has produced sharper contrasts in policies 
among many authorities. 
(Flynn, 1993, p50) 
Stewart concurs with this view proposing that "local politicians have become 
more determined to assert political control and to pursue distinctive policies" 
(1988, p13). Whilst reviewing performance in relation to policies is arguably 
more complex than operational details, it can be more important in terms of 
organisational purpose. Stewart has argued that: 
A local authority can be seen as a convenient unit for the administration of a 
series of separate services or as an elected body charged not with one purpose, 
but with many purposes, and with a wide-ranging concern for its area and for 
those who live within it. It can be seen as local administration or as local 
government. 
(Stewart, 1988, p32) 
Local authorities have statutory responsibilities in relation to a number of the 
services they provide but they also have considerable discretionary powers 
which afford them the opportunity to determine local policies across a wide 
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range of services significantly affecting those individuals living and working 
within the local authority boundary. Exercising this local government right 
should entail an implicit obligation to review progress in relation to those 
policies - it is not sufficient to merely have a statement of policy. Indeed, the 
Audit Commission has argued that: 
The members and officers of a local authority have three main responsibilities: 
planning the services that the council is to provide; ensuring the appropriate 
structures and resources to deliver them are in place; and then checking that the 
desired results have actually been achieved. 
(Audit Commission, 1989, p2) 
Monitoring results within a policy framework should strengthen local 
government by reinforcing the policy role which needs to be played by local 
authorities if they are not to become a convenient local administration for 
central government-determined policies. It should also prevent a local 
authority from drifting into performing to the Citizen's Charter indicators 
which are devoid of policy and contextual considerations and which even the 
Accounts Commission has conceded are often primarily determined by the 
capacity to produce numerical information (Accounts Commission, 1992a). 
The need for a local authority to review its performance relative to its overall 
aims and objectives will become increasingly critical if the trend towards 
enabling and decentralisation persists and services continue to be put out to 
competitive tender. A performance review mechanism can facilitate a local 
authority ensuring that progress is being made relative to what it set out to 
achieve even though it is not necessarily the direct service provider. 
However, this is not to suggest that performance review is a panacea. As 
Monaghan and Ball have indicated "performance review is not an all- 
encompassing solution to the many and varied problems confronting local 
government" (1993, p14). But in the absence of consultation with local 
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authorities, the limitations of performance review, like its strengths, cannot be 
specified. 
There are thus a number of reasons why a comprehensive investigation of 
performance review practice in this country is timely. To this end, a critique of 
the state of the art in performance review activity in British local authorities 
was undertaken and is described in this thesis. 
l. 4 Thesis Overview 
In the next chapter, definitions of the terms commonly used in this area are 
considered and the approaches to performance review expounded by the 
Audit and Accounts Commissions are examined. In chapters 3 and 4, 
attention is turned to methodological issues. Chapter 3 establishes the specific 
research questions to be addressed in the remainder of the thesis and takes an 
overview of the methodological considerations which underpin research of 
this type. Chapter 4 delineates the actual methodology employed in 
undertaking research for this thesis which comprised two principal 
components; namely, a comprehensive postal questionnaire issued to both 
chief executives and council leaders of all local authorities in Great Britain, 
and a series of five case studies undertaken in authorities operating a range of 
different performance review systems. 
Chapters 5 to 8 present the research material. Chapter 5 identifies the scale of 
performance review activity occurring in this country as revealed through this 
piece of research. Chapters 6 and 7 summarise the postal questionnaire results 
respectively received from chief executives and council leaders whilst chapter 
8 presents the case study material. 
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In chapter 9, all the research evidence on review systems is synthesised and a 
critique of performance review is made founded on the actual experiences of 
councils, culminating in the delineation of good practice recommendations for 
authorities intending to implement a review mechanism in the future. 
Concluding comments relating to this programme of research are made in 
chapter 10. 
Much of the research fieldwork was conducted in 1992 as part of the ESRC- 
funded project from which this thesis emerged. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that significant change has occurred in relation to 
performance review in the local government arena between the research being 
undertaken and the presentation of this thesis. This reflects the priority which 
other major pieces of legislation have demanded of local authorities such as 
the introduction of the council tax, the extension of compulsory competitive 
tendering, the implementation of the Citizen's Charter, and Local 
Government Review. Contact has been maintained with four of the five case 
study authorities and their performance review systems are little changed from 
when the case study visit was undertaken with only modest refinements 
having being made to the review processes. An open dialogue has also been 
maintained with the Policy and Performance Review Network, the 
practitioners organisation in this field, and again it is perceived from 
discussions with key figures in this organisation and attendance at their 
conferences, that progress is being made only very gradually in the review 
area reflecting the lack of central time available because of all the competing 
pressures facing local councils. It is thus felt that the observations and findings 
of this research remain valid. 
Chapter 1, Introduction, page 25 
Although the research material is exclusively drawn from local government, 
the general findings are applicable to other public sector arenas. All 
organisations in the public domain are under pressure to monitor their 
performance (Jowett and Rothwell, 1988) and thus some of the findings from a 
review of practice in the local government area, will inevitably be of relevance 
in these other sectors and consequently may have a bearing on practice 
beyond the confines of local authorities. Local government was singled out 
for investigation because central government has so overtly challenged this 
component of the public sector and placed the performance of local 
authorities high on the public agenda with rhetoric such as Michael 
Heseltine's assertion that "the Government had been returned on a promise to 
cut out waste in local government" (1987, p40). But as Elcock et al. more 
incisively observe "this assumption of waste as the original sin of the public 
sector is commonly made by those preaching the hot gospel of value for 
money, but it is only an assumption" (1989, p154). 
Chapter 2 
Approaches to Performance Review 
2.1 Definitions 
2.2 The Audit Commission's Approach to Performance Review 
2.3 The Accounts Commission's Approach to Performance 
Review 
2.4 Alternative Approaches to Performance Review 
2.5 Summary 
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2.1 Definitions 
Within the performance review field, definitional imprecision is commonplace 
and therefore terminology will be considered prior to examining the 
advocated approaches to performance review. 
In chapter 1, it was proposed that performance review was proffered as an 
appropriate solution to the requirement to have arrangements in place for 
securing value for money in local authorities. Butt and Palmer propose that 
"being a colloquialism, value for money has become a wide and ambiguous 
term, but it is generally accepted that it covers three basic elements: economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness" (1985, p10). They define these elements as 
follows: 
Economy - The practice by management of the virtues of thrift and good 
housekeeping. An economical operation acquires resources in appropriate 
quality and quantity at the lowest cost. 
Efficiency - Making sure that the maximum useful output is gained from the 
resources devoted to each activity, or, alternatively, that only the minimum level 
of resources are devoted to achieving a given level of output. An operation 
could be said to have increased in efficiency if either lower costs were used to 
produce a given amount of output, or a given level of cost resulted in increased 
output. 
Effectiveness - Ensuring that the output from any given activity (or the impact 
that services have on a community) is achieving the desired results. To evaluate 
effectiveness we need to establish that approved/desired goals are being 
achieved. A goal (or operating objective) may be defined as a concrete 
expression of a policy objective. This is not necessarily a straightforward 
procedure; some goals may not be initially apparent. Once a set of goals has 
been established we need to determine whether these goals are being 
accomplished. 
(Butt and Palmer, 1985, pp10-11) 
Carter has commented that "the precise definition of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness became an industry in itself' (1991, p90). However, the above 
interpretations of the criteria are broadly held by most commentators although 
the Commissions define effectiveness as "how well a programme or activity is 
achieving its established goals or other intended effects" (Audit Commission, 
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1984; Accounts Commission, 1988). Rogers interestingly notes that this limits 
the scope of effectiveness to the intended effects of a policy, whereas the 
unintended effects may be of equal importance (1990, p15). He provides the 
following additional definitions: 
Inputs refer to the resources which are used to produce a service or execute a 
policy and are expressed in terms of finance, personnel, equipment etc. Outputs 
refer to the services produced or delivered. They are most often expressed in 
terms of their quantity but should also include some statement of quality. 
Outcome is the term most variably defined but is generally considered to be a 
statement of what actually happens as a result of providing the service or of the 
benefits of the service to its users. This definition can sometimes conflict with 
the use of the term `impact' which may be described as the ultimate effect of a 
policy, both intended and unintended. 
(Rogers, 1990, p14) 
He proposes that this generally accepted definition of the term `input' could 
be considered narrow since it does not take into account the fact that for 
many services, the inputs to a service cannot be limited to resources alone but 
should also include reference to the characteristics or needs of the customers 
or clients for whom the service is provided, citing pupil characteristics as an 
input into the educational process, as an example. 
In addition to economy, efficiency and effectiveness, there has been pressure 
for the inclusion of equity to the value for money framework given the social 
remit which local authorities have (Flynn, 1993; Bovaird et al., 1995; Hulme, 
1988; Jackson, 1988). Jackson and Palmer have gone further proposing the 
addition of excellence, entrepreneurship, expertise and electability and 
possibly Europe and the environment. They propose that: 
The extended VFM framework which incorporates equity, entrepreneurship, 
excellence, expertise and electability by adding them to economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness brings the issues of performance measurement much closer to the 
reality of management problems. There are many different dimensions to 
performance and the problem which faces management is to choose the 
appropriate trade offs between each of the elements. 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1992, p20) 
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Pollitt similarly argues that "the alphabet of performance does not begin and 
end with the 3Es" (1986, p161) and he cites a number of other criteria which 
have been suggested as relevant. In particular, availability, awareness, 
extensiveness and acceptability (Clarke, 1984). Pollitt proposes that: 
Certainly some of these terms could be collapsed into others, but sweeping 
definitional aggregation serves to conceal complex problems of multi- 
dimensional attribute identification and weighting. Our needs, desires and 
preferences are not simple so neither, other than by distortion, can be our 
measures of the performance of the services which tender to those needs. 
(Pollitt, 1986, p161) 
This view is supported by McSweeney who says of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness: 
Desirable, and indeed simple, as the criteria may appear to be, their meaning are 
complex and their use for auditing or managerial purposes is often problematic, 
indefinite and capable of different and conflicting interpretations. 
(McSweeney, 1988, p32) 
The emphasis to date is considered to have been on economy and efficiency 
(Hopwood, 1984; Pollitt, 1986; Midwinter and Monaghan, 1993; Midwinter 
1994). This situation, which Pollitt describes as "sadly lop-sided" (1986, 
p161), reflects the difficulty in capturing effectiveness (Jowett and Rothwell, 
1988; Elcock et al., 1989; Jackson, 1993). As McSweeney has sardonically 
commented: 
Prior specification of a few uncontested, unambiguous and tangible (and 
preferably quantified) goals for each local authority task, and each local 
authority as a whole, is regarded as usually possible and always highly 
desirable. 
(McSweeney, 1988, p34) 
Butt and Palmer have proposed that "the three elements, economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness, have been ranked in order of scope and ease of 
measurement" (1985, ph) so it is not surprising that limited progress has been 
made with respect to the latter criteria. However, the Audit Commission, not 
impressed by what it perceived to be inertia, proposed that "it is wrong to 
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overstate the difficulties" (1989, pl) and as Henkel has noted, "began to 
break down, and in effect, redefine what is meant by effectiveness" (1992, 
p76). She also suggests that the Commission has set itself up as a source of 
national standards against which local organisations could assess themselves 
and be assessed (1992, p76). The Citizen's Charter has legitimised this 
process by allowing both the Audit and Accounts Commissions to define the 
indicators against which the performance of local authorities is to be publicly 
judged, although doubts pertain as to whether such evaluation will occur in 
practice. 
In assessing a local authority's achievement, performance indicators and 
measures are normally employed. Jackson and Palmer consider that: 
A distinction is often and usefully made between performance measures and 
performance indicators. Where economy, efficiency and effectiveness can be 
measured precisely and unambiguously it is usual to talk about performance 
measures. However, when as is most usually the case it is not possible to 
obtain a precise measure it is usual to refer to performance indicators. 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1989, p2) 
Carter proposes that performance indicators can be employed as either dials or 
tin-openers: 
`Performance' can be read off the dials: that is, there is a set of norms or 
standards against which achievement can be assessed, as in measuring the 
quality of water.... Tin-openers are simply descriptive. They do not speak for 
themselves. They may signal that a particular unit, be it a crown court, prison 
or bank, is a statistical outlier, but no conclusion can be drawn from this fact in 
itself. It is simply an invitation to investigate, to probe and to ask questions. 
(Carter, 1991, p94) 
Jackson and Palmer concur with this view proposing that "performance 
indicators are provocative and suggestive. They alert managers to the need to 
examine the issue further" (1989, p2). Jackson has suggested a number of 
characteristics which performance indicators should ideally possess: 
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consistency: the definitions used to produce the indicators should be consistent 
over time and between units; 
comparability: following from consistency, it is only reasonable to compare like 
with like; 
clarity: performance indices should be simple, well defined and easily 
understood; 
controllability: the manager's performance should only be measured for those 
areas that (s)he has control over; 
contingency: performance is not independent of the environment within which 
decisions are made; which includes the organisation structure, the management 
style adopted as well as the uncertainty and complexity of the external 
environment; 
comprehensive: do the indicators reflect those aspects of behaviour which are 
important to management decision makers? 
bounded: concentrate upon a limited number of key indices of performance - 
those which are likely to give the biggest pay off; 
relevance: many applications require specific performance indicators relevant to 
their special needs and conditions. Do the indicators service these needs? 
feasibility: are the targets based on unrealistic expectations? Can the targets be 
reached through reasonable actions? 
(Jackson, 1988, p12) 
He proposes that indicators can be classified according to whether they are 
prescriptive (linked to particular objectives), proscriptive (negative indicators - 
it is possible to know when performance is unacceptable but it is more difficult 
to know when it is acceptable) or descriptive (a multitude of statistics which 
describe what a department does, in other words, its activities and throughput) 
and Jackson considers that the majority of performance indicators published in 
the annual Public Expenditure White Paper and in the annual reports of local 
authorities are descriptive (1988, pl2). The dominance of descriptive statistics 
has continued with the Citizen's Charter legislation with all the indicators 
prescribed to date falling into the descriptive category. As a consequence, as 
previously intimated, Midwinter suggests that such indicators should be 
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reclassified as local government statistics since they communicate little about 
`performance. ' Developing this theme, Pollitt has indicated: 
In the context of politics and management, performance is a very attractive term. 
It exudes an aroma of action, dynamism, purposeful effort. It suggests a 
sorting out of the good from the bad. Its seeming neutrality permits managers 
to discuss assessment and appraisal as though they were technical, non-political 
procedures. Similarly, it enables politicians to enthuse audiences suspicious of 
party dogma with visions of a down-to-earth drive to make public services work 
better. Of course, things are not, and could not possibly be as simple as this. 
(Pollitt, 1986, p161) 
Such misleading seductiveness obscures the fact that, as Stewart and Walsh 
have noted, "performance in the public domain is an elusive concept" (1995, 
p51). However, whilst this is undoubtedly true at the aggregate level of local 
government and particularly when attention is focused on inter-authority 
comparisons, it does not necessarily hold when considering the performance 
of an individual authority which is the emphasis of performance review 
systems, the focus of this thesis. As indicated in chapter 1, Rogers has defined 
performance review as "the monitoring and evaluation of organisational 
performance" (1990, p16). Whilst such a definition does not preclude external 
comparisons, Elcock et al. have proposed that "performance review is mainly 
an internally-orientated process" (1989, p167) and in embarking on this piece 
of research, it is anticipated that performance review will be an internal 
mechanisms for evaluating an authority's performance according to the 
criteria which that authority considers to be important. This may involve some 
external input, for example, by encompassing the views of service-users or 
local interest groups, but it will primarily be internally-driven and focused. 
Indeed, the Audit Commission have described performance review as "an 
essential element in the management of a local authority" (1989, pl). 
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Performance review is to be distinguished from performance appraisal which 
normally refers to the "evaluation of the performance of individuals" (Rogers, 
1990, p16). Rogers proposes that: 
Performance management is used more variably and may sometimes be equated 
with performance appraisal, but on other occasions is used .... to include both individual and organisational performance. It may be defined as an integrated 
set of planning and review procedures which cascade down through the 
organisation to provide a link between each individual and the overall strategy of 
the organisation. 
(Rogers, 1990, p16) 
In undertaking performance review, appraisal and management, performance 
indicators will inevitably play a significant role and in advocating their use for 
internal purposes, Midwinter and Monaghan have proposed that: 
Performance indicators should be rescued from the confining and inappropriate 
strait jacket of the value for money framework, and set in a broader context of 
policy analysis to assist the political process in local government. 
(Midwinter and Monaghan, 1993, p 122) 
2.2 The Audit Commission's Approach to Performance 
Review 
Ball and Monaghan have proposed that "the Audit Commission has 
championed the performance review cause" (1993, p38) and whilst other 
commentators have also promoted its introduction and compiled 
accompanying `how to do it' guides (for example, Butt and Palmer, 1985; 
Jackson and Palmer, 1989); the high profile which the Audit Commission has 
within the local government sphere has given its advocation and 
recommended approach, predominance. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Audit Commission produced a series of 
publications, Performance Review in Local Government -A Handbook for 
Auditors and Local Authorities, which were updated and refined in the light 
of accumulated experience and the changing circumstances of local 
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government. In the 1988 handbook, it was proposed that performance 
review should underpin the management process shown in figure 2.1. 
FIGURE 2.1: THE AUDIT COMMISSION'S MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Needs and Vision and -f Service --º Outputs f The performance 
resources are strategic proposals and achievements of one period 
assessed objectives are resource and resource use is fed back into 
defined allocations are are monitored the process for 
translated into the next 
specific plans I 
and budgets 
(Audit Commission, 1989, p2) 
Comparing this process with the corporate management and PPBS models 
outlined in chapter 1, it is clear why value for money and performance review 
have been considered as a partial resurrection of these earlier approaches. 
In December 1989, The Commission published Managing Services 
Effectively - Performance Review, which was a refined and modified version 
of the approach espoused in the earlier handbooks. Following this 
publication, the Commission's attention in the performance domain was 
dominated by preparation for and implementation of the Citizen's Charter and 
thus despite all the reforms which have occurred in the local government 
arena since 1989 and the experience accumulated by authorities operating 
performance review systems, the Audit Commission's approach to 
performance review remains unchanged to date. It has recently published a 
series of papers which emphasise the role of the individual in determining 
overall organisational performance and indicating methods of strengthening 
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this (Audit Commission 1995b, 1995c, 1995d) but the Commission has not 
updated its recommended performance review approach. 
Given the profile and standing which the Commission has, it is highly 
probable that it's recommended approach to performance review will 
significantly influence how local authorities embark on reviewing their 
performance. Consequently, the process advocated by the Audit Commission 
will be considered in detail. In the 1989 paper, the Commission proposed 
that a council intending to strengthen its performance review capability needs 
to focus on four main steps which are separately considered in detail below: 
1. Measuring Performance 
2. Assessing Effectiveness and Quality 
3. Monitoring and Reporting 
4. Making it Happen 
2.2.1 Measuring Performance 
The Commission considers that performance review ultimately depends on 
"defining what performance means, and then measuring it. " It is considered 
that most services or activities can be (or ought to be) measured along four 
dimensions: 
* the cost 
* the resources provided - for example the staff, buildings and other resources 
employed in providing swimming pools or residential homes for the elderly. It is sometimes possible also to measure the units of service that these resources 
jointly provide, for example the number of residential places. 
* the outputs - the use made of these resources, or the service actually delivered 
to the public, for example the number of residents in council homes, or the 
number of swimmers. 
the outcomes - the ultimate value or benefit of the service to its users. Examination results provide one measure of the outcome of secondary 
schooling. 
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These measures are considered "to provide the raw materials for performance 
review" but that they normally only come to life in the form of performance 
indicators normally based on ratios between the measures, particularly 
economy (the cost of acquiring resources such as staff, premises or supplies), 
efficiency (the outputs achieved in relation to the resource inputs) and 
effectiveness measures (the final outcome of the service in relation to its 
output). These indicators can then be monitored over time or compared with 
targets or with performance elsewhere. The Commission perceives the 
indicators to be inter-related as indicated in appendix 2.1. 
The Commission also considers that it is important that the target population 
for each service is defined and measured, thus providing the basis for two 
further performance indicators: 
* Level of Service - for example, the number of places provided per elderly 
resident, or the number of leisure facilities in relation to the catchment 
population. 
* Take-up - for example, the proportion of the catchment population that use the 
swimming pool - often useful as a proxy indicator of the quality of the facilities 
provided. 
It is argued that: 
Once these performance indicators have been identified and measured, then the 
performance of the service can be monitored and compared with the expected 
levels of achievement. Problems and opportunities can be spotted and investigated and corrective action initiated where needed. 
(1989, p3) 
However, the Commission recognises that practice is not always as easy as 
"the theory of performance measurement" and considers measuring `service 
outcome' or effectiveness to be a particularly significant difficulty. It is 
conceded that it is usually easier to measure the `output' of a service, with the 
number of children educated by a school cited as an example, but it is 
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proposed that such measures are of little value "unless there is reasonable 
reassurance about the effectiveness and quality of the service. " It is proposed 
that measuring inputs seldom presents difficulties but that this potentially 
creates the problem of "the measurable driving out the unmeasurable" with 
performance review consequently being biased towards "reducing cost rather 
than improving effectiveness. " The literature which underlines such 
difficulties is acknowledged but it is argued that whilst "respecting the quality 
of these arguments, the Commission believes it is wrong to conclude that 
performance measurement is quite so difficult and dangerous. " In particular, 
it is considered better to "have incomplete or imperfect measures of 
performance than none at all. " Furthermore, the Commission argues that 
many of the objections assume that the audience for performance measures 
"has no judgement or common-sense" whereas in fact they will normally 
know the limitations and pitfalls of the information and are well-capable of 
determining what conclusions can and cannot be drawn. It is concluded: 
The Commission therefore believes that it is a dis-service to local government to 
dwell too much on the theoretical difficulties of measuring performance. What 
is more useful is to propose practical ways in which local authorities actually 
can measure their performance, while avoiding the worst consequences of 
misleading indicators. 
(1989, p4) 
The paper then proceeds to advise authorities on specific aspects of measuring 
cost, resource inputs, outputs and outcomes. This advice is reproduced in 
appendix 2.2 (for space reasons) but an underlying theme is the reiteration 
that the measures are only of significance if service quality and effectiveness 
are not ignored and it is considered that this is one of the main areas in which 
performance review systems can be improved. 
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2.2.2 Evaluating Quality and Effectiveness 
The Commission proposes that: 
No matter what a service costs, or how generously it is provided, the most 
critical indicator of its performance is the value or benefit that it confers on its 
users. Simply measuring costs and quantities with no regard for quality, is not 
a satisfactory basis for performance review. At the same time once a council 
has some assurance about service quality, it can then attach more importance to 
other measures such as unit costs, making the whole performance review 
process more credible. 
(1989, p6) 
The Commission on a number of occasions in this paper use quality and 
effectiveness interchangeably proposing at one point that "the effectiveness 
or impact of most services can reasonably be gauged by inspecting and 
controlling the quality of the service itself in relation to accepted standards. " 
This point is somewhat contentious since quality and effectiveness can 
reasonably be argued to be different things. For example, a swimming pool 
may be a high quality facility but if it is inaccessible to its users for example by 
poor public transport linkages, or if there has been some sort of incident 
putting people off coming to the area in which the pool is located, then it will 
be ineffective in terms of the Commission's definition: how well a programme 
or activity is achieving its established goals or other intended effects. One 
could similarly think of examples, particularly in social services and housing 
where a comparatively poor quality service is provided but because the impact 
on those involved is significant (consider for example, the homeless) the 
service, is in fact relatively effective. Both quality and effectiveness are 
relatively elusive concepts and both are difficult to `measure' in the local 
government context but this does not imply that they are interchangeable. 
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The Commission proposes that the simplest solution to the difficult issue of 
assessing effectiveness and quality, is to use proxy measures of impact. The 
following example is given: 
One of the reasons for providing recreation centres may be to occupy teenagers 
and so reduce vandalism. This impact may be hard to measure directly, but a 
fair proxy is simply the number of teenagers - or particular types of teenagers - that actually use the facilities. 
(Audit Commission, 1989, p6) 
One might reasonably suggest that concurrent monitoring of vandalism levels 
would significantly strengthen this proxy measure of effectiveness. It is also 
suggested that a simple proxy measure for many services is "the level of 
public complaints, or the level of customer demand and customer retention. " 
It is proposed that service users should be the judges of the quality of the 
service and it is suggested that "surveys of users, recording their opinion of 
the current service, and their suggestions for what else might be provided" 
should help gauge quality and identify the main opportunities for 
improvement. It is also proposed that quality control and quality assurance 
systems will have a significant role in improving service quality and 
effectiveness. 
Whilst it would be difficult to argue with the logic of the foregoing, it must be 
observed that throughout the 28 paragraphs devoted to the evaluation of 
quality and effectiveness, no mention is made of policies, members or politics 
despite the fact that the effectiveness of a service must be related to what 
policy objectives are being pursued by a local authority. The entire discussion 
is devoid of any policy dimension or recognition of the political process 
underpinning the delivery of services by local councils. Whilst this is the case 
throughout the publication, the omissions seems particularly acute when the 
effectiveness of services is being considered. There is also no 
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acknowledgement that a trade-off normally exists between service quality and 
the cost of provision and that often a policy decision is taken as to the quality 
of service a council can `afford. ' 
2.2.3 Monitoring and Reporting Performance 
The Commission proposes that there are four main steps to developing an 
effective monitoring and reporting system: 
* Identify the key issues for each service, and the key processes that genuinely 
need to be monitored; and select the performance indicators that measure them. 
* Clarify responsibilities for monitoring performance - who needs to monitor 
what, and how often, including members, senior management, and the front- 
line managers of each service. 
* Set targets or yardsticks, including quality objectives that indicate whether 
performance is good or bad, or at least getting better or worse. 
* Design and produce the appropriate reports. 
(1989, p9) 
In identifying key performance indicators, it is stressed that monitoring 
performance is not simply a matter of "scanning whatever statistics happen to 
come to hand" but rather there needs to be a focus on key issues and it is 
considered that these will depend to some extent "upon the audience, the 
time-period and local circumstances. " It is also proposed that: 
In choosing the critical indicators, it is often useful to make a distinction 
between operational performance, that needs to be monitored at regular 
intervals, and underlying performance (for example quality and effectiveness) 
that may be just as critical, but which it is not sensible to debate every month, 
even if the information were available. 
(1989, p9) 
In clarifying monitoring responsibilities, the Audit Commission proposes that 
the purpose, type and frequency of reporting data can be summarised as a 
series of pyramids as shown in figure 2.2 overleaf. 
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FIGURE 2.2: THE AUDIT COMMISSION'S MONITORING PYRAMIDS 
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(Audit Commission, 1989, p11) 
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It is recognised that members should be involved in the monitoring of 
performance as well as management but because they "cannot possibly 
monitor every aspect of every service at every meeting" the Commission 
proposes that: 
* members regularly monitor a limited set of measures that they judge to be most 
critical, supplemented with an annual review of the whole service; 
* they ensure that officers are adequately monitoring everything else, at the 
appropriate detail and frequency; and 
* they require any deviations beyond a certain level of significance to be reported 
to them immediately. 
(1989, ppl0-11) 
Additionally, it is considered that councils have an obligation to report 
performance to the public normally through broad annual reports and that 
information is increasingly being demanded by service users about standards. 
The Commission asserts that performance indicators are pointless without 
associated targets or yardsticks and considers that: 
As a general rule, any performance indicator that a council monitors should have 
some kind of comparative figure set beside it. There are two possible 
approaches: setting targets, or using comparisons such as last year's figures or 
averages for other authorities. 
(1989, p12) 
The Commission produced a Data Supplement to the 1988 Performance 
Review in Local Government handbook comprising a large number of 
benchmark figures and it is proposed that councils should compare their 
performance with these national average and good practice targets and report 
performance accordingly. 
The final stage of monitoring and reporting performance is designing and 
producing the appropriate reports. It is proposed that the following questions 
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should be asked in deciding what information and comparative indicators are 
to be included in any monitoring report: 
* Whom is the report for, and for what activities are they responsible? 
* What decisions do they have to take, or genuinely need to monitor, in the 
sense that they might intervene if the results were unsatisfactory? 
How frequently do these decisions need to be taken? 
The report should then contain the minimum information needed to satisfy 
these requirements. Authorities are urged to make sure that reports are well 
presented and to observe the following points: 
* Avoid over-crowding the page 
* Use clear headings 
* Employ graphs to illustrate trends and variations 
* Highlight the key figures 
* Include text commentary alongside the relevant figures 
Authorities are reminded that reporting and monitoring should not be 
confined to quantifiable performance indicators and it is proposed that issues 
such as quality and effectiveness should have a regular place on the agendas 
of members and senior management perhaps at an annual meeting devoted to 
performance review. 
2.2.4 Making it Happen 
The Commission proposes that setting up a performance review system is 
relatively easy but that the best defined systems will serve little purpose unless 
members and officers take it seriously. Whilst the latter point is undoubtedly 
true, the assertion that establishing a system is comparatively easy is more 
dubious and it is intended in this thesis to analyse the process of constructing 
a review process and to assess how easy it is. The Commission considers that: 
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It is also easy to go through the motions of monitoring and reporting 
performance, without taking it seriously - avoiding the sensitive issues, or the 
awkward comparisons, turning a blind eye to obvious weaknesses, and focusing on why things cannot be changed rather than how they could be. 
(1989, p16) 
It is proposed that to counteract this, a conscious and concerted effort needs 
to be made in the following areas: 
* ensure that each department has adequate arrangements for performance review; 
* make the chief executive responsible for the process, and provide him or her 
with staff resources; and 
* involve members. 
(1989, p16) 
It is suggested that there are three main pre-conditions for effective 
performance review in a department namely, an accountable management 
structure, a clear commitment to quality, and leadership from the top. In terms 
of chief executive involvement, it is considered that he or she should not 
simply "occupy the top of the performance review pyramid" but should in 
fact have responsibility (and the corresponding authority) for the way in 
which the system operates. In particular: 
* ensuring that each department has an effective performance review system; 
* monitoring key aspects of each department's performance, reviewing results 
with its chief officer and where possible agreeing corrective action; 
* organising the council's top-level performance review system - in particular providing regular monitoring information to its central policy-making 
committee; 
* recommend which services or activities should be subjected to an in-depth 
review of performance; agreeing the arrangements for doing this with the 
appropriate chief officer; and reviewing departments' progress in implementing 
agreed changes. 
(1989, p17) 
In addition to chief executive input, the Commission considers that effective 
performance review will almost certainly require "the assistance of a small 
central staff, respected by service departments and well-managed by central 
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chief officers and members. " It is asserted that these staff will report to the 
chief executive and will be responsible for both performance review and 
policy planning. It is proposed that it is not the job of such central staff to 
directly review department's performance but rather to act as catalyst for the 
efforts of others by: 
* helping departments design and improve their performance review systems, and 
promoting a reasonably uniform approach across all departments; 
* designing and operating the central policy review process; 
* helping the chief executive to identify the issues to bring to the attention of the 
centre, or to raise with other chief officers; and 
* taking part or leading in-depth reviews of services whose performance appears 
to need improvement. 
(1989, p18) 
It is recognised that the exact arrangements will vary from council to council 
and that smaller authorities will not be able to employ the same number of staff 
as large councils but it is suggested that in such instances, the chief executive 
could second some of his departmental staff on a part-time basis. 
In terms of involving members, the Commission asserts that: 
Performance review should form an integral part of each member's work for the 
council, in the same way as it forms an integral part of a manager's job. In 
general therefore the Commission believes that performance review should not 
be hived off to a separate Performance Review Committee. Temporary working 
parties can deal with particular issues, and there may be a case for a special 
group of members to oversee the working of the performance review system 
itself. But the actual responsibility for reviewing performance should rest with 
the same committees who are already responsible for each service. 
(1989, p18) 
It is considered that the change needed is simply to give performance review 
the proper weight in the agenda and business of committees probably at the 
expense of detailed involvement in the day to day operations of the service. It 
is suggested that members should receive operations reports from officers as 
the first substantive item on the committee agenda and that once a year, 
Chapter 2, Approaches to Perfon'nance Review, page 45 
committees might hold a special meeting solely devoted to the review of the 
year's performance. It is also proposed that members have the task of 
ensuring that performance review is linked to the strategic planning process 
but it is not indicated how such a linkage might be achieved. The Commission 
also suggests that member-officer reviews might prove a useful vehicle for 
reviewing performance and that above all "there is little point in monitoring 
performance and identifying short comings unless something is done. " 
The Audit Commission concludes this guide to performance review by 
providing some advice to councils embarking on setting up a system: 
The first requirement is that the initiative must be taken seriously, and not 
simply regarded as one more management drill. The objective is not to go 
through the motions, but to highlight genuine problems and to secure 
improvement and change. It should have visible and sustained backing from 
members, from the chief executive and from chief officers. And this backing 
should be demonstrated by action rather than simply by words, and by the use 
made of the results. 
(1989, p19) 
It is suggested that councils developing a system can do so in "easy stages" 
and that they should work from the front-line upwards, start with the most 
promising areas, and avoid being too ambitious. The Audit Commission does 
however suggest that the majority of councils already have some elements of a 
performance review system in place but need to develop these into something 
that is more systematic and effective. 
Throughout Managing Services Effectively - Performance Review, the Audit 
Commission's approach is asserted as the definitive process. There is no 
suggestion that alternative processes or mechanisms for reviewing 
performance may exist or indeed be better suited to a particular local 
authority's needs and circumstances. The approach is postulated as best 
Chapter 2, Approaches to Performance Review, page 46 
practice but without any substantiation being given. Nor is it apparent that 
the Audit Commission's suggested approach has actually been tested in the 
complex, turbulent and political environment which characterises most local 
authorities. 
Unlike the previous Audit Commission publications on this subject, there is no 
discussion of how performance review might fit into the overall management 
and political framework of a local council. Passing reference is made to the 
need for a link to exist between reviewing performance and the authority's 
planning process, but despite the fact that detailed guidance is given on 
significantly less imperative matters such as the presentation of performance 
reports, this particular issue is skipped over without any useful advice being 
offered. Overall, the policy dimension of performance and local government 
more generally, is virtually ignored particularly in the discussion of service 
effectiveness, 
in this thesis, the approaches to performance review actually adopted by local 
authorities will be examined and these can then be compared with the Audit 
Commission's espoused process. However, there are a number of other 
mechanisms which have been advocated in the public domain. 
2.3 The Accounts Commission's Approach to Performance 
Review 
Being north of the border, the Accounts Commission has nothing like the 
impact or profile which the Audit Commission has and encompasses only 65 
local authorities as compared with the 449 which the Audit Commission has 
under its wing. Its approach is consequently different and it has tended to 
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work wherever possible in partnership with local authorities and indeed the 
Accounts Commission set up a Value for Money Liaison Group with the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to determine the most appropriate 
methods of pursuing value for money within Scottish local government. 
In chapter 1, the management practices which the Accounts Commission 
intimated a local authority should have in place if the necessary arrangements 
for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness are likely to exist, were 
outlined (page 9). These included "regular monitoring of results against 
predetermined and quantified performance objectives and standards" 
(Accounts Commission, 1988). In examining an authority's value for money 
arrangements, auditors were advised to focus on a number of areas including 
the "existence of commitment and a corporate approach to value for money 
within an authority, for example, steering group or performance review 
machinery" (1988). In a subsequent publication, the Accounts Commission 
outlined how performance review might operate within the total framework of 
a council's operations as reproduced in figure 2.3. This indicates the need for 
reviewing both the performance of operational activities and policies and 
suggests that performance should be related to targets and that the actual 
results achieved should lead to replanning at the strategic level. 
In developing this further, the Accounts Commission published research in 
1992 which had been undertaken in collaboration with the Institute of 
Housing in Scotland examining current management practice and progress 
made towards establishing a performance culture within the housing area 
(Accounts Commission, 1992c). It was reported that: 
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FIGURE 2.3: ACCOUNTS COMMISSIONS FRAMEWORK OF COUNCIL OPERATIONS 
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(Accounts Commission, 1992b, p 13) 
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Just over half (57%) of the authorities have either a policy commitment to 
introduce performance review or have some system in operation. Only a few 
authorities, however, have developed a systematic approach to performance 
review of the majority of housing functions. 
(Accounts Commission, 1992c, p 11) 
A number of case studies were conducted within this research programme and 
it was indicated that amongst the case authorities: 
* the development of performance review is not dependent on one organisational 
form and can operate in a centralised or decentralised structure; 
* performance review, with effective use of information technology and trained 
staff, can be operated successfully in authorities irrespective of size; 
* performance review is relevant and applicable to all types of housing agency 
(Accounts Commission, 1992c, p13) 
Some advice on developing good practice in performance management was 
then offered including clarification of the relationship between objectives as 
outlined in figure 2.4. It was suggested that: 
The strategic objectives and indicators defined by authorities should provide 
senior management and the administration with a clear view of departmental 
performance. Below this level, however, authorities should ensure that key 
objectives and indicators for individual functions are established for each 
organisational level. Authorities can then monitor trends and variations in 
performance at different operational and management levels, identify more 
accurately the source of difficulties, and set targets which increase accountability 
for performance throughout the department. 
(Accounts Commission, 1992c, pp14-15) 
FIGURE 2.4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVES, INDICATORS AND TARGETS 
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(Accounts Commission, 1992c, p14) 
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The report strongly argues that "the development of effective performance 
management also requires adequate costing of the management and 
administration of delivering individual housing functions: 
By establishing cost centres for individual housing functions, accompanied by 
key operational objectives, indicators and targets at different organisational 
levels, an integrated performance review framework can be operated throughout 
the annual cycle of activity. 
(Accounts Commission, 1992c, p15) 
It was proposed that "performance budgeting and performance review are 
essential elements of an effective management process" (1992c, pl6). Figure 
2.5 sets out their inter-relationship in a housing service as perceived by the 
Accounts Commission. The report concludes by providing a framework for 
improving housing performance as indicated in figure 2.6. Whilst the analysis 
from which these recommendations emerged was concerned with housing, 
the findings are of wider applicability. 
The Accounts Commission approach highlights a number of issues in the 
performance review domain not apparent in the Audit Commission discourse. 
In addition to being considerably less paternalistic, the Accounts Commission 
highlights the need to integrate the performance review process into the 
overall management of the authority and in particular recognises that a policy 
dimension exists in local government and thus that performance in relation to 
policy achievements needs to be considered within a performance review 
system. The need for a link to be established with the budgetary process is 
also indicated and it is suggested that cost centres with clear operational 
objectives and associated performance indicators, which have cascaded down 
form the organisation's overall strategy, may be an appropriate means of 
achieving this. For the performance indicators, the accent is on comparing 
performance against pre-set internal targets rather than external criteria such 
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as the Audit Commission's benchmark figures or average performance levels 
for local authorities. Little attention however, is paid to non-quantifiable 
performance and in particular there is an inadequate treatment of service 
quality. Within the Accounts Commission dialogue, the emphasis is on 
promoting change as opposed to the Audit Commission's work which smacks 
of `imposing' change. 
FIGURE 2.5: INTEGRATED PERFORMANCE BUDGETING - PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
FRAMEWORK 
HOUSING SERVICE 
Required 
resources/ 
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objectives 
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Targets 
---1 14 
ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
Monitor and Actual 
measure Performance 
achievement 
(Accounts Commission, 1992c, p15) 
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FIGURE 2.6: KEY ELEMENTS FOR IMPROVING HOUSING PERFORMANCE 
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budgets 
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* assess overall performance of each function 
* presents results in appropriate format to 
internal audiences (staff, directorate, committee) 
* respond to feedback, act to improve service, 
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The Accounts Commission has promoted good practice but has also 
encouraged local authorities to develop review processes and approaches to 
performance management which match their local circumstances. Midwinter 
and Monaghan have commented on the difference between the Commissions 
proposing that: 
The Audit Commission for Local Authorities in England and Wales has 
specified a uniform evaluation model to be applied by auditors... . 
Contrastingly, 
in Scotland, the Accounts Commission issued guidelines and an `exemplified 
approach' which were to provide a framework within which auditors had, and 
indeed have, flexibility to derive their own detailed manuals of guidance for 
staff engaged in value for money. This seems a more appropriate way of 
operating than the previous method since recognition of local operating 
conditions is essential if value for money is to become meaningful and against 
this backdrop, flexibility and to some degree discretion seems fundamental. 
(Midwinter and Monaghan, 1993, p 106) 
Like the Audit Commission, the Accounts Commission's agenda in recent 
years has been dominated by preparation for and implementation of the 
Citizen's Charter and thus they have not issued an updated performance 
review guide since 1992. However, in anticipation of local authorities bearing 
the responsibility for implementing arrangements for securing economy, 
efficiency and efficiency, the Commission is currently developing a 
management arrangements guide. This is being compiled with support from 
councils and is currently being piloted in selected local authorities for planned 
implementation in the first operational year of the new unitary councils 
(Accounts Commission, 1995a). It is not yet available in the public domain but 
it is not anticipated that it will represent a significant deviation from the 
previous approach recommended by the Accounts Commission. 
2.4 Alternative Approaches to Performance Review 
As previously indicated, much of the commentary surrounding value for 
money and performance review has centred on the definition and 
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measurement of performance indicators (Beeton, 1988). As Pollitt has 
commented: 
There is now a substantial body of literature on the introduction of performance 
indicators to the major public services. Most commentators, however, have 
been concerned with the characteristics of particular indicators and with the 
pressures which led to their adoption in the first place. 
(Pollitt, 1989, p51) 
Consequently, there are few developed approaches to performance review 
apart from those proposed by the Commissions. However, there are a couple 
of contributions which are worthy of consideration particularly for identifying 
any issues not exposed by either the Audit or Accounts Commissions which 
may need to be considered in undertaking research in the performance review 
area. 
Henry Butt and Robert Palmer of Price Waterhouse produced Value for 
Money in the Public Sector: The Decision-Maker's Guide in 1985 which was 
intended as "a comprehensive guide to all aspects of value for money in the 
public sector" (1985, jacket cover) and which Elcock et al. have described as 
"an unusually comprehensive guide to value for money" (1989, p155). This 
sets out an approach to "organising for value for money in local authorities" 
(1985, p23) as indicated in figure 2.7. This is supported by a 14 key point 
action plan for securing value for money as indicated in box 2.1. Whilst the 
action plan is arguably over-ambitious for most local authorities, it again 
highlights the need for a link to be made with the budgetary process which 
they propose should be prioritised or zero-based, and a distinction is drawn 
between the systematic, continuous on-going review of performance with 
respect to both strategy and operations, and one-off, in-depth reviews of 
service areas where there may be an indication that a problem exists. 
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FIGURE 2.7: BUTT AND PALMER'S APPROACH TO ORGANISING FOR 
VALUE FOR MONEY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
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(Butt and Palmer, 1985, p25) 
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BOX 2.1: BUTT AND PALMER'S 14 KEY POINT ACTION PLAN FOR SECURING 
VALUE FOR MONEY 
Total commitment by senior elected representatives and officials. Right attitude to 
achieving value for money should permeate whole organisation. 
Small, powerful but representative committee to direct and co-ordinate value for 
money projects. Corporate approach to value for money should be adopted. 
Clearly defined strategic and operational objectives and targets for all functions and 
activities. 
Priority based or zero based budgeting approach whereby budget items are ranked 
for priority and the incremental effects of service level changes are calculated. 
Key performance measures used for all major functions to evaluate and monitor 
productivity and effectiveness. 
Performance measures linked to performance targets or standards for operational 
management so that productivity gains achieved during value for money reviews are 
maintained or improved upon. 
A `rolling' cost based review covering all areas of material spending and linked to 
the budgeting process. Particular attention to be paid to the cost of administration 
and supervision, energy and supplies. Management should be prepared to tackle 
`soft' areas (eg. education) as well as `hard' areas (eg. transport). 
Regular comparisons with the costs and performance applying in the private sector 
for all services where it is appropriate to do so. Where better cost effectiveness can 
be obtained outside the organisation managers should be asked to justify keeping 
the service in-house. 
9. Select for review only those areas with `payback' potential. Areas of greatest 
materiality, or those which have known problems or those with a history of 
significant improvement in other organisations, should be considered first. `Pilot' 
studies are useful to ensure that limited review resources are not wasted. Studies 
should cross departmental boundaries, for areas such as transport, to ascertain what 
scope exists for `pooling. ' 
10. Investment made in people or equipment which will save money within a reasonable 
payback period (ideally 2/3 years) eg. energy conservation officers and monitoring 
equipment, contract audit specialists, `cook-chill' catering equipment. 
11. Effective procedures to ensure that there is proper control over scarce resources eg. 
for identifying surplus land, overstocking, unbanked cash, overmanning. 
12. Consumer and `client' surveys on a sample basis to test the quality of services eg. 
exit questionnaires for mature students. 
13. Budget process to encourage the controlled use of virement. Other incentives to 
achieving value for money such as performance bonuses should be considered. 
14. Officials should be trained in management as well as technical matters. 
(Butt and Palmer, 1985, p23) 
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However within their approach, there seems to be a heavy emphasis on 
savings and fiscal containment. The process also appears to be very 
mechanistic but the authors have indicated that: 
It cannot be stressed enough that value for money is not just a collection of 
techniques. It is above all an attitude of mind, a commitment to good practice 
on the part of politicians and officials.... Having said that, value for money 
cannot be achieved by merely inspiring the necessary crusading spirit. 
Management's enthusiasm and drive has to be supported by the right 
organisational structure and also formalised budgeting, evaluation and 
monitoring systems. 
(Butt and Palmer, 1985, p22) 
Commitment to the process is stressed not just from the top organisational tier 
but cascading throughout the local authority. 
Robert Palmer, this time writing with Peter Jackson, has produced two further 
guides in the performance field. The first, First Steps in Measuring 
Performance in the Public Sector: A Management Guide, was published in 
1989, and the second, Developing Performance Monitoring in Public Sector 
Organisations: A Management Guide, was produced in 1992. In the 1989 
contribution, it was proposed that "it is important that performance measures 
are matched to policy objectives, targets and activities for which specific 
managers have been allocated clear responsibility" (1989, p13). They suggest 
that the performance management system should be designed as indicated in 
figure 2.8. The specific steps involved in designing a performance 
measurement system as prescribed by Jackson and Palmer, are shown in figure 
2.9. 
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FIGURE 2.8: JACKSON AND PALMER'S PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH 
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(Jackson and Palmer, 1989, p17) 
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FIGURE 2.9: JACKSON AND PALMER'S STEPS FOR DESIGNING A PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
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The Jackson and Palmer approach is very much focused on policy 
achievement although operational performance is not ignored and it is 
suggested that the performance of managers in relation to the areas for which 
they have responsibility be fed into a performance-related pay scheme. This 
suggests that this approach could be categorised as a performance 
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management system according to the definition provided by Rogers (see page 
32). The policy theme is continued in the 1992 publication where 
performance review is set within a complex strategic management process as 
indicated in appendix 2.3. Jackson and Palmer provide a summary and action 
plan for councils intending to introduce a performance management system 
and this is reproduced in appendix 2.4. However, in the supporting 
commentary, the following advice is offered to those on the first rung of the 
performance review ladder: 
Strong senior management and political leadership; the unfreezing of prevailing 
attitudes of senior professional officers especially of the type that, "the concept 
of objective setting and the measurement and assessment of outputs cannot be 
applied to my job; " designing new information systems and the re-orientation 
and training of staff are all necessary inputs to a performance review exercise. 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1992, p 162) 
They propose that many public service organisations have found it useful to 
employ an external agency to act as a catalyst in getting the fundamental 
message of performance review across to the senior management team 
primarily because an external consultant can be more objective and is not part 
of the finely balanced political system of the internal organisation. They 
suggest that a typical way of approaching the problem of getting started and 
moving towards total organisational commitment is for the chief executive and 
senior managers and possibly members to participate in a number of residential 
weekend seminars led by the external consultant. During the course of the 
seminar a particular service is chosen to demonstrate how service objectives 
might be identified and how appropriate indicators relating to intermediate 
and final outputs and the 3Es etc. might be determined. Jackson and Palmer 
consider that this kind of exercise is useful in demonstrating to managers and 
politicians the potential value of performance review. 
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Having secured commitment to the concept of performance review the next 
step is deciding how to implement the review process. Jackson and Palmer 
argue that it is clear from an examination of the experiences of different public 
service organisations that no single ideal blue print exists. In particular, they 
cite that local authorities all have different characteristics and different needs 
ranging from the closely knit small rural authority to the sprawling central city 
authority. The authors report that a choice faced by most organisations is 
whether or not to have a centralised performance review team whose purpose 
is to facilitate performance review throughout the organisation at a balanced 
and measured pace or to leave each service department to create its own 
performance review team. Jackson and Palmer report that many organisations 
have chosen to establish a centralised review team to get the system up and 
running but that the intention is then to dissolve the central team once the 
performance review process has matured, leaving a small central core to 
facilitate further developments with the major part of performance review 
work being undertaken by service departments. However, they also 
advocate that: 
Whichever structure is adopted a performance review group should not be left in 
isolation to determine its own fate. It must be keyed in to the regular reporting 
mechanisms of the organisation. Performance review groups themselves must 
pay particular attention to their own performance; what are their objectives, are 
they meeting them and are they giving value for money? 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1992, p163) 
The authors indicate that the implementation process is likely to take several 
years and be an expensive exercise and that it is therefore necessary for those 
advocating its introduction to be ready to demonstrate that the benefits of a 
review outweigh the costs. 
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The 1992 guide contains a number of case studies but although performance 
measurement in a number of local authority service areas is considered, in 
particular, the library service, policing, education and social services; the 
approach which a local authority as a whole, might pursue is not exemplified. 
Jackson and Palmer conclude their contribution by proposing that: 
As in all spheres of management, there is no single best way of doing things. 
The procedures that you adopt for performance review will be contingent upon 
your local circumstances. Our framework represents a starting point for the 
design of your framework which will reflect your local conditions. 
Management systems evolve from experimentation, having an open mind and a 
willingness to learn and to cut and trim as circumstance change. 
(Jackson and Palmer, 1992, p167) 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has considered the recommended approaches to performance 
review which are in the public domain. No consensual impression of 
performance review emerged from examining these alternative processes but 
there were some common themes: 
* all of the approaches stressed that commitment to performance review was 
critical; 
* in varying degrees, the approaches acknowledged the need to differentiate 
between performance in relation to policies and operations. The Audit Commission whilst recognising the need to consider service effectiveness did 
not discuss this within the context of policies and advocated the use of proxy 
measures in this domain; 
* de-emphasising the local policy dimension accounts for the Audit Commission's 
bias towards comparing performance with external criteria where the other 
approaches stress measurement against internally-determined targets and 
standards; 
* with the exception of the Audit Commission, performance review is perceived 
as an integral part of a wider management process and Jackson and Palmer 
particularly see it as being integrated into a complex strategic management framework; 
* the Accounts Commission and Butt and Palmer particularly stress the need to link performance review with the budgetary process; 
* the Audit Commission and Jackson and Palmer highlight the potential role to be 
played by a performance review team, both perceiving this to be catalytic. 
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However, there were also some issues only highlighted in one of the 
approaches: 
* only the Audit Commission emphasised the significance of quality in the 
performance of services but recognised the measurement difficulties which this 
posed; 
* Jackson and Palmer see the results of performance review as feeding into 
performance related pay for managers; 
* they also see a role for external consultants in getting the process off the ground 
and argue that the implementation process is likely to be long and expensive; 
* only in Butt and Palmer's approach is a distinction drawn between systematic, 
continuous, on-going review and one-off, in-depth reviews normally initiated 
when some thing appears to be wrong in a particular service area. 
None of the mechanisms seem based on the experiences of local authorities 
but are rather postulated as best practice without substantiation. 
The purpose of considering these approaches was to identify some the key 
issues which need to be considered in undertaking a critique of performance 
review activity and to allow comparisons to be made between the systems 
identified as in operation in local authorities and the advocated approaches. 
The research methodology involved is now considered. 
Chapter 3 
A Methodological Overview 
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3.5 Summary 
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3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have been focused on the drive for performance review 
within the local government sector and consideration of suggested 
approaches to performance review. The benefits to be accrued from operating 
a performance review system in the immensely complex and turbulent world of 
local government were highlighted. In particular, as well as responding to the 
legislative requirement to having arrangements in place for securing economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness, it was argued that as local authorities continue 
the progressive transition from direct service providers to service `enablers' it 
will be increasingly important that some mechanism or process is in place for 
reviewing performance within local authorities particularly in relation to 
policies and their achievement. 
However, with the relentless flow of legislation which has characterised this 
particular sphere of the public sector during the last 15 years, there has been 
a wide spectrum of research topics requiring attention and much focus has 
gone on the more tangible legislative changes that have occurred. 
Consequently, performance review systems have been relatively neglected as 
a research area and comparatively little is known about either the scale or 
scope of review systems currently utilised. If more local authorities are to go 
down the review route in the future and there are multivariate reasons why 
this is desirable as previously outlined, then it would be of significant benefit 
to assess the review processes that are currently operational and see what 
lessons can be learned from experience accumulated to date. 
The research focus of this thesis is intended to redress this lack of knowledge 
and is concentrated on performance review activity in Great Britain. Whilst it 
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may have been the case that useful lessons could have been learned from 
practice in Ireland, the boundaries of this study had to be drawn somewhere 
and there are several reasons to justify the exclusion of Ireland from this 
research. Local authorities and their associated information are more readily 
accessible in mainland Britain - for example, the Municipal Yearbook does not 
extend to Ireland. The functions of the Audit Commission, who have been 
key actors in the promotion of performance review, are confined to England 
and Wales with the Accounts Commission encompassing the Scottish 
dimension. Furthermore, the political agenda in Ireland, both north and 
south, has been dominated by a different set of concerns than those which 
have been in evidence in Great Britain. 
This chapter is concerned with methodology and will consider some of the 
fundamental issues relevant to social science research. The research 
methodology employed in assessing the state of the art in performance review 
activity will be described in the next chapter. 
3.2 The Research Focus 
Almost all of the texts on social science research and methods stress the 
considerable importance in delineating the "problem" to be considered - in 
other words clearly defining the research focus. Simon for example states that 
"no matter what problem you want to work on and no matter what method 
you will eventually use, your empirical work must begin with a careful 
consideration of the research problem. " (1978, p98). Catherine Hakim 
parallels a research project with the construction of a new building and 
suggests that the design stage of research is as critical as the architects role in 
the building and that furthermore "famous buildings are known by the name 
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of the architect rather than that of the construction company" (Hakim, 1987, 
pl). 
Hedrick, Bickman and Rog have identified three stages to research definition: 
1. developing an understanding of the issue or problem underlying the research; 
2. identifying the specific researchable questions; and 
3. refining and revising the questions. 
(Hedrick et aA, 1993, p15) 
In many respects, the first stage in this defmition process seems superfluous 
since it is almost inconceivable that research could be undertaken without 
having an understanding of the underlying topic. Indeed it is often through 
this understanding that the researcher is made aware of the need for research 
in the particular area. However, Hedrick et al. go on to specify strategies for 
gathering information in educating themselves on the issue under 
consideration. These are: 
* holding discussions with the research clients or sponsors (agency, legislative 
member, foundation, business, organisation, etc. ) to obtain the clearest 
picture of their concerns; 
* reviewing relevant literature (research reports, transcripts of legislative 
hearings, program descriptions, administrative reports, agency statistics, 
media articles and policy/position papers by all major interested parties); 
* gathering current information from experts on the issue (including all sides and 
perspectives) and major interested parties; and 
* conducting information-gathering visits to sites of the program or problem to 
obtain a real-world sense of the context and to talk with persons actively 
involved in the issue. 
(Hedrick et al., 1993, p16) 
This is in fact a more rigorous process than that typically undertaken before a 
research project commences. They argue that "these activities should enable 
the researcher to obtain a comprehensive and balanced view of the issue and 
begin the process of defining the research" (1993, p17). However, it could be 
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suggested that it is perhaps a little naive to imply that any of the strategies 
they outline could be employed prior to some preliminary definition of the 
research focus. For example, the literature reviewed and the people identified 
as experts and the subsequent information gathered, will inevitably be 
conditioned by the researchers' pre-conceptions about the research topic. In 
practice, what might reasonably be hoped for is a process that is dynamic 
where the researcher in engaging in all or any of the strategies identified, is 
open-minded and willing to modify his/her initial thoughts on the scope of 
research in the light of emergent evidence. This is in accordance with Robson 
who, in his book on Real World Research, notes that "the real world 
enquirer often has a good idea of the `lie of the land' and is looking for 
something quite specific whilst still being open to unexpected discoveries" 
(1993, p20). 
For this particular piece of research there was no research client or sponsor 
requiring consultation on key issues as recommended by Hedrick et al., but in 
accruing an understanding of the research topic in order to define specific 
research questions: 
* the performance review approaches proposed by the Audit and Accounts 
Commissions and others were scrutinised; 
* preliminary background discussions were undertaken with both local authorities 
which had review systems and therefore were aware first-hand of what issues 
are involved, and those which did not operate any review process to ascertain 
what sort of information/guidelines they might find beneficial and what sort of 
factors had prevented them from introducing a system; and 
* discussions also took place with the Policy and Performance Review Network, 
the practitioners' organisation for those with an interest in performance review 
matters, and with the Audit and Accounts Commissions, about what the main 
issues have been for local authorities operating review systems. 
In addition to the information and background perspective developed by the 
above, the research focus which emerged reflected my own concern with 
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establishing a rich picture of performance review activity which is currently 
noticeable by its absence. The questions were also founded on my 
expectation that performance review is likely to play a more dominant role in 
councils in the future and that it is thus desirable to secure a dynamic 
perspective on the sustainability of review mechanisms. 
In focusing on the scale and scope of performance review in Great Britain, the 
key research questions identified for consideration are: 
* how many local authorities operate performance review systems? 
* what type of systems are in operation? 
* what is the attitude from within the council towards performance 
review? 
* what factors are significant in establishing a performance review 
system? 
* what factors are significant in operating a review mechanism once it has 
been implemented? 
* what issues need to be considered in sustaining a performance review 
process? 
* is there a political dimension to performance review? 
* what good practice recommendations can be made from the 
experiences of councils already operating performance review systems? 
en and 
* for authorities not operating any performance review mechanisms, are 
any alternative processes utilised and what are the attitudes of officers 
and members towards performance review? 
The first two questions are seeking fundamental information about 
performance review activity and the question on types of systems in operation 
should facilitate a comparison between the types of process actually used by 
local authorities with those approaches considered in chapter 2. Throughout 
the latter, commitment from officers and members to performance review was a 
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key theme hence the inclusion of a research question relating to attitudes from 
within the council. 
The process of actually setting up a system was identified as an issue by some 
of the authorities with whom preliminary discussions were undertaken hence 
the research question `what factors are significant in establishing a 
performance review system ?' The approaches considered in chapter 2 
variously argued for links with the policy and budgetary processes. Some also 
identified a key role for committees whilst others stressed the need for a 
central review unit to act as a catalyst. There are thus a number of matters to 
be considered in the actual operation of a review mechanism. One issue not 
really considered in depth by the approaches discussed is sustaining a 
performance review system. Although reference was made to the fact that 
performance review is not just another management drill and that it needs to 
be kept fresh, there is a real danger of a systematic review process going stale 
or fading into the background. It was thus felt appropriate to have a research 
question which addressed the issue of sustainability. Local authorities are 
political institutions and the preliminary discussions with both local authorities 
and PPRN highlighted that the involvement of members with performance 
review is very variable and can be problematic and it was thus felt relevant to 
consider the political dimension of performance review. 
Research of this type, whilst interesting in its own right because it is being 
undertaken in an area which little is known about, has its real value in the 
application of the findings. Consequently, it was considered relevant to 
discern `what good practice recommendations can be made on the basis of the 
experiences of councils operating performance review? ' Finally, it is 
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anticipated that not all authorities will operate a performance review system 
and that it would be interesting to see what alternative processes they utilise 
and what the disposition of their officers and members is towards performance 
review and whether they are likely to introduce a system in the future. 
Whilst it would be possible to argue with the particular choice of research 
questions, the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others, as with the 
geographical coverage of this study, boundaries had to be drawn somewhere. 
Hedrick et al. in their research definition process, stress the need for refining 
and revising research questions. Miles and Huberman similarly argue that 
"formulating the questions is an iterative process; the second version is 
sharper and leaner than the first, and the third cut gets the final few bugs out" 
and they suggest that "the questions should not be done in one sitting. " 
(1994, p25) The questions outlined above do in fact represent several 
refinements and particular attention was paid to their practical researchability: 
"you can always think of trenchant questions, that you or your informant 
have no real means of answering, nor you of measuring (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p25). 
Unfortunately, regardless of how much iterative revising is done, it is 
normally only through studying a research topic in depth that the "real 
issues" can be unveiled and it is but to be hoped that these are consistent 
with the research questions established at the outset! Campbell et al. (1982) 
consider that the choice process for selecting research questions is often non- 
linear and involves considerable uncertainty and intuition and that 
furthermore, research starting with mechanistic linear thinking closely tied to 
the known and understood may be clean and tidy, but it is unlikely to be of 
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any significance. Whilst flexible methodology allows for some refocusing 
after the research has begun there are limitations to how much "correcting" 
can be done. It is not anticipated that the research questions outlined above 
are necessarily provocative or contentious but it is hoped that they address 
the key issues in the performance review field and that in concentrating on 
them, information which will be of benefit to local government in the future 
will be generated. 
3.3 Alternative Methodological Approaches 
In responding to the research questions, of critical importance is the 
delineation of an appropriate and adequate research methodology. The 
debate about the relative merits of alternative methodological approaches 
within the social sciences takes place at several different levels reflecting 
varying epistemologies and also perceptions about types of research. Much 
of the rhetoric is concerned with the differences between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. 
3.3.1 Positivism versus Phenomenology 
Bogdan and Taylor propose that two major theoretical perspectives have 
dominated the social science scene: 
One, positivism, traces its origins to the great social theorists of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries and especially August Compte and Finile 
Durkheim. The positivist seeks the facts or causes of social phenomena with 
little regard for the subjective states of individuals.... The second theoretical 
perspective which, following the lead of Irwin Deutscher we will describe as 
phenomenological, stems most prominently from Max Weber. The 
phenomenologist is concerned with understanding human behaviour from the 
actor's own frame of reference. 
(Bogdan and Taylor, 1975, p2) 
The positivism/phenomenology debate is primarily focused on the 
philosophical position from which methods should be derived. The essence of 
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positivism is that the social world exists externally and that its properties 
should be measured through objective methods, rather than being inferred 
subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition (Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991, p22). As Cassell and Symon have observed "the assumption behind 
the positivist paradigm is that there is an objective truth existing in the world 
which can be revealed through the scientific method where the focus is on 
measuring relationships between variables systematically and statistically 
(1994, p2). 
The positivist's philosophical stance has a number of inherent implications in 
the research context as summarised by Easterby-Smith and his colleagues. In 
particular: 
1. independence: the observer is independent of what is being observed; 
2. value freedom: the choice of what to study, and how to study it, can be 
determined by objective criteria rather than by human beliefs and interests; 
3. causality: the aim of social sciences should be to identify causal explanations 
and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social research; 
4. hypothetico-deductive: science proceeds through a process of hypothesising 
fundamental laws and then deducing what kinds of observations will 
demonstrate the truth or falsity of these hypotheses; 
5. operationalisation: concepts need to be operationalised in a way which enable 
6. 
facts to be measured quantitatively; 
reductionism: problems as a whole are better understood if they are reduced 
into the simplest possible elements; 
7. generalisation: in order to be able to generalise about regularities in human and 
social behaviour it is necessary to select samples of sufficient size; 
8. cross-sectional analysis: such regularities can most easily be identified by 
making comparisons of variations across samples. 
(Easterby -Smith et al., 1991, p23) 
These propositions are a collection of points which have come to be 
associated with the positivist viewpoint rather than the view of a single 
positivist philosopher. Disparity is evident in which of these statements 
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different positivist protagonists would agree with. As Kolakowski has 
observed "one would be obliged in discussing each thinker, to single out 
those elements in positivism that are not to his taste, at the same time pointing 
out how much of the rest of it he none the less subscribes to. " However he 
also advocates that "one has to organise the material at hand according to 
some schema, disregarding differences in matters one looks upon as 
secondary, in order to bring out the continuity in primary contexts" (1993, 
pl). 
The emergence of the alternative major theoretical perspective, 
phenomenology, was largely a reaction to the application of positivism to 
the social science world which precludes any recognition of the possibility 
that the world and "reality" are not objective and exterior but socially 
constructed and given meaning by people (Husserl, 1946). As Bryman has 
concluded "It was argued that the application of a `scientific' approach - in 
the form of surveys and experiments - fails to take into account the differences 
between people and the objects of the natural sciences" (1988, p3). It is 
argued that the continued application of the positivist perspective is a 
consequence of the social sciences' claim to scientific method which is often 
regarded as being dependent on quantification (Hollway, 1991). Qualitative 
research is frequently perceived as inferior to that derived through 
quantitative techniques which Patton describes as the "dominant paradigm. ' 
Patton argues that: 
This dominant paradigm assumes quantitative measurement, experimental design and multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to be the epitome of `good' science. 
(Patton, 1978, p203) 
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He also argues that "the label research" has come to mean the equivalent of 
employing the "scientific method" within the dominant paradigm. 
The recognition of an alternative approach is attributable to the 
anthropological field studies tradition (Pelto and Pelto, 1978). Indeed, there 
are a number of other epistemologies closely associated with phenomenology 
with each taking a different stance on the application of phenomenology and 
which aspects of positivism they find least palatable (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991, p24). These include interpretative sociology (Habermas, 1970), 
naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln and Guba, 1986); social constructionism (Berger 
and Luckman, 1966), qualitative methodology (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984) 
and new paradigm' inquiry (Reason and Roewan, 1981). 
At a philosophical level, the starting point of phenomenology is the notion 
that reality is socially-constructed rather than objectively determined. The 
task of the social scientist is therefore not to gather facts and measure how 
often certain patterns occur as in positivism, but to appreciate the different 
constructions and meanings that people place upon their experience. Giorgi 
(1970) and Spiegelberg (1972) have both argued that "adopting qualitative 
(phenomenological) approaches implies taking a different perspective on 
human behaviour from that adopted in utilising quantitative (positivist) 
approaches" (Cassell and Symon, 1994, p2). The phenomenologists task is 
to try and understand and explain why people have different experiences 
rather than search for external causes and fundamental laws to explain their 
behaviour because human action arises from the sense that people make of 
different situations rather than as a direct response from external stimuli 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1991, p24). 
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In translating the implications of this into a research context, there is a paucity 
of supporting or indicative literature. On the whole, authors writing on the 
subject of phenomenology move seamlessly from epistemological 
considerations to a discussion of the relative merits of alternative qualitative 
techniques. If one scratches around, the reverse of the research implications 
of positivism outlined by Easterby-Smith et al. (see p72) can be found 
scattered amongst the literature. One particularly recurrent theme is the need 
for the researcher to submerse him/herself in the phenomena they are 
researching, the opposite of the `independence' assumption within positivism. 
Bogdan and Taylor consider "that the phenomenologist examines how the 
world is experienced. For him or her the important reality is what people 
imagine it to be" (1975, p2). Logically, this can only be achieved through 
naturalistic inquiry (Guba, 1978), what Denzin considers to be "the studied 
commitment to actively enter the world of interacting individuals" (1978, p8), 
which makes description and understanding of both externally observable 
behaviours and internal states feasible, the latter concept disaggregated by 
Patton as comprising worldview, opinions, values, attitudes, symbolic 
constructs and the like (1980, P44). It is this demand to directly access the 
research world which has led to the concentration on non-quantitative 
approaches within the phenomenological paradigm. Evered and Louis (1981) 
contrastingly consider research deriving from positivism as `inquiry from the 
outside' as opposed to the `inquiry from the inside' which emerges from 
phenomenological approaches. 
Considerable energy has been utilised in arguing the relativities of the 
positivist and phenomenological paradigms (see for example, Keat, 1981; or 
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Habermas, 1970) but the most useful contribution I have come across is from 
Gareth Morgan who distinguishes three levels of difference: 
* the philosophical level which reflects basic belief about the world; 
* the social level, which provides guidelines about how the researcher should 
conduct his or her endeavour; and 
* the technical level, which involves specifying the method and techniques which 
should ideally be adopted in conducting research. 
(Morgan, 1979) 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p27) have adopted and developed these 
distinctions in summarising the main differences between the positivist and 
phenomenological viewpoints. These are described in table 3.1 but the 
authors do recognise that these represent "pure" versions of each paradigm. 
TABLE 3.1: KEY FEATURES OF THE POSITIVIST AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
PARADIGMS 
POSITIVISM PHENOMENOLOGY 
Basic Beliefs: The world is external and The world is socially 
objective constructed and subjective 
Observer is independent Observer is part of what is 
observed 
Science is value-free Science is driven by human 
interests 
Researcher Should focus on facts focus on meanings 
look for causality and try to understand what is fundamental laws happening 
reduce phenomena to look at the totality of each 
simplest elements situation 
formulate hypothesis and develop ideas through 
then test them induction from data 
Preferred Methods operationalising concepts using multiple methods to 
include so that they can be establish different views of 
measured phenomena 
taking large samples small samples 
investigated in depth or 
over time 
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The relevance of the epistemological positivist/phenomenological debate is 
that alternative perspectives imply different methodological approaches to 
research within the social sciences. Thus the dispute is not just philosophical 
in nature. As Bogdan and Taylor have noted: 
Since the positivists and the phenomenologists approach different problems and 
seek different answers, their research will typically demand different 
methodologies. 
(Bogdan and Taylor, 1975, p2) 
Cassell and Symon similarly argue that "the perception that different methods 
emerge from different philosophies has important implications (1994, p2). 
However, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that although the distinction 
between the two paradigms is clear at the philosophical level, when it comes 
to the use of quantitative or qualitative methods and to the issue of research 
design, the distinction breaks down, an observation supported by Bulmer 
(1988) and Punch (1986). Indeed, although Easterby-Smith et al. logically 
trace the epistemological differences from basic beliefs through research 
design through to differing preferred methods as summarised in table 3.1, 
they do in fact concede that: 
Although the basic beliefs may be quite incompatible, when one comes down to 
the actual research methods and techniques used by researchers the differences 
are by no means so clear cut and distinct. 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 1991, p26) 
Miles and Huberman are similarly wary of abstract epistemological arguments 
that do not connect operationally with the actual research practices used to 
gain knowledge (1994, p4). Hartley proposes that it is not the techniques 
which themselves are positivist or phenomenological but rather it is how the 
data are interpreted which defines the epistemological assumptions on which 
they based (1994, p210). Whilst such a view has refreshing appeal it is over- 
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simplistic since the choice of data to collect and the collection method 
employed cannot be entirely dissociated from epistemological underpinnings. 
Henwood and Pidgeon consider that it is important that "we do not over 
emphasise the significance of the epistemological distinction" whilst guarding 
against the equivalent danger of minimising the epistemological dimension 
(1994, p17). The fact that alternative philosophical stances lead to different 
research approaches and concentration in different methods necessitates that 
the social science researcher should at least be conscious of the 
positivist/phenomenological debate. However, as argued by Miles and 
Huberman "in epistemological debates, it is tempting to operate at the poles" 
but that "at the working level, it is hard to find researchers encamped in one 
fixed place along a stereotyped continuum. " They consider that whilst the 
lines between the epistemologies have become blurred, research is 
considerably more than adherence to methodological rules and in general, 
studies do not conform to a standard methodology (1994, p5). 
3.3.2 Types of Research 
The second level at which alternative methodological approaches is often 
considered is in the context of the type of research which is conducted. 
Hedrick, Bickman and Rog (1993) draw a distinction between basic and 
applied research and argue that basic research is grounded firmly in the 
experimental method and has as its goal the creation of new knowledge about 
how fundamental processes work. They consider it to be a relatively 
protected research, allowed to build facts and theory incrementally in an 
environment generally of low stress and few outside influences or 
interruptions. They consider that applied research also has its roots in the 
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experimental method, but it uses scientific methodology to develop 
information aimed at clarifying or confronting an immediate societal problem. 
Its environment is often a messy one, with pressure for quick and conclusive 
answers, sometimes in very political contexts (1993, p2). They argue that 
basic and applied research have many more commonalties than differences 
but that these differences are critical if studies are to produce useful results. 
The significant areas where they differ are purpose, context and methods and 
they conclude that "the world of applied research often has more numerous 
and varied purpose, its context is less controllable, and its methods are more 
varied and more complex than research conducted in laboratory settings. " 
(1993, p1! ). 
Easterby-Smith et al. similarly distinguish between basic and applied research 
although in the for er case they classify basic research as "pure" research. 
However, their discussion of the difference is focused exclusively on purpose: 
The key feature of `pure' research is that it is intended to lead to theoretical 
developments; there may, or may not, be any practical implications.... Applied 
research is intended to lead to the solution of specific problems, and usually 
involves working with clients who identify the problems. 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p6) 
They also add a third type of research called action research which 
encompasses a number of approaches which do not fit comfortably into either 
of the other categories: these start from the view that research should lead to 
change, and therefore that change should be incorporated into the research 
process itself (1991, p8). 
Hakim considers that the distinctions typically drawn between pure and 
applied research are crude and based on superficial characteristics such as 
funding source, timescale, audience and whether academics are involved or 
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not (1987, p7). Rossi has similarly pointed out that the dividing line is a very 
fine one if one looks at the characteristics of the research itself (Rossi, 1980). 
In Hakim's view, the main distinction in research types is between theoretical 
research and policy research and that underlying this distinction is the 
separation of "knowledge for understanding" from "knowledge for action" : 
Theoretical research is concerned primarily with causal processes and 
explanation. The factors (or variables) considered are frequently abstract or 
purely theoretical constructs for which operational definitions and indicators or 
varying degrees of precision and validity are developed.... The long-term aim is 
the development of social-science knowledge. Theoretical research is 
essentially concerned with producing knowledge for understanding, usually 
within the framework of a single social science discipline. 
Policy research in contrast, is ultimately concerned with knowledge for action, 
and the long-term aim is in line with famous dictum that it is more important to 
change the world than to understand it. 
(Hakim, 1987, p3-4) 
Hakim recognises that there is no well-delineated boundary between 
theoretical and policy research but argues that the differences normally have 
implications for research design. In particular, theoretical research is normally 
conducted within the framework of a single-discipline where policy research is 
typically multi-disciplinary. In keeping with Hedrick et al. 's view of applied 
research, policy research is considered to be typically multi-dimensional with a 
greater propensity towards multi-method and multi-level study. She also 
argues that the need for a comprehensive picture within policy research leads 
to a preference for studies which are nationally representative which contrasts 
with theoretical studies which are often carried in the context of small local 
studies. She argues that theoretical research is orientated towards reporting 
statistically significant results with a lesser emphasis on the size and strength 
of any association. This is contrasted with policy research which is seen as 
requiring robust results on associations and the impact of any given factor. 
Hakim considers that this necessitates that policy research results must report 
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large effects rather than statistically significant effects and that this has led to 
the statistical significance of research findings being regularly and wrongly 
confused and conflated with the substantive or practical importance of 
research results which is seen as a matter for judgement and cannot be 
determined mechanistically by statistical techniques. Whilst other differences 
exist as Hakim notes they "are of a more peripheral nature, or are contingent 
rather than inherent distinctions" (1987, p5). She summarises that there are 
distinctions between policy research and theoretical research which have 
implications for research design. Whilst much of her discussion, particularly 
the latter point on statistical significance, offers interesting and alternative 
insights to those normally found in methodological texts, examples are not 
given to illustrate or substantiate the distinctions which she draws out. Her 
text, being predominately focused on Research Design, ignores the vital link 
between theoretical and policy research differences and alternative 
methodologies. 
Robson in discussing types of research, distinguishes between real world 
research and that undertaken in a laboratory setting although he argues that 
"the proposal for a real world emphasis is as much about an attitude of mind 
as an invitation to come out of the laboratory closet" (1993, p10). Table 3.2 
summarises the dimensions which he sees as separating the two forms of 
research. Many of the dimensions defined overleaf have already been 
mentioned in the context of both the positivist/phenomenology debate and in 
the discussion of other alternative research types. Robson notes that not all of 
these distinguishing aspects will be evident in any particular enquiry. 
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TABLE 3.2: REAL WORLD AND LABORATORY SETTING DIMENSIONS 
REAL WORLD LABORATORY SETTING 
solving problems gaining knowledge 
redictin effects finding causes 
getting large effects and a particular 
concern for actionable factors 
Relationships between variables and 
assessing statistical significance 
developing and testing programmes, 
interventions, services 
developing and testing theories 
field laboratory 
outside organisation research institution 
strict time constraint as long as the problem needs 
strict cost constraints as much finance as the problem needs 
little consistence of topic from study to the 
next 
high consistence of topic from one study 
to the next 
often generalist researcher icall highly specialist researcher 
little use of `true' experiments much use of `true' experiments 
multiple methods single methods 
orientated to the client orientated to academic peers 
currently viewed as dubious by many 
academics 
high academic prestige 
need for well developed social skills some need of social skills 
(Robson, 1993, ppll-12) 
Table 3.2 reiterates a point made in many of the texts in the social science 
methods area which is that their type of research is poorly-resourced and 
carried out under considerable time pressure in comparison with scientific, 
basic, or pure research. Whilst there may be some truth in this judgement in 
terms of pure relativity, many laboratory scientists will testify to enduring 
extreme constraints and pressures not dissimilar to those experienced by real 
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world, applied or policy researchers. Perhaps the social science world is 
suffering from `the grass is always greener on the other side' syndrome. 
Robson argues that "academic researchers may not feel that the suggestions 
about open-ended availability of time and money chime in too well with their 
experience but, to take a strict line, there is little point in their carrying out 
studies intended to advance their discipline if the resources available are 
inadequate" (1993, p14). This assertion highlights two points: laboratory 
scientists, who he classifies as academic researchers, are not sitting on large 
wads of cash waiting for inspiration to determine the next great problem to be 
solved or scientific discovery - they have to secure funding too; and 
secondly that Robson has implied that real world research is non-academic. 
This assumed status is at best spurious and may perhaps explain one of his 
other separating dimensions between the research types, that of academic 
credibility! Soundly-based, rigorous research will always attract higher 
acclaim and more prestige than poorly-constructed research whether it is 
conducted in a real world or a laboratory setting. There may be more of an 
attempt on the part of those working on real world problems to demystify their 
research work and to disseminate their findings more extensively than `pure' 
scientists but this does not devalue the credibility or recognition of their 
research or make it inferior in any way. 
Robson has clear ideas about the distinctiveness of real world research as 
opposed to that undertaken in a laboratory context and whilst I would 
disagree with some of the criteria he uses in separating the two forms of 
research, he does delineate the methodological implications of their 
differences (see section 3.4 below) unlike some of the other authors drawing 
distinctions in research types. Recognising the type and nature of research 
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being undertaken particularly with regard to purpose and context has 
methodological implications. However, the typical lack of rigorous discussion 
in methodological texts about the implications of alternative types of research 
suggests that such factors have only limited bearing when it comes to actually 
conducting research. 
3.3.3 Quantitative Methodologies versus Qualitative Methodologies 
The most substantive and frequently recurring debate on alternative 
methodologies is centred around the relative merits of the quantitative versus 
the qualitative style of inquiry. As Cassell and Symon have noted "the 
division between qualitative and quantitative methods has a long history in 
the social sciences" (1994, pl). Boundaries in this context are problematic 
with some writers on the subject focusing on qualitative versus quantitative 
paradigms, some on qualitative versus quantitative research, some on 
qualitative versus quantitative methods, some on qualitative versus 
quantitative techniques, some on qualitative versus quantitative data, and 
some on qualitative versus quantitative analysis with few ever specifying 
what is encompassed within the particular teen they have chosen to adopt, a 
feature further complicated by the fact that many authors often use several 
terms interchangeably. 
It is quite interesting to observe that almost all of the texts concerned with 
qualitative approaches to research begin with a discussion, or what often 
reads as more of a defence, of qualitative methods as compared with 
quantitative approaches. For example, Marshall and Rossuran open their 
book Designing Qualitative Research with the following statements: 
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Qualitative research methods have become increasingly important modes of 
inquiry for the social sciences. Long dominated by methods borrowed from the 
experimental sciences, the social sciences now present a sometimes confusing 
array of appropriate alternative research methods. 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1989, p9) 
Yin begins the preface to his authoritative text on Case Study Research with 
the observation that: 
The case study has long been stereotyped as a weak sibling among social 
science methods. Investigators who do case studies are regarded as having 
deviated from their academic disciplines, their investigations as having 
insufficient precision (that is quantification), objectivity, and rigour. 
(Yin, 1994, xiii) 
In contrast, it is very rare to see a text on the topic of quantitative research 
approaches, mentioning the existence of any alternative methods such as 
qualitative techniques. Hence, it is not surprising that the positivist 
perspective and its inherent quantitative techniques, is viewed as the 
dominant paradigm as noted previously. 
Having justified the writing of a qualitative book in the introductory section, 
most authors on this subject then proceed to ignore the existence of 
quantitative approaches. Bryman has noted that "much of the discussion in 
the literature on these two traditions has created a somewhat exaggerated 
picture of their differences. " Furthermore, he concedes that "these discussions 
reflect a tendency to treat quantitative and qualitative research as though they 
are mutually antagonistic ideal types of the research process" (1988, p93). 
For example, Robson describes the qualitative/quantitative debate as "the 
fundamental dichotomy in social science research - the flags waved by the 
warring factions of interpretative ethnography and positivistic scientists 
respectively" (1993, p303). Bryman's text Quantity and Quality in Social 
Research. is one of the rare literature contributions that does not treat 
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quantitative and qualitative approaches as mutually exclusive and indeed 
devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of ways of combining the two modes 
of inquiry. However, whilst recognising that there are areas of similarity 
between the two approaches and certainly more commonality than typically 
suggested or acknowledged by most social science methods texts, Bryman 
argues that there are key dimensions which mark their differences (1988, p94). 
These areas of divergence are indicated in table 3.3. 
TABLE 3.3: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Dimension Quantitative Qualitative 
Role of qualitative research preparatory means to exploration of 
actors' interpretation 
Relationship between distant close 
researcher and subject 
Researcher's stance in outsider insider 
relation to subject 
Relationship between confirmation emergent 
theory/concepts and 
research 
Research strategy structured unstructured 
Scope of findings nomothetic ideographic 
Image of social reality static and external to actor processual and socially 
constructed by actor 
Nature of data hard, reliable rich, deep 
Exploring these dimensions further and considering the role of qualitative 
research, quantitative protagonists generally consider that its exploratory and 
unstructured approach make it an ideal mechanism for throwing up hunches 
and hypotheses which can then be verified using quantitative techniques. In 
contrast, proponents of qualitative research consider it an end in itself 
particularly since it exposes research subjects' meanings and interpretations. 
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However, as Bryman points out "it is possible to detect a degree of unease 
among qualitative researchers about the extent to which their findings can 
stand alone" (1988, p95). 
The researcher's contact with the research subjects within quantitative 
approaches is typically minimal or non-existent (for example, using postal 
surveys to gather data) and thus their relationship is distant. Within 
qualitative inquiry, the researcher typically has sustained contact with the 
subject although the degree of involvement will vary considerably from one 
study to the next. Characteristically therefore, qualitative research will entail 
close contact between the researcher and the researched. It is only through 
prolonged contact that the researcher can `access' the subject's world. This is 
why the researcher's stance in relation to the research topic is generally as an 
`insider' as opposed to the `outside' perspective which typifies quantitative 
studies where a detached scientific observer stance is the norm. 
The logical structure of the quantitative research process is outlined by 
Bryman as beginning with theory followed by hypothesis followed by 
observations/data collection followed by data analysis followed by findings 
which ultimately feeds back into theory again as the emergent findings lead to 
confirmation or some modification of the original theory (1988, p20). 
Therefore, the relationship between theory/concepts and research is one of 
confirmation. Within qualitative approaches however, the idea of using 
theory as a precursor to an investigation is often rejected since it may not 
reflect the subject's view of what is occurring and what the significant factors 
are. As Lofland has argued "in order to capture participants `in their own 
terms' one must learn their categories for rendering explicable and coherent 
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the flux of raw reality" (1971, p7). The exception to this is where theory is 
used as a means of providing an initial orientation. As Filstead has observed 
of qualitative research "it is marked by a concern with the discovery of theory 
rather than the verification of theory" (1979, p38). Thus theory/concepts 
emerge from qualitative inquiry. 
In quantitative research a structured approach tends to be adopted primarily 
because of the methods which are used - surveys and experiments for example 
require that the `issues' be closely focused on from the outset. The 
quantitative research process defined above is tightly sequential and thus the 
research structure must be closely defined. Qualitative research tends to be 
more open primarily because it is not until the research has commenced that it 
is clear how the subjects perceive their world and what they consider to be 
the key factors involved in the particular topic being studied. As a result, it is 
recommended that the tight delineation of a research focus be deferred for as 
long as is possible (Cohen, 1978). As Bryman observes "consequently, many 
qualitative researchers refer to a sensation of being overwhelmed during their 
early days in the field, since everything they observe is potentially `data"' 
(1988, p99). However Whyte has also commented that "you may find so 
many interesting things to study that you are at a loss to delimit the scope of 
your project and focus on specific problems" (1984, p225). By adopting an 
unstructured approach, qualitative research has a much greater capacity to 
unveil the unexpected and to change direction according to emergent 
findings but this must be weighed against the potential for drifting or getting 
swamped with numerous possible research paths to follow. 
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Within table 3.3, the scope of findings has been described according to a 
divergent nomothetic/ideographic dimension. A nomothetic approach to 
research seeks to establish general law-like findings which can be deemed to 
hold irrespective of time and place. The ideographic approach locates 
research findings within a specific time period and for specific locales. The 
argument really reduces to one of the generalizability of research. By virtue of 
being about testing theories, quantitative research demands that the findings 
can be generalised - hence the emphasis within quantitative approaches of 
taking random but representative samples which can thus be inferred to larger 
subject populations. Bryman argues that "the qualitative researcher 
frequently conducts research in a specific milieu (a case study) whose 
representativeness is unknown and probably unknowable so that the 
generalizability of such findings is also unknown" (1988, p100). Hence, the 
close association of qualitative research with ideography. However, this is 
one dimension which Bryman considers to be exaggerated. Quantitative 
research is rarely conducted with random, representative samples which allow 
generalizability to be feasible. As Freeman has disclosed of researchers 
adopting quantitative styles of inquiry "they rarely work with samples that 
are representative of even the restricted types of organisations they choose to 
study" (1986, p300). Additionally, the findings of qualitative research would 
be of little benefit if they were entirely confined to the case study and topic 
under consideration. Although the findings are not directly transferable in a 
wider context, qualitative research is about building a very rich and deep 
picture and understanding about a particular phenomena and some of this will 
be applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of the research - otherwise no 
progress would be made using qualitative research. Bryman advocates that 
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"caution is necessary in treating the two research traditions as being strictly 
associated with nomothetic and ideographic findings. " (1988, pl01). 
Quantitative research, by the nature of its purpose and the way it is 
conducted, conveys a view of social reality that is static. The linkages 
between the variables under review and the processes which link different 
factors are rarely considered. The research is about establishing that such 
links exist not identifying why they exist. Qualitative research, by 
submerging the researcher within the phenomena under consideration 
normally reaches the heart of the interconnectivity of variables. A further 
consequence of this is that unlike qualitative research, quantitative 
approaches rarely incorporate the impact and role of social change which 
within the social science world not renowned for its stability, is problematic. 
Indeed, Cassell and Symon have argued that "only qualitative methods are 
sensitive enough to allow the detailed analysis of change" (1994, p5). 
The final dimension on which Bryman considers that a divergence between 
quantitative and qualitative research is discernible is the nature of the data 
produced by each approach. Quantitative studies are often associated with 
hard, rigorous and reliable data. The systematic procedures used to collect 
them means that they can readily be checked by another investigator. 
However, protagonists of qualitative inquiry consider such data to be 
superficial in nature providing at best, surface information. This contrasts 
sharply with the rich and vivid detailed portrayal of a small sector of social life 
which it is argued is produced by qualitative studies. 
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Some of these divergent facets are similar to differences identified in the 
context of the positivist/phenomenology discussion and the rhetoric relating 
to differing types of research. However, they do not reveal very much about 
what constitutes quantitative and qualitative research. Bryman argues that 
most authors either separate quantitative and qualitative approaches 
according to epistemological underpinnings or according to technical 
consideration. 
Filstead has argued that: 
Quantitative and qualitative methods are more than just differences between 
research strategies and data collection procedures. These approaches represent fundamentally different epistemological frameworks for conceptualizing the 
nature of knowing, social reality, and procedures for comprehending these 
phenomena. 
(Filstead, 1979, p45) 
Rist has similarly argued that each of the two research traditions rests on "an 
interrelated set of assumptions about the social world. " (1977, p62). Such a 
perspective implies that researchers formulate their views about the proper 
foundation for the study of social reality and then choose their investigation 
methods in the light of this decision. As Bryman has observed, "a view that 
the scientific method provides a poor basis for the study of people, coupled 
with a commensurate endorsement of a position like phenomenology, will 
propel an investigator in the direction of a qualitative approach" (1988, p105). 
The alternative standpoint arises from the view that quantitative and 
qualitative research are each appropriate to different kinds of research 
problem. Consequently, the research issue will determine the research 
approach. Walker has proposed that "certain questions cannot be answered 
by quantitative methods, while others cannot be answered by qualitative 
Chapter 3, A Methodological Overview, page 92 
ones" (1985, p16) and as Bryman concludes "this view implies that the 
decision over whether to use a quantitative or qualitative approach should be 
based on `technical' issues regarding the suitability of a particular method in 
relation to a particular research problem" (1988, p106). 
Within a research setting, the epistemological/technical distinction has most 
significance when considering combining different methods. The technical 
perspective provides few impediments to a research strategy which integrates 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. However, if quantitative and 
qualitative research represents different epistemological positions, then 
effectively they represent incompatible views about the way social reality 
ought to be studied. As Bryman notes "it is not obvious how a marriage of 
such divergent epistemological positions as positivism and phenomenology 
can be entertained" (1988, p107). Guba has argued that one "must pledge 
allegiance to one paradigm or the other" and that the two traditions cannot 
be reconciled (1985, p80). However, Filstead, who perceives quantitative and 
qualitative research as alternative epistemological frameworks, considers that 
"great advantages can be obtained by creatively combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods" (1979, p42). He does not however address the 
inconsistency which this proposition throws up and in fact, provides 
evidence for Bryman's observation regarding the tendency of some writers to 
oscillate between epistemological and technical accounts. 
Bryman considers that: 
It is little wonder that confusion ensues when there is a lack of clarity about 
what quantitative and qualitative research are... Precisely because many 
qualitative researchers have failed to sort out whether the style of research to 
which they adhere is an epistemological or a technical position, it is possible for 
such confusion to reign. 
(Bryman, 1988, p126) 
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However, arguably if one adopts a technical position and is matching research 
methods to the immediate problem in hand, the need to discuss, and justify, 
not accommodating an epistemological account of quantitative and qualitative 
research, is mitigated. In practice, it is quite uncommon to find social science 
researchers undertaking studies in accordance with epistemological 
underpinnings except those who are closely associated with a particular 
method and are thus justifying its delineation and application such as Guba 
(1985) or Glaser (1992) with regard to naturalistic inquiry and grounded 
theory respectively. In practice, the technical adequacy of a particular 
method or combination of methods in relation to specific research problems 
appears to be a much more dominant consideration. 
In considering what actually constitutes quantitative and qualitative research, 
then if one adopts an epistemological stance, then effectively they are 
alternative forms of inquiry which derive from differing philosophical 
perspectives of the social world and how it should be interpreted. If however, 
a technical position is taken and it is argued here that the technical adequacy 
of methods is likely to be of more relevance to researchers in the real world 
than epistemological concerns, then the quantitative/qualitative debate 
centres on the actual research methods engaged. 
Concentrating on methods, Van Maanen suggests that: 
The label qualitative methods has no precise meaning in any of the social 
sciences. It is at best an umbrella team covering an array of interpretive 
techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to 
terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world. (Van Maanen, 1979, p520) 
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Strauss and Corbin employ a more simplistic definition proposing that "by the 
term qualitative research we mean any kind of research that produces 
findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification" (1990, p3). Quantitative methods are closely associated with 
numerical data and statistical analysis. Patton has argued that "quantitative 
measures are succinct, parsimonious and easily aggregated for analysis" and 
that "quantitative data are systematic, standardised and easily presented in a 
short space" (1980, p28). This is in sharp comparison with qualitative 
measures which he considers to be longer, more detailed and variable; and 
qualitative data which typically consists of "detailed description of 
situations, events, people, interactions, and observed behaviours; direct 
quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and 
thoughts; and excerpts or entire passages from documents, correspondence, 
records and case histories" (1980, p22). Such data is typically collected as 
open-ended narrative without attempt to fit it into predetermined response 
categories. As Cassell and Symon have argued "qualitative methods are often 
associated with the collection and analysis of written or spoken text or the 
direct observation of behaviour (1994, p2). Fryer considers that: 
Qualitative researchers are characteristically concerned in their research with 
attempting to accurately describe, decode and interpret the precise meanings to 
persons or phenomena occurring in their normal social contexts and are typically 
pre-occupied with complexity, authenticity, contextualisation, shared 
subjectivity of researcher and researched and minimization of illusion. (Fryer, 1991, p3) 
Cassell and Symon, in their book Qualitative Methods in Organisational 
Research are fervently promoting the application of qualitative methods 
particularly in their field of organisational psychology. However, they argue 
that there is consensus that "we should count the countable - that is to say, 
count what it makes sense to reduce to quantifiable terms" (1994, p4). Such a 
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pragmatic advocation of a qualitative-quantitative mix, based on quantifying 
that which lends itself to quantification and approaching that which doesn't 
through qualitative methodology seems both logical and sensible. 
In considering the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative methods, the 
recurring themes have been succinctly summarised by Easterby-Smith and his 
colleagues: 
In the case of quantitative methods and the positivist paradigm, the main 
strengths are that: they can provide wide coverage of the range of situation; they 
can be fast and economical; and, particularly when statistics are aggregated 
from large samples, they can be of considerable relevance to policy decisions. 
On the debit side, these methods tend to be rather inflexible and artificial; they 
are not very effective in understanding processes or the significance that people 
attach to actions; they are not very helpful in generating theories; and because 
they focus on what is, or what has been recently, they make it hard for the 
policy-maker to infer what changes and actions should take place in the future. 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, p32) 
Correspondingly of qualitative methods, they observe that: 
They have strengths in their ability to look at change processes over time, to 
understand people's meanings, to adjust to new issues and ideas as they 
emerge, and to contribute to the evolution of new theories. They also provide a 
way of gathering data which is seen as natural rather than artificial. There are, 
of course, weaknesses. Data collection can take up a great deal of time and 
resources, and the analysis and interpretation of data may be difficult, 
Qualitative studies often feel very untidy because it is harder to control their 
pace, progress and end-points. There is also the problem that many people, 
especially policy-makers, may give low credibility to studies based on 
phenomenological approach. 
(Easterby-Smith eta!., 1991, p32) 
On the latter point it is worthy of note that Easterby-Smith et al. were 
primarily concerned with Management Research and as Fetterman has 
observed "many policy-makers find descriptive accounts more palatable than 
an avalanche of figures and tables. However, the length of most 
ethnographic appraisals inhibits the most diligent sponsors and evaluators 
from even approaching a qualitative report of research findings" (1988, p15). 
These delineated strengths and weaknesses are reiterated by other authors (for 
example, see Cassell and Symon, 1994; and Bryman, 1988) 
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Researchers actually conducting research will in practice be employing 
quantitative and/or qualitative methods whether for technical or 
epistemological reasons. However, it is sometimes difficult to reconcile what 
occurs in practice which essentially seems driven by pragmatism, with the 
relatively artificial, often exaggerated, discussions about methodological 
approaches evident in the literature. However, such approaches provide the 
methodological framework within which actual research occurs and thus must 
be acknowledged. 
3.4 The Research Design 
In practice, researchers normally begin with a research issue or a set of 
research questions, sometimes clearly delineated, sometime not, and then 
seek to identify a methodology or combination of techniques which is likely 
to lead to the questions being adequately addressed subject to the time and 
resource constraints which they face. As Hakim notes "design deals primarily 
with aims, purposes, intentions and plans within the practical constraints of 
location, time, money and availability of staff' (1987, pl). In extending her 
architect's analogy mentioned previously, she also considers that research 
design "is also very much about style, the architect's own preferences and 
ideas (whether innovative or solidly traditional) and the stylistic preferences of 
those who pay for the work and have to live with the finished result" (1987, 
p1). For Robson, "design is concerned with turning research questions into 
projects" (1993, p38). He considers that in broad terms, research can be 
classified according to three alternative types of enquiry as shown in table 3.4. 
Robson also distinguishes between three traditional research strategies. These 
are indicated in table 3.5. 
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TABLE 3.4 : TYPES OF ENQUIRY 
1. Exploratory 
To find out what is happening 
To seek new insights 
To ask questions 
To assess phenomena in a new light 
Usually, but not necessarily, qualitative 
2. Descriptive 
To portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations 
Requires extensive previous knowledge of the situations etc. to be researched or 
described, so that you know appropriate aspects on which to gather information 
May be qualitative and/or quantitative 
3. Explanatory 
Seeks an explanation of a situation or problem, usually in the form of causal 
relationships 
may be qualitative and/or quantitative 
(Robson, 1993, p42) 
TABLE 3.5 : ROBSON'S ALTERNATIVE RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
1. Experiment measuring the effects of manipulating one variable on another 
variable. 
Typical features: selection of samples of individuals from known populations; 
allocation of samples to different experimental conditions; introduction of 
planned change on one or more variables; measurement on small number of 
variables; control of other variables; usually involves hypothesis testing. 
2. Survey: collection of information in standardised form from groups of people. 
Typical features: selection of samples of individuals from known populations; 
collection of relatively small amount of data in standardised form from each 
individual; usually employs questionnaire or structured interview. 
3. Case study: development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single `case', 
or of a small number of related `cases. ' 
Typical features: selection of a single case (or a small number of related cases) 
of a situation, individual or group of interest or concern; study of the case in its 
context; collection of information via a range of data collection techniques including observation, interview and documentary analysis, 
(Robson, 1993, p4O) 
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He argues that in terms of what actually happens particularly in relation to the 
past, in considering the purpose of research and alternative research 
strategies; case studies were typically used for exploratory work, surveys 
were considered most appropriate for descriptive studies, and that 
experiments were most frequently used for explanatory studies. However, 
Robson argues that "this is not a necessary or immutable linkage. Each 
strategy can be used for any or all of the three purposes" (1993, p43). 
Robson's view is shared by Yin who argues that "the most appropriate view 
of these different strategies is a pluralistic one. Each strategy can be used for 
all three purposes - exploratory, descriptive or explanatory" (1994, pp3-4). 
He argues that in fact, three conditions determine the appropriateness of 
alternative research strategies. These are the type of research question to be 
addressed; the extent of control which an investigator can exercise over 
actual behavioural events; and the degree of focus on contemporary as 
opposed to historical events. Yin considers that "the first and most important 
condition for differentiating among the various research strategies is to 
identify the type of research question being asked" (1994, p7). Yin relates 
these three conditions to five major research strategies adding archival 
analysis and histories to the experiments, surveys and case studies already 
discussed. The conditions under which these alternative strategies are 
appropriate as perceived by Yin is summarised in table 3.6. 
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TABLE 3.6: YIN'S ALTERNATIVE RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
Research Form of research Requires control Focuses on 
Strategy question over behavioural contemporary 
events ? events 
Experiment how, why yes yes 
who, what, where, 
Survey how many, how no yes 
much 
who, what, where, 
Archival analysis how many, how no yes/no 
much 
History how, why no no 
Case study how, why no yes 
(Yin, 1994, p6) 
In the context of this thesis, in exploring performance review activity 
occurring in local authorities, no control can be exercised over behavioural 
events and the focus is on contemporary events. Thus, according to Yin's 
classification, the research strategies which can be considered are survey, 
archival analysis and case study. Since no archives exist in this research area, 
this must also be excluded as a research strategy. If the research questions 
identified at the start of this chapter are considered, they comprise a 
combination of how many and what questions suggesting the survey method 
as the most appropriate strategy. However, Yin argues that "the boundaries 
between the strategies - or the occasions when each is to be used - are not 
always clear and sharp" (1994, p4). Indeed, some of the research questions 
outlined could have been reworded as `how' or "why' questions. For 
example, "what is the attitude from within the council towards performance 
review? " might have read "how is performance review perceived from within 
the council by officers and members? " and "what factors are significant in 
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operating a performance review system? " could have been asked as "how is 
performance review operated within your council? " and the final research 
question relating to authorities not operating performance review might have 
been asked as "why does your authority not operate performance review? " 
This suggests that case studies could also be a useful research strategy for this 
particular piece of research. 
Furthermore, there is considerable support for the application of more than 
one research method in many studies. In the earlier discussion of alternative 
research types, the application of multi-methods was a recurrent theme for 
research which was not basic, pure, theoretical or laboratory-based such as 
that encompassed within this research programme. Denzin has argued that: 
Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple 
methods of observations must be employed. This is termed triangulation. I 
offer as a final methodological rule the principle that multiple methods should be 
used in every investigation. 
(Denzin, 1978, p28) 
Patton defines methodological triangulation as the use of multiple methods 
to study a single problem or program (1980, p109). Denzin also promotes 
other forms of triangulation. Primarily, data triangulation (the use of a variety 
of data sources in a study), investigator triangulation (the use of several 
different researchers), and theory triangulation (the use of multiple 
perspectives to interpret a single set of data). Most commentators promote 
methodological triangulation. Webb et al. (1966) have argued that social 
scientists can have greater confidence in their findings when these are derived 
from more than one method of investigation and Cassell and Symon have 
gone further suggesting "the triangulation of data by multi-method 
approaches is essential to answer many of the most important questions in 
organizational research" (1994, p4). Bryman considers that: 
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By and large, researchers have viewed the main message of the idea of 
triangulation as entailing a need to employ more than one method of 
investigation and hence more than one type of data. Within this context, 
quantitative and qualitative research may be perceived as different ways of 
examining the same research problem. By combining the two, the researcher's 
claim for the validity of his or her conclusions are enhanced if they can be 
shown to provide mutual confirmation. 
(Bryman, 1988, p131). 
If we recall the specific research questions posed within the context of this 
thesis, which for convenience are listed in Box 3.1 overleaf, it is difficult to 
see how they could all adequately be addressed utilising either a survey or a 
case study approach as a stand alone research strategy. For example, the 
question `how many local authorities operate performance review systems? ' 
requires that contact be made with all local authorities falling within the 
sphere of this study and a postal survey would appear to be an appropriate 
mechanism for accumulating this information. However, the depth of answer 
being sought for other questions, could not be gained from a postal survey 
but would be better tackled using a case study approach. However, a case 
study would not reveal how many authorities operate review mechanisms nor 
would it provide the coverage which would make the results of this 
investigation useful. However, a combination of the two approaches should 
allow for the generation of satisfactory responses to all the research questions 
posed. The combination of survey and case study method is also in keeping 
with Robson's juxtaposition of types of enquiry and research strategies, 
which considered case studies as being most appropriate for exploratory 
enquiry and surveys being most relevant for descriptive enquiry. Performance 
review activity is relatively unknown in this country and thus part of this 
investigation is about fording out about, or exploring, what is happening. 
However, this work is also concerned with portraying an accurate picture of 
performance review operations and thus is describing current activity. By 
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combining a case study approach with a survey methodology, it is intended 
to secure both depth and breadth in relation to the research topic and the 
research questions. 
BOX 3.1: THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
* how many local authorities operate performance review systems? 
* what type of systems are in operation? 
* what is the attitude from within the council towards performance review? 
* what factors are significant in establishing a performance review system? 
* what factors are significant in operating a review mechanism once it has been 
implemented? 
* what issues need to be considered in sustaining a performance review process? 
* is there a political dimension to performance review? 
* what good practice recommendations can be made from the experiences of 
councils already operating performance review systems? and 
* for authorities not operating any performance review mechanisms, are any 
alternative processes utilised and what are the attitudes of officers and members 
towards performance review? 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter began by stressing the importance of undertaking background 
and preliminary research before delineating the specific questions to be 
addressed in any programme of research and then outlined the methods of 
induction used within the context of this thesis. Subsequently, a set of 
research questions was produced for consideration as detailed in box 3.1 
above and it was argued that in responding to these questions, the 
delineation of an appropriate methodology is required but it was recognised 
that arguments about the relativities of alternative methodological approaches 
have different dimensions. 
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In particular, the commonly rehearsed debates concerning positivism versus 
phenomenology, the type of research being conducted, and quantitative 
methodologies versus qualitative methodologies, were presented. However, 
it was concluded that in all these domains that the debates are remote from 
research conducted in the real world which is typically much more driven by 
pragmatic concerns rather than for example, epistemologica idifferences. It 
was proposed that normally a researcher faced with a set of research questions 
will seek to identify a methodology or a combination of techniques which is 
likely to lead to the questions being adequately addressed within the time and 
resource constraints faced. 
Within the context of this thesis and in recognising that alternative research 
strategies are needed to address different types of research question, the 
process of research design led to the conclusion that a two-pronged 
methodology would be required comprising a survey of all local authorities to 
secure the breadth of information needed to fully answer the research 
questions, and a case study approach to provide the required depth. The 
actual methodology employed will now be considered. 
Chapter 4 
The Research Methodology 
4.1 The Research Survey 
4.2 The Research Case Studies 
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4.1 The Research Survey 
4.1.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, it was concluded that a two-stemmed methodology 
comprising a survey and case studies would be required to address the 
delineated research focus. This chapter describes how these methods were 
employed in the context of this thesis. In the first part, the survey is 
considered and in the latter part, the case study methodology is discussed. 
The purpose of the survey was to get a breadth of information relating to 
performance review including gauging the scale of review activity in Great 
Britain. It therefore seemed inappropriate to consider sampling in this context 
and it was concluded that contact would have to be made with all local 
authorities to illicit the relevant data. Whilst surveys can be conducted either 
by phone or post or indeed through face-to-face interviewing, the number of 
local authorities in mainland Britain and the range of questions on which 
information was being sought, suggested that a postal questionnaire was the 
only viable option. A questionnaire would thus need to be sent to each chief 
executive but it was felt that since the political dimension of performance 
review was also being explored, a questionnaire would also have to be 
forwarded to the council leader of local authorities. The construction of these 
questionnaires is now considered. 
4.1.2 The Postal Questionnaire Sent to Chief Executives 
Nachmias and Nachmias argue that "the questionnaire must translate the 
research objectives into specific questions" (1992, p239). Considering the 
research questions posed in the context of this thesis, it was intended that the 
questionnaire sent to chief executives would address: 
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* what is the attitude from within the council towards performance review? 
* what factors are significant in establishing a performance review system? 
* what factors are significant in operating a review mechanism once it has been 
implemented? 
* what corporate and development issues need to be considered in sustaining a 
performance review process? 
* for authorities not operating any performance review mechanisms, are any 
alternative processes utilised and what are the attitudes of officers and members 
towards performance review? 
Of the other research questions, the scale of review activity would be 
calculated through identifying the authorities whose chief executives and 
council leaders reported performance review systems operating/not operating 
in their authorities and combining these with the case study councils 
participating in the research programme who all represented authorities with 
review mechanisms in place. The questionnaire to council leaders would 
focus on the political dimension of review and the case studies, as well as 
providing a deeper analysis on most of the research questions, would 
facilitate identification of the types of systems in operation although it is 
anticipated that some of these details will also be revealed through 
consideration of operational details in the postal questionnaire sent to chief 
executives. It is intended that the good practice recommendations will emerge 
from a synthesis of the research evidence accumulated in this thesis. 
Given that information was being sought from authorities operating and not 
operating performance review systems, it was decided to split the 
questionnaire into two parts, part 1 to be completed by authorities which had 
implemented a review system and part 2 to be completed by those which had 
not. This would also allow easy identification of the scale of review activity 
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through comparison of the level of part 1 returns against the level of part 2 
responses. 
The questionnaire which was sent to chief executives is contained in 
appendix 4.1. The actual questions asked in both this questionnaire and that 
sent to council leaders reflects the issues identified as important by those 
parties with whom preliminary background discussions were undertaken (see 
page 67) as well as consideration of the approaches to performance review 
discussed in chapter 2. Both questionnaires were also discussed in 
considerable detail with two local authorities, one with a review system in 
place and the other without. 
Part 1 of the survey form sent to chief executives was subdivided into 4 
sections. The introductory section related to background information and in 
keeping with advice from commentators (see for example, Robson, 1993 or 
Newell, 1993) was kept as simple and succinct as possible. The section, 
which was contained within one page, comprised closed questions which 
only required either a YES or a NO answer apart from the last, which 
requested the name and telephone number of a contact person to whom 
follow-up queries could be forwarded to. Throughout the questionnaire, 
adequate spacing was left between all questions for respondents to add 
additional comments where they felt that this was appropriate. 
Section B of the chief executives questionnaire was entitled `Establishing the 
Performance Review System' and contained questions on the attitude of 
officers and members to the introduction of the review system as well as those 
relating to the process of establishing a review mechanism. Most of the 
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questions were again closed asking respondents to respond either yes or no, 
or in the case of questions exploring alternative disposition towards 
performance review, supportive or unsupportive. However, a number of the 
other questions could not be closed because it would have been impossible to 
encompass all possible response categories. This is in keeping with the 
guidance offered by Stacey where he proposes that: 
Closed questions should be used where alternative replies are known, are 
limited in number, and are clear cut. Open-ended questions are used where the 
issue is complex, where relevant dimensions are not known, and where a 
process is being explored. 
(Stacey, 1969, p80) 
Indeed, until a number of the questions included in the questionnaire had 
been answered, it was not known what response categories might exist. 
Open-ended questions were therefore also used. In particular: 
How were policy targets set for the performance review system? 
Who set the policy targets? 
How were performance measures set for the performance review system? 
Who set the performance measures? 
Where difficulties had been encountered in setting up the system, 
respondents were asked to elaborate on the nature of the difficulties. Chief 
executives were asked who had initiated the proposal to introduce 
performance review and provided with the closed response categories of 
officers, members and others but in the latter case asked to be specific. 
Section C related to the operation of the performance review system and 
asked a series of factual questions some of which again had to be left open- 
ended because of the impossibility of identifying all response categories. A 
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number of the questions contained prompts to illustrate the type of answer 
anticipated. For example: 
Which officers carry out performance review work (for example policy 
planners, internal audit)? 
Section D explored general issues with chief executives and the questions 
were generally structured as a closed question initially but with an open- 
ended follow-up. For example: 
Have any measures been introduced to ensure officer/member co-operation? 
YES/NO 
If yes, please describe. 
Most of the questions in this section were factual but chief executives were 
also asked for their opinion on a number of issues. In particular, whether they 
considered that the review system had contributed towards achieving a 
corporate management perspective and corporate goals. They were also 
asked whether overall they considered the review system to have been 
successful and to identify the most significant future developments resulting 
from the operation of the system. 
Part 2 of the questionnaire to be completed by chief executives was much 
briefer than part 1 and comprised a series of closed questions requiring Yes/No 
or supportive/unsupportive answers. However, respondents were also asked 
to provide details of any mechanism used in their authority for reviewing 
performance and also where they had indicated that the council had 
previously had a performance review system, they were asked to explain why 
it was no longer operational. 
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The questionnaire sent to chief executives was fairly long with part 1 
spanning 8 pages and part 2 taking up a further 2 pages. The text books in 
this area say little about the optimal length of questionnaires. But there 
appears to be a general consensus, that if a questionnaire is short, then the 
shorter the better but if it is long, then actual length is less important 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). Given the range of questions to be covered 
in this questionnaire, it was infeasible that it could be short and thus although 
the questionnaire could have been made comparatively shorter by exclusion 
of a few of the less critical questions or by leaving less space for any 
comments respondents might wish to make, it was considered that such 
refinements would be unlikely to affect the response rate and could possibly 
detract from the information generated by the chief executives postal 
questionnaire. 
4.1.3 The Postal Questionnaire Sent to Council Leaders 
The main reason for issuing a questionnaire to council leaders was to access 
the political dimension of performance review. Thus most of the questions 
asked of leading members related in some way to politics. However, council 
leaders were also asked to identify the year in which the system had been 
introduced and who had initiated the proposal to introduce performance 
review. This was to allow a comparison of answers with the responses 
received from chief executives and is further discussed in chapter 7. 
Council leaders were also asked whether there had been any difficulties with 
the operation of the review system and where there had been, to elaborate on 
the nature of these. They were asked whether they considered performance 
review to have been successful and what future developments they would 
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like to see in the performance review system. Part 1 of the questionnaire sent 
to council leaders was much briefer than that sent to chief executives so no 
subdivisions were considered necessary. 
As with chief executives, there was also a section of the questionnaire to be 
completed by council leaders representing authorities where no review system 
was in place. The emphasis was again on politics but leaders were asked to 
specify what factors were inhibiting the introduction of a review system in 
their authority and whether they expected to see a review system introduced 
in the lifetime of their administration. The questionnaire sent to council 
leaders is contained in appendix 4.2. 
For both chief executives and council leaders, one questionnaire was sent 
comprising a part 1 section at the front with the part 2 section at the back. 
The accompanying letter to be discussed in the next section, directed 
respondents to complete part 1 of the survey form if their authority had 
implemented a review system and to complete part 2, if they had not. 
However, a number of authorities returned the questionnaire uncompleted 
saying that their authority did not operate a review system and they were 
therefore unable to participate in the survey. This suggests that the direction 
in the letter was insufficient and perhaps it would have been better to have 
sent two separate questionnaires to chief executives and council leaders, one 
for authorities with review procedures and one for authorities where no 
system had been implemented and with the difference in the questionnaires 
clearly marked at the top of the forms. Unfortunately, this difficulty was not 
anticipated by those with whom the survey was discussed nor during the pilot 
stage further discussed below. 
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4.1.4 The Questionnaire Process 
Nachmias and Nachmias propose that after a questionnaire has been 
constructed, the next step is to write a covering letter to explain the purpose 
of the survey to the respondents and to encourage a high response rate (1992, 
p256). They also suggest that. 
A cover letter must succeed in overcoming any resistance or prejudice the 
respondent may have against the survey. It should (1) identify the sponsoring 
organization or the persons conducting the study, (2) explain the purpose of the 
study, (3) tell why it is important that the respondent answer the questionnaire, 
and (4) ensure the respondent that the information provided will be held in strict 
confidence. 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992, p256) 
They also suggest that an altruistic approach tends to generate the best 
results. The introductory letter which accompanied the postal questionnaires 
reflects this advice and is enclosed in appendix 4.3. The scale of operations 
made it infeasible to personalise the letter but each letter was addressed to The 
Chief Executive or The Leader of the Council followed by the address of the 
authority. Those to chief executives began `Dear Sir/Madam' whilst those to 
council leaders began `Dear Councillor. ' One decision which needed to be 
made concerning the content of the letter was whether or not to provide 
guidance on what constitutes a performance review system. The background 
discussions, particularly those with local authorities, suggested that there 
were many different types of review system in operation and it was highly 
improbable that all of these could be accommodated into any guidance. 
However, it was anticipated that if guidance was given which excluded a 
particular type of review system operated by a council then they might be less 
inclined to complete and return the questionnaire. When combined with the 
suggestion from the local authorities interviewed, that it was highly 
improbable that chief executives or council leaders would not understand 
what was meant by the term, it was decided not to provide a definition. 
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Since two questionnaires were being sent to each council albeit to different 
people, the possibility existed of sending them in one envelope thereby 
cutting down on mailing costs. However, this was considered not to be 
appropriate because if the person opening the envelope was not well 
disposed towards the subject area or the completion of questionnaires or 
considered the project unworthy of the time needed to participate, then they 
might not forward the other questionnaire. By sending them out separately, 
each chief executive and council leader had the option to complete the survey 
form. Additionally, having combined them would have meant a heavy 
envelope landing on someone's desk which may have discouraged some 
participants. Consequently, the postal questionnaires were separately sent to 
chief executives and council leaders. 
A Freepost address was set up for the return of completed survey forms and 
an envelope with a Freepost address label attached was sent along with each 
questionnaire. Respondents were invited to send any documentation relating 
to their performance review system using the Freepost address both in the 
covering letter and again at the end of the questionnaire and a number took 
up this offer. 
All the questionnaires had to be coded to allow reminders to be sent and to 
ease the processsing and analysis of questionnaire returns. Each authority 
was assigned a code beginning with two or three letters denoting the 
authority type - for example, LB for London Boroughs or NMD for Non- 
Metropolitan Districts - followed by a council specific number. For the chief 
executives' questionnaire, the code was suffixed with an A whilst that for 
council leaders ended with a B. It was anticipated that respondents from 
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authorities not operating a review system might detach part 2 from the rest of 
the questionnaire for completion and return and thus for each questionnaire, 
the code needed to be put on both part 1 and part 2 of the questionnaire. 
Whilst this doubled the coding work which was already significant because 
two questionnaires were being sent to each authority, since approximately 
one-third of respondents who returned a completed part 2 questionnaire, did 
in fact separate it from part 1; this additional input proved worthwhile. 
Given the significance of achieving a good response rate, it was decided to 
conduct a pilot study and the questionnaire was initially sent to 42 
authorities. 18 of these councils were known to me and I had sufficiently 
good contacts within the authority to request that the respondent comment 
critically on any difficulties in the interpretation and relevance of questions 
and the length and general style of the questionnaire. The rest of the pilot 
authorities were not known to me but were also asked to comment on all 
aspects of the survey fomn. The pilot postal survey resulted in only very 
modest refinements in the questionnaire particularly the addition of the 
request for identification of a contact person, increased spacing between 
questions and the supply of an A4 rather than an A5 return envelope. 
The timetable for issuing the postal questionnaire is indicated in table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1: POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE TIMETABLE 
1.27th January 1992 Pilot questionnaire issued 
2.18th March 1992 Modified questionnaire issued to all authorities not included in pilot stage 
3.23rd April 1992 Reminders issued to non-respondents from pilot 
authorities 
4.7th September 1992 Reminders issued to non-respondents from the main 
mailing 
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The reason for delaying reminder letters for the main mailing until the 7th 
September was that to have issued them any earlier was to risk them arriving 
at councils during the holiday period. This could have resulted in them either 
being lost amongst a pile of holiday mail and being given a low priority (or the 
bin) when the relevant person returned from vacation; or the questionnaire 
being completed by an alternative member of staff perhaps not as familiar with 
the nuances of the authority's system. Thus, although it was felt that five 
months was a relatively long period to wait before issuing reminders, it was 
considered the best course of action. The reminder letter sent to non- 
respondents is reproduced in appendix 4.4. 
Due to a mistake by the photocopying department in the university, the 
questionnaire used for the main mailing had been photocopied single-sided 
rather than double-sided as requested and thus looked on the long-side. 
When the reminder letters were sent out in September, a replacement 
questionnaire, now double-sided as originally intended, was also sent out. 
Since the participation rate did not rise significantly following the reminder, 
the mistake which led to what looked like a long questionnaire being issued, 
appears not to have been a deterrent to its completion. 
Of the total 262 questionnaire responses received from chief executives, 237 
(90.5%) of these were generated by the initial mailing and only 25 (9.5%) 
were the result of reminders. The reminders appear to have had more impact 
on council leaders - the initial mailing resulted in 139 (74.3%) responses being 
received whilst the reminder accounted for a further 48 (25.7%) survey forms 
being returned. It may have been the case that a further set of reminders, 
perhaps in mid November, would have been useful. However, it was 
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probable that this would have resulted in few additional questionnaires being 
returned - authorities wishing to make a contribution to this research 
programme would have been likely to do so in the first questionnaire round or 
at the reminder stage. It would also in my opinion, have been verging on 
pestering councils. Additionally, the response rate after one set of reminders 
was sufficiently high to suggest that further responses were not imperative to 
the validity of any conclusions drawn from the postal survey. 
In addition to those returning completed questionnaires, a number of 
authorities were in contact either by phone or letter indicating that : 
* they had systems, but insufficient time and/or staff to complete the 
questionnaire; 
* they did not have a performance review system and therefore could not fill in 
the questionnaire (they had not properly read the covering letter which directed 
such authorities to complete part 2); 
* their authority was in the very early stages of establishing a system and 
therefore did not feel it appropriate to complete either part 1 or 2; 
* it was the council's policy not to complete questionnaires other than those 
required by statute; 
* the Citizen's Charter had dispensed with the need for performance review in 
their authority and thus there was little point in this research; and 
* they did not have time to complete the questionnaire but if there was an option 
to be interviewed, then they would be willing to contribute in this way. 
29 chief executives and 10 council leaders responded in one of these ways. 
Table 4.2 indicates participation rates for the postal questionnaire according 
to types of authority. In calculating participation rates, the 22 authorities 
contributing to the case study stage of the wider ESRC research programme 
from which this thesis emerged, were excluded since it was felt inappropriate 
to also expect them to complete a questionnaire. Therefore, 492 
questionnaires were issued to chief executives and council leaders. 
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262 chief executives completed either part 1 or part 2 of the postal 
questionnaire giving a participation rate of 53.3% for chief executives. The 
corresponding figures for council leaders are 187 and 38.0%. Overall, this 
participation rate is relatively high for a postal questionnaire where experience 
both from my own research and knowledge of others' research, suggests a 
general response rate of around 30% to 35% for postal surveys. Nachmias 
and Nachmias (1992) suggest a typical participation rate of between 20% and 
40% and Newell reports that "many postal surveys do not achieve more than 
a 50% rate of return" (1993, p96). 
Amongst chief executives, participation rates varied according to authority 
type and were highest in Scottish Regions (80.0%), London Boroughs 
(70.0%), County Councils (62.8%), Welsh Counties (62.5%) and Scottish 
Districts (62.0). The poorest response rate was achieved from Welsh Districts 
(37.8%) and Metropolitan Districts (41.2%). 
For council leaders, the highest response levels were from London Boroughs 
(53.5%), Welsh Counties (50.0%) and County Councils (40.0%). Lowest 
participation rates were again evident for Welsh Districts (24.3%) and 
Metropolitan Districts (32.4%). Across all authority types, the participation 
rate of council leaders was lower than that achieved for chief executives. One 
could speculate on many possible reasons for this. However, two 
explanations were apparent from feedback which was received as a direct 
response to the postal questionnaire : 
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some council leaders on receiving a questionnaire relating to performance 
review, took it to the officer with responsibility for performance review. The 
officer often having already completed the questionnaire sent to the chief 
executive, concluded either that this was a further copy of the same 
questionnaire and thus did not require completion; or that they had already made 
a contribution on behalf of their council to this research and that there was 
nothing further to add; 
no chief executives questioned the value of the research with all feedback 
received being supportive. However, a number of council leaders including 
two who made returns, communicated the opinion that the Citizen's Charter 
would dispense with the need for internal performance review mechanisms and 
that thus, research into this area was untimely and of little consequence. 
More generally, chief executives rarely completed the questionnaire 
personally but normally asked the officer with performance review 
responsibilities to do so. Since many of the questions related to organisational 
and operational details, this was not an unreasonable course of action. 
Although some council leaders also took their questionnaires to the 
performance review officer for completion, it is a less obvious course of action 
and if they had read it prior to delegating its completion, they realised that 
since it contained questions about political attitudes to performance review, it 
did actually require a politician's perspective. If chief executives had been 
asked to individually complete their survey forms, it could reasonably be 
speculated that their response rate would probably have been much lower. 
Correspondingly, in my opinion, a contributory factor to the comparatively 
low response rate achieved with council leaders, is the implied requirement for 
them to complete the questionnaire themselves. 
With a postal questionnaire response rate of 53.3% and 38.0% from chief 
executives and council leaders respectively, there is sufficient representation 
of local authority practice to be confident that conclusions drawn are likely to 
be generally applicable but with perhaps some caution being exercised in the 
case of things surmised from the council leader returns. 
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4.1.5 The Questionnaire Data 
With 262 questionnaires being received from chief executives and 187 from 
council leaders, a huge volume of questionnaire data was generated which 
had to be handled in a way which facilitated its use for analysis at a later 
stage. After due consideration and some experimentation, a two stage 
approach was set up to reflect the fact that the questionnaires contained both 
closed and open-ended questions. For each authority type, two spreadsheets 
were set up, one for the chief executives' data and one for the responses 
received from council leaders. Given the number of responses received from 
Non-Metropolitan Districts (147 for chief executives and 109 for council 
leaders), the questionnaires for this type of authority were divided into five 
groups for ease of handling and spreadsheets created for each group. Across 
the top of these spreadsheets, the questions contained in the questionnaire 
were listed in order, with summary identification codes used. Running from 
top to bottom, the authorities were listed along with their codes. For closed 
questions, the questionnaires were then processed by entering the answer to 
each question in the appropriate column for each authority where a return had 
been made. 
In addition to these spreadsheets, for each authority type, two word 
processing files were also created - again, one for the questionnaire responses 
from chief executives and the other for the returns from council leaders. For 
open-ended questions, the code `wp' was entered onto the spreadsheet and 
the full response reproduced on the word processing file along with the name 
of the authority and its identification code, with the word-processing file 
organised according to questions. Thus, within the word-processing file 
generated for the returns made by London Borough chief executives, all the 
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open-ended responses given by the London authorities to the question `How 
were policy targets set for the performance review system? ' were grouped 
together. This procedure was also used where additional comments or non- 
standard responses had been given to closed responses. Once these two 
stages had been completed it was possible to access information on any of the 
questions contained in the questionnaires with comparative ease. The 
spreadsheet approach also allowed side-by-side comparison to be made of the 
responses given by chief executives and council leaders from the same 
authority and cross-referencing became feasible, for example, comparing the 
respondents reporting performance review as unsuccessful in their authority 
with those indicating operational difficulties and/or officers unsupportive of 
the introduction of performance review. 
In summarising the responses received from chief executives and council 
leaders, it proved more useful to group the answers to the same question 
together by authority type and such summaries appear in the appendices 
supporting chapters 6 and 7 which respectively detail the results of the postal 
questionnaire sent to chief executives and council leaders. 
4.2 The Research Case Studies 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The second strand of the research strategy used in the context of this thesis 
was that of case studies. Hartley defines this approach as: 
Case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data 
collected over a period of time, of one or more organisations, or groups within 
organisations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and processes 
involved in the phenomenon under study. 
(Hartley, 1994, p208) 
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One of the most well-documented problems in utilising a case study approach 
relates to generalizability - the ideographic dimension discussed in chapter 3. 
As Bryman has observed: 
For many people, reliance on a single case poses a problem of how far it is 
possible to generalize the results of such research.... Many display an unease 
about the extent to which their findings are capable of generalization beyond the 
confines of the particular case. 
(Bryman, 1988, p88) 
Bryman proposes a number of potential solutions to the problem of case study 
results being dismissed as idiosyncratic: the first is that more than one case is 
studied; the second is "the examination of a number of cases by more than 
one researcher" - what Denzin termed investigator triangulation; and the 
third is where cases which are typical of certain clusters of characteristics are 
studied on the assumption that the results are at least generalizable to cases 
which have the same set of characteristics. 
In the latter case, local authorities are all very different with their 
"characteristics" reflecting their political complexion, a blend of socio- 
economic, geographic and circumstantial factors, their management structure 
which is often determined by historical accident, the personalities of key 
management and council players, and a raft of other known and unknown 
determinants. Thus, in undertaking a case study of one Labour-controlled 
inner-London Borough's performance review system for example, one could 
not generalise about the performance review systems of all, or even most, 
Labour-controlled inner-London Boroughs. As mentioned in the preface to 
this thesis, this research formed part of a wider research programme which did 
involve another researcher undertaking some case study investigations. The 
results of these are not directly incorporated into this thesis for reasons of 
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originality. However, this form of triangulation was part of the overall 
research programme. Thus in the context of this immediate piece of research, 
in order to enhance the generalizability of the research, the solution rested in 
adopting a multiple case-study approach. 
Of the total 22 case studies, only 10 were conducted by myself and therefore 
eligible for inclusion within this thesis. In 4 of these, the review systems were 
either fairly early on in their development or relatively unrevealing and in a 
further case, there were difficulties in undertaking the interviews, one of the 
key sources of information within the case studies, because the officer in 
charge of performance review matters within that particular authority insisted 
on being present in all discussions which severely limited their openness. 
Thus 5 case studies are included within this thesis and as is further discussed 
in chapter 8, these represented a reasonable cross-section of types of 
authority, population and political control. 
4.2.2 The Case Study Information 
In undertaking case studies, a range of techniques can be used to gather 
information. Yin identifies six major sources of evidence and highlights what 
he perceives to be their strengths and weaknesses as reproduced in table 4.3. 
In the context of this piece of work, physical artefacts and archival records 
did not exist and therefore had to be excluded as a source of evidence. The 
nature of review systems and indeed local government, meant that 
observation, both direct and participant, was highly infeasible, particularly 
for resource reasons. Consequently, documentation and interviews were 
used to gather information in the case study authorities. 
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TABLE 4.1: CASE STUDY SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 
SOURCE OF EVIDENCE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Documentation * stable - can be reviewed * retrievability - can be low 
repeatedly 
* biased selectability, if 
* unobtrusive - not created as a collection is incomplete 
result of the case study 
* reporting bias - reflects 
* exact - contains exact names, (unknown) bias of author 
references, and details of an 
event * access - may be deliberately blocked 
* broad coverage - long span 
of time, many events, and 
man settings 
Archival Records * (same as for documentation) * (same as for documentation) 
* precise and quantitative * accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Interviews * targeted - focused directly on * bias due to poorly 
case study topic constructed questions 
* insightful - provides * response bias 
perceived causal inferences 
* inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
* reflexivity - interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to 
hear 
Direct Observations * reality - covers events in real * time consuming 
* selectivity - unless broad * contextual - covers context of coverage 
event 
* reflexivity - event may 
proceed differently because 
it is being observed 
* cost - hours needed by human observers 
participant * (same as for direct * (same as for direct 
Observation observation) observation) 
* insightful into interpersonal * bias due to investigator's 
behaviour and motives manipulation of events 
Physical Artifacts * insightful into cultural * selectivity features 
* availability 
* insightful into technical 
operations 
(Yin, 1994, p80) 
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4.2.3 The Case Study Interviews 
Within this context, documentation was comparatively easy to accumulate 
with case study authorities asked to provide documentation relating to their 
performance review system, although as will be discussed in chapter 8, in 
some instances, the content of these was limited. However, in using 
interviews, a decision had to be made about who to request an interview 
with. Since chief executives and council leaders from other authorities had 
received the postal questionnaire and would inevitably play some role in the 
process, it was felt that they would have to be interviewed. However, where 
review systems had been operational, many of the chief executives' postal 
questionnaires had been completed by the officer with responsibility for 
performance review and it was anticipated that such an officer would be able 
to provide invaluable depth and insight into the operation of the review 
system and thus an interview was sought with this key player. In the 
background discussions to this piece of research, it was indicated that to get a 
comprehensive picture about the operation of performance review, 
discussions would need to take place with the managers of departments 
incorporated into the review process and thus an interview was requested 
with a departmental director. In accessing the political dimension of 
performance review, it was considered appropriate to also discuss 
performance review with a member of the opposition as well as the ruling 
administration. 
The initial approach letter to potential case study authorities which is 
reproduced in appendix 4.5, acknowledged that these key people may not all 
be available (or amenable) to interview and that flexibility did exist to modify 
the interviewees. The approach letters were all personalised and wherever 
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possible, contact had already been made with the review officer prior to a 
formal approach to participate being made. Most of the case studies were 
identified as authorities who had made progress in the performance review 
field normally through the Policy and Performance Review Network but one 
of the ones included in this thesis, Hertfordshire County Council, was not 
highlighted in this way and was routinely sent the postal questionnaires. On 
receiving the survey form,, they got in contact intimating that they had a 
particularly innovative type of review system and after some discussion they 
agreed to become a case study authority. Only a small number of councils 
who were approached to participate as case studies declined, normally on the 
grounds of the time involved or because they considered their review system 
to be unworthy of the attention. 
Having determined that interviews were to be a key source of evidence in the 
case studies and decided which organisational figures would ideally be 
interviewed within each case study, the next decision was how much 
structure to impose on the interviews. Fielding proposes that interviews can 
be differentiated as follows: 
In the standardised or structured interview the wording of questions and 
the order in which they are asked is the same from one interview to another... . It is most familiar from market research; most of us have been stopped in the 
street or visited at home by an interviewer bearing a schedule to be completed 
by ticks in the answer boxes corresponding to our answers. The next type of 
interview is semi-structured; here the interviewer asks certain, major 
questions the same way each time, but is free to alter their sequence and to 
probe for more information. The interviewer is thus able to adapt the research 
instrument to the level of comprehension and articulacy of the respondent, and 
to handle the fact that in responding to a question, people often also provide 
answers to questions which were going to be asked later. The endpoint of this 
typology is the non-standardized interview. This is also called an 
unstructured or focused interview. Here interviewers simply have a list of 
topics which they want to talk about, but are free to phase the questions as they 
wish, ask them in any order that seems sensible at the time, and even join in the 
conversation by discussing what they think of the topic themselves. 
(Fielding, 1993, pp 135-136) 
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In developing these distinctions, Patton summarises the strengths and 
weaknesses of alternative types of interviews as indicated in table 4.4 
overleaf. 
The last option in the table is really a survey comprising closed questions 
conducted on a face-to-face basis and would not have provided the depth 
required in this project and was ruled out. Similarly with the standardised 
open-ended interviews, it was anticipated that the lack of flexibility and 
opportunity for probing would limit the depth of the interview and would 
prevent questions specific to just one case study authority or indeed emerging 
as the case study proceeded, from being incorporated into the interview. It 
was felt that most local authorities would be comparatively unreceptive to the 
informal conversation type of interview which is inevitably extremely time- 
intensive and liable to yield a very variable quality of data being particularly 
dependent on a good rapport being generated with the interviewee who may 
or may not be well-disposed to the research project. Whilst I had had some 
interview experience prior to undertaking the case studies, I would not have 
felt sufficiently confident at securing the required depth of information on a 
broad range of topics in what is effectively a conversation. This particular 
type of interview is recommended when the researcher is sensitising 
him/herself to a particular research topic rather than trying to assimilate 
evidence of a particular issue. Thus for a number of reasons, it was not felt 
appropriate to use here. 
By a process elimination, the interview guide approach seems the most 
suitable type of interview to employ within the case study phase of this 
research. Patton proposes that: 
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An interview guide is a list of questions or issues that are to be explored in the 
course of an interview. An interview guide is prepared in order to make sure 
that basically the same information is obtained from a number of people by 
covering the same material. The interview guide provides topics or subject 
areas within which the interviewer is free to explore, probe and ask questions 
that will elucidate and illuminate that particular subject. Thus, the interviewer 
remains free to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to word 
questions spontaneously, and to establish a conversational style - but with the 
focus on a particular subject that has been predetermined. 
(Patton, 1980, p200) 
Patton's perception thus differs from Fielding's in that he contends that 
questions can be worded as the interviewer considers appropriate. Within 
Patton's approach, the interview guide appears to be a prop to the 
interviewer whilst in Fielding's semi-standardised interview, it is more of a 
prompt. Flexibility in the phrasing of questions was desired but not as much 
as is implied by Patton or indeed other commentators on this subject (see for 
example Jones, 1985 or King, 1994). It was therefore decided that an 
interview guide/questionnaire would be prepared for the interviews to be 
conducted with each organisational figure and that this would be used as the 
basis of the interview but with flexibility retained in the sequencing of 
questions and their particular wording. This is reproduced in appendix 4.5 
and its contents again reflect the issues identified as significant in the 
background research discussions and consideration of the approaches to 
performance review which have been proposed. 
Before committing themselves to participation, a number of authorities 
wanted to know what sort of areas would be covered in discussions and the 
questionnaires were forwarded whilst stressing that this was only a guide to 
the types of questions and areas which would be covered. In other 
authorities, once they had agreed to take part as a case study, the set of 
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questionnaires was also sent with the same proviso since it was anticipated 
that this would put interviewees at relative ease. 
When it came to actually conducting the interviews, it was felt that given the 
large volume of issues to be covered, that it would be much easier if the 
interviews could be taped. At each interview, participants were asked 
whether they minded the discussion being taped prior to the machine being 
produced and advised that they could turn the machine off at any time during 
the interview. Only one participant denied the use of the tape recorder but 
three other participants, all councillors, had the machine paused during the 
course of dicussions. The interview questionnaire was also used to check that 
the relevant issues were all covered and also to take some notes during the 
meeting. It often proved useful for pacing the interview. If a respondent had 
gone on significantly about one particular point or indeed had meandered 
from the point, I found that looking at the interview guide proved a useful 
mechanism for bringing them back to the topic in hand or moving onto the 
next question. 
Once the interviews were completed, the comments made by interviewees to 
each questions were filled out in the questionnaire. Where they had repeated 
themselves, which they often did, or had paused or faltered during the 
response, this was smoothed out of the answer when it was written up. 
Additionally, when respondents went off on a tangent which really was of no 
relevance to the topic under discussion, this was also excluded. 
The report on each case study is presented in chapter 8 and comprises a 
discussion about the documentation supplied by the authority which related 
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to their performance review system; a description of the review system in 
operation; an analysis of each interview undertaken highlighting the salient 
points made by interviewees; and a brief critique of performance review as 
operated by the case study authority. As will be observed, some of the 
material is quite sensitive and a decision had to be made whether or not to 
conceal the identity of participating authorities. In the initial approach letter, 
anonymity was offered if the council so desired but none of the authorities 
made this a requirement of their participation nor was it mentioned during the 
case study visit. It was thus concluded that given the generally low level of 
public interest in postgraduate work and the minimal circulation of theses, it 
was not necessary to change the names of those involved but given the 
disparaging nature of some of the case study information, it was felt 
appropriate to add a footnote to the chapter requesting that any reader 
intending to reproduce any of its contents should refer to the author. 
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5.1 Introduction 
One of the research questions identified for consideration in the context of 
this thesis was `how many local authorities operate performance review 
systems? ' This chapter is focused on delineating the scale of review in Great 
Britain. Some of the characteristics of local authorities are also considered to 
explore whether there is any identifiable pattern distinguishing authorities 
which operate performance review systems from those which do not. Whilst 
many factors could have been considered in this context, time and space only 
permitted deliberation of two key facets. In particular, the services which 
authorities are responsible for delivering (or enabling the delivery of) and the 
population base of councils. In the former case, one could reasonably argue 
that the benefits to be accrued from introducing a performance review system 
are likely to be of particular significance to authorities delivering services such 
as education and social services partly because of the scale and diversity of 
operations involved but also because they are typically politically high- 
profile. Consequently, a mechanism which can facilitate monitoring progress 
in terms of policy objectives and ensure that performance is given high 
priority in these service areas, is likely to be particularly welcome. In the case 
of population, this is a proxy measure for the size of the authority and it may 
be the case that authorities which are larger, find it more feasible to introduce 
and operate a review system because they have a more substantial resource 
base from which to draw. Again, because the scale of operations is increased, 
review may prove to be a particularly useful tool. 
Consequently, analysis will be undertaken to establish whether there is any 
discernible pattern to the incidence of performance review in terms of the 
functions of local authorities and their populations. The other obvious 
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characteristic which could have an impact on whether a review system is 
introduced in a council or not, is political control. Since the Conservatives 
have provided sustained backing for the value for money initiative and done 
much to place performance high on the local government agenda, it could be 
anticipated that performance review systems will be prevalent in 
Conservative-controlled councils. However, this is considered within chapter 
7 which considers the political dimension of performance review from the 
perspective of council leaders. 
5.2 Calculating the Incidence of Review 
The primary source of information used in investigating the incidence of 
review practice was the postal questionnaire. This survey was intended 
principally as a census of performance review activity and until completed, it 
was unknown what proportion of authorities would have any involvement in 
review practices. Given its use for investigating the scale of review activity, 
of fundamental importance is the level of participation in the postal survey. It 
was established in the previous chapter that at 53.3% for chief executives and 
38.0% for council leaders, the level of returns was satisfactory and higher 
than that often experienced in social science surveys. 
In calculating the incidence of performance review, those councils (22 in 
total) who participated in the personal interview stage of the wider research 
project from which this thesis originated, have been included since clearly 
they have performance review systems and to exclude them would give an 
unrepresentatively low figure for the incidence of performance review. Since 
it was intended to get as accurate a picture as possible of the scale of review 
in Great Britain, for the purposes of this table only, those authorities which 
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communicated whether or not they had a performance review system in place, 
but did not return a postal questionnaire, have also been included. 
There was no question in the survey which asked directly whether an 
authority operated a performance review system. However, in general, all 
authorities which had completed part 1 of the postal questionnaire were 
deemed to be operating a performance review system whilst those completing 
part 2 were considered not to have any formalised performance review system 
operating in their authority. This may sound unnecessarily simplistic but there 
were a number of confusing responses. In four instances, respondents 
completed both part 1 and 2 of the survey. In two of these cases, a covering 
letter explained that the council had previously had a system but that it had 
lapsed and they had therefore completed part 1 in relation to the system that 
had been in place and part 2 in relation to their position at the time of 
completing the questionnaire. These were categorised as part 2 respondents 
In one of the other cases, close examination of the responses indicated that 
since the answer given to the vast majority of questions was "not applicable, " 
it was highly probable that no system was in operation and that they were in 
fact part 2 respondents. In the other case, no rational explanation was found 
and the response was discounted. In three other cases, the respondent had 
completed part 1 of the questionnaire but with the majority of responses 
indicating that no system was in fact operating. Follow-up calls were made to 
ascertain for the purposes of calculating the scale of review, whether a system 
was in fact in place and then the response was discounted. In two cases the 
reverse happened, where the respondent had completed part 2 but the 
answers indicated the likelihood of a highly-developed system. Follow-up 
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calls were again used and in one instance, the authority was persuaded to 
resubmit its questionnaire with part 1 completed. 
Since the response rate to the questionnaire was highest amongst chief 
executives, the incidence of performance review was principally based on the 
chief executives' responses. However, one of the distinct advantages of 
putting the postal questionnaire results onto a spreadsheet was that it allowed 
side-by-side comparisons of chief executive and council leader responses to 
be made with relative ease. In calculating the scale of review, it was possible 
to pick up a significant number of council leaders (60 in total) who had 
responded to the survey from authorities where no response was received 
from the chief executive and thus to ascertain whether or not that authority 
had implemented a performance review system. This process also revealed 
two instances where the chief executive had completed part 1 of the 
questionnaire thereby indicating a review mechanism in place but the council 
leader had completed part 2 suggesting the opposite. In one case, a follow-up 
call to both parties revealed that a system was definitely in place but that since 
it did not involve councillors, the leader was unaware of its existence! In the 
other case, the leader argued that the procedures followed in his organisation 
constituted a performance review system whilst the chief executive 
considered that it fell short of amounting to a review mechanism. The returns 
from this particular authority had to be excluded. 
S. 3 The Scale of Review 
Table 5.1 indicates the incidence of performance review in British local 
authorities. 225 (43.8%) councils in this country are known to operate a 
performance review mechanisms and 128 (24.9%) have no formal review 
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process in place. The incidence of performance review is highest amongst 
County Councils, London Boroughs and Scottish Regions where 74.4%, 
72.7% and 50.0% respectively of authorities reported review mechanisms 
operating. Excluding Welsh Districts where evidence of performance 
mechanisms operating is particularly low at 21.6%, review practice within 
other authority-types ranges from 35.8% in Scottish Districts to 47.2% in 
Metropolitan Districts. A published summary of this research (Ball and 
Monaghan, 1996-forthcoming) contains moderately different figures for the 
incidence of review but these were based only on part 1 and part 2 returns 
received from chief executives and council leaders. 
The proportion of authorities responding to the postal questionnaire who did 
not have review systems in place, was particularly high in Scottish Districts 
where 39.6% of authorities do not have review procedures in operation. 
33.3% and 32.4% are the corresponding figures for Scottish Regions, and 
Welsh Districts respectively. In the case of the Scottish authorities, this 
comparatively high incidence of not operating performance review systems 
could reflect the fact that the Accounts Commission was not given a value- 
for-money remit until 1988 as compared to 1982 for the Audit Commission for 
England and Wales. Consequently, the performance agenda in Scotland is 
somewhat lagging behind that for the rest of Britain. 
Only 7.7% of County Councils, 12.1% of London Boroughs and 16.7% of 
Metropolitan Districts are known not to have established review mechanisms. 
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These figures relate to authorities who participated in the research. By 
averaging the responses received against the number of responding 
authorities (rather than the total number of authorities), the data can be 
extended to include authorities who did not participate in this study. This 
suggests that up to 63.7% of authorities could have review mechanisms in 
place whilst 36.3% may not yet have implemented a performance process. In 
terms of authority type, performance review is most likely to be occurring in 
County Councils (90.6%), the London Boroughs (85.7%) and Metropolitan 
Districts (73.9%). It is less likely in Welsh Districts and Scottish Districts 
where 60.0% and 52.5% of responding authorities reported that no review 
process was operating in their authority. 
Intuitively however, there may be a higher probability of a council which is 
operating some form of performance review process completing the 
questionnaire than one which is not and this was clearly evidenced in the 
returns made by council leaders where the level of part 2 returns was minimal. 
There were insufficient data points to test for this statistically but in the 
follow-up calls made to authorities where their questionnaire return gave rise 
to some confusion as to whether or not the authority operated performance 
review, some councils were in fact reticent to admit that they did not operate a 
review system. This attitude was supported by other general observations 
made in the course of conducting this research. Consequently, the above 
figures are only illustrative of the potential scale of review activities being 
undertaken and are likely to be slightly on the high side in evaluating the 
proportion of total councils who could be operating review processes and on 
the low side in calculating the number of councils potentially not operating a 
review system. 
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5.4 Analysis of Characteristics of Local Authorities 
In considering the characteristics of local authorities operating and not 
operating performance review, given the scale of information to be handled, 
a summary is given for each local authority type. The population data was 
that returned to the Registrar General and the Registrar General, Scotland by 
local authorities for 1992 since this was the year in which the questionnaires 
were completed. 
5.4.1 London Boroughs 
The London Boroughs are responsible for the following local authority 
functions: 
Education (including The Careers Service) 
Housing 
Social Services 
Highways 
Libraries 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Strategic Planning 
Local Planning, Development Control 
Economic Development 
Recreation, Parks, Pools and Sports Centre 
Refuse Collection, Street Cleansing 
Refuse Disposal 
Consumer Protection 
Cemeteries and Crematoria 
Licensing 
Council Tax and Rate Collection 
Indeed, the only areas for which they are not responsible are police; the fire 
service and civil defence; and traffic and transportation. They can thus be 
classified as most-purpose authorities. Wilson and Game have compared their 
creation to `a complex web' (1994, p58) and Hebbert and Travers similarly 
argue that: 
The one sure conclusion about London government since the abolition of the 
GLC is that its arrangements are complicated. In every service with the 
possible exception of housing, administration structures have become more 
intricate and political responsibility harder to attribute. Nothing is 
straightforward about local government in London today. 
(Hebbert and Travers, 1988, p188) 
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To recall from table 5.1, the incidence of performance review amongst the 33 
London Boroughs is particularly high with 24 (72.7%) of them known to 
have review systems in place with only 4 (12.1%) reporting no performance 
processes operating and one of these being the exceptional City of London 
Corporation which only has a population of 3,900. Table 5.2 indicates the 
London Boroughs communicating whether or not review systems were in 
operation along with their populations. 
TABLE 5.2: LONDON BOROUGHS AND THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Bexley 219,500 City of London Corporation 3,900 
Brent 247,000 Greenwich 215,000 
Bromley 293,400 Harrow 204,900 
Camden 180,800 Wandsworth 265,900 
Croyden 320,700 
Ealing 283,700 
Enfield 262,600 
Hackney 189,600 
Hammersmith & Fulham 156,100 
Havering 231,300 
Hillingdon 237,600 
Hounslow 206,800 
Kensington and Chelsea 146,900 
Kingston upon Thames 137,800 
Lambeth 258,800 
Lewisham 240,000 
Merton 172,800 
Newham 223,700 
Richmond upon Thames 165,000 
Southwark 227,400 
Sutton 172,000 
Tower Hamlets 168,500 
Waltham Forest 218,300 
Westminster 188,600 
The authorities operating performance review have populations ranging in 
size from 320,000 in Croydon to 137,800 in Kingston upon Thames with an 
average population of 214,500. Excluding the City of London Corporation, 
the population attached to those authorities not having established a review 
mechanism at the time of completing the postal questionnaire varied from 
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204,900 in Harrow to 265,900 in Wandsworth with an average size of 
228,600. 
Although the London Boroughs overall have a high incidence of performance 
review, there is no evidence of a population effect with the smaller authorities 
being just as likely as the larger ones to be operating review processes. There 
is also no discernible pattern of review activity in teens of inner and outer 
London Boroughs 
5.4.2 Scottish Regions 
The Scottish Regions were created by the 1973 Local Government (Scotland) 
Act. There are 9 such councils and they are responsible for: 
Education (including the Careers Service) 
Social Services 
Police 
Fire Service and Civil Defence 
Traffic and Transportation 
Highways 
Water 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Strategic Planning 
Economic Development 
Consumer Protection 
Council Tax and Rate Collection 
In addition, there are three Island authorities - Orkney, Shetland and the 
Western Isles - normally classified as regions, which also have responsibility 
for the services delivered by the Scottish Districts (see below in section 5.3.3) 
and act effectively as all-purpose authorities. Table 5.1 revealed that the 
incidence of performance review was also fairly high for this authority 
grouping with 6 (50.0%) councils known to operate a review mechanism and 
4 (33.3%) indicating no performance system in place. Table 5.3 indicates 
which authorities fall into which category. 
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TABLE 5.3: SCOTTISH REGIONS AND THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Borders 104,800 Central 272,700 
Fife 349,900 Highland 205,900 
Grampian 522,400 Orkney 19,710 
Strathclyde 2,290,700 Shetland 22,640 
Tayside 394,600 
Western Isles 29,350 
The population of authorities operating performance review ranges from 
104,800 in the Borders to 2,290,700 in Strathclyde with an average of 
615,300. The 4 authorities which indicated that they did not have a review 
system in place comprised Orkney and Shetland both unitary Island Councils 
with respective populations of 19,710 and 22,640; and Central and Highland 
Regions with populations of 272,700 and 205,900. Although their average 
population at 130,250 tends to suggest a population effect when compared 
with the average for Scottish Regions operating review procedures, the mean 
figures are skewed by the presence of the small Islands authorities and 
Strathclyde Region, which is exceptionally large. 
5.4.3 Scottish Districts 
The Scottish Districts of which there are 53 in total, were also created by the 
1973 Local Government (Scotland) Act and their functions are complimentary 
to those of the Scottish Regions. They are responsible for: 
Housing 
Libraries 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Local Planning and Development Control 
Economic Development 
Recreation, Parks, Pools and Sports Centres 
Refuse Collection and Street Cleansing 
Refuse Disposal 
Consumer Protection 
Cemereries & Crematoria 
Licensing 
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Table 5.4 identifies the Scottish Districts which indicated in the context of this 
thesis, whether or not performance review featured in their authority. Their 
associated populations are also given. 
TABLE 5.4: SCOTTISH DISTRICTS AND THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE 
Aberdeen 216,520 
Angus 96,500 
Annandale 37,220 
Banff and Buchan 86,940 
Clackmannan 48,460 
Clydesdale 58,190 
Dunfermline 129,840 
East Kilbride 84,750 
East Lothian 85,140 
Ettrick and Lauderdale 34,740 
Falkirk 142,800 
Glasgow 684,260 
Hamilton 107,130 
Kirkcaldy 148,450 
Lochaber 19,350 
Monklands 103,480 
Motherwell 144,270 
Renfrew 200,750 
Strathkelvin 85,950 
REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Argyll and Bute 63,350 
Berwickshire 19,390 
Caithness 26,650 
Cunninghame 138,880 
Dundee 171,520 
Inverclyde 90,990 
Inverness 63,280 
Kincardine 54,990 
Kyle and Carrick 113,640 
Midlothian 79,840 
Nairn 10,760 
Nithsdale 57,050 
North East Fife 71,610 
Perth and Kinross 126,580 
Ross and Cromarty 49,710 
Skye and Lochalsh 11,840 
Stewartry 23,660 
Sutherland 13,090 
Tweedale 15,380 
West Lothian 145,740 
Bearsden and Miingavie 41,000 
Table 5.1 revealed that 19 Scottish Districts had indicated that they had 
performance review systems in operation. These ranged in size from 19,350 in 
Lochaber to 684,260 in Glasgow District with an average of 132,350 people. 
Excluding Glasgow from the calculation on the grounds that it is 3.16 times 
larger than Aberdeen, the district with the next biggest population, the 
average falls to 101,700. The population range for the 21 districts indicating 
no review system established in their authority varied between 171,520 in 
Dundee to 10,760 in Nairn with an average population of 66,140. Comparing 
the mean population figures for the Scottish Districts operating performance 
review with that for the authorities known not to have any review mechanism 
suggests that there may be a population effect. 
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To explore this further, Scottish districts participating in this research were 
ranked in descending population order as indicated in table 5.5 and a `Y' or 
`N' tagged to each population denoting whether a performance review 
system had been implemented (Y) or not (N). The data series was then 
separated into quartiles allowing comparisons between the proportion 
operating and not operating performance review in each to be drawn, 
TABLE 5.5: SCOTTISH DISTRICT POPULATION QUARTILES 
QUARTILE 1 QuARTn. E 2 QuARTILE 3 QuARTn. E 4 
684,260 Y 126,580 N 79,840 N 37,220 Y 
216,520 Y 113,640 N 71,610 N 34,740 Y 
200,750 Y 107,130 Y 63,350 N 26,650 N 
171,520 N 103,480 Y 63,280 N 23,669 N 
148,450 Y 96,500 Y 58,190 Y 19,390 N 
145,740 N 90,990 N 57,050 N 19,350 Y 
144,270 Y 86,940 Y 54,990 N 15,380 N 
142,800 Y 85,950 Y 49,710 N 13,090 N 
138,880 N 85,140 Y 48,460 Y 11,840 N 
129,840 Y 84,750 Y 41,000 N 10,760 N 
7 of the 10 authorities allocated to the upper quartile indicated that they were 
operating a performance review procedure and all 3 with populations above 
200,000 had a review mechanism in place. Only 3 had no review system in 
place and this was also the case in quartile 2. However, in quartile 3a very 
different pattern is in evidence with only 2 of the 10 authorities indicating that 
a review process had been established. In quartile 4a similar distribution is in 
evidence with 3 councils indicating the implementation of performance review 
and 7 reporting no process having been established. 
On the basis of this, it would appear that whilst the incidence of performance 
review is relatively low amongst Scottish Districts with fewer councils 
reporting systems implemented than indicated no performance procedures in 
operation (19 as compared with 21), performance review is more prevalent 
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amongst the district authorities with the larger populations perhaps reflecting 
the increased scale of operations and also their larger resource base making 
the introduction of a review system feasible. However, whilst there is 
evidence of a population effect amongst the Scottish Districts, there are also a 
few small councils which have gone down the review route and a number of 
the larger authorities had not introduced performance review at the time of 
completing the postal questionnaire. 
One of the factors distinguishing the Scottish Districts from the other 
authority groupings, is the enormous variation in population size with 
Glasgow the participating authority with the largest population being 63.6 
times greater than Naim, the smallest council. Although Glasgow is 
particularly big, there are authorities with populations spanning right across 
these extremes. This makes the population effect more transparent. There was 
also a relatively high participation rate in the research with 75.5% of Scottish 
Districts indicating whether or not they had implemented a review system. 
5.4.4 Welsh Counties 
The Welsh Counties were created by the 1972 Local Government Act which 
became effective from April 1974. They have responsibility for the following 
functions: 
Education (including the Careers Service) Refuse Disposal 
Social Services Consumer Protection 
Police 
Fire Service and Civil Defence 
Traffic and Transportation 
Highways 
Libraries 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Strategic Planning 
Economic Development 
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In total, there are only 8 Welsh Counties and of the 5 who participated in this 
research, 3 indicated that they had a review mechanism in place whilst 2 
reported no performance procedures established. Table 5.6 indicates the 
Welsh Counties operating and not operating performance review and their 
populations. There were too few data points to test for any population effect 
but none is apparent. 
TABLE 5.6: WELSH COUNTIES AND THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Clwyd 414,600 Gwent 449,300 
Gwynedd 239,800 West Glamorgan 371,200 
Mid Glamorgan 542,800 
5.4.5 Welsh Districts 
The Welsh Districts offer the complimentary set of services to the Welsh 
Counties having responsibility for: 
Housing 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Local Planning and Development Control 
Economic Development 
Recreation, Parks, Pools and Sports Centres 
Refuse Collection and Street Cleansing 
Cemeteries and Crematoria 
Licensing 
Council Tax and Rate Collection 
Like the Scottish Districts, more Welsh Districts are known not to operate 
performance review than are known to have established performance 
procedures - 12 as compared with 8. However, the Welsh Districts recorded 
the poorest participation rate of all the authority groupings with only 20 of 
the 37 (54.1%) authorities in this grouping submitting a questionnaire return. 
Table 5.7 indicates which of the Welsh Districts have review systems and 
which have not, along with the associated populations of each council. 
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TABLE 5.7: WELSH DISTRICTS AND 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE 
Blaenau Gwent 76,900 
Cardiff 295,600 
Lliw Valley 64,200 
Monmouth 76,700 
Ogwr 134,200 
Port Talbot 51,100 
South Pembrokeshire 42,700 
Yns Mon 69,300 
THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Alyn and Deeside 74,500 
Brecknock 41,500 
Colwyn 56,400 
Cynon Valley 65,600 
Islwyn 67,200 
Presli Pembrokeshire 71,200 
Rhondda 79,300 
Rhuddlan 55,000 
Rhymney Valley 104,000 
Swansea City 189,400 
Torfaen 91,300 
Vale of Glamorgan 114,800 
The population of authorities which have implemented performance review 
procedures ranges from 295,600 in Cardiff to 42,700 in South Pembrokeshire 
with an average of 101,300. For those with no performance review system, 
population varies from 189,400 in Swansea City to 41,500 in Brecknock with 
an average of 84,200. Whilst a crude comparison of the averages suggests the 
possibility of a population effect amongst the Welsh Districts, the fact that 
there are 3 councils with populations in excess of 100,000 not operating 
performance review and a number of the smallest Welsh Districts are operating 
performance review suggests that a population effect is unlikely. To further 
explore this, the data was divided into quartiles as before and as indicated in 
table 5.8. 
TABLE 5.8: WELSH DISTRICT POPULATION QUARTILES 
QUARTILE 1 QUARTII. E 2 QUARTILE 3 QUARTILE 4 
295,600 Y 91,300 N 71,200 N 56,400 N 
189,400 N 79,300 N 69,300 Y 55,000 N 
134,200 Y 76,900 Y 67,200 N 51,100 Y 
114,800 N 76,700 Y 65,600 N 42,700 Y 
104,000 N 74,500 N 64,200 Y 41,500 N 
The quartile data reveals no evidence of a population effect with the 
authorities operating performance review being evenly distributed across the 
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whole spectrum of population size. Indeed, in every quartile, 2 Welsh 
Districts are known have established a review mechanism whilst 3 have 
indicated no process in place. 
5.4.6 County Councils 
County Councils are the authority type known to have the highest level of 
performance review activity with 29 indicating a review system in place and 
only 3 known not to be operating a review mechanism. These respectively 
represented 74.4% and 7.7% of all County Councils. County Councils are 
responsible for the same set of services as the Welsh Counties, namely: 
Education (including the Careers Service) 
Social Services 
Police 
Fire Service and Civil Defence 
Traffic and Transportation 
Highways 
Libraries 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Strategic Planning 
Economic Development 
Refuse Disposal 
Consumer Protection 
Table 5.9 indicates which councils were operating performance review at the 
time of completing the questionnaire and which were not and their 
populations. 
The population of authorities operating performance review ranges from 
1,587,500 in Hampshire to 125,600 in the Isle of Wight with an average of 
779,500. For those few county councils indicating an absence of a 
performance review process, the population ranges from 1,051,900 in 
Staffordshire to 690,400 in Hereford and Worcester with an average of 
835,100. 
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TABLE 5.9: COUNTY COUNCILS AND THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Avon 968,400 Hereford and Worcester 690,400 
Bedfordshire 536,500 Norfolk 763,000 
Buckinghamshire 645,700 Staffordshire 1,051,900 
Cambridgeshire 677,700 
Cheshire 966,900 
Cornwall 473,400 
Cumbria 490,200 
Derbyshire 947,400 
Devon 1, U45,1UU 
Dorset 664,300 
Durham 607,000 
East Sussex 720,600 
Essex 1,555,800 
Gloucestershire 541,400 
Hampshire 1,587,500 
Hertfordshire 994,200 
Humberside 881,400 
Isle of Wight 125,600 
Kent 1,538,300 
Lincolnshire 596,800 
North Yorkshire 723,000 
Nottinghamshire 1,025,200 
Oxfordshire 587,100 
Shropshire 412,800 
Somerset 472,400 
Surrey 1,036,700 
Warwickshire 492,000 
West Sussex 712,600 
Wiltshire 579,300 
5.4.7 Metropolitan Districts 
The Metropolitan Districts, like the London Boroughs, are most-purpose 
authorities and are responsible for the following functions: 
Education (including The Careers Service) Council Tax and Rate Collection 
Housing 
Social Services 
Highways 
Libraries 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Strategic Planning 
Local Planning, Development Control 
Economic Development 
Recreation, Parks, Pools and Sports Centre 
Refuse Collection, Street Cleansing 
Refuse Disposal 
Consumer Protection 
Cemeteries and Crematoria 
Licensing 
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From table 5.1,17 Metropolitan Districts, 47.2% of councils in this grouping, 
are known to operate performance review. 6 indicated that performance 
review did not feature in their authority and this accounted for 16.7% of 
Metropolitan Districts. Table 5.10 indicates which councils fall into which 
category and what their populations are. 
TABLE 5.10: METRO. DISTRICTS AND THE INCIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
REVIEW SYSTEMS IN PLACE REVIEW SYSTEMS NOT IN PLACE 
Barnsley 224,800 Calderdale 193,900 
Bradford 477,500 Manchester 434,600 
Doncaster 293,500 Oldham 220,300 
Dudley 311,000 Rotherham 255,100 
Knowesley 155,500 Sheffield 531,000 
Newcastle upon Tyne 281,700 Wirral 335,300 
North Tyneside 195,200 
Rochdale 205,700 
Salford 230,300 
Sandwell 294,000 
Stockport 288,900 
Tameside 221,000 
Trafford 216,000 
Wakefield 317,100 
Walsall 263,500 
Wigan 312,500 
Wolverhampton 247,500 
The population of authorities having established performance review ranges 
from 477,500 in Bradford to 155,500 In Knowesley with a mean population of 
266,800. For those known not to have implemented review procedures, 
population varies from 531,000 in Sheffield to 193,900 in Calderdale with an 
average of 328,400. No population effect is in evidence. 
5.4.8 Non-Metropolitan Districts 
Non-Metropolitan Districts are the district counterparts of the County 
Councils and are responsible for the provision of: 
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Housing 
Museums and Art Galleries 
Local Planning and Development Control 
Economic Development 
Recreation, Parks, Pools and Sports Centres 
Refuse Collection and Street Cleansing 
Cemeteries and Crematoria 
Licensing 
Council Tax and Rate Collection 
In total, there are 296 Non-Metropolitan Districts in England. 119 (40.2%) 
reported review procedures operating whilst 76 (25.7%) indicated no review 
system in place. Due to the scale of councils involved in this grouping, 
identification of those councils operating and not operating performance 
review and their populations is contained in appendix 5.1. 
The population of authorities having established performance review systems 
ranges from 396,600 in Bristol to 43,800 in Purbeck with a mean population 
of 112,200. The distribution of authorities which are not operating a review 
mechanism ranges from 227,100 in Derby to 24,400 in Teesdale with an 
average of 97,650. 
To test for a population effect, the non-metropolitan districts were listed in 
descending order of population and then divided into five groups as indicated 
in table 5.11. 
If a population effect is operating and thus there is a higher level of 
performance review activity amongst larger councils and less incidence of 
review in smaller authorities, this would manifest itself in a disproportionate 
number of `Ys' in the upper quintiles and `Ns' in the lower quintiles. Given 
the large volume of data contained in table 5.11, summary statistics are 
presented in table 5.12. 
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TABLE 5.11: POPULATION QUINTILES FOR NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 
QUINTILE 1 QUINTILE 2 QUnNTIjE3 QUINTILE 4 QUINTILE 5 
396,600 Y 128,400 Y 106,500 Y 92,500 N 75,900 Y 
285,400 Y 128,200 Y 106,100 Y 92,400 N 75,800 Y 
282,500 Y 127,700 Y 105,400 Y 92,100 N 75,500 Y 
268,500 Y 127,200 N 105,400 N 91,700 N 74,900 N 
257,600 Y 126,900 N 104,500 Y 91,500 Y 72,900 N 
227,100 N 124,500 N 104,200 N 89,000 N 71,800 Y 
208,200 Y 123,300 Y 103,900 Y 88,900 Y 71,800 Y 
189,500 N 120,600 Y 103,900 Y 88,500 N 71,100 Y 
186,000 N 119,800 N 103,800 Y 88,400 N 70,100 Y 
183,700 N 119,100 Y 103,400 Y 87,900 N 69,300 Y 
180,500 N 118,600 Y 103,300 Y 87,300 Y 68,700 N 
176,200 Y 118,500 N 102,900 Y 87,200 Y 68,700 N 
173,600 Y 118,300 N 102,700 Y 86,700 Y 68,600 Y 
162,400 Y 118,200 N 102,200 Y 86,700 N 66,600 N 
161,800 Y 116,800 Y 102,100 Y 86,000 Y 66,000 N 
161,100 N 116,000 Y 102,000 Y 85,700 Y 64,800 N 
159,300 N 115,300 Y 101,800 Y 85,600 Y 63,600 N 
156,200 Y 115,300 N 100,600 Y 85,600 N 63,300 Y 
152,000 Y 114,800 Y 100,300 Y 84,300 Y 63,000 Y 
150,300 N 113,600 N 100,300 Y 83,900 Y 62,400 Y 
149,200 N 113,000 Y 100,100 N 83,900 Y 62,000 Y 
148,600 Y 113,000 Y 99,500 Y 83,500 N 61,300 Y 
147,600 Y 112,300 Y 99,400 N 82,500 Y 58,100 Y 
146,400 Y 111,800 Y 99,100 N 81,900 Y 57,300 Y 
146,000 N 111,400 Y 98,200 Y 81,600 Y 54,100 N 
145,600 Y 111,200 N 98,200 N 81,300 Y 53,300 N 
145,000 Y 110,100 Y 98,000 Y 81,200 N 53,200 N 
142,500 Y 109,900 Y 98,000 N 80,800 Y 52,900 Y 
142,200 Y 109,800 Y 96,900 N 80,500 Y 52,900 N 
138,000 Y 109,800 Y 96,900 N 80,300 Y 51,800 N 
137,100 Y 109,600 N 96,200 N 80,000 N 51,500 N 
136,300 N 109,700 Y 95,900 Y 78,900 Y 51,000 N 
135,500 Y 109,200 Y 95,100 Y 78,700 Y 50,100 Y 
134,500 Y 108,500 N 94,600 Y 78,200 Y 46,500 N 
132,200 Y 108,400 Y 93,600 N 78,000 N 46,400 N 
131,500 Y 108,100 N 93,500 Y 77,800 N 43,800 Y 
131,500 N 107,700 Y 92,800 Y 77,100 N 39,400 N 
131,200 Y 107,400 Y 92,700 N 77,000 N 31,700 N 
130,600 Y 107,400 Y 92,600 N 76,200 N 24,400 N 
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TABLE 5.12: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR NON-METROPOLITAN QUINTILES 
tile 1 tile 3-Quintile 5T 
396,600 
24,400 
106,500 
Upper Point 396,600 128,400 106,500 92,500 
Lower Point 130,600 107,400 92,600 76,200 
Average 173,600 115,400 99,100 84,100 
75,900 
24,400 
59,700 
Nos of Ys 27 26 26 21 19 119 
% of Ys 69.2 66.7 66.7 53.8 48.7 61.0 
Mean Pop of Ys 176,600 114,600 100,900 83,600 64,400 112,200 
Nos of Ns 12 13 13 18 20 76 
% of Ns 30.8 33.3 33.3 46.2 51.3 39.0 
Mean Pop of Ns 166,700 116,900 98,000 84,800 55,100 97,650 
For the non-metropolitan districts, evidence of a population effect is less 
distinctive than was the case for Scottish Districts. 61% of non-metropolitan 
respondents reported performance review systems operationalised in their 
council but 69.2% of councils located in the upper data group had established 
systems but only 48.7% of those located in the lower quintile had a review 
system. In total, 39% of non-metropolitan districts communicated the 
absence of a review system in their authority but in the upper data category, 
only 30.8% of councils were not operating a review mechanism with this 
proportionate figure rising to 51.3% in the lower quintile. Additionally, 
within the data groups, with the exception of quintile 4, the average 
population of councils operating performance review systems is greater than 
that for the authorities where no system has been implemented. Overall, this 
summary data suggests that a population effect is operating but on a much 
less dramatic scale than that evident for Scottish Districts. 
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5.5 Summary 
In considering the research question `how many local authorities operate 
performance review systems? ' there is direct evidence of 43.8% of all local 
authorities having review processes in place but in extrapolating the results to 
incorporate those not participating in this research, potentially as many as 
63.7% of local authorities could have review mechanisms in place. 
Correspondingly, 24.9% of all authorities in Britain were known not to have 
review systems in place at the time the postal questionnaire was issued to 
chief executives and council leaders but by compensating for those not 
participating in this research, this proportion could be as much as 36.3%. This 
suggests that Kerley is right in describing as `overstated, ' the Audit 
Commission's assertion that most local authorities already operate some sort 
of review system (1990, p16). 
In looking at the characteristics of councils operating and not operating 
performance review, London Boroughs, Scottish Regions, Welsh Counties, 
County Councils and Metropolitan Districts can be grouped together as 
authority types with responsibility for similar service areas and particularly 
services which are complex, politically-sensitive and requiring a high level of 
strategic management. Aggregating the incidence of performance review 
mechanisms amongst these groupings reveals that 79 (61.7% of all authorities 
in these groups) operate a performance review system whilst 19 (14.8%) do 
not. Correspondingly, grouping together Scottish, Welsh and Non- 
Metropolitan Districts, 146 (37.8%) have established a review process whilst 
109 (28.2%) have not. This lends support to the view that there is a higher 
likelihood of authorities with the more strategic functions having implemented 
performance review systems than councils which do not. Amongst the 
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districts, particularly in Scotland, there is evidence of a population effect with 
the larger authorities being more likely to operate performance review than 
those with smaller populations. 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines performance review from the perspective of chief 
executives utilising information drawn from the postal questionnaire results 
generated by the responses received from chief executives. Part 1 of the 
questionnaire focused predominately on operational and organisational 
matters relating to performance review, in contrast to that sent to council 
leaders which concentrated much more on the political dimension of review 
systems. To recall from chapter 4, part 1 of the questionnaire sent to chief 
executives was subdivided into 4 sections. Section A explored the 
background to establishing a system and the disposition of the chief 
executive towards performance review. Section B focused on the process of 
establishing the review system with section C concentrating on operational 
details. Section D explored corporate and developmental issues arising from 
the operation of a performance review system. The structure of this chapter 
broadly reflects these subdivisions with separate sections devoted to a 
discussion of internal council attitudes towards performance review, the 
establishment of a review system, the operation of review processes, and 
corporate and developmental issues arising from the operation of review 
systems. There is also a section discussing the part 2 responses received from 
chief executives of local authorities which had not introduced performance 
review systems at the time of completing the questionnaire, and finally there is 
a summary section. 
Fundamental to the relevance of subsequent discussions and underpinning 
the validity of observations made and conclusions drawn from the postal data, 
is the level of part 1 responses received from chief executives (part 2 response 
levels are considered in section 6.6). To recall from chapter 4, overall 53.3% 
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of chief executives participated in the postal questionnaire. However, this 
figure includes those chief executives who completed part 2 of the survey 
form. Table 6.1 indicates the number of part 1 returns for chief executives 
according to authority type. 
TABLE 6.1 : PART 1 RETURNS FROM CHIEF EXECUTIVES 
Part 1 
returns 
London Boroughs 18 
Scottish Regions 4 
Scottish Districts 13 
Welsh Counties 3 
Welsh Districts* 6* 
County Councils 19 
Metropolitan Districts 8 
Non-Met Districts 82 
Total 
* 
% of chief 
executive % of issued % of all 
returns questionnaires authorities 
85.7 60.0 54.5 
50.0 40.0 33.3 
41.9 26.0 24.5 
60.0 37.5 37.5 
42.9 16.2 16.2 
86.4 54.3 48.7 
57.1 23.5 22.2 
55.7 28.5 27.7 
153 58.4 31.1 29.8 
Includes a part 1 return from the chief executive of an authority where the 
performance review system was temporarily suspended at the time of completing 
the questionnaire . 
In total, 153 chief executives completed part 1 of the survey form This 
represents 58.4% of the total number of questionnaires completed by chief 
executives and 31.1% of the number of postal questionnaires issued to chief 
executives. It incorporates 29.8% of all local authorities including those who 
participated as case study authorities. 
Part 1 returns as a percentage of completed questionnaires indicates the 
proportion of chief executives responding to this survey who are from 
authorities operating performance review systems. As table 6.1 shows, the 
highest proportion of part 1 returns came from County Councils (86.4%) and 
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London Boroughs (85.7%). In contrast, only 41.9% of chief executives from 
Scottish Districts who returned survey fortes, were from authorities operating 
performance review mechanisms. Comparatively low figures were also 
recorded for Welsh Districts (42.9%) and Scottish Regions (50.0%). These 
figures broadly reflect those contained in table 5.1, (page 136) which 
indicated the incidence of performance review by type of authority with 
discrepancies indicating authorities whose council leaders had submitted a 
return but whose chief executive had not. 
Part 1 returns as a percentage of postal questionnaires issued is again highest 
amongst London Boroughs (60.0%) and County Councils (54.3%). The 
proportion is lowest for Welsh Districts at 16.2%; but Metropolitan Districts, 
Scottish Districts and Non-Metropolitan Districts also all recorded relatively 
low percentages (23.5%, 26.0% and 28.5% respectively). Part 1 returns as a 
proportion of all local authorities including those participating in the case 
study stage of the project, follow a similar trend with comparatively high 
figures being recorded for London Boroughs (54.5%) and County Councils 
(48.7%); and relatively low percentages being noted for Welsh Districts 
(16.2%) and Metropolitan Districts (22.2%). 
There are no guidelines as to what level of representation is adequate to 
validate findings emerging from postal questionnaires. Indeed, given the 
diverse usage and format of questionnaires, any attempt at delineating 
indicative figures could be considered inappropriate. In this survey, 30% of 
local authorities in Great Britain are represented by part 1 returns made by 
chief executives and this is arguably sufficient to imply that observations 
made and conclusions drawn from the data are likely to be of general 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 158 
applicability. Table 6.1 however, reveals significant diversity in part 1 
participation according to authority type and in authority groupings where 
representation is particularly low, notably the Welsh and Metropolitan 
Districts, caution needs to be exercised before generalising from the data. 
6.2: Internal Council Attitudes Towards Performance Review 
Intuitively and on the basis of evidence gathered through the case studies 
incorporated into this research, the successful implementation and subsequent 
sustainability of a performance review system is dependent on support from 
officers and members alike, both to the principle and practice of reviewing 
performance. One of the research questions thus identified for consideration 
was "what is the attitude from within the council towards performance 
review? " 
On the officer side, commitment from the chief executive is fundamental to the 
success of performance review. However, a number of the chief executives 
completing this questionnaire, were not in post at the time the performance 
review system had been established but rather had inherited the process on 
taking up appointment. Of the 153 chief executives completing part 1 of the 
questionnaire, 32 (20.9%) had not been in post at the time the performance 
review system was implemented. As indicated in Table 6.2 overleaf, the 
highest proportion of these were in the London Boroughs where one-third of 
chief executives participating in this postal questionnaire had moved into 
authorities which had review mechanisms already in place. In both Scottish 
Regions and Welsh Counties, at the time this postal questionnaire was 
conducted, there had been no change in chief executive personnel following 
the establishment of the council's performance review system. 
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TABLE 6.2: CHIEF EXECUTIVES NOT IN POST WHEN THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
SYSTEM WAS ESTABLISHED. 
Percentage of 
Number Part 1 returns 
London Boroughs 6 33.3 
Scottish Regions 0- 
Scottish Districts 1 7.7 
Welsh Counties 0- 
Welsh Districts 1 16.7 
County Councils 3 15.8 
Metropolitan Districts 2 25.0 
Non-Met Districts 19 23.2 
Total 32 20.9 
All 32 of the chief executives who had moved into authorities already 
operating a performance review systems, intimated that if they had been in 
post at the time the system was being established, then they would have been 
supportive of its introduction. 
Of the 121 chief executives in post when the performance review system was 
being established, only 5 had been unsupportive of its introduction; 1 in a 
Scottish District, and 4 in Non-Metropolitan Districts. One chief executive in 
a Welsh district had had some reservations but in all these cases, the 
introduction of the performance review system had been predominately 
driven by members and in two of the Non-Metropolitan Districts, the system 
was operated only through council committees excluding direct officer 
involvement. 
This demonstrably high level of support from chief executives in authorities 
operating performance review is not surprising. Introducing performance 
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review is a complex task and inevitably creates additional work for some 
officers and in an era of increasing demands from a range of different 
directions, this further burden is unlikely to be relished. Whilst the chief 
executive does not need to be actively involved in the development and 
operation of the system, and indeed as will be discussed later in this chapter, 
these tasks are frequently delegated to assistant chief executive level or to a 
performance review officer/team; his/her endorsement is required to give the 
process impetus and to ensure that as far as possible, chief officers take 
performance review seriously and give it sufficient priority. Without a 
supportive chief executive, it is a considerably more onerous task to get a 
performance review system implemented and it would have thus been 
surprising to see many part 1 returns from chief executives unsupportive of 
the introduction of performance review. 
The evidence gathered during the personal interview stage of this research 
suggested that there are few authorities where chief officers have 
unanimously and overwhelmingly embraced performance review. Resistance 
fi a few senior managers is commonplace. They resent the additional 
burden it will place on their already overworked departments regarding it as 
an add-on and some are suspicious of the motivation behind establishing a 
performance review system regarding it as a move from the centre to monitor 
individual departments' activities. However, most resistance arises through 
lack of knowledge about what is involved and can be overcome by 
communicating the benefits of operating performance review and the 
processes and procedures involved. Table 6.3 indicates the attitude of officers 
to the introduction of performance review according to the chief executives 
who returned part 1 of the postal questionnaire. The figures in italics show 
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their attitude towards performance review at the time the questionnaire was 
completed. 
TABLE 6.3: OFFICER SUPPORT FOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
Supportive Mixed Unsupportive 
Too soon 
to say 
London Boroughs 15 16 3101 
Scottish Regions 231110 
Scottish Districts 11 11 1111 
Welsh Counties 330000 
Welsh Districts 521102 
County Councils 18 18 1100 
Metropolitan Districts 870100 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 61 64 16 17 51 
Total 
Percentage 
123 124 23 23 751 
80.4 81.4 15.0 15.0 4.6 3.3 0.7 
In total, 123 (80.4%) chief executives considered their officers to be 
supportive of the introduction of performance review, 23 (15.0%) reported 
mixed support and 7 (4.6%) said that their officers were unsupportive of the 
establishment of a performance system. In only Welsh Counties and 
Metropolitan Districts, did all chief executive returns exclusively record 
supportive officers. 5 of the 7 chief executives recording unsupportive 
officers were from Non-Metropolitan Districts and the other two were from a 
Scottish Region and a Scottish District. 
Following implementation, the disposition of officers towards performance 
review is broadly similar with 124 (81.4%) chief executives indicating 
supportive officers, 23 (15.0%) recording mixed support and 5 (3.3%) 
reporting unsupportive officers. 1 chief executive of a Welsh District felt that 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 162 
it was too soon after the implementation of his system to respond to this 
question. Although the overall figures are similar, there were some shifts of 
support within authority groupings. For example, in the London Boroughs, 
of the three councils reporting mixed support from officers prior to 
implementation, the officers in one had become supportive, the officers in 
another had become unsupportive, and the officers in the other, still had some 
reservations. 
Overall, this data suggests that there is a minority of authorities in which the 
attitude to performance review from officers within the council is problematic. 
Most officers have been supportive of the introduction of review mechanisms 
and support has continued following implementation. What the postal 
questionnaire did not explore was what were the reasons for support lacking 
in some authorities. Some explanations for this were detected in the responses 
detailing the problems encountered in establishing a performance review 
system but it would have been interesting to explore this issue further. There 
was also no measure of the strength of support or otherwise and with 
hindsight, the use of some sort of scale might have proved more revealing in 
this question. 
In the case studies, a number of authorities which regard performance review 
as primarily a management tool were identified and the issue of commitment 
from members to the system was sometimes underplayed or even ignored. The 
precise reasons for reviewing performance vary considerably amongst 
authorities but as discussed in chapter 2 there is a general consensus that it is 
to improve performance normally by assessing whether current actions are 
having the desired and expected effect and consequently what action is 
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required to achieve policies in the future. Since members should be the policy- 
makers or should at least be involved in the policy process, they are by 
definition involved in performance review and their commitment is thus 
required. Table 6.4 indicates the level of member support for the introduction 
of performance review as perceived by chief executives and also their 
disposition towards the systems following operationalisation (the figures 
shown in italics). 
TABLE 6.4 : MEMBER SUPPORT FOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
Supportive Mixed Unsupportive Indifferent 
London Boroughs 18 16 010100 
Scottish Regions 44000000 
Scottish Districts 12 11 011100 
Welsh Counties 33000000 
Welsh Districts 53000211 
County Councils 16 16 130020 
Metropolitan Districts 87010000 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 74 73 880001 
Total 140 133 9 14 1432 
Percentage 91.5 86.3 5.9 9.2 0.7 2.6 2.0 1.3 
Overall, 140 (91.5%) chief executives reported that their members had been 
supportive of the introduction of a performance review system. 9 (5.9%) 
noted mixed support from their members and only 1 (0.7%), from a Scottish 
District, intimated that councillors had been unsupportive. 3 (2.0%) chief 
executives communicated that their members were indifferent to the 
introduction of a review mechanism and from other questionnaire responses it 
was possible to discern that these all represented councils where members had 
minimal involvement in the review mechanism and thus had no interest in it. 
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In some other councils, members were not directly involved in the process but 
still were clearly either favourably disposed towards it or not. Following 
implementation, the broad trend of support is similar with 133 (86.3%) chief 
executives reporting continued support from members, 14 (9.2%) noting 
mixed support, 4 (3.3%) intimating an unsupportive disposition on the part of 
their members, and 2 communicating indifference to performance. However, 
there are some shifts in attitudes of members within authority types as 
indicated in the italics in table 6.4. For example, amongst metropolitan district 
chief executives, one reported a shift to mixed support from supportiveness 
and 1 non-metropolitan district noted a shift from supportiveness to 
indifference. 
In comparing the disposition of officers and members towards performance 
review both prior to implementation and following the establishment of the 
system, in general, supportiveness seems to have modestly grown amongst 
officers following implementation but been slightly reduced amongst members. 
A number of councils added comments to this question which indicated that 
there had been a level of suspicion from officers about the introduction of the 
system but following the event, these had been allayed. However, on the 
member side, two chief executives reported that the operation of the review 
process had revealed unwelcome details of weak performance and this had led 
to a reduction in their support for performance review. Two chief executives 
also said that they had had a great deal of difficulty in sustaining the interest 
of members towards performance review once the decision to introduce a 
system and the design of the review process, had gone through the committee 
stage. 
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Changes in attitudes following implementation as revealed by this postal 
survey, tend to suggest that there has been some misunderstanding on the 
part of officers and members about what operating a performance review 
system will entail. Following operationalisation, in some cases the experience 
has been better than anticipated and in a few cases, operating a system has 
been worse than expected and has precipitated a lessening of support. This 
suggests that perhaps more should be done to communicate what is involved 
although this does run the risk of generating more unsupportiveness at an 
early stage in the process and ultimately might result in the system never 
getting established. 
More generally, it is not surprising to observe a high level of general support 
from both officers and members towards performance review since with few 
exceptions, the decision to establish a performance review system has 
principally been internal. Table 6.5 overleaf indicates where the initial idea of 
introducing performance review came from. In 58% of cases, the decision has 
been principally officer-led (including chief executive and chief officer 
responses); in 13% of cases it has been member-led; and in 26% of cases, the 
proposal was jointly initiated by officers and members. Little difference in 
pattern was discernible according to authority type except that in 3 non- 
metropolitan districts, the proposal to introduce performance review came 
from consultants and in one further case, from the district auditor. 
A number of authorities have also introduced measures intended to enhance 
officer/member co-operation in relation to the performance review system and 
its operation and so maintain a positive attitude towards performance review. 
Table 6.6 indicates the breakdown of responses according to authority-type. 
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TABLE 6.5 : WHO INITIATED THE PROPOSAL TO INTRODUCE PERFORMANCE REVIEW? 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD TOTAL (%) 
Officers 7143193 37 65 42.5 
Officers & members 312261 19 34 22.2 
Members 63127 19 12.4 
Chief executive 1223218 19 12.4 
Chief executive and leader 11242.6 
Chief officers 11132.0 
Consultants 332.0 
Chief executive & member 110.7 
Leader 110.7 
Previous chief executive 110.7 
District Auditor 110.7 
Nil response 1121.3 
In total, 72 (47.1%) chief executives reported that specific measures had been 
introduced to facilitate co-operation from officers and members in relation to 
the performance review system. A further 2 (1.3%) said that such a 
development was on-going. 66 (43.1%) reported no specific measures in 
place and there were 13 nil responses to this question - which was particularly 
high and may be accounted for by the fact that the question appeared near 
the end of the survey form. 
With the exception of Scottish Regions, the proportion of those 
introducing/not introducing co-operation measures, approximately holds 
across all authority types with one chief executive from a London Borough 
and one from a Scottish District reporting the introduction of such measures as 
on-going. In the relatively small sample of Scottish Regions, all respondents 
reported co-operation measures in place. 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 167 
TABLE 6.6: WERE MEASURES INTRODUCED TO ENSURE OFFICER/MEMBER CO- 
OPERATION 
Yes No On-Going Nil Response 
London Boroughs 7911 
Scottish Regions 4000 
Scottish Districts 5710 
Welsh Counties 1101 
Welsh Districts 3201 
County Councils 9802 
Metropolitan Districts 5300 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 38 36 08 
Total 
Percentage 
72 66 2 13 
47.1 43.1 1.3 8.5 
Where authorities had introduced specific measures to enhance co-operation, 
they were asked to describe these. Appendix 6.1 contains the full breakdown 
of responses but box 6.1 contains a sub-set of the most pertinent, revealing 
and frequently recurring answers. The majority of measures focus on keeping 
members and officers informed and/or involved; or on facilitating their 
collaborative working; or on giving them a platform from which to voice their 
concerns and debate emerging issues. The case studies undertaken for this 
thesis revealed however, that sometimes such initiatives can go stale very 
quickly after the performance review system is fully implemented. There was 
also some doubt about their effectiveness - having a formalised mechanism in 
place to enhance officer/member co-operation does not guarantee improved 
levels of co-operation. Indeed, such measures have often been introduced 
where problems with co-operation from officers and members have been 
anticipated, and creating an officer-member working group for example, is not 
always sufficient to overcome these difficulties. Consequently, it is likely that 
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councils which have not instigated any measures to enhance co-operation, 
may experience at least the same levels of co-operation from their officers and 
members, as those which have. 
BOX 6.1 : MEASURES INTRODUCED TO ENHANCE OFFICER/MEMBER 
CO-OPERATION 
Regular chief executive/leader meetings and extended use of informal member/officer 
groups. 
Members are kept informed of targets and the review process and would be informed 
by the chief executive of any drastic departure from targets. 
The system is being developed through the consent and support of officers and 
members. There has been joint awareness training and a newly established group of 
chief officers and members will be involved in its development. 
Joint officer/member informal seminars on policy formulation and strategic direction 
but this is wider than service by service performance review. 
Through the interface created by meetings of the Audit Panel. 
Chief officers and members are working together on agreeing a Corporate Plan and a 
Statement in relation to what this county council does. 
An officer performance review group chaired by the chief executive's policy assistant 
feeds into the main Performance Review Committee. 
Full debate with members as appropriate at Committees. Also an informal arena has 
been created for chief officers and all members to discuss policy and performance 
issues. 
At the start, middle and end of the performance review, the corporate management 
team consult the 2 members designated to assist with the review. 
Rolling programme of review and discussion sessions. 
Service Plan Panel Meetings - informal meetings to discuss individual services whereby 
members have an opportunity to review performance, discuss any issues and agree 
targets. 
Small working groups have been established to focus on the area of performance 
review that members are principally interested in. 
The case studies also revealed that one method used for ensuring that the 
performance review system remains high on the officer agenda is linking the 
process to performance appraisal and/or performance-related pay and this 
could have a significant bearing on the attitude of officers towards 
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link with performance-related pay and indeed strong opposition to 
performance-related pay was evident. Unfortunately the importance of the 
distinction was not revealed during the pilot stage of the postal questionnaire 
and thus the two were taken together in the postal survey. 
There is significant variation in the proportion of chief executives reporting a 
link between performance review and performance appraisal/performance- 
related pay according to authority type. In the Welsh Counties and Scottish 
Districts, no such links were recorded and only one Metropolitan chief 
executive reported a link in place. Contrastingly, 76.5% (13) of London 
Borough chief executives reported that a link had been made between the 
review mechanism and performance appraisal and/or performance-related pay. 
In the County Councils and Non-Metropolitan Districts, the proportion of 
authorities reporting a link, is higher than those reporting that no link had 
been established (57.9% against 42.1%; and 53.8% against 46.2% 
respectively). The balance is even within the Scottish Regions, and for the 
Welsh Districts, one-third of authorities have review systems linked to 
performance appraisal/performance-related pay. Information from the wider 
ESRC project suggested that it is the type of performance review system 
established and the reasons why it was implemented which often determines 
whether the review system feeds into performance appraisal and/or 
performance-related pay. One of the other key determinants is whether a 
performance appraisal system and/or performance-related pay scheme was in 
place prior to the establishment of the system. Where these have been present, 
it makes little sense to devise a review process which does not build on these 
existing schemes. 
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performance review. Table 6.7 shows the breakdown of authorities who have 
made such a link. 
TABLE 6.7: IS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM LINKED TO PA/PRP 
Yes 
London Boroughs 13 
Scottish Regions 2 
Scottish Districts 0 
Welsh Counties 0 
Welsh Districts 2 
County Councils 11 
Metropolitan Districts 1 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 43 
Total 
Percentage 
No Nil response 
41 
20 
13 0 
30 
40 
80 
70 
37 2 
72 78 
47.1 51.0 
3 
2.0 
In total, 72 (47.1%) of the chief executives completing part 1 of the 
questionnaire reported that the performance review system operating in their 
authority had been linked to performance appraisal and/or performance- 
related pay. 78 (51.0%) indicated that such a link had not been made and 
there were 3 nil responses to this question. The precise question asked was "Is 
the performance review system linked to performance appraisal and/or 
performance related pay? " In retrospect, it would have been better to 
separate these two issues and to have had different questions about the 
system being linked to performance appraisal and performance-related pay. 
Although this particular question only required a yes/no answer, a number of 
the chief executives added comments to the effect that they felt strongly that 
it was appropriate to link performance review with performance appraisal and 
that such a link had been made or that such a modification was intended in 
their authority some time in the future but that there should definitely not be a 
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A positive disposition towards performance review is less imperative below 
senior officer level but clearly still desirable - supportiveness at all levels of the 
organisation could ultimately impinge on the overall effectiveness of the 
performance review system. A number of authorities have thus instigated 
mechanisms for communicating knowledge of targets and performance to 
junior management and operative grade staff. Table 6.8 indicates the 
breakdown of authorities who have put such mechanisms in place. 
TABLE 6.8: IS THERE ANY MECHANISMS FOR COMMUNICATING KNOWLEDGE TO 
JUNIOR MANAGEMENT? 
Yes No On-going Nil response 
London Boroughs 13 401 
Scottish Regions 1300 
Scottish Districts 10 210 
Welsh Counties 1110 
Welsh Districts 4101 
County Councils 12 610 
Metropolitan Districts 4400 
Non-Met Districts 59 19 04 
Total 
Percentage 
104 40 36 
68.0 26.1 2.0 3.9 
Overall, 104 (68.0%) chief executives reported some mechanism in place for 
communicating information from the performance review system to junior 
management and operative grade staff. A further 3 (2.0%) reported that such 
a mechanism was currently being developed. 40 (26.1%) said that no formal 
communication channel had been established and there were 6 nil responses 
to this question. Within the total figures, some variation is apparent. Only in 
Scottish Regions had fewer authorities not introduced communication 
mechanisms as compared with those who had. In Welsh Counties and in 
Metropolitan Districts, the balance is the same although one additional Welsh 
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County reported that such a link was currently being developed. In the other 
authority groupings, the proportion of chief executives responding to this 
question, who reported that a mechanism was in place for communicating 
knowledge downwards, ranged from 63.1% in County Councils to 80% in 
Welsh Districts. 
Respondents were not asked to elaborate on the specific nature of the 
mechanism utilised but a number of chief executives indicated how 
knowledge was communicated and the mechanisms included an authority- 
wide performance newsletter, departmental performance information bulletins, 
performance appraisal schemes, and departmental team and individual "prizes" 
for performance. 
On the basis of the evidence accumulated in the postal questionnaire 
completed by chief executives, in the majority of cases it appears that internal 
council attitudes towards performance review are positive and non 
problematic. 
6.3 : Establishing a Performance Review System 
One of the key areas explored in the postal questionnaire relates to the 
research question `what factors are significant in establishing a performance 
review system? ' This section explores the introduction of review processes as 
described by chief executives. The case study stage of the ESRC project 
revealed that some performance review systems in existence are revisions or 
modifications of mechanisms that have been in place for some time. Often the 
review process is revised over time, in line with both external and internal 
changes affecting its operation and the council more generally. Table 6.9 
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indicates whether an alternative performance review system had been in place 
prior to the introduction of the current system and where this was so, whether 
the new system was a modified version of the previous mechanism. 87 
(56.9%) chief executives reported no previous performance review system 
operating whilst 66 (43.1%) indicated that a system had been in place prior to 
the introduction of the current process. 
TABLE 6.9 : PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEMS 
Nos of authorities 
not previously 
operating a review 
mechanism (%) 
London Boroughs 13 (72.2) 
Scottish Regions 2 (50.0) 
Scottish Districts 10 (76.9) 
Welsh Counties 3 (100.0) 
Welsh Districts 2 (33.3) 
County Councils 6 (31.6) 
Metropolitan Districts 4 (50.0) 
Non-Met Districts 47 (57.3) 
Nos of authorities Nos of these 
previously which are modified 
operating a review versions of old 
mechanism (%) system (%) 
5 (27.8) 4 (80.0) 
2 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 
3 (23.1) 1 (33.3) 
0 (0.0) 
4 (66.7) 2 (50.0) 
13 (68.4) 3 (23.1) 
4 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 
35 (42.7) 18 (51.4) 
Total 87 (56.9) 66 (43.1) 30 (45.5) 
Of the 66 authorities reporting systems in operation prior to the introduction 
of the existing system, 30 (45.5%) indicated that the current system was a 
modification or enhancement of the previous mechanism. The proportion of 
existing systems which are revisions on earlier processes is highest in the 
London Boroughs (80.0%) and Non-Metropolitan Districts (51.4%) and 
lowest in County Councils (23.1%) and Scottish Regions where all the 
existing systems are new. Additional comments to this question revealed that 
in general, in authorities which already had a performance review system in 
operation, completely new systems were implemented where a major change 
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such as a fundamental restructuring had been undertaken. Modified systems 
or enhancements to existing processes were generally the result of a more 
limited review of practice or reflected a change in key personnel. 
Many authorities are known to have continuously refined their performance 
review system in the light of changing needs, circumstances and recognised 
good practice; with the result that the existing system bears little relation to 
that which was initially set up. However, since this does not constitute the 
introduction of a new system, it will not be reflected in the figures above. 
Similarly, in some councils that consider a new system to have been 
introduced, close scrutiny might suggest that the old system has only been 
tinkered with rather than modified or replaced. Intuitively, the longer a 
system has been in place, the more likely it is to have been replaced rather than 
refined. Further insight can be gained by looking at the year in which the 
existing system was established and this information is contained in table 6.10. 
The peak period reported by chief executives for establishing existing 
performance review systems is 1990-1992 during which 61.5% of the 
mechanisms currently in operation, were implemented. 5.9% were set up prior 
to the first Thatcher administration (1974-1978). Only one chief executive, 
from a Non-Metropolitan District, reported a system being established during 
the 1979 -1983 period. 11 (7.2%) systems were operationalised between 1984 
and 1987; 8 (5.2%) during 1988; and 13 (8.5%) during 1989.14 (9.2%) chief 
executives completing part 1 of the postal questionnaire reported that the 
introduction of performance review was on-going. Since the survey forms 
were completed in 1992, these could reasonably be re-classified as 1992 
respondents bringing the proportion of systems introduced during the 1990- 
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1992 period to 70.7%. This is not surprising since as discussed in chapter 4, 
1988 marked the height of the Audit Commission's campaign for the 
introduction of performance review to local authorities. With increasing 
pressure from this quarter and with value for money issues looking set to 
assume continued prominence on all public sector agendas, it is not surprising 
to see a substantially increasing trend of introducing review mechanism 
following some short time after this. 
TABLE 6.10: WHEN WAS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM ESTABLISHED? 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD TOTAL (%) 
1974-1978 0000311495.9 
1979-1983 0000000110.7 
1984-1987 30010304 11 7.2 
1988 2120001285.2 
1989 10200406 13 8.5 
1990 6220062 13 31 20.3 
1991 2140241 28 42 27.5 
1992 2012002 14 21 13.7 
On-going 10201118 14 9.2 
Nil response 1000000232.0 
3 (50.0%) Welsh District chief executives reported systems introduced during 
the 1974-1978 period. However, 1 of these had recently been suspended 
pending review at the time the questionnaire was completed. 4 Non- 
Metropolitan chief executives and 1 each from a County Council and from a 
Metropolitan District also record mechanisms dating back to this 
comparatively early period. Given the depth and scope of change which has 
confronted local government since the late 1970's, it is surprising, if not 
alarming, to see any systems conceived and implemented in the mid-1970s, 
still in existence today. However, in addition to the process suspended within 
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the Welsh Districts, close inspection and follow-up calls revealed that 6 of the 
remaining 7 authorities had, as described above, continuously revised their 
systems to accommodate the changing local government environment but 
without ever formally introducing a "new" system. One Non-Metropolitan 
District still operated basically the same system as that established in 1974. 
Within this process, chief officers and committee chairs agree service levels for 
each service area, information on which is then reported back to committee at 
annual intervals. Although the level of service had changed, and sometimes 
the committee to which information was reported for certain services, and 
indeed sometimes the services delivered and thus reported on, the basic 
framework utilised for reviewing performance was still the same and still 
considered appropriate by this authority. 
Comparing the number of chief executives reporting a previous review 
process in place prior to the existing one, with the year in which current 
systems were established; the majority of authorities reporting previous 
review mechanisms, also report current systems being set up since 1989 (58 
out of 66). Correspondingly, only 2 of the authorities reporting systems 
established prior to 1988, also reported a previous performance review 
process in place. 
Once a council has taken the decision to introduce some form of performance 
review mechanism, the next stage is to design a process which matches the 
organisation and then establish it within the authority. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, it was anticipated that the uniqueness and diversity of local councils 
would result in wide variation in the scope of review systems which have 
been implemented in this country. It was therefore felt that the "design" of 
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performance review systems could not accurately be picked up through a 
postal questionnaire and that this issue was best explored through the case 
studies and consequently, is discussed in chapter 8. However, in establishing 
a performance review system most councils have to consider a number of 
similar issues and these will now be considered. 
Regardless of the nature and specific type of performance review system 
introduced, the process of reviewing performance implies that an organisation 
has some knowledge of what level of performance is desirable and how it is 
going to measure whether this level is being achieved. Most organisations 
consequently have goals and targets addressing this and these exist both at an 
organisational and a departmental level. However, many organisations not 
operating performance review mechanisms also have specific goals and targets 
because these often form part of the budgetary, policy planning and service 
delivery processes. Table 6.11 indicates whether goals and targets had been 
formally set prior to the introduction of the performance review system as 
reported by chief executives. 
TABLE 6.11: WERE GOALS AND TARGETS SET PRIOR TO THE PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW SYSTEM? 
Yes No Partially 
%%% 
London Boroughs 4 22.2 14 77.7 0 0.0 
Scottish Regions 3 75.0 1 25.0 0 0.0 
Scottish Districts 3 23.1 10 76.9 0 0.0 
Welsh Counties 0 0.0 3 100 0 0.0 
Welsh Districts 2 33.3 4 66.7 0 0.0 
County Councils 11 57.9 8 42.1 0 0.0 
Metropolitan Districts 2 25.0 6 75.0 0 0.0 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 33 40.2 44 53.7 5 6.1 
Total 58 37.9 90 58.8 5 3.3 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 178 
58 (37.9%) chief executives reported that goals and targets had been formally 
set prior to the introduction of the performance review system. 90 (58.8%) 
said that they had not been in place and 5 (3.3%) reported that they had been 
partially in place normally in some departments or service areas, but not in 
others. Within authority types, the proportion of chief executives reporting 
goals and targets set is highest for Scottish Regions (75.0%) and County 
Councils (57.9%) and lowest for Welsh Counties where no authorities had 
pre-set goals and targets, and London Boroughs (22.2%), Scottish Districts 
(23.1%) and Metropolitan Districts (25.0%). All 5 chief executives reporting 
partially set goals and targets represented Non-Metropolitan Districts. 
Authorities which already have goals and targets set before introducing 
performance review are likely to have been conscious of performance issues 
for some time prior to establishing a system and in particular have already 
identified what the council is trying to achieve (goals) and what level can 
reasonably be expected to be achieved (targets) and will presumably have 
some mechanism in place for measuring progress towards achieving these. In 
such cases, it is quite likely that the performance review system is a 
formalisation or extension of an existing internal process. In contrast, in 
authorities, where no goals and targets have previously been set, the 
introduction of a performance review system is likely to be a more substantial 
step since the council has not yet addressed the issues outlined above. 
Intuitively, authorities which have only recently introduced performance 
review would be more likely to have goals and targets formally set since the 
recent trend in local government has been towards focusing on the purposes 
of services and indeed of councils themselves. The postal questionnaire data 
supported this with 52 of the 58 chief executives reporting goals and targets 
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set prior to the introduction of the review system, also reporting systems 
established during or after 1990. 
For authorities embarking on performance review who already have goals and 
targets set, either these need to be incorporated into the performance review 
system, or new goals and targets have to be set which are more appropriate 
for the review process. For those councils not having pre-set goals and 
targets, these normally require to be established before the review mechanism 
can be implemented into the authority, although there are a few performance 
review systems in operation which do not rely on goals and targets being in 
place. The range of methods used in setting policy targets for the performance 
review system as reported by chief executives completing part 1 of the postal 
questionnaire was extremely broad and appendix 6.2 contains the full set of 
responses given to the question "How were the policy targets set for the PR 
system? " However box 6.2 contains a pertinent sample. 
In most cases, policy targets emerge from the strategic and operational plans 
of the authorities including strategy statements, business plans, and corporate 
and developmental objectives. However, in a few instances, more elaborate 
processes are in evidence including consultation with the public about the 
level of service delivery that they desired, prior to the setting of policy targets. 
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BOX 6.2: HOW WERE POLICY TARGETS SET FOR THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
SYSTEM? 
Strategy statements. 
Annual Business Plans. 
Policy targets are set in accordance with corporate/departmental objectives. 
Originated in departments, discussed in management team and noted by councils. 
The council published its corporate strategy and the strategic objectives within the 
corporate strategy have been expressed in terms of policy work targets for the council 
and form the corporate work programme. 
Policy targets are not formally set. Members identify areas for review. If officers were 
to suggest that policy targets should be introduced, this would be seen as officer 
domination/interference. 
Client teams in departments draft annual service plans, including policy targets which 
go to service committees for approval. 
Public consultation through magazine and exhibition; member policy workshops and 
through discussion with chief officers management team. 
Combination of political manifesto and departmental objectives 
Targets set by each service manager in consultation with staff based on past practice, and 
objectives and priorities for the forthcoming year. 
The starting point was current standards of performance many of which had previously 
been set by service committees. 
By discussion between chief officers and committee chairmen of draft targets and then 
endorsed by committees. 
The postal questionnaire also asked respondents who had set policy targets 
for the performance review system. The full set of responses is contained in 
appendix 6.3. However, it was possible to group responses as summarised in 
table 6.12. In total, 45 (29.4%) chief executives reported that policy targets 
had been jointly set by officers and members - this category also included 
responses such as chief executive and leader; and chief officers and service 
committee chairs. A further 30 (19.6%) chief executives reported that the 
targets had predominately been set by officers. This grouping of responses 
included instances where officers had set the targets which had then been 
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endorsed by committees since clearly there was not member input in the actual 
setting of the targets. 
TABLE 6.12 : WHO SET THE POLICY TARGETS? 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD Total (%) 
Jointly set 5251051 26 45 (29.4) 
Members 5020131 19 31 (20.3) 
Officers 2120221 20 30 (19.6) 
Committees 3011152 10 23 (15.0) 
Other 211002017 (4.6) 
Not set/agreed 001011115 (3.3) 
On-going 000110114 (2.6) 
Chief executive 101001014 (2.6) 
Nil response 000000134 (2.6) 
31 (20.3%) chief executives noted that policy targets had been set by 
members and an additional 23 (15.0%) recorded targets as being set by 
Committees. Consequently, members were exclusively involved in target 
setting in 54 (35.3%) responding authorities and including the authorities 
where they were jointly set, they had some level of input in 99 (64.7%) 
councils. This level of involvement from councillors is not surprising. 
Members are the politicians and in theory, officers are there to inform and 
implement the policies determined by councillors. If this theory is to turn into 
practice, then members have to set the policy targets being striven for. 
However, it is not surprising to note some officer involvement in this process 
since they have valuable knowledge for example, on the costs of delivering 
services. The postal questionnaire issued to chief executives did not ask 
respondents about the political balance of their council but this was identified 
in the questionnaire issued to council leaders. Of the 30 chief executives 
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reporting that officers were predominately involved in setting policy targets, 
responses were received from 23 corresponding council leaders and 16 
(69.6%) of these represented councils where either no political control was 
exercised or where there was a minority ruling group. In such councils, clear 
policy direction is not always forthcoming from the council and therefore 
officers often have to feature more dominantly in the process of setting policy 
agendas including policy targets for the organisation. 
In 4 (2.6%) authorities, the policy targets were set by the chief executive 
although one might reasonably speculate that this response means that the 
chief executive had ultimate responsibility for their setting and that they are 
likely to have been set by chief officers or service managers for his 
endorsement or approval only. In 4 (2.6%) councils, the setting of policy 
targets was an on-going development at the time the questionnaire was 
completed; 5 (3.3%) chief executives intimated that policy targets had yet to 
be set and/or agreed in their organisation; and their were 4 nil responses to 
this question. Within these total figures, no discernible pattern is evident for 
alternative authority groupings. 
Not surprisingly, these responses are in keeping with the responses given to 
the question "How were policy targets set for the PR system? " For example, 
authorities which indicated that policy targets were set through the Members' 
Strategic Policy Statements or equivalent-type documents, have responded 
that it was members that set the policy targets. Similarly, organisations 
communicating that policy targets originated in departments, have intimated 
that targets were set by officers. Recalling tables 6.3 and 6.4 which reported 
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whether officers and members were supportive or not of the introduction of 
performance review, in most cases where officers were unsupportive or where 
mixed support was recorded, the policy targets have been set by members 
Similarly, in councils where members were unsupportive, displayed mixed 
support or were indifferent to the introduction of performance review, the 
policy targets have been set either predominately by officers or the chief 
executive or have not yet been agreed. 
In setting policy targets in the context of performance review, some means of 
monitoring the degree to which these targets are being attained or not, is 
required and generally performance measures and indicators are utilised. Chief 
executives completing part 1 of the postal questionnaire were asked to 
indicate "How were performance measures set for the PR system? " As with 
policy targets, a wide range of responses was received and these are 
contained in full in appendix 6.4. However, box 6.3 contains a sub-set of the 
most revealing of these. 
The responses were rather surprising. It might reasonably have been 
anticipated that performance measures for the performance review process 
would be determined in a similar manner to the policy targets. Since one of 
the purposes of the performance measures is to ascertain whether policy 
targets are being achieved, it is not unreasonable to expect these to be set at 
the same time as the targets are established. However, the responses to the 
question of how performance measures were established, often seem 
unrelated to the mechanisms employed for setting targets and indeed, there 
was one chief executive who had indicated policy targets set through the 
committee process but also reported no performance measures in place. Many 
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of the responses to the performance measures question suggest that the 
measures used are extremely operational in nature if not in fact, management 
statistics, for example, those councils indicating that they rely on the Audit 
Commission's suggested statistics. To explore this further, an analysis was 
undertaken on who had set the performance measures. The full set of 
responses is contained in appendix 6.5 but table 6.13 overleaf summarises the 
data. 
BOX 63: How WERE PERFORMANCE MEASURES SET FOR THE PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW SYSTEM? 
Customer-service driven 
Defined by heads of service in business plans. 
Consideration of key service areas by management team. 
Consultative mechanism starting with the Audit Commissions statistics. These are still 
being refined. 
These were developed by managers in liaison with the policy Unit. 
Via the "Quality Assurance" Panel of members 
Initially they were set by the Management Services Unit staff and modified by 
departmental managers. They were based on Audit Commission information and 
research information elsewhere. 
Reference to the approach adopted in other authorities but with emphasis on quality- 
based performance indicators. 
Based on a formula provided by consultants. 
Largely by reference to Audit Commission suggestions. This has evolved since 
performance review has been embarked upon and the business planning process is 
helping to focus minds. 
Not used in this authority. 
Based upon measured customer/client expectations. Agreed targets set between staff 
and directors. 
Mainly the achievement of key tasks within timetables. Certain measures relate to 
norms. 
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TABLE 6.13: WHO SET THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES? 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD Total (%) 
Officers 4260265 46 71 (46.4) 
Jointly set 9121160 16 36 (23.5) 
Committees 2100141 11 20 (13.1) 
Members 100001057 (4.6) 
Other 201101117 (4.6) 
Ongoing 001100013 (2.0) 
Not sedagreed 001000001 (0.7) 
Nil response or N/A 002021128 (5.2) 
Overall, 71 (46.4%) chief executives reported that officers had set the 
performance measures with a further 36 (23.5%) intimating that performance 
measures had been jointly set by officers and members. 20 (13.1%) 
respondents communicated that measures were set by committees and a 
further 7 said that members had been responsible for their establishment. Thus 
members had exclusive involvement in only 27 (17.6%) cases and including 
those jointly set with officers, members were involved in the setting of 
performance measures in 63 (41.2%) authorities. 
In comparison with the figures contained in table 6.11, member involvement in 
establishing policy targets is more substantial than their input in determining 
performance measures. It may be the case that this question was 
misinterpreted by chief executives and that the responses received related to 
general performance monitoring within local authorities rather than 
performance measuring in the context of policy targets, an idea supported by 
responses of the type "service departments, the policy co-ordination unit, 
accountants, client teams and cost centre managers. " Or it may in fact be the 
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case that performance measures have not been developed in relation to policy 
targets and the responses relate to operational performance monitoring, 
because that is all that is occurring. It was not possible from the postal 
questionnaire to ascertain which explanation, if either, is more likely and 
there is no obvious reason why the question might have been misinterpreted. 
However, the personal interviews did provide support for the argument that 
policy targets were not always supported by relevant performance measures. 
A comparison was made between those respondents giving answers which 
indicated that performance measures were not of direct relevance to policy 
targets and the year in which the performance review system had been 
introduced and in the majority of cases, the systems were relatively new at the 
time of completing the questionnaire and it may be the case that more relevant 
measures will emerge in time. However, there was little evidence to suggest 
that chief executives considered the development of performance indicators to 
be an on-going matter lending only partial support to this explanation. 
In addition to those responses detailed in table 6.13, there were 7 responses 
categorised as "other" and these included such diverse answers as `Quality 
Assurance Panel' to `partly the Audit Commission. ' 1 chief executive reported 
that performance measures had not yet been set in his authority and there were 8 
nil or not applicable responses to the question which includes those who in 
response to the question of how performance measures were set had 
communicated that they were not used in their authority. No difference in the 
balance of responses was apparent according to authority type. 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 187 
Chief executives were asked whether the performance measures developed 
distinguished between economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Table 6.14 gives 
the breakdown of responses. 
TABLE 6.14: DO THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE 3ES? 
Not Nil 
Yes No Comprehensively On-Going Response 
London Boroughs 5 11 101 
Scottish Regions 211 
Scottish Districts 49 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 33 
County Councils 8 11 
Metropolitan Districts 44 
Non-Met Districts 32 42 413 
Total 58 83 525 
Percentage 37.9 54.2 3.3 1.3 3.3 
In 58 (37.9%) authorities, a distinction was made within the performance 
measures between economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In a further 5 
(3.3%) authorities such a distinction exists but not comprehensively and in 3 
(1.3%) authorities the development of performance measures which make 
such a distinction is on-going. In 83 (54.2%) councils, no such distinction 
exists. This broad pattern of response holds across all authority types. This 
suggests that the majority of authorities are designing performance measures 
in keeping with their own requirements rather than tailoring them around the 
concept of value for money. 
For those authorities making a distinction within their performance measures, 
they were asked to give examples. The full set of responses is given in 
Appendix 6.6 but a subset is contained within Box 6.4. 
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BOX -DETAILS OF HOW PERFORMANCE MEASURES DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
ECONOMY, EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Measures are still straightforward financial ratios but information is provided for 
example on success rate in planning appeals, HSE notices etc. 
Indicators am presented/identified using the following headings: Input/Budget 
(Economy); Demand, Productivity and Output (Efficiency); and Outcome/Quality and 
Customer Service Standards (Effectiveness). 
Economy - focus on costs e. g. inputs; efficiency - doing things right e. g. on time, 
turn around within target, general focus on outputs; effectiveness - doing the right 
thing e. g. customer satisfaction surveys, general focus on outcomes. 
We have been trying to concentrate on output indicators; VFM is addressed by 
individual policy reviews on a 5-year cycle; the Audit Commission profiles are used as 
a first stage comparator. 
Unit cost information and some information on effectiveness are included in PI reports. 
Indicators are identified in relation to: cost of the service; amount of service available; 
amount of service used; quality and efficiency of the service; and value for money. 
Implicitly if not explicitly. Whenever targets are set, they must if possible be 
quantifiable in some way - otherwise they cannot be measured. 
Measures are set to develop and direct services by examining unit costs, inputs and 
outputs and using basic zero based budgeting. 
Performance measures are linked to the strategic and operational objectives of the 
services concerned. Strategic objectives are concerned with effectiveness; operational 
objectives with economy and efficiency. 
Utilise Audit Commission definitions. 
The responses lacked any consistent or common theme and rather appeared to 
be an assortment of attempts at answering a question to which respondents 
felt they should be able to provide an answer to. Only a very small number of 
authorities appear to have adopted the Commissions' definitions of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness and tried to match performance measures around 
these. 
Given the emphasis on quality, particularly as a substitute for effectiveness 
evident in the approach to performance review promulgated by the Audit 
Commission, chief executives were also asked whether any measures of 
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quality were incorporated into the performance review system and table 6.15 
gives the full breakdown of responses to this question. 
TABLE 6.15: ARE MEASURES OF QUALITY INCORPORATED INTO THE 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM? 
Not Nit 
Yes No Systematically On-Going Response 
London Boroughs 11 61 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 64111 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 321 
County Councils 11 611 
Metropolitan Districts 53 
Non-Met Districts 50 23 252 
Total 91 46 475 
Percentage 59.5 30.1 2.6 4.6 3.3 
91 (59.5%) chief executives reported that quality measures had been 
incorporated into the performance review system whilst 7 (4.6%) reported 
that such a development was on-going. 46 (30.1%) authorities indicated that 
quality measures had not been integrated whilst a further 4 (2.6%) indicated 
that quality measures existed but were not systematically or comprehensively 
part of the performance review system. Given the emerging prominence of 
quality issues in local government and particular the launch of Charter Mark 
and the number of authorities pursuing BS 5750 in some service areas, this is 
likely to be an area which has changed since the postal survey was conducted 
and it is probable that an increasing proportion of authorities now have 
quality measures in evidence although the extent to which these are 
integrated into the performance review system is more questionable. 
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Chief executives were asked to give examples of the quality measures which 
had been incorporated into the performance review system. As before, the 
full set of responses is given in Appendix 6.7 but a selection is given in Box 
6.5. 
BOX 6.5: EXAMPLES OF MEASURES OF QUALITY UTILISED IN PR SYSTEM 
Standards of housing repairs and maintenance; standards of refuse collection and street 
cleaning; and standards in education particularly schools and exam results. 
Service standards; market research and the Citizen's Charter. 
Quality Assurance Standards. 
The objective of the system is all about quality. We are defining in advance what our 
customers need and expect, doing it and then asking them to review our performance. 
Annual user satisfaction surveys in urban improvement areas (Planning). 
Audit Commission's Quality Exchange Exercise. 
Examination results and pupils staying on rates; satisfaction surveys; successful 
prosecution rates on trading standards; ratio of planning appeals lost to total appeals; 
class days lost due to closure of buildings from failure of fabric or service. The above 
are just a selection of performance indicators which are more clearly measures (or 
indicators) of quality. The continuing challenge is to produce more indicators which 
measure quality of output/outcome rather than quality and quantity of inputs. 
"Quality" is understood as the aggregation of efficiency, effectiveness and economy 
which will ultimately be measured by separate indicators for each service. 
Customers assess the quality of service via questionnaires. 
Quality Assurance and BSI accreditation being sought. 
The majority of the responses stress the importance of the customers' 
assessment of the service in any measure of quality. It is immaterial how good 
members and officers perceive a service to be, if the end-users do not consider 
it to be up to standard. Consequently, in addition to asking whether quality 
measures were included, chief executives were asked whether consumer 
measures had been included within the performance review system The full 
breakdown of responses is given in table 6.16 overleaf. 
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TABLE 6.16: ARE CONSUMER MEASURES INCORPORATED INTO THE PR SYSTEM? 
Not Nil 
Yes No Systematically On-Going Response 
London Boroughs 10 611 
Scottish Regions 22 
Scottish Districts 841 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 321 
County Councils 12 511 
Metropolitan Districts 44 
Non-Met Districts 52 20 343 
Total 93 42 585 
Percentage 60.8 27.5 3.3 5.2 3.3 
In total, 93 (60.8%) chief executives reported that consumer measures were 
part of the system; 8 (5.3%) indicated that such a development was on-going; 
5 (3.3%) intimated that consumer measures were not a comprehensive part of 
the performance review system; and 42 (27.4%) indicated that their council 
did not have consumer measures. This pattern is similar to that in evidence for 
quality measures both in aggregate and by authority type. For those 
authorities which had encompassed consumer views, chief executives were 
asked whether the views of consumers had been sought prior to the system 
being drawn up. Only 33 chief executives indicated that such consultation 
had occurred (35.5% of the 93 authorities operating performance review 
systems which contain consumer measures). This is surprising and 
disappointing since one might expect that if consumer measures are to be 
included then these should reflect consumers' expectations as was the case 
with quality measures. The questionnaire did not ask for examples of the 
consumer measures incorporated into the performance review system but with 
hindsight, examples would have been worth having, not least to allow 
comparisons to be drawn between consumer measures established by 
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authorities consulting their consumers and those established by councils not 
undertaking any consultation. 
Chief executives were asked whether the process of establishing a 
performance review system had caused the authority to focus on the 
objectives of their service. 
TABLE 6.17 : DID SETTING UP THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM LEAD TO A 
FOCUS ON THE OBJECTIVES OF SERVICE? 
Yes No Partially Too Soon 
London Boroughs 15 111 
Scottish Regions 4 
Scottish Districts 10 3 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 33 
County Councils 14 41 
Metropolitan Districts 8 
Non-Met Districts 67 10 14 
Total 
Percentage 
123 22 37 
80.4 14.4 2.0 4.6 
As can be seen from table 6.17,123 (80.4%) chief executives intimated that 
this was the case, 3 (2.0%) intimated that it had partially done so, 5 (3.3%) 
chief executives felt that it was too soon to judge; and 22 (14.4%) felt that 
setting up the performance review system had not caused the authority to 
focus on the objectives of service. Such a response is reassuring since the 
purpose of performance review in most cases is to review performance relative 
to objectives and thus the process of establishing a review mechanism should 
lead to a focus on the objectives of service. However, within authorities 
where a focus on service objectives has not occurred in response to 
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establishing a performance review system, it may be the case that a focus on 
the objectives of service had previously taken place prior to establishing the 
system - it does not necessarily imply that the review system is unrelated to 
service objectives. 
For those authorities intimating that establishing a performance review system 
had precipitated a focus on the objectives of service, chief executives were 
asked to indicate whether this had led to a reappraisal of the service and/or a 
redefinition of the customer since this would suggest that a thorough review 
had been undertaken. Tables 6.18 and 6.19 give the full breakdown of 
responses. 
TABLE 6.18 : DID THE FOCUS ON SERVICE OBJECTIVES LEAD TO A REAPPRAISAL 
OF THE SERVICE? 
Not Nil 
Yes No PartiallyToo soon Applicable Respons 
London Boroughs 83412 
Scottish Regions 211 
Scottish Districts 7213 
Welsh Counties 111 
Welsh Districts 213 
County Councils 11 413 
Metropolitan Districts 71 
Non-Met Districts 46 14 27 12 1 
Total 84 25 7 11 24 2 
Percentage 68.3 1 6.3 4.6 7.2 15.7 1.3 
In total 84 ( 68.3%) of the 123 chief executives reporting a focus on 
objectives, intimated that a reappraisal of service had taken place and 77 
(62.6%) indicated that a redefinition of the customer had occurred. 32 of the 
33 chief executives reporting that consultation had been undertaken with 
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their consumers in the drawing up of consumer measures for the performance 
review system also reported that a redefinition of the customer had emerged 
from refocusing on the objectives of service. This in itself suggests that 
consumer consultation could reveal some worthwhile information to almost all 
local authorities. 
TABLE 6.19 : DID THE FOCUS ON SERVICE OBJECTIVES LEAD TO A REDEFINITION 
OF THE CUSTOMER? 
Not 
Yes No Partially Too soon Applicable Responsi 
London Boroughs 10 3311 
Scottish Regions 211 
Scottish Districts 6313 
Welsh Counties 111 
Welsh Districts 1113 
County Councils 86113 
Metropolitan Districts 62 
Non-Met Districts 43 17 27 12 1 
Total 77 33 6 12 23 2 
Percentage 50.3 2 1.6 3.9 7.8 15.0 1.3 
Of critical importance in the establishment of a performance review system, is 
the nature and extent of difficulties encountered during the set-up process. 
Within the postal survey, chief executives were firstly asked whether any 
major difficulties had occurred in setting up the system and the responses are 
given in table 6.20.81 (52.9%) chief executives reported that major 
difficulties had been encountered whilst a further 5 (3.3%) felt that it was too 
soon to pass judgement. 65 (42.5%) councils did not experience major 
problems. The proportion of authorities experiencing difficulties was highest 
amongst Scottish Regions and Metropolitan Districts (75.0%), and London 
Boroughs (72.2%) and lowest in Scottish Districts (30.8%) and Non- 
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Metropolitan Districts (46.3%). This could infer that larger authorities which 
are responsible for more areas of service provision are more likely to 
experience difficulties when establishing a performance review system than 
the smaller, less complex authorities. Within a smaller authority, it is 
comparatively easy to identify what you are trying to achieve both in terms of 
your service objectives and by adopting a performance review system, and it 
may be easier to secure support, co-operation and participation than in a 
larger, more complex, and often politically charged council. 
TABLE 6.20 : WERE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN SETTING UP THE PR 
SYSTEM? 
Yes No Too soon Nil Response 
London Boroughs 13 5 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 4711 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 33 
County Councils 12 7 
Metropolitan Districts 62 
Non-Met Districts 38 39 41 
Total 81 65 52 
Percentage 5 2.9 4 2.5 3.3 1.3 
To explore this further, for those authorities experiencing difficulties, the chief 
executives was asked to elaborate on the nature of these. Appendix 6.8 
contains the fu l set of responses to this request but a sample are included in 
Box 6.6. 
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Box 6.6: Difficulties Encountered 
System 
in etting up the Performance Review 
Reluctance of some chief officers to introduce targeting; lack of interest of some 
members; culture not supportive of performance measurement; continual budget 
reductions; difficulty in defining sensitive performance indicators. 
Attitudes of some managers; the overheads of monitoring certain indicators; and the 
paperwork presented at Committee. 
It was a top down process introduced by members and imposed corporately. The main 
problem was that of getting ownership of the process by managers at all levels of the 
organisation particularly at first-line management level. 
Ambiguous accountabilities; lack of management information; centralised control; and 
lack of customer-orientation. 
I Members understanding of the concept; seen as method of `sorting out' the officers; following initial period (to 1976) when the Council has majority rule, the Council 
became hung and PR was used as a tool for inter-party debate and differences. 
Whilst not a major problem, both officers and members were concerned about the setting 
of explicit targets because of the risk of failing to meet them and this being treated 
negatively by opposition groups on the Council or by the public. 
Finding worthwhile PIs; keeping scrutiny at the right level (e. g. avoiding detailed review 
of operational matters and focusing on overall performance of policies). 
Some reluctance to change traditional ways of thinking, that is to make the cultural 
change required in order to focus more on outputs and outcomes rather than simply 
inputs. 
All change is feared, particularly when it exposes individual performance. The education 
process has a distance to go still. 
Low level of awareness of full potential of performance review among the members and 
so officers, caused limited degree of support. This was compounded by some services 
being dealt with at too operational a level for members interests. Process is still being 
developed to address these and in particular to develop the role of members. 
Sustaining momentum. 
Senior staff could not see the advantages; staff felt threatened; and performance 
indicators have been difficult to agree. 
The most common theme emerging from these responses is that of lack of 
ownership and/or commitment from either officers or members. This is at odds 
with the earlier fording that only a minority of chief executives reported that 
their officers and/or members had been unsupportive (4.6% for officers and 
0.7% for members) of the introduction of performance review or had 
displayed mixed support (15.0% for officers and 5.9% for members). On 
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reading the responses in box 6.6, one might reasonably have expected a 
much higher proportion of chief executives reporting mixed support or 
unsupportive officers and members. This may reflect a general level of support 
for the principle of performance review from key personnel which deteriorates 
when the operational implications of running a system become apparent or it 
may reflect a reluctance on the part of chief executives to admit that their 
officers were not overwhelmingly supportive of the introduction of a review 
mechanism. Whatever the explanation, it is clear from the responses in 
appendix 6.8 and box 6.7, that ownership has been a frequently recurring 
problem. There is also evidence of technical problems particularly the 
definition of adequate and acceptable performance indicators. These issues 
are further considered in the case study analysis and within the critique of 
performance review (chapter 9). 
It is clear from the foregoing section, that establishing a performance review 
system is not straightforward and the ease with which a mechanism can be 
implemented will depend on a diverse set of factors. Clearly the more 
ownership and commitment exhibited from officers and members towards 
performance review, then the less likely that major problems will be 
encountered during the set up process. However, technical hurdles also have 
to be overcome; policy targets have to be defined and performance measures 
set, and there is evidence of these processes giving rise to difficulties. There is 
preliminary evidence to suggest that consultation with `customers' could 
yield beneficial information. All these factors lend support to the view that a 
`text book' approach to performance review does not exist. 
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6.4 Operating a Performance Review System 
Once a performance review system has been established, the next major area 
to be considered is how the process operates within the context of a local 
authority. Chief executives were asked to describe how the performance 
review system fitted into the corporate management structure since this will be 
a major determinant of the operational impact of the processes. A wide array 
of answers was forthcoming and the full set of responses is contained in 
appendix 6.9. However, most of the answers could be grouped together 
under a number of headings and these are given below in table 6.21 according 
to authority types. Those answers which could not comfortably be slotted 
into one of these categories is listed under `other' in the table and detailed in 
box 6.7 overleaf. 
TABLE 6.21: HOW DOES THE PR SYSTEM FIT INTO THE CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE? 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD Total (%) 
1.4 252324 32 54 (35.5) 
2.2 179 19 (12.4) 
3.2 2218 15 ( 9.8) 
4.1 216 10 (6.5) 
5.2 259 (5.9) 
6.1 1327 (4.6) 
7.4 11112 13 23 (15.0) 
8.3 12127 16 (10.5) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Through the Council's Management Team/Board 
Through the Chief Executive 
Through Chief Officers 
Through all Managers 
PR system is fully integrated 
Through the Policy Unit 
Other (see box 6.7) 
Nil response 
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BOX 6.7: How DOES THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM FIT INTO THE 
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE? 
London Boroughs 
Service Contract Process. 
Review reports to members. 
Each departmental management team has responsibility for their service plan and 
reviewing performance. 
A Review Team in the managing directors office runs the corporate process, but 
individual departments retain responsibility. 
Scottish Regions 
It is viewed as an integral part of the cyclical planning system - even though this is just 
underway. Outcome of the PR work feeds into next planning and budgetary cycle. The 
management team will be discussing a series of related papers produced by the Principal 
Corporate Adviser. 
Scottish Districts 
Audit System Section. 
Welsh Counties 
PR is carried out through the co-ordinating role of the Chief Executive and the 
Management Team is the officer reference group. 
Welsh Districts 
It doesn't. 
County Council 
Overall review responsibility is with the Policy and Resources Committee but it is firmly 
with Service Committees for operational key tasks. 
Built into Committee structure - each Committee considers a performance indicator report 
at its quarterly meetings with an annual review by Policy and Resources Committee. 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 
Regular reviews of progress and co-ordination of action. 
Key objective. 
Items if report are considered prior to committee meetings. 
Not fully integrated yet. 
Issues regularly feature on agendas. 
Cascade effect. 
Business plans are a fundamental part of the corporate plan and performance indicators 
are fundamental to business plans. 
Still to be determined. 
Part of service plan/service review process. 
Via strategic/business planning process. 
Management Services located within the Chief Executive's Department. 
Assistant Chief Executive ensures process runs smoothly. 
Head of Consultancy Services reports to Corporate Strategy and Planning Group. 
54 (35.5%) chief executives reported that the Council's Management Team 
effectively operated as the interface between the performance review system 
and the corporate management structure. 19 (12.4%) reported that the review 
process was integrated directly through the chief executive and a further 15 
(9.8%) indicated that the process was operated through chief officers. Thus 
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performance review fits into the corporate management structure through 
senior management in 88 (57.5%) local authorities. This suggests that 
performance review is given high priority in a significant number of councils 
although the possibility exists that senior managers do not have enough time 
to deal with performance review matters and that such issues will fade into the 
background in the presence of more pressing issues. 7 (4.6%) chief 
executives indicated that Policy Units act as the link with the performance 
review system and corporate management. There is a higher likelihood that 
where Policy Units operate as the interface, sufficient time will consistently be 
devoted to performance review issues. 9 responses indicated that the review 
mechanism was fully integrated into the management structure whilst 10 
(6.5%) reported that all managers were responsible for review issues in their 
area of responsibility. Whilst both of these responses can be interpreted as 
review having become fully embedded into the council, they could also mean 
that no one does very much about performance review. No significant 
variation was evident between authority types except that 7 (36.8%) County 
Council chief executives indicated that the performance review system was 
operated through themselves and that a further 3 (15.8%) indicated that the 
council's Policy Unit was the interface. 
Box 6.7 reveals that in some instances performance review is but one stage of 
other council processes most notably business planning. It also indicates that 
performance review in some councils is perceived more as feeding into the 
committee programme and providing member information than being 
interfaced with the corporate management structure. Such a wide range of 
responses serves to illustrate the diversity of approaches to performance 
review within local authorities. 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 201 
Chief executives were also asked to indicate whether or not the performance 
review process operated across the whole authority since clearly this will 
impact on the operation of the system. Only 11 (7.2%) chief executives 
reported that the system in operation in their authority was not all 
encompassing. A further 2 indicated that authority-wide performance review 
was an on-going development. Chief executives were asked how areas were 
selected for inclusion in the performance review system if the process did not 
operate across the whole council. Table 6.22 gives a breakdown of the 
responses with no particular theme or pattern evident. Only one chief 
executive reported that it was not his intention to achieve full authority-wide 
coverage in the future. 
TABLE 6.22: HOW WERE DEPARTMENTS SELECTED FOR INCLUSION IN THE 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM? 
CCT and SLA areas only (2 responses) 
Non-CCT services first 
By CCT 
Front-line services 
DSOs excluded 
Self-selection 
Willingness to participate 
Trial participation 
Political decision 
Three departments selected each year by Policy Committee on advice of Management Team 
The next operational area considered was the designate of the officer with 
performance review responsibilities. Not surprisingly, the answers follow a 
similar pattern to the responses given to the question "How does performance 
review fit into the corporate management structure? " For example, where the 
response to the latter question was `through the chief executive' the answer 
to the former was `the chief executive. ' Appendix 6.10 contains the full set of 
responses concerning the designate of the officer with performance review 
responsibilities but the answers have been aggregated into groups and are 
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listed below in table 6.23 since no particular pattern was evident according to 
authority type. Box 6.8 lists the 27 answers categorised as `other' in the 
table. 
TABLE 6.23: THE DESIGNATE OFFICER WITH PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
RESPONSIBILITY 
% 
Chief Executive 29 19.0 
Chief Officers 19 12.4 
Corporate Staff 16 10.5 
Assistant Chief Executive 15 9.8 
Policy Staff 11 7.2 
Performance Review Staff 8 5.2 
Service Managers 6 3.9 
Management Services Staff 6 3.9 
No specific responsibility assigned 6 3.9 
All Senior Managers 4 2.6 
All Staff 3 2.0 
Other 27 17.6 
Nil response 3 2.0 
29 (19.0%) chief executives reported that they were the officer within the 
authority with responsibility for performance review. 19 (12.4%) reported 
that all chief officers had such responsibilities and in a further 15 (9.8%) cases, 
the assistant chief executive was responsible. In a significant number of cases, 
responsibility fell upon a particular type of officer. In 16 (10.5%) councils, 
corporate staff were responsible, and policy planners, performance review 
officers and management service officers were responsible in 11 (7.2%), 8 
(5.2%) and 6 (3.9%) local authorities respectively. 6 (3.9%) chief executives 
reported that all service managers had responsibility for performance review. 
A further 4 indicated that all senior managers were the responsible officers and 
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3 chief executives indicated that responsibility rested with all council staff. In 
6 councils, responsibility had not been specifically assigned to any officer. 
The only pattern evident according to authority grouping was that more of 
the `non-typical' answers listed in box 6.8 originated from the non- 
metropolitan districts (18 as opposed to 9 from other council types). 
Box 6.8: DESIGNATE OF OFFICER WITH PERFORMANCE REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY 
Head of Policy and Performance Review 
Head of Strategic and Policy and Performance 
Central Services Director 
Principal Management Systems Officer 
Research and development staff 
Management Development Unit 
Personnel Officer 
Secondment so varies 
Designate as yet undecided 
Democratic Services Manager 
Local Government Review Co-ordinator 
Head of Personnel and Administrative Services 
Research Officer 
Assistant Director of Audit 
Senior Strategy Management Officer 
Strategy Co-ordinator 
Head of Manpower Services 
Interdepartmental team of 2nd tier officers 
Chief Policy and Administration Officer 
Head of Consultancy Services 
2nd tier managers 
Head of Audit and Review 
Organisational and Development Manager 
Personnel Office 
Training and Personnel Officer 
Audit and Review Manager 
Principal Executive Officer 
d 
I 
Chief executives were asked how many staff are specifically involved in 
performance review. The responses generated were too diverse to aggregate 
sensibly into tabular form The full set of answers is contained in appendix 
6.11 but a verbal summary for each type of local authority incorporated into 
the postal questionnaire is presented below. 
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In London Boroughs, 3 chief executives reported that no staff were 
specifically involved in performance review presumably because all or most 
staff input into the system, 2 responses reported that all senior managers were 
involved and 1 chief executive indicated that all chief officers participated 
whilst another indicated that all staff were involved. In 1 London borough, a 
combination of central (3) and departmental (5) staff were involved in the 
performance review system and in a further 2 London authorities, only central 
staff were identified as having an input. 3 chief executives reported actual 
numbers of involved staff ranging from 0.5 FTE to 5 FTE. 2 London 
boroughs were used in the pilot stage of the questionnaire and this particular 
question was not asked in the pilot survey form. There were 3 nil responses 
from London chief executives. 
Of the 4 chief executives from Scottish Regions completing part 1 of the 
postal questionnaire, 1 reported that no specific staff were involved whilst 
another reported that all accountable managers participated. 1 reported that 
20 staff at the centre were involved which seems a questionably high figure 
particularly since there was nothing else in that particular questionnaire to 
explain such a high level of central involvement. The other chief executive 
reported that 2 staff at the centre were involved as well as all chief officers. 
Amongst Scottish Districts, one chief executive reported 2 staff as well as all 
chief officers and the chief executive involved in the review mechanism 2 
chief executives indicated no specific staff involvement whilst 1 reported that 
the number of staff involved varied. All chief officers, all managers and all 
staff were each given as a response from one Scottish District. Of the 5 
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councils responding with numbers, the level of staff involved varies from 1 
FTE to 5 FTE. 
The 3 chief executives from Welsh Counties reported: no specific staff 
involvement; all chief officers inputting into the review mechanism; and 8 
FTE staff participating in the system. Amongst Welsh Districts, 4 chief 
executives reported that no staff were specifically involved in performance 
review, and 1 each indicated 5 staff involved and 3 staff involved on a part- 
time basis. 
Box 6.9 contains the responses given for County Councils since these were 
the most varied and proved difficult to adequately summarise. In essence, the 
responses indicate a diverse range of approaches to performance review from 
involving an enormous number of staff (in one case, 400 teams) to having a 
very small number of staff involved. In most County Councils however, a 
significant number of council staff seem to be involved in the process. 
BOX7. COUNTY COUNCIL STAFF INVOLVED IN PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
All staff -3 responses 
All senior managers -2 responses 
1FTE 
3FTE 
8FTE 
Line management and chief officers 
6 at the centre but many in departments 
5 lead officers but many others for specific reviews 
Chief executive and policy review officer 
None whole time 
2 corporate but many other service-based staff 
Many staff throughout the authority 
None specifically 
2 centrally plus service treasury input 
So far approximately 400 teams (that is, one manager and team members) have been 
introduced to performance monitoring and are starting to get into Performance Review. 
Some teams are undertaking PR on a three-monthly basis, some on a six-monthly basis, 
the minimum recommended is annually. 
Pilot (question not asked) 
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1 chief executive from a metropolitan district reported that all senior staff were 
involved in performance review whilst a further respondent reported that all 
staff input into the system. The other 6 reported actual numbers of involved 
staff ranging from 2 to 9 although in the latter case not on a full time basis. 
14 chief executives from non-metropolitan districts indicated no specific staff 
involvement in performance review whilst 8 indicated that all senior managers 
had an involvement. 4 chief executives reported the involvement of all their 
service managers, 3 the input of all their managers, and 2 each, the 
participation of all line managers and all chief officers. 1 chief executive 
reported that 3 full-time staff and all committee officers input into the 
performance review system. Another reported that one officer at the centre 
plus an officer working group participated in the process whilst another chief 
executive reported that 1 central staff member plus a range of in-service staff 
input. 3 chief executives indicated that the number varied whilst another 2 
indicated that the number of staff involved varied from department to 
department or according to the particular review being undertaken. Of those 
chief executives indicating the actual number of staff involved, these range 
from 1 part-time staff member to 60 staff with no explanatory statement 
indicating why so many in the latter case. 
Since the number of staff involved in performance review in a council will 
depend on the type of system being operated, it is little surprise to see such 
great variety in evidence. 
Chief executives were asked to indicate which officers actually carry 
out performance review work. Considerably disparity was again apparent in 
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the responses which could not usefully be aggregated. Most of the responses 
followed a similar pattern as those for the designate of the officer with 
performance review responsibilities and since no additional useful information 
could be gleaned from the responses, they are contained in appendix 6.12 for 
information only. 
Chief executives were asked whether training had been required in relation to 
operating the system. The more staff actually involved in undertaking review 
work will necessitate more people to be trained if the particular system in 
operation demands that staff be trained, thereby increasing the resource costs 
associated with the review system. Table 6.24 aggregates the responses 
received from chief executives. 
TABLE 6.24: HAS THE PR SYSTEM IDENTIFIED ANY TRAINING NEEDS IN 
RELATION TO OPERATING THE SYSTEM? 
Yes No Too early Nil response 
London Boroughs 15 21 
Scottish Regions 211 
Scottish Districts 94 
Welsh Counties 3 
Welsh Districts 231 
County Councils 12 7 
Metropolitan Districts 521 
Non-Met Districts 49 19 95 
Total 
Percentage 
97 38 11 7 
63.4 24.8 7.2 4.6 
Overall, 97 (63.4%) chief executives reported that training needs had been 
identified in relation to the performance review system. 11 indicated that they 
were at too early a stage following introduction and/or operation to give a 
response. 38 (24.8%) respondents indicated that no training needs were 
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associated with the operation of the review process. Disparity was evident 
according to authority type with the highest proportion of chief executives 
reporting training needs in Welsh Counties (100%) and London Boroughs 
(83%) and the lowest proportion being noted for Welsh Districts (33%) and 
Scottish Regions (50%). 
Chief executives were also asked whether any training needs had been 
identified as a consequence of the operation of the performance review 
system and table 6.25 summarises the responses. 
TABLE 6.25: HAS THE PR SYSTEM IDENTIFIED ANY TRAINING NEEDS AS A 
CONSEQUENCE OF ITS OPERATION? 
Yes No Too early Nil Response 
London Boroughs 14 31 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 10 3 
Welsh Counties 111 
Welsh Districts 231 
County Councils 12 7 
Metropolitan Districts 4211 
Non-Met Districts 46 17 13 6 
Total 92 36 15 10 
Percentage 60.1 23.5 9.8 6.5 
92 (60.1%) chief executives reported the operation of the review system had 
identified training needs. A further 15 (9.85) indicated that it was too early in 
the operational cycle to reach a conclusion on this matter and 36 (23.5%) 
responded that recognition of training needs had not emerged from the 
operation of the review process. Disparity in the balance of responses was 
again apparent according to authority groupings with 77% of London 
Boroughs and 75% of Scottish Regions reporting training needs identified as 
compared with 33% of Welsh Counties and Welsh Districts. The type of 
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review system in place in an authority will have a significant bearing on 
whether training is required to operate the review system and whether the 
operation of the review mechanism will identify training needs should there be 
a training gap. It is therefore not surprising to see differences in the pattern of 
responses by authority type. 
The next operational area considered is the committee with performance 
review responsibilities. A considerable spectrum of answers was forthcoming 
and is contained in appendix 6.13. However, an aggregation of the responses 
is contained below in table 6.26 with box 6.10 detailing the answers listed as 
`other' in the table. 
TABLE 6.26: WHICH COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW? 
Number % 
All Committees 34 22.2 
Policy and Resources 23 15.0 
Performance Review 23 15.0 
All Service Committees 12 7.8 
Policy 11 7.2 
Policy & Resources and service committees 6 3.9 
None specifically 4 2.6 
Performance Review and service committees 3 2.0 
Quality Service Sub-Committee 2 1.3 
Policy and Review 2 1.3 
A Finance Sub-Committee 2 1.3 
Policy, Resources and Performance Review 2 1.3 
Other 26 17.0 
Nil response 3 2.0 
34 (22.2%) chief executives reported that performance review was the 
responsibility of all committees. A further 12 (7.8%) indicated that all service 
committees had responsibility and 6 (3.9%) and 3 (2.0%) chief executives 
respectively reported that responsibility lay with all service committees in 
addition to the Policy and Resources Committee and the Performance Review 
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Committee. 23 (15.0%) respondents indicated that Policy and Resources was 
the principal committee for performance review matters whilst the same 
number indicated that a specific Performance Review Committee dealt with 
performance issues although in a number of cases, this was a sub-committee 
of Policy and Resources. In a further 11 (7.2%) cases, the Policy Committee 
was responsible. 
BOX 6.10: WHICH COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW? 
Budget and Performance Review 
Policy and all Management Committees 
Service and Policy and Resources 
Resources and General Purposes 
All members involved 
Quality Assurance Panel to Policy Committee 
Resources Co-ordination Corporate Policy Advisory Committee 
Effectiveness and Efficiency Committee 
Quality and Performance Review 
Management Review Sub-Committee 
Performance Review and Audit 
Performance Management 
Finance and Policy and Resources 
Organisation and Review 
Performance Review/Information Technology Group 
Corporate Planning and Service Review 
Resources 
Principal Committee for its respective 3 year service plan 
Personnel and Performance Review 
Policy and Management 
Strategy Committee 
Performance Review and Programme 
Corporate Review reporting to Policy and Resources 
Establishment 
4 chief executives reported that no committees were responsible for 
performance review which may indicate either a system which entails minimal 
member involvement or that performance review is the responsibility of all 
committees so that none is specifically singled out. 2 chief executives 
indicated that performance review was the responsibility of a Quality Service 
Sub-Committee whilst a further council reported that the council's Quality 
and Performance Review Committee dealt with review matters and another 
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indicated that a Quality Assurance Panel to the Policy Committee was 
responsible for performance review. In 2 authorities, performance review is 
the responsibility of a Finance Sub-Committee. 
One of the major factors affecting the operation of performance review is how 
it interacts with other major council processes particularly the policy and 
budgetary processes. Chief executives were thus asked to indicate whether 
the performance review system was linked to the policy planning/strategic 
planning process and whether it was linked to the budgetary process. They 
were then asked to describe the nature of the link if one existed. Tables 6.27 
and 6.28 respectively detail the number and proportion of links existing 
between performance review and the policy and budgetary processes 
according to types of authority. 
114 (74.5%) chief executives affumed that their performance review system 
was linked to the policy process. A further 11 (7.2%) indicated that it was 
either an on-going or a planned development. 24 (15.7%) reported that the 
performance review system operated in their authority was not linked to the 
policy process. This pattern broadly holds across authority types with 
London Boroughs reporting the highest proportion of linked processes (16 
out of 18) and Welsh Districts having the lowest (3 out of 6). Given the 
dominance of Policy and Policy-associated committees being responsible for 
performance review matters, it is of little surprise to observe such a high level 
of association between review and policy and strategic planning systems. 
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TABLE 6.27: IS PERFORMANCE REVIEW LINKED TO THE POLICY PLANNING/ 
STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS? 
Yes No On-going Nil response 
London Boroughs 16 11 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 832 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 321 
County Councils 15 22 
Metropolitan Districts 611 
Non-Met Districts 61 14 52 
Total 
Percentage 
114 24 11 
74.5 15.7 7.2 
4 
2.6 
TABLE 6.28: IS PERFORMANCE REVIEW LINKED TO THE BUDGETARY PROCESS? 
London Boroughs 10 7 
Scottish Regions 4 
Scottish Districts 76 
Welsh Counties 12 
Welsh Districts 312 
County Councils 11 53 
Metropolitan Districts 332 
Yes No On-going Nil response 
1 
Non-Met Districts 55 23 22 
Total 94 47 93 
Percentage 61.4 30.7 5.9 2.0 
94 (61.4%) chief executives reported that their review system was linked to 
the budgetary process. A further 9 (5.9%) indicated that such a link was 
either an on-going or planned development. 47 (30.7%) reported that no link 
had been made between the review process and the budget. More variety in 
responses is evident according to authority type than was the case for 
linkages with the policy processes. All 4 chief executives of Scottish Region 
who completed part 1 of this postal questionnaire indicated that in their 
authorities, the performance review system was linked into the budgetary 
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process. However, only 1 of 3 Welsh County chief executives and only 3 of 
8 chief executives from Metropolitan Districts indicated that such a linkage 
existed. Indeed in all authority types apart from Scottish Regions, fewer 
authorities reported linkages to the budgetary process than reported a 
connection with the policy process. 
Where linkages existed between the performance review system and the 
policy and budgetary processes, chief executives were asked to indicate the 
nature of the link. Appendices 6.14 and 6.15 contain the full set of responses 
but a selection of the most revealing and frequently recurring responses is 
contained in boxes 6.11 and 6.12. 
Many of the linkages with the policy planning process are through Service 
Plans or equivalent documents and through committees setting targets. 
However, if we recall from earlier in this chapter about the way in which 
policy targets and performance indicators are set, often council members are 
involved in target setting but setting the indicators to assess progress towards 
achieving the targets is left to officers. Some of the processes appear quite 
dynamic with findings emerging from the performance review system feeding 
into policy formulation and determining what needs to be the subject of close 
scrutiny in future years. Some of performance review systems operate at a 
departmental level giving scope for variation in the way the system works 
within a particular council as well as the way in which performance review 
and policy planning interact. The responses do give rise to the question of 
what happens in councils in which performance review and policy planning 
are not linked. If the results of performance review do not feed into the 
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process of redefining policy or at least demonstrating progress in relation to 
policy targets, then might question its purpose. 
BOX 6.11: How IS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM LINKED TO THE 
POLICY/STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS? 
Through committee agreement of targets for services and each committees Three Year 
Plan details strategic developments which translate into targets for services. 
Key tasks and review are part of the strategic plan for this authority. 
Our system is a three stage cyclical process whereby review feeds into policy formulation 
which feeds into policy budgets which feeds back into review. 
By virtue of monitoring and intuition by the corporate management team. 
The planning process outlines the direction in which the county council is going and all 
Key Result Areas and Performance Standards need to be linked to this. 
The policy planning/strategic planning process forms the basis of the performance review 
system. 
Three year Committee Service Plans are produced annually, containing targets and 
indicators where possible. Quarterly performance indicator reports are produced for each 
Committee - these refer inter alia to the plan targets. 
Key priorities are sub-divided into objectives/targets for development which forms the 
basis of measurable performance review system. 
Each service will have a working group which will be comprised of members and officers. 
The group will look at service provision and then feed these ideas into the corporate 
planning process. 
Through Service Plans. 
Performance Review Sub-Committee looks at policy review. Policies/policy objectives are 
identified and effectiveness reviewed. Policy objectives will be fed into the 
strategic/business planning process which will be subject to performance review. 
Provides information for Forward Planning Cycle. 
Each department examines the strategic objectives, through their business plans through 
to their own performance indicators. 
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HOW IS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM LINKED TO THE 
BUDGETARY PROCESS? 
The policy budget process will increasingly encourage past performance to be taken into 
account in resource allocation decisions. 
Service plans are expected to demonstrate how proposals will progress the Council's 
strategic objectives which are then taken into account in budget allocations. The process 
is still fairly embryonic and requires considerable refinement. 
The PR system is linked to the budgetary process but not driven by it. There is a vast 
amount of work to be done before getting to the stage where policy decisions determine 
all spending priorities. 
We are aiming to make the budget process more service and policy objective led but this 
will take time - it is like trying to change the direction of an ocean liner. 
A review of performance takes place each Autumn prior to the budget setting process and 
the results are fed into the process. 
Intention is that performance indicators will be included in the Budget Book showing 
change over time. 
Policy/strategic planning cannot be separated from budgetary planning. 
Service Plans are the first stage of the budget cycle each year. 
Budgets (capital and revenue) are determined within a corporate cost-benefit framework 
based on overall objectives. The performance standards for each service reflect what is 
achievable within the level of resources allocated to a service via this process. 
The whole budget/corporate planning/review systems are interlinked, although major 
reviews of performance are often undertaken for political reasons also. 
Used to find options for change to meet capping level. 
Financial performance is part of the process. 
In considering the way in which performance review is linked into the 
budgetary process, it is clear that in the majority of councils, this is at a far 
earlier stage than the linkages with the policy process. A number of the 
responses stressed that the linkage was currently being developed and that a 
lot still had to be done but that it could only be done gradually. The case 
study evidence to be discussed in chapter 8 indicated that committee chairs 
and chief officers were supportive of performance review and its 
implementation until it affected the budget allocated to their particular service 
area and it is of little surprise to see less progress, and indeed clarity, within 
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this set of responses. With the huge volume of financial changes which have 
confronted local government generally and all those managing service 
budgets particularly, when taken in conjunction with the long tradition of 
incremental budgeting which has characterised British local government, 
inevitably there will be a defensiveness over cash received by the departments 
of an authority and thus this particular area is likely to take much longer to see 
progress than others. However, ultimately to link the policy and budgetary 
processes meaningfully together and move away from budget-led policy 
decisions to policy-led budget decisions requires that performance review has 
a significant role to play. One respondent indicated that performance review 
was used to find options for change to meet the council's capping level - or in 
other words identify areas where cuts can be made. This creates a very 
negative image for performance review which should be more about assessing 
progress. 
One problem which many local authorities have to confront is the existence of 
conflicting and multiple council objectives. To have a fully comprehensive set 
of objectives and related policies often involves having policies which are not 
complimentary to one another. Chief executives were therefore asked how 
their performance review system coped with conflicting and multiple 
objectives. Not surprisingly, a wide array of responses was generated which 
proved impossible to usefully aggregate. The full set of answers is therefore 
contained in appendix 6.16 with a sub-set of indicative responses detailed in 
box 6.13. 
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BOX 6.13: HOW DOES THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM COPE WITH 
CONFLICTING AND MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES? 
With difficulty. 
The PR system exposes conflicting objectives in a way that helps clarity; it provides a 
supportive approach to managing multiple objectives. 
Through corporate resolution and attempts to improve strategic planning across different 
directorates and committees. 
The system provides raw material for decisions. Members can use PR and other 
information to reach decisions. 
It is too early to be categorically sure how it will cope but a key purpose of the PR 
process is to expose and reconcile conflict at a corporate level. 
Multiple Performance Review Panels prevent this being a problem. 
We try to make sure that there are not too many objectives in each area and that they 
represent the authority's overall philosophy. 
As far as possible `conflicting' objectives are resolved in debate within the Chief Officers 
Management team. `Multiple' objectives are encouraged by the system: a recognition 
that services are capable of delivering against a range of strategic goals. 
In general. since the Council Strategy sets out the council's objectives, conflicting 
objectives are minimised. Since each Forward Business Plan is approved by Committee, 
multiple and conflicting objectives are dealt with in the committee approval process. 
Too soon to say but it will certainly help to identify them and thereby demand a 
questioning resolution of the situation. 
There are no conflicting objectives - these are ironed out in the stages leading to the 
adoption of the Policy Plan. Multiple objectives have multiple performance criteria. 
. 
These responses go across the spectrum. Some chief executives report that 
conflicting and multiple objectives are not a problem in their authority whilst 
others indicate that they are a problem and something which the performance 
review system cannot deal with. Others indicate that performance review has 
facilitated recognising and solving conflicting and multiple objectives 
primarily by making their existence explicit, bringing them out into the open, 
and thereby forcing a solution to be found. Other respondents report that 
conflicting and multiple objectives have been dealt with outwith the 
performance review system. 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 218 
One area of potential difficulty in the operation of a performance review 
system is whether there is any change in performance in relation to tasks 
which are not incorporated into the performance review system. Most 
performance review systems cannot feasibly cover all areas of activity within a 
council and therefore it is likely that only certain key areas will be assessed 
within the performance review process perhaps even in rotation leaving 
others `unmonitored. ' One of the concerns voiced early in the performance 
debate, was that reviewing performance in certain areas will lead to a 
deterioration in activity in other areas. Chief executives completing part 1 of 
the questionnaire were therefore asked to indicate whether any provision had 
been made for monitoring and appraising tasks which were not incorporated 
into the performance review system and where they had been, to specify how 
this had been achieved. Table 6.29 indicates the breakdown of responses to 
the former question according to authority grouping. 
TABLE 6.29: IS ANY PROVISION MADE FOR MONITORING AND APPRAISING TASKS 
WHICH ARE NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE PR SYSTEM? 
Yes No On-going Nil response 
London Boroughs 10 8 
Scottish Regions 22 
Scottish Districts 5611 
Welsh Counties 21 
Welsh Districts 231 
County Councils 17 11 
Metropolitan Districts 26 
Non-Met Districts 41 33 35 
Total 81 5958 
Percentage 52.9 38.6 3.3 5.2 
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81 (52.95) chief executives reported that provision had been made for 
monitoring and appraising tasks not incorporated into the performance review 
process. A further 5 (3.3%) indicated that this was a planned development 
and 59 (38.6%) recorded that no such provision was made. Disparity was 
evident according to authority grouping with 17 of the 19 (89.5%) County 
Council chief executives indicating that provision had been made but only 2 
of the 8 (25%) Metropolitan Districts noting any mechanism in place. 
Appendix 6.17 contains the full set of responses indicating the nature of the 
provisions made but a selection are contained in Box 6.14 below. 
BOX 6.14: WHAT PROVISION IS MADE FOR MONITORING AND APPRAISING TASKS 
NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM? 
Via chief officers and other appraisal processes - the performance review system operates 
primarily at the strategic level of whole services. 
By the use of staff appraisals and departmental working plans. 
Additional reviews. 
Quarterly reports will include any unforeseen developments. 
The County Council Departments are continually reviewing and revising their services in 
the light of changes in needs, legislation and to meet targets. DSOs have their own 
statutory targets to meet and review their progress towards meeting these. The County 
Treasurer continuously monitors the financial performance of Departments and the 
County. 
Performance appraisal, general departmental monitoring and supervisory procedures. 
Performance measurement and monitoring is only part of performance review. A small 
group of senior members and officers consider and stimulate the review of any activity. 
Internal audit carries out wide-ranging reviews as do individual chief officers. 
Performance appraisal. 
Appraisal covers both completion of targets and overall job performance. 
The relevant committees can request specific reports covering areas of concern wit the 
agreement of the Policy Committee. 
Basic management responsibility. 
Exceptional reporting to committee and performance appraisal 
Different services have their own ad hoc/informal measures for tasks which, whilst important to a section and its work programme would not be sufficiently high profile to be formally included in the corporate review system. 
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Many of these responses highlight that performance appraisal and 
departmental monitoring and ad hoc additional review can be used in addition 
to the council's performance review system. Staff appraisals will generally 
look at across the board job performance rather than in relation to a few key 
areas so that the problem of tasks not being covered is minimised. 
This section has reviewed some of the operational details of performance 
review systems but inevitably these details overlap with the type of systems 
being introduced and therefore many of the themes will be developed in the 
context of the case studies and the critique of performance review in later 
chapters. However, it is clear from the information detailed here, that there is 
a wide diversity of systems in operation and that their organisational impact of 
is very varied. 
6.5 Corporate and Developmental Issues 
The previous sections have reported on how performance review systems 
have been established and operated and data was presented on some of the 
issues which require consideration by local authorities in introducing and 
operating review processes. This section explores corporate and 
developmental matters relating to performance review from the perspective of 
chief executives. 
The first area considered is whether the introduction of a performance review 
system has been associated with any changes in corporate values or corporate 
goals and table 6.30 gives a breakdown of the responses received. 
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TABLE 6.30: HAS THE INTRODUCTION OF THE REVIEW SYSTEM BEEN ASSOCIATED 
WITH ANY CHANGES IN CORPORATE VALUES/CULTURE 
Yes No Nil response 
London Boroughs 16 11 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 11 2 
Welsh Counties 3 
Welsh Districts 24 
County Councils 15 5 
Metropolitan Districts 71 
Non-Met Districts 58 20 4 
Total 115 345 
Percentage 75.2 22.2 3.3 
115 (75.2%) chief executives indicated that the introduction of the 
performance review system had been associated with a change in corporate 
values and/or corporate culture whilst 34 (22.2%) reported that the 
establishment of a review mechanism was not associated with any such 
change. This pattern approximately holds across all authority types except in 
Welsh Counties where all 3 respondents noted that a change in corporate 
values/culture had occurred; and in Welsh Districts where only 2 (33.3%) of 
the 6 chief executives returning part 1 of the survey form indicated that a 
change had taken place, the rest indicating that the review system was not 
associated with any corporate changes. 
For those respondents indicating that a change in corporate value/culture had 
occurred, they were asked to elaborate on the nature of the change. The full 
set of responses is contained in appendix 6.18 but a sub-set of the most 
revealing and pertinent responses is contained in box 6.15. 
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BOX 6.15: CHANGES IN CORPORATE VALUES CULTURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
OPERATION OF THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM. 
We are now more customer orientated. 
The introduction of performance review was consciously and explicitly associated with 
the efforts to change the culture of the organisation towards performance/customer 
orientation. 
It has directly led to a revaluation of policies and objectives. This has in turn led to better 
definition of corporate values, management standards and disciplines, service standards, 
client/customer orientation and service guarantees. 
More customer-orientated; the introduction of quality measures; responsiveness to the 
recession; and the enabling culture. 
Accountableldeveloped management :a clearer client/provider relationship; and more 
customer orientation in services. 
Commitment to quality has been enhanced and their is an increased awareness of the 
`customer. ' 
The introduction of performance review is a component of a package of measures 
designed to facilitate cultural change in the authority. These include enhancing the 
strategic and policy-making role of members, improved member technical support, 
development of the County Strategy, officer/member working groups, customer- 
orientation and improved local accountability. 
Focus on client needs. 
Council has evolved clear customer care policies such as `quality' culture - listening to 
customers, more questioning /awareness of what services are about. The introduction of a 
performance review system involves and requires major changes in values/culture, to one 
of putting the customer first. 
Now greater awareness within the organisation of strategic aims of the Council and how 
individual services contribute to these. 
The process has caused cultural priorities and values to emerge as well as performance 
review goals that is, the way in which the goals are to be achieved has been put into 
context. 
Change from finance-led to policy-led. 
An acceptance that customers attitudes and opinions have to be examined to specify 
services and service levels. Recognition of a general need to develop a more commercial 
management approach. 
The system itself has been a means of changing culture by the establishment of targets 
and tasks which mirror a more modern culture. 
A range of different changes in corporate values and cultures is in evidence. 
A significant number of the answers stress that operating a review system has 
introduced a new `customer' focus within the local authority with greater 
attention being paid to what customers perceive their needs to be, leading to 
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more customer-orientated service provision. In a number of other cases, 
establishing a review system has been the catalyst for delineating the 
council's aims, objectives and priorities and getting agreement between 
officers and members about what the organisation is trying to achieve. 
The responses given highlight some of the major benefits to be achieved from 
introducing a review system although these benefits will only accrue if the 
organisation is committed to such changes and if the right system is 
introduced. To explore this further, chief executives were asked whether the 
system had significantly contributed towards achieving a corporate 
management perspective and achieving corporate goals. Tables 6.31 and 6.32 
contains the breakdown of responses. 
TABLE 6.31: Do YOU FEEL THAT THE SYSTEM HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY 
TOWARDS ACHIEVING A CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE? 
Yes No Too early Nil response 
London Boroughs 13 32 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 10 21 
Welsh Counties 3 
Welsh Districts 141 
County Councils 12 52 
Metropolitan Districts 611 
Non-Met Districts 52 13 13 4 
Total 100 28 18 7 
Percentage 65.4 183 11.8 4.6 
100 (65.4%) chief executives reported that they felt the performance review 
system had contributed towards the achievement of a corporate management 
perspective. A further 18 (11.8%) felt that is was too soon to give a response 
to the question presumably because the system had only recently been 
introduced at the time the questionnaire was completed; and only 28 (18.3%) 
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respondents felt that the review process had not contributed to securing a 
corporate management perspective. This is not to say that in these latter cases 
a corporate management perspective does not exist, but where it does, it is 
not attributable to the performance review system. The distribution of 
responses holds for most authority types but with all Welsh County chief 
executives reporting a positive link between the review system and a 
corporate management perspective and only 1 (16.7%) Welsh District 
respondent considering that such an association could be made. 
TABLE 6.32: Do YOU FEEL THAT THE SYSTEM HAS CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS 
ACHIEVING CORPORATE GOALS? 
Too Nil 
Yes No Partially Early Response 
London Boroughs 12 312 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 10 21 
Welsh Counties 3 
Welsh Districts 411 
County Councils 11 611 
Metropolitan Districts 4211 
Non-Met Districts 49 13 3 13 4 
Total 92 30 7 17 7 
Percentage 60.1 19.6 4.6 11.1 4.6 
Slightly fewer chief executives felt that the review system had contributed 
towards achieving corporate goals. 92 (60.1%) responded positively but with 
a further 7 indicating that the system had partially made a contribution and 17 
(11.1%) recording that it was too soon to reach a judgement. 30 (19.6) chief 
executives indicated that the review system had not contributed towards 
achieving corporate goals. Again the main authority groupings not following 
this aggregate pattern are Welsh Counties and Welsh Districts with all 
respondents in the former category reporting that the review system had made 
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a positive contribution and with none in the latter authority type considering 
that the review system had made a contribution to the achievement of 
corporate goals. 
Chief executives were asked whether they considered the performance 
review system to be successful overall. Table 6.33 contains a summary of the 
responses. 
TABLE 6.33: ON THE WHOLE DO YOU CONSIDER THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
SYSTEM TO BE SUCCESSFUL? 
Too Nil 
Yes No Partially Early Response 
London Boroughs 11 1231 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 724 
Welsh Counties 12 
Welsh Districts 222 
County Councils 13 141 
Metropolitan Districts 53 
Non-Met Districts 52 32 20 5 
Total 94 85 38 8 
Percentage 61.4 5.2 3.3 24.8 5.2 
94 (61.4%) chief executives reported that they considered that the 
performance review system had been successful in their authority. A further 
38 (24.8%) indicated that it was too early to pass judgement and 5 (3.3%) 
responded that the system had been partially successful. Indeed, only 8 
(5.2%) out of 153 chief executives felt that the performance review system 
had overall, been unsuccessful. These negative responses were from 1 
London Borough, 2 Scottish Districts, 2 Welsh Districts and 3 Non- 
Metropolitan Districts. With the exception of the London Borough, those 
chief executives reporting unsuccessful performance review processes 
represent the `smaller' types of authority and one comment provided by one 
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of the Scottish District respondents indicated that introducing a review system 
had entailed a lot of additional work for senior officers and members in 
focusing in on the core services, defining standards and measures of 
performance but that ultimately, performance review had only highlighted 
and confirmed weak areas which the council were already aware of but 
critically however, it did not provide the resources needed to improve these 
weaknesses. However, it could be argued that this particular chief executive 
had had an unrealistic expectation of performance review and that the review 
system which had been introduced to the authority, had been inappropriate 
to the needs of the council. 
In retrospect, it would have been useful to have asked respondents intimating 
that the system had been unsuccessful or only partially successful, to comment 
on why this was so. However. all the participants in the pilot stage of the 
project had felt that their systems were successful, so this secondary question 
only became apparent when analysis of the full set of questionnaires was 
undertaken. Overall, most chief executives appear to be satisfied with the 
performance review system and its impact on the local authority. 
In considering the development of performance review activities, chief 
executives were asked whether any changes to the review system had been 
necessary since it had been introduced. Table 6.34 gives the breakdown of 
responses. 39 (25.5%) chief executives reported that changes had been made 
whilst 3 (2.0%) indicated that it was too early for changes to be needed. 105 
(68.6%) respondents noted that no major changes had been made since the 
review process had been introduced but given that 108 (70.7%) of the 
systems had been introduced in the two years preceding the completion of the 
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questionnaire, this figure is not particularly surprising. However, closer 
analysis revealed that 9 of the review processes introduced during the 1990- 
92 period had been changed in some way following their introduction and 
that there was in fact a review process dating back to 1981 which had 
received no changes. 
TABLE 6.34: HAVE ANY MAJOR CHANGES BEEN MADE TO THE PR SYSTEM SINCE 
ITS INTRODUCTION? 
Yes No Too early Nil response 
London Boroughs 5 11 11 
Scottish Regions 13 
Scottish Districts 1 12 
Welsh Counties 12 
Welsh Districts 42 
County Councils 5 13 1 
Metropolitan Districts 26 
Non-Met Districts 20 56 15 
Total 
Percentage 
39 105 36 
25.5 68.6 2.0 3.9 
For those authorities reporting that changes had been made to the review 
system, they were asked to indicate the nature of the change. The full set of 
responses is contained in appendix 6.19 but some of the responses made by 
chief executives are contained in box 6.16 overleaf. 
A wide range of changes is in evidence some extending the role and coverage 
of the review system with others indicating a rationalisation of its operation 
for example by focusing on fewer but more appropriate performance measures 
or by refocusing the review system to concentrate on more strategic issues. A 
number of chief executives also indicated that they had accommodated the 
Audit Commission's indicators. Surprisingly, there seems little relationship 
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between the difficulties reported by chief executives in establishing the 
review system and the changes which have been made to review processes. 
BOX MAJOR CHANGES MADE TO PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEMS SINCE 
THEIR INTRODUCTION 
The incorporation of the Audit Commission's requirements for statutory indicators; the 
requirement for customer service standards linked with the Citizen's Charter. 
It is currently under review to make it more strategic and less operationally focused. 
Further coverage of services; more definitions to aid data comparability; spotlights on 
areas of special interest to management board; neighbourhood performance review sub- 
committee where the general public can take a greater interest. 
Since 1990, annual reports contain performance indicators and key objectives are linked 
to targets and measures. 
Emphasis shifted to total quality management. 
Extended to all committees. 
Performance measures have been adopted to take account of the Audit Commission's 
Quality Exchange initiatives. 
All members of the County Council are invited to suggest new key tasks; and 
responsibility for monitoring key tasks is now being differentiated between main 
committees and sub-committees. 
Linking the performance review process more clearly with the Policy Planning Process 
through Including provision for service prioritisation, addressing strategic priorities. 
Move to make PIs more clearly related to service provision. 
Performance indicators substantially updated. 
Concentrated on fewer but better measures. 
When first introduced, there was no standard authority-wide process, which led to 
varying practices between committees and departments. A standard practice manual was 
then introduced, supported by officer training and a seminar with members. The process 
is currently under review after around 18 months in operation. 
The introduction of trading accounts. 
originally the system applied to a small number of services, for whom it was easier to 
apply quantitative measures. The aim now is to have more qualitative measures and cover 
all services and council activities internal and external. 
The final developmental question considered is `what do you see as the most 
significant future development resulting from the operation of the 
performance review system? ' The complete set of responses is contained in 
appendix 6.20 but some of the answers are contained in box 6.17. 
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BOX HAT DO YOU SEE AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
RESULTING FROM THE OPERATION OF THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
SYSTEM? 
The development of an integrated strategic planning and review process across the 
council; and the development of a performance culture. 
Improved performance arising from the clarification of the roles of all employees, with 
due regard to the Councils Corporate and Developmental Objectives. 
Greater clarity of purpose and direction; improved corporate working; and the provision 
of benchmarks to measure progress in key areas. 
Our system will be related to Accounts Commission proposals on an external level. 
Internally, for each specified activity we intend to develop quality targets to enable us to 
assess our performance. 
The identification of a managerial and political consensus around a common purpose. 
Performance review is a key component in a strategic change package which should 
facilitate the acceptance and enthusiastic implementation of performance management as 
a process owned by departments, and leading to greater sense of purpose, direction and 
accountability 
Client committees focusing on policies, achievement, relevance of activity undertaken 
rather than the efficiency of delivery. 
Closer links with the budgetary process and developments arising from the 
implementation of proposals in the Citizen's Charter. 
Ability to plan service delivery in the light of agreed priorities, and able to measure the 
effect of those priorities. 
Greater member awareness as to strategic levels and quality and to the best use of 
resources. 
The most significant development from our system must be the ability to establish 
accurately whether departments are providing the service which the members require 
them to. 
Ability to cope with uncertain financial and political climate. 
Better allocation of resources; clearer acknowledgement of priorities; clearer 
individually defined accountabilities. 
Integration of systems, better `control' over the very diverse range of Local Government 
Services, enables better delegation without abdication of responsibility, and framework 
for setting targets, linked to resources and choices of priorities. 
Greater member concentration on core service standards rather than operational decisions 
and new developments at the margin. 
Greater emphasis on outputs rather than inputs. 
The ability to judge where policy and performance is effective and efficient and to be 
able to identify weak areas. To have the information to decide what action should be 
taken. To improve priority setting. Improvement to policy implementation. Managers 
will have the information to control the work of their service so that it meets objectives. 
Alignment of council activities with members desires and consumer needs/demands 
Y 
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Not surprisingly, considerable disparity is evident in the answers. Some 
responses highlight that the processes of the council are now more integrated 
and that there is now more of a managerial and political consensus about the 
purpose and direction of the authority. Others stress that performance review 
has facilitated the clarification of the council's strategy. In a number of cases, 
it has also provided the framework to facilitate coping with uncertainty and 
given the current local government environment, that must be a positive 
attribute. De-emphasising members' involvement in operational matters and 
increasing their focus on strategic issues was also highlighted as a 
development arising from the operation of a performance review system. A 
small number of chief executives identified future developments which had 
negative undertones such as an anticipation of members keeping a watchful 
eye on the performance of officers but most respondents identified positive 
developments, including those chief executives who considered performance 
review to have been less than successful. 
Overall, in considering corporate and development issues associated with 
performance review, the implementation of a review mechanism has led to a 
change in corporate values and culture and is particularly associated with a 
customer focus being illicited. It has also contributed to securing a corporate 
management perspective throughout the council and with the achievement of 
corporate goals and is generally perceived by chief executives to have been 
successful and it is anticipated that it will bring positive benefits in the future. 
However, there were a number of respondents who felt that it was too soon 
after the introduction of the review system to reach a conclusion on how 
review had impacted on their authorities. 
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6.6 Responses from Chief Executives of Authorities Not 
Operating a Performance Review System 
This section looks at the responses received from chief executives 
representing authorities which did not have a review system in operation and 
who had therefore completed part 2 of the postal questionnaire sent to them. 
Table 6.35 indicates the level of part 2 responses received. 
TABLE 6.35: PART 2 RETURNS FROM CHIEF EXECUTIVES 
Part 2 
returns 
London Boroughs 3 
Scottish Regions 4 
Scottish Districts 18 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 8 
County Councils 3 
Metropolitan Districts 6 
Non-Met Districts 65 
Total 
% of chief 
executive % of issued % of all 
returns questionnaires authorities 
14.3 10.0 9.1 
50.0 40.0 33.3 
58.1 36.0 34.0 
40.0 25.0 25.0 
57.1 21.6 21.6 
13.6 8.6 7.7 
42.8 17.6 16.7 
44.2 22.6 22.0 
109 41.6 22.2 21.2 
Overall, 109 chief executives from authorities not operating review systems 
returned completed questionnaires. This accounted for 41.6% of all the 
questionnaire returns from chief executives and 22.2% of the authorities 
issued with questionnaires. Part 2 returns represented 21.2% of all local 
authorities including councils which participated in the research case studies. 
The level of part 2 returns is very low for County Councils and London 
Boroughs where the returns respectively accounted for only 13.6% and 
14.3% of the questionnaires completed by chief executives, 8.6% and 10.0% 
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of issued questionnaires, and 7.7% and 9.1% of the authorities in these 
groupings. This reflects the high incidence of performance review in these 
authority groupings. In relation to total chief executive returns, the level of 
part 2 responses was highest amongst Scottish Districts (58.1%), Welsh 
Districts (57.1%) and Scottish Regions (50.0%) respectively representing 
36.0%, 21.6% and 40.0% of questionnaires issued and 34.0%, 21.6% and 
33.3% of councils in these authority types. 
Chief executives representing authorities not operating a performance review 
system were asked whether there was any mechanism in place for reviewing 
performance in their authority. Table 6.36 gives a summary of the responses 
received. 
TABLE 6.36 IS THERE ANY MECHANISM FOR REVIEWING PERFORMANCE IN YOUR 
AUTHORITY ? 
Yes No Nil Response 
London Boroughs 3 
Scottish Regions 31 
Scottish Districts 13 5 
Welsh Counties 11 
Welsh Districts 71 
County Councils 21 
Metropolitan Districts 6 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 42 22 
Total 
Percentage 
77 31 
70.6 28.4 
1 
1 
0.9 
77 (70.6%) chief executives indicated there was some mechanism for 
reviewing performance in their authority whilst 31 (28.4%) said that there was 
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not. They were also asked to elaborate on the particular mechanism used and 
appendix 6.21 contains the full breakdown of responses given with a sub-set 
indicated in box 6.18. 
BOX 6.18 MECHANISMS USED TO REVIEW PERFORMANCE 
This is done in a rather piecemeal unstructured manner. There is no formal corporate 
review system. 
Service reviews are carried out by departments, the policy unit and internal and external 
audits. Reviews are often initiated by concerns raised by management 
information/performance measures. 
The Council has set up an informal group of elected members to give preliminary 
consideration to the questions of performance efficiency and quality review. 
One is currently in the process of being introduced. Service plans have been prepared for 
1992/95 and these are to be supported by annual departmental plans. These are being 
drawn up in liaison with a newly created Performance Review Sub-Committee who will 
have a major role in determining performance indicators and reporting mechanisms. 
Measurement of quality standards to those activities subject to CCT. Looking to develop 
PR measures and complaints procedures. 
Service committees are supposed to review their achievement of objectives on an annual 
basis. In practice this has been hit and miss. There is also a Performance Review 
Committee but to date they have not grasped the problem but have concentrated on 
peripheral issues. 
There is not a tight performance review system here but we have an annual service 
planning framework within which departments prepare a set of annual service targets and 
a three-year outlook. Responsibility is devolved to chief officers who report to their 
individual committees. 
Financial monitoring and complaints level monitoring. 
We have a system of Base Budget Review Working Parties which are appointed by each of 
the Service Committees at the beginning of the financial year to review specified services 
and submit reports and recommendations to the main committees. 
Although there is no formal, authority-wide system, services are regularly reviewed in 
response to CCT, legislative change, budgetary constraints. 
Normal management practice. 
Service committees carry this responsibility and are reviewing all services in turn as part 
of a2 year programme linked to the Council's strategic plan to year 2000. 
m 
Most of the responses indicate that the foundations of a performance review 
system exist but that it lacks structure or is still relatively embryonic. A 
number of chief executives reported ad-hoc reviews of particular service areas 
being undertaken, normally in response to something being amiss. 
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Chief executives completing part 2 of the postal survey were also asked 
whether a review system had previously been operational in their authority 
and 17 (15.6%) reported that a review system has been in place in the past. 
Box 6.19 contains the complete set of responses to the question `why is it no 
longer operational? ' 
Box 6.19: WHY IS YOUR REVIEW SYSTEM NO LONGER OPERATIONAL ? 
It was abandoned many years ago on the grounds that little notice was taken of the results 
and the basis was inappropriate. The system was extremely badly designed and was too 
centralised. 
The system collapsed for a number of reasons but predominately because of the lack of 
credibility which the system operated in this authority had which may reflect the 
inadequacies of the system rather than of PR as such. 
Too broad. 
System collapsed. 
Very loose arrangements through a PR Sub-Committee were ineffective and the system 
lapsed 10 years ago. 
Pressure of external change. 
Change in leadership and chief executive. 
Discounted many years ago when the Performance review Sub-Committee exceeded its 
powers. 
Fell into disrepute because of complexity. 
There was a change in the chief executive and the new one considered that the 
performance review system consisted of no more than a position statement on various 
services which was barely given a glance by Committees. It was achieving nothing. 
This was many years ago and it failed. 
A formal system was introduced by a previous chief executive but did not operate 
satisfactorily. 
A performance review committee was disbanded because it tended to review departmental 
reports of performance and not performance itself. 
Rewards produced by the system exceeded our financial resource. 
Lacked meaningful performance indicators. 
This was abandoned in the early 1980s. It was considered centrally prescriptive in an 
authority with strong service departments and members support was insufficient. 
Committee structures were simplified with the task specifically allotted to service 
committees. Each committee draws up a committee plan at the start of the year (with 
increasing emphasis placed on performance indicators in line with Audit Commission 
proposals) and considers a monitoring report regularly against these. No longer centrally 
managed but system still operating. 
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The reasons for discontinuing performance review are wide-ranging and a 
recurrent theme in the responses is that the systems failed some years back. 
Some of review systems which have previously been in operation are reported 
as being too centralist, but complexity is also highlighted and mention is made 
of the inability to generate meaningful performance indicators. 
Chief executives were also asked whether the authority they represented had 
established a mission statement or statement of objectives, a set of clearly 
defined goals or targets, and whether they made use of performance 
indicators. Tables 6.37,6.38 and 6.39 indicate the responses received. 
TABLE 6.37 DOES YOUR AUTHORITY HAVE A MISSION STATEMENT OR A 
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
Yes No Limited 
London Boroughs 3 
Scottish Regions 13 
Scottish Districts 15 3 
Welsh Counties 1 
Welsh Districts 71 
County Councils 3 
Metropolitan Districts 6 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 55 9 
Total 91 16 
1 
2 
Percentage 8 3.5 1 4.7 1.8 
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TABLE 6.38 DOES YOUR AUTHORITY HAVE A SET OF CLEARLY DEFINED GOALS? 
Nil 
Yes No Partial Response 
London Boroughs 2 
Scottish Regions 
Scottish Districts 12 
Welsh Counties 
Welsh Districts 4 
County Councils 
Metropolitan Districts 4 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 27 
Total 
Percentage 
1 
4 
6 
2 
4 
12 
11 
36 1 1 
49 54 51 
45.0 49.5 4.6 0.9 
TABLE 6.39 DOES YOUR AUTHORITY MAKE USE OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS? 
Yes No Partially 
London Boroughs 3 
Scottish Regions 13 
Scottish Districts 6 10 2 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 53 
County Councils 12 
Metropolitan Districts 222 
Non-Metropolitan Districts 34 24 7 
Total 
Percentage 
52 44 13 
47.7 40.4 11.9 
Overall, 67 (61.5%) chief executives indicated that their authority had 
established a Mission Statement or a Statement of Objectives; 49 (45.0%) 
reported that clearly defined goals existed in their organisation; and 52 
(47.7%) reported that use was made of performance indicators in their council. 
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One could reasonably infer from this that in councils where a statement of 
objectives and/or clearly defined goals have been established, the basic 
framework for strategic management is in place and where this is 
supplemented by the utilisation of performance indicators, then the basis for a 
review system exists. 44 authorities responded positively to the series of 
questions above. 
Finally, chief executives were asked whether it was intended to introduce a 
performance review system to their authority in the future. Table 6.39 
contains the aggregated responses but 74 (67.9%) chief executives indicated 
that a review system would be established in the future whilst 8 (7.3%) 
thought that this would probably be the case. 26 (23.9%) chief executives 
responded negatively to this question. The pattern of responses holds across 
most authority types except amongst the Scottish Districts where 8 of the 18 
(44.4%) chief executives reported that it was not their authority's intention to 
implement a review process in the future. 
For those respondents reporting that review was likely to be introduced, they 
were asked whether they thought the officers and members of the authority 
would be supportive of its introduction. One County Council chief executive 
reported that the implementation of a review mechanism would meet with a 
lack of support from his officers, whilst another chief executive from a 
County Council, 3 from Metropolitan Districts and 7 from Non-Metropolitan 
Districts indicated that there was likely to be mixed support from officers. In 
terms of member support, a chief executive from. a Scottish District and one 
from a Non-Metropolitan District anticipated unsupportiveness from 
councillors whilst overall, 9 expected mixed support to be in evidence. In 
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only 1 Non-Metropolitan District did the chief executive anticipate 
unsupportiveness from both officers and members. 
Overall, within the responses received from chief executives from authorities 
not operating performance review systems, it is apparent that performance is 
not excluded from the agendas of these authorities with 70.6% of authorities 
having some mechanism in place for reviewing performance and with 67.9% 
anticipating the introduction of a performance review system in the future. A 
small number (15.6%) reported that a previous review system had been 
operational but had subsequently lapsed. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has examined performance review from the perspective of chief 
executives and is based on the responses received from the postal survey 
conducted to illicit their views. With respect to chief executives representing 
authorities operating a performance review system, several key findings have 
emerged: 
*a high level of support for the introduction of performance review from chief 
executives, senior officers and councillors is in evidence; 
* this support is broadly maintained following the implementation of the review 
system but with a modest increase in the number of chief executives reporting 
supportive officers but a moderate decline in the number recording supportive 
members; 
* the decision to introduce a performance review system has generally been 
internally-driven typically being either officer-led (in 58% of cases), member- 
led (13%) or jointly initiated by officers and members (26%); 
* 47.1% of chief executives reported that specific measures had been introduced 
to enhance co-operation from officers and members with respect to performance 
review but it was postulated that this may reflect the anticipation of a lack of co- 
operation in these councils; 
* 47.1% of chief executives also reported that their review system was linked to 
performance appraisal and/or performance-related pay; 
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* in the majority of authorities (68%), some mechanism is in place for 
communicating knowledge of targets and performance to junior management 
and operative grade staff; 
* 43.1 % of respondents reported a review system in operation prior to the 
introduction of the current process being put in place and in 19.6% of cases the 
current system was based on the previous process; 
* the majority of systems (70.7%) were introduced during or subsequent to 1990 
but there were a small number of systems (5.9%) which pre-date the first 
Thatcher administration; 
* 37.9% of chief executives reported that goals and targets had been set prior to 
the introduction of the performance review system to their authority and most of 
these were in authorities where the review system had only recently been 
established; 
* policy targets for the review system generally emerged from the Council's 
strategic and operational documents and processes such as corporate objectives 
or business plans and members were involved in their determination in 64.7% 
of cases; 
* where officers set the policy targets, there was a higher incidence (69.6%) of 
the authority having no overall political control or there being a minority 
administration; 
* the setting of performance measures for the review system often seemed 
unrelated to the setting of policy targets and members were only involved in 
their delineation in 41.2% of cases; 
* only 37.9% of chief executives reported a distinction being drawn between 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness but the examples provided suggest that 
even in these cases, a clear distinction does not actually exist; 
* in 59.5% of authorities, quality measures had been incorporated into the 
performance review system and many of the examples of these stress the 
importance of the customer's assessment of quality; 
* in 60.8% of authorities, consumer measures had also been incorporated into the 
review process but only 21.6% of chief executives reported that the views of 
consumers had been sought; 
* establishing a review system led the majority of councils to focus on the 
objectives of services and in many of these cases, a reappraisal of the service 
and a redefinition of the customer also occurred; 
* major difficulties in setting up a review system were reported by 52.9% of chief 
executives and one of the most common problem encountered was lack of 
ownership and commitment from officers and members which is at odds with 
the high level of support also reported by chief executives and may reflect a 
reluctance to admit that officers and members were not fully supportive of 
performance review operations; 
* considerable disparity in the operational details of performance review systems 
was in evidence particularly concerning how such systems fit into the corporate 
management structure, the designate of the officer with review responsibilities; 
the number and type of staff involved in performance review work, and the 
committee dealing with review matter, 
Chapter 6, Performance Review: The Chief Executives' Perspective, page 240 
* in the majority of cases, training needs were identified both in relation to 
operating the review system and as a consequence of its operation; 
* 74.5% of chief executives reported that the review system was linked to the 
policy/strategic planning process; 
*a smaller proportion (61.4%) reported a linkage with the budgetary process but 
the reports of the nature of the linkage revealed that much less progress had 
been made in this domain; 
* in 52.9% of authorities, provision is made for monitoring and appraising tasks 
not incorporated into the review process with systems of performance appraisal 
and ad hoc reviews being the most common method for achieving this; 
* 75.2% of chief executives indicated that a change in corporate values and/or 
culture could be associated with performance review with a strengthened 
customer focus and improved clarity in the purpose and direction of the 
authority being the most common change; 
* the review system is also associated with a corporate management perspective 
being achieved and with the attainment of corporate goals; 
* only 8 (5.2%) chief executives felt that the review system had been 
unsuccessful overall, with most respondents indicating that it had been a 
success (61.4%) or that it would be premature to reach such a conclusion 
(24.8%); 
*a small proportion (25.5%) of chief executives reported changes being made to 
the review system most of these being from authorities with systems in place 
for some time; 
* almost all chief executives identified positive future developments arising from 
the operation of performance review. 
For those chief executives making a part 2 return and thus representing 
authorities which had not implemented a performance review system, it was 
clear that performance issues were not excluded from council business and 
there was evidence of the basic elements of review systems typically already 
in place. The majority of chief executives anticipated the introduction of 
performance review sometime in the future. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses performance review from the perspective of council 
leaders utilising data collected from members completing the postal 
questionnaire. To recall from chapter 4, the survey form sent to council 
leaders was briefer than that sent to chief executives and was predominately 
focused on political aspects of the review systems. However, a number of 
key questions were asked of both chief executives and council leaders to 
allow comparisons to be drawn between the two sets of answers and the 
accuracy of responses to be assessed. These duplicate questions mainly 
related to factual considerations and are further discussed below. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. In this introductory section, the level 
of part 1 returns is identified since this underpins the relevance of the rest of 
the chapter and the questions used to test the level of consistency in 
responses between council leaders and chief executives are also discussed. 
The political dimension of performance review as explored through the 
questions asked in the survey form completed by councils leaders is then 
considered. There are sections relating to operational considerations, 
developmental issues and the responses provided by council leaders from 
authorities not operating performance review, followed by a summary. The 
chapter is mainly confined to the presentation and preliminary analysis of the 
data collected through the postal questionnaire. A more substantive analysis 
is subsumed into chapter 9, A Critique of Performance Review, compiled 
using all the research evidence. 
Table 7.1 indicates the level of part 1 postal questionnaire returns received 
from council leaders. In total, 146 survey forms were returned by council 
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leaders representing authorities which had review systems operating. This 
accounted for 84.9% of the returns received from council leaders - the number 
of part 2 responses made by council leaders was minimal and is discussed in 
section 7.5. Part 1 responses received from council leaders accounted for 
29.7% of issued questionnaires and 28.4% of all authorities in Great Britain 
including those participating in the case study stage of this research. The 
corresponding figures for chief executives were 31.1% and 29.8%, so council 
leader representation in terms of part 1 returns, is marginally lower than that 
for chief executives. 
TABLE 7.1 PART 1 RETURNS FROM COUNCIL LEADERS 
Part 1 
returns 
London Boroughs 15 
Scottish Regions 2 
Scottish Districts 12 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 4 
County Councils 15 
Metropolitan Districts 10 
Non-Met Districts 86 
Total 146 
% of council 
leader % of issued % of all 
returns questionnaires authorities 
93.8 50.0 45.4 
50.0 20.0 16.7 
63.2 24.0 22.6 
50.0 25.0 25.0 
44.4 10.8 10.8 
100.0 44.1 38.5 
90.9 29.4 27.8 
78.9 29.9 29.1 
84.9 29.7 28.4 
Amongst authority types, considerable disparity is evident in the scale of 
positive returns. The highest response rates were from London Boroughs and 
County Councils where 50.0% and 44.1% of council leaders receiving a 
questionnaire returned a completed part 1 survey form This respectively 
accounted for 45.4% and 35.5% of all authorities in these categories. With 
the exception of Welsh Districts, the proportion of issued questionnaires 
which generated a completed part 1 return from council leaders in other 
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authority groups, ranged from 20% in Scottish Regions to 29.9% in Non- 
Metropolitan Districts. Only 10.8% of council leaders from Welsh Districts 
completed part 1 of the survey forms. 
Examining part 1 returns as a proportion of total council leader returns, 
highlights the low level of returns received from council leaders representing 
authorities not operating performance review mechanisms. The 15 responses 
received from County Councils accounted for all of the questionnaires 
returned by county council leaders. Similarly, part 1 returns represented 
93.8%, 90.9% and 78.9% of completed survey forms received from council 
leaders in London Boroughs, Metropolitan Districts and Non-Metropolitan 
Districts. Contrastingly, the responses received from council leaders in Welsh 
Districts operating performance review accounted for 44.4% of all returns 
received from council leaders in this category; and in Scottish Regions and 
Welsh Counties, part 1 returns represented 50% of all returns but in all these 
authority types, the overall level of response from council leaders was 
comparatively low. 
In both Metropolitan Districts and Non-Metropolitan Districts, the number of 
part 1 completed survey forms received from council leaders is higher than the 
number received from chief executives: 10 against 8 in the case of 
Metropolitan Districts; and 86 against 82 for Non-Metropolitan Districts. In 
all other authority groupings, the converse holds. However, it is important to 
stress that the returns received from council leaders and chief executives 
within the same authority grouping, do not necessarily originate from the 
same authorities. For example, for only 10 of the 15 London Boroughs from 
whom a part 1 return was received from the council leader, was there a 
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corresponding part 1 return made by the chief executive. In total, for 89 of 
the 146 (61.0%) authorities whose council leader completed part 1 of the 
questionnaire, a part 1 return was also made by the chief executive. There 
were 57 (39.0%) council leaders who completed the questionnaire and whose 
authorities had established a performance system but whose chief executive 
did not make a return. This observation is of particular significance when 
considering questions put to both council leaders and chief executives since it 
explains some level of disparity between the responses received from the two 
groups. 
Two such questions were `when was the performance review system 
established? ' and `who initiated the proposal to introduce performance 
review? ' and tables 7.2 and 7.3 respectively indicate the responses given by 
council leaders to these questions. 
According to 16 (11.0%) council leaders, the performance review system was 
established in their organisation prior to the election of the first Thatcher 
administration, with 3 indicating systems going back as far as the 1970 to 
1973 period. This compares with 9 (5.9%) chief executives reporting review 
systems predating Thatcher with the earliest of these in 1974 (see page 175). 
Only 1 (0.7%) chief executive reported a system introduced between 1979 
and 1983 but 8 (5.5%) council leaders indicated that this was the period in 
which the review system had been introduced in their council. 11 (7.5%) 
council leaders and 11 (7.2ßb) chief executives reported processes established 
between 1984 and 1987.14 (9.6%) council leaders indicated systems 
introduced in 1988 whilst 16 (11.0%) reported 1989 as the start-up year in 
their council. The corresponding figures for chief executives are 8 (5.2%) and 
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13 (8.5%). The peak period reported by chief executives for introducing 
performance systems was between 1990 and 1992 when, including those 
systems whose development was on-going, 108 (70.7%) review mechanisms 
were established. 79 (54.9%) council leaders recorded processes introduced 
during this period. The response categorised as `other' in table 7.2 was from a 
council leader in a Metropolitan District where performance review is 
operated departmentally with the consequence that different departments 
within the same authority introduced review initiatives at different times. 
TABLE 7.2: WHEN WAS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM ESTABLISHED? 
(COUNCIL LEADER RESPONSES) 
1970-73 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-87 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
On-going 
Other 
Nil Response 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD Total % 
1232.1 
21 10 13 8.9 
1121385.5 
2117 11 7.5 
11228 14 9.6 
33 10 16 11.0 
11122 13 20 13.7 
55122 14 29 19.9 
311496.2 
31111 14 21 14.4 
110.7 
110.7 
Overall, the level of discrepancy in responses is too high to be adequately 
explained by the fact that 57 of the council leaders whose responses are 
included in table 7.2 above are excluded from the chief executive returns. 
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Consequently, for the 89 authorities for which a questionnaire was received 
from both the council leader and the chief executive, a close comparison of 
the response sets was undertaken to explore the discrepancy further. 
In 64 cases, the same year was reported by both chief executives and council 
leaders for the establishment of a performance review system In a further 19 
cases, the year reported by council leaders was within one year of that 
reported by chief executives and this is likely to reflect the fact that the 
introduction of the review system is typically a long process, often spanning 
twelve months or more. In the other 6 authorities, a more marked discrepancy 
exists between the responses. However, in 4 of these, the chief executive 
had indicated that the current performance review system was an 
enhanced/modified version of a previous system that had operated within the 
authority and it is likely that the chief executive's response relates to the year 
in which the modified review system was introduced whilst the council 
leader's answer refers to the date that the original system was established. 
Thus in only 2 out of 89 (2.2%) cases is there genuine discrepancy between 
the response given by the council leader compared with that of the chief 
executive. Follow-up calls in both cases revealed that the date given by the 
chief executive was in fact accurate. One of the council leaders had given the 
date that a Performance Review Working Party was set up to investigate 
establishing a system, as the year in which the review system was actually 
introduced and in the other case, the council leader had thought he had 
remembered accurately the year of introduction but was in fact two years 
outwith the actual date of establishment - this was a system dating back to 
1984 and this does highlight the problem of securing accurate information 
about something which happened a number of years previously. In the case 
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of three council leaders who reported a review system in their organisation 
dating back tothe early 1970s, at the time of completing the questionnaire, 
they were being asked to recall facts about something which had occurred 
more than a decade previously. However, the only response given by council 
leaders that this is likely to materially affect is that relating to difficulties being 
encountered in the operation of the review process since the memory of the 
inevitable `teething difficulties' in operating performance review may have 
faded with time. 
Overall, in relation to the year in which the review system was established, 
close inspection reveals a high degree of consistency in the responses given 
by council leaders and chief executives. This is not however the case with 
the responses given to the question `who initiated the proposal to introduce 
performance review? ' Table 7.3 summarises the responses received from 
council leaders. 53 (36.3%) reported that the introduction of performance 
review had been jointly initiated by officers and members; 50 (34.2%) 
indicated that it had been driven by members; whilst 31 (21.2%) responded 
that officers had been the main driving force behind the establishment of the 
review process. 3 council leaders indicated that the chief executive had 
initiated the introduction of the review mechanism whilst a further 3 reported 
that the chief executive and council leader had been jointly responsible for 
the proposal. A small assortment (5 in total) of other responses was given as 
indicated in the table and there was one nil response to this question. 
In comparing the responses given by council leaders to those returned by 
chief executives to the same question (see page 166), disparity is in evidence. 
34 (22.2%) chief executives reported a joint initiation whilst 65 (42.5%) 
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maintained that officers were responsible, 19 considered members to be the 
driving force and 19 gave the credit for proposing to introduce performance 
review to the chief executive with a further 4 reporting that the chief 
executive had been the joint initiator with the council leader. 3 chief 
executives indicated that consultants had initiated the proposal to establish a 
performance review system in the council. 7 `other' answers were given by 
chief executives and there were 2 nil returns to this particular question from 
chief executives. 
TABLE 7.3: WHO INITIATED THE PROPOSAL TO INTRODUCE PERFORMANCE REVIEW? 
(COUNCIL LEADER RESPONSES) 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD Total % 
1.3 1143 19 31 21.2 
2.6 21171 35 53 36.3 
3.8 24116 27 50 34.2 
4.3 3 2.1 
5.1 1132.1 
6.2 2 1.4 
7.1 1 0.7 
8.1 1 0.7 
9.1 1 0.7 
10.1 1 0.7 
1. Officers 6. Consultants 
2. Officers and Members 7. Policy Committee 
3. Members 8. Chief Executive and Chair of Policy 
4. Chief Executive 9. Reorganisation 
5. Chief Executive and Council Leader 10. Nil Response 
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At a glance, council leaders consider there to have been a higher level of 
member involvement in the initiation of review processes than chief 
executives report. Conversely, chief executives indicated more review 
systems initiated by officers than council leaders reported. Again, close 
analysis revealed that the level of inconsistency in the responses given could 
not be sufficiently explained by the fact that the responses of council leaders 
and chief executives did not all originate from the same authorities. Taking 
the latter point into account and allowing for the higher level of responses 
received from chief executives (153 as opposed to 146 from council leaders), 
there was still inconsistency in 43 (29.5%) of the answers from authorities 
where a return was received from both the chief executive and council leader. 
Exploring this further revealed that in 25 cases, the chief executive had 
reported that the proposal to introduce performance review had been initiated 
by officers but the council leader in these authorities contended that it was a 
jointly driven initiative; and in 14 cases, chief executives had responded that 
officers and members had proposed the introduction of performance review to 
their authority whilst the council leaders from these authorities considered the 
proposal to have originated from members. 2 council leaders claimed that 
members were responsible whilst the corresponding chief executives 
considered that officers had proposed the introduction of performance 
review. In one case, the chief executive indicated that he had proposed the 
introduction of the review system but the council leader had given the 
response of `officers' being responsible. In one further case, the chief 
executive claimed that members had wanted review introduced whilst the 
council leader reported that the proposal was initiated by officers but in this 
particular council, neither respondent considered the review system to have 
been successful in the organisation. 
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Given this high level of discrepancy in responses, further analysis was 
undertaken to see whether the inconsistency was attributable to elapsed time 
(and hence memory). However, no pattern was evident, with the distribution 
of differing responses from council leaders and chief executives being 
approximately equal across the range of years in which the performance 
systems were introduced. 
Little can be done to rectify this tendency for both officers and members to 
have differing perspectives on the set-up of the review system but it does 
underline the problem of using questionnaires to gather data because the 
accuracy of the responses cannot be gauged and there is a natural tendency 
on the part of respondents to exaggerate the positive and underplay the 
negative. In analysing questionnaire material, this facet needs to be 
considered but it is less of a problem within a multi-layered methodological 
framework such as that adopted within this thesis, where a survey is used to 
collect surface-level data but where a further strategy is employed, in this 
context case-studies, to assimilate in-depth data. 
Whilst the level of part 1 returns is sufficiently high at 29.7% to suggest that 
the data collected using the postal survey issued to council leaders is likely to 
be representative, examining the consistency of responses on duplicate 
questions highlights certain issues. In particular, questionnaires were 
completed at one point in time whilst the review systems were introduced 
across a wide spectrum of dates. Some of the systems had been established 
more than a decade prior to the completion of the survey form whilst other 
cases, the development of the review system was on-going when responses 
to the questions were compiled. This will inevitably have an impact on the 
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accuracy of the answers and there is likely to be a tendency for both chief 
executives and council leaders to take credit for those aspects of the review 
system that are particularly successful. However, the scale of inaccuracies is 
impossible to control, estimate or rectify and therefore can only be borne in 
mind when considering questionnaire responses. 
7.2 The Political Dimension 
This section explores the political dimension of performance review, an area 
not covered in the questionnaire issued to chief executives. The first area 
considered is that of political control and table 7.4 indicates the political 
control of authorities whose council leaders completed part 1 of the survey 
form 
TABLE 7.4: WHICH PARTY HAS OVERALL POLITICAL CONTROL IN YOUR COUNCIL? 
LB SR SD WC WD CC MD NMD Total % 
1.7 71356 29 58 39.7 
2.6 171 26 41 28.1 
311 10 12 8.2 
41232.1 
511121396.2 
61112 18 23 15.8 
1. Labour 
2. Conservative 
3. Liberal Democrat 
4, Independents 
5. Hung Council/Alliance 
6. No overall control 
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58 (39.7%) councillors indicated that their council was Labour-controlled, 41 
(28.1%) reported a Conservative administration, 12 (8.2%) noted Liberal- 
Democrats in power whilst 3 (2.1%) reported an Independent administration. 
9 (6.2%) council leaders responded that their council was hung normally with 
a two or three party alliance having been established whilst a further 23 
(15.8%) council leaders reported no overall control in their authority with 18 
of these representing Non-Metropolitan districts. This pattern is broadly in 
keeping with the political complexion of local government in Britain (see 
Wilson and Game, 1994) and thus there was no evidence of any particular 
political group favouring the introduction of review systems to local 
authorities. The distinction between a `hung' council and a council with no 
political control is blurred but since both these responses were given by 
council leaders and that hung authorities normally had a minority 
administration or a coalition operating and that this was not the case where 
no political control was indicated, it was felt appropriate to include both 
answers as separate categories. 
Council leaders were also asked whether their political party had been in 
power at the time the performance review system was introduced and the 
responses are given in table 7.5. 
117 (80.1%) council leaders reported that their group had been in control at 
the time the review system was introduced whilst 27 (18.5%) indicated that 
this had not been the case. However 4 of the 27 responding negatively to the 
question `was your political party in power at the time of the introduction of 
performance review' added comments indicating that this was because no 
`party' was in power at the time the review mechanism was introduced, in 3 
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cases because there was no overall political control in their authority and in 
the fourth instance, because the Independents formed the administration but 
were not a political party. There is no fool-proof way of assessing how many 
of the 27 respondent who indicated that their party had not been in control at 
the time performance review was established, had subsequently come to 
power and hence it was their leader who was completing the questionnaire 
and how many fell into the categories described above, except to observe 
that 15 of those listed as `no' in table 7.5, were either from Independent 
authorities, hung councils or authorities where there was no overall political 
control. In retrospect, this question could have been better phrased to avoid 
this difficulty. 
TABLE 7.5: WAS YOUR POLITICAL PARTY IN POWER AT THE TIME THE 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM WAS INTRODUCED? 
Yes No Nil Response 
London Boroughs 14 1 
Scottish Regions 11 
Scottish Districts 12 
Welsh Counties 11 
Welsh Districts 4 
County Councils 14 1 
Metropolitan Districts 73 
Non-Met Districts 65 21 
Total 117 27 2 
Percentage 80.1 18.5 1.4 
Where council leaders had responded positively that they had been in power 
at the time performance review was introduced to their authority, they were 
asked to indicate whether their party had been supportive of its establishment 
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or not. Only 1 council leader from a Non-Metropolitan district indicated that 
his party was indifferent to performance review, the rest indicating support. 
Council leaders were also asked to report on their party's current attitude 
towards performance review. Support was again the norm but with 1 London 
Borough leader reporting a `mostly supportive' disposition; 1 councillor 
from a Non-Metropolitan district indicating indifference with a further leader 
in this authority type reporting a lack of party involvement and 1 respondent 
noting `general support' but without expanding on the nature of this 
qualified answer. For those council leaders whose party was not in power at 
the time the review system was established, all 27 indicated that if they had 
been in control, they would have been supportive of the introduction of 
performance review and all were favourably disposed towards performance 
review at the time of completing the questionnaire. 
Member support for performance review was considered within the chief 
executive's questionnaire (see page 163) and a high level of support was 
again in evidence although moderate numbers of chief executives reported 
mixed support (9), indifference (3) and unsupportiveness (1) with a modest 
decrease in the number of chief executives reporting supportive members 
following the implementation of the review system (140 down to 133). This 
change was attributed to the review system occasionally revealing details of 
weak performance and giving the opposition political ammunition. However, 
there is little evidence in the responses given by council leaders to lend 
support to this perspective, with members reporting continued support from 
councillors following the implementation of the system. 
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One area critical to the political dimension of performance review is the role 
played by the majority and minority groups in the performance review 
process. Consequently, council leaders were asked to describe this role. The 
full set of responses given by leaders is contained in appendices 7.1 and 7.2 
but a range of the most revealing answers is contained in boxes 7.1 and 7.2. 
BOX 7.1: WHAT ROLE DOES THE MAJORITY GROUP PLAY IN THE PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW PROCESS? 
Overall supervision 
The Executive of the majority group meets on a fortnightly basis with senior officers to 
monitor/review key performance indicators. The majority group is involved in the 
selection of indicators annually. 
Chair of Policy oversees the PR process; Chair and vice-chairs of Service Committees 
present relevant information on their departments to the Chair of Policy. 
The Performance Review Committee regularly receives reports on selected service areas 
regarding performance across the Borough. Standing Neighbourhood Committees (or 
their Sub-Committees) receive reports as requested, comparing performance in that 
neighbourhood with results achieved elsewhere so that neighbourhoods can learn from 
each other. 
Decide areas for review. 
Information relating to performance against targets is fed into annual departmental 
service development plans and used as part of the decision-maldng process to determine 
the allocation of funding in committee. 
The majority group sets objectives and agrees targets and performance standards for 
services in consultation with the chief executive and his management team. 
Party groups do not play any role in the process as it is at Panel, sub-committee and main 
committee level that members get involved in setting and monitoring performance, for 
example through the Annual Key Tasks system. 
The performance review process is now embodied into the work of Committees of the 
City Council, in particular the Management Services Committee which plays a leading 
role. The majority group, through holding the chairmanship of various committees, 
therefore has an important role in ensuring that the process succeeds. 
They have the major input together with chief officers to the policy planning process and 
agreeing the principle corporate and departmental objectives. Progress is regularly 
reported to all members. The majority group controls priorities, 
The majority group sets direction, identifies objectives and decides on action resulting 
from review. 
Sets standards and targets. 
Identification of in-depth projects for review; sets down broad overall political objectives 
on which policy and performance review system is based. 
Close scrutiny of reported performance; directs and corrective action necessary. 
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BOX 7.2: WHAT ROLE DOES THE MINORITY GROUP PLAY IN THE PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW PROCESS? 
A full role. 
A minimal role. 
The opportunity to share recommendations at committee. 
Representation on the Performance Review Committee. 
As members of the Council Committees they receive regular reports on performance and 
may refer comments to the chief executive or heads of departments. They were not 
involved in setting up the process. 
They influence topics for review. 
Members of the minority group are present at delegation sub-committees and main 
committee meetings. 
Progress in reporting all objectives is regularly reported to all members. 
The minority group share responsibility - performance review is conducted in a relatively 
apolitical manner. 
Fully supportive. 
Through the committee process. 
To deal with the role of the minority group first, it is apparent that typically 
the minority group is confined to the level of participation which might 
reasonably be expected of an opposition group primarily having 
representation on the committee dealing with performance review in 
proportion to their numbers. In this context, they can propose areas for 
review, share recommendations at committee and comment on performance 
information reported to members to the extent that the review system 
operated in the authority accommodates such involvement. 
A minimal number of authorities indicated that the minority group in their 
council played a more active role in the performance review process than 
might be anticipated of a group of opposition politicians with responses such 
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as `a full role, ' `the minority group share responsibility - performance review 
is conducted in a relatively apolitical manner' and `fully supportive' being 
given by council leaders. However, in one of these cases, the Independents 
were the ruling administration; in another, no political control was exercised; 
and in the other, Labour had a substantial majority. Therefore, in all cases 
where the opposition were proffered a participatory role, there was no threat 
of the minority group being able to use performance information to significant 
advantage. 
Far greater variety is in evidence for the roles played by the majority group in 
the performance review process. This is not surprising since the extent to 
which the ruling administration participates in performance review will be 
significantly determined by the type of review system introduced and thus the 
disparity of roles reported by council leaders reflects the range of review 
system being operated in this country. The responses given by council 
leaders could broadly be divided into the following categories: 
* active - as indicated by the response `the majority group sets direction, 
identifies objectives and decides on action resulting from review' or for 
example by setting the performance agenda for the authority and 
relevant committees and identifying areas for review; and setting 
standards and/or defining indicators of performance; 
* passive - for example as indicated by the response `through the 
committee process' or by the councillors role being confined to 
receiving regular performance information but with no indication given 
that much was done with the information; or by `supervising' the 
process; 
* delegation - predominately to group officers as in the response `the 
Chair of Policy oversees the performance review process; Chair and 
Vice-Chairs of Service Committees present relevant information on 
their departments to the Chair of Policy'; 
* minimal - where the council leader considered that the majority group 
played no role in the review system. 
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Not all responses given by council leaders fitted neatly into one of these 
categories but at a general level, approximately half of council leaders 
reported that the majority group's role in the review system was passive. 
Around 30% indicated an active involvement with a further 16% reporting 
that participation in performance review was confined to key members of the 
majority party particularly committee chairs (see delegation above). A small 
proportion (approximately 4%) indicated that the majority group were not 
involved in performance review. 
Council leaders were asked to indicate whether the performance review 
system was used for political purposes by the majority and minority groups 
and a summary of the responses given are indicated in tables 7.6 and 7.7. 
TABLE 7.6: IS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM USED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES 
BY THE MAJORITY GROUP? 
Not 
Systematically Too Not Nil 
Yes No Early Applicable Response 
London Boroughs 7512 
Scottish Regions 11 
Scottish Districts 381 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 13 
County Councils 38211 
Metropolitan Districts 352 
Non-Met Districts 26 38 10 345 
Total 44 69 12 56 10 
Percentage 30.1 47.3 8.2 3.4 4.1 6.8 
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44 (30.1%) council leaders indicated that the review process had been used 
for political purposes by the majority group whilst 69 (47.3%) indicated that it 
had not. An additional 12 council leaders reported that it had not been used 
for political purposes in any systematic or conscious way. 5 (3.4%) members 
indicated that it was too early for this to have become apparent. 6 (4.1%) 
leaders indicated that the question was not applicable presumably because of 
an apolitical majority group or no majority group at all. 
TABLE 7.7: IS THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM USED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES 
BY THE MINORITY GROUP? 
Not 
Systematically Too Not Nil 
Yes No Early Applicable Response 
London Boroughs 3811 
Scottish Regions 1 
2 
1 
Scottish Districts 291 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 13 
County Councils 1 11 21 
Metropolitan Districts 262 
Non-Met Districts 11 47 10 639 
Total 21 86 13 85 13 
Percentage 14.4 58.9 8.9 5.5 3.4 8.9 
Fewer council leaders reported the review process being used for political 
purposes by the minority group, 21 as opposed to 44 for the majority group 
with 86 (58.9%) indicating that it was not used politically and a further 13 
(8.9%) responding that it was not systematically used politically by the 
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opposition group in the council. 8 (5.5%) felt that it was too early to pass 
comment and in 5 (3.4%) cases, the question was considered inapplicable. 
These answers were rather surprising since I had a general preconception that 
performance review would generally give the opposition powerful 
ammunition both by baring the administration soul, defining the level and 
standard of service considered acceptable by the majority group; and/or by 
providing them with information on performance with which to attack the 
ruling administration. However, the responses to this question suggest that 
this is not the case and that generally minority groups are not seizing the 
political opportunity presented by performance review. 
To explore this further, closer analysis was undertaken in terms of the political 
balance of the 44 responses given by council leaders reporting the review 
system being used politically by the minority group in their authority, In 10 
cases, the administration was Labour-controlled but in 8 of these cases, the 
Conservatives were the next largest group and in 7 of these, the 
Conservatives held only a few seats less than the Labour group and by taking 
control of these, the Conservatives could secure control of the authority. 
Hence, the stakes were high. In 6 cases the converse is true with the 
Conservatives holding power but with Labour a close second. No pattern in 
terms of political balance was in evidence in the other cases. More 
significantly however, there were other authorities where only a few seats 
separated the controlling group from the party with the second most seats but 
the review system was not used for political purposes by either the majority or 
the minority party. This tends to suggest that other factors are likely to affect 
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whether review is used politically by the council and considerations such as 
the personality of the politicians is likely to be significant. 
The final strand in the political dimension of performance review considered in 
this chapter is the incorporation of political objectives into the review process. 
Council leaders were initially asked to indicate whether the political 
objectives of the administration were incorporated into the performance 
review system and table 7.8 contains the breakdown of given responses. 
TABLE 7.8: ARE THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION 
INCORPORATED INTO THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM? 
Not 
Systematically Too Not Nil 
Yes No Early Applicable Response 
London Boroughs 12 21 
Scottish Regions 11 
Scottish Districts 5331 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 22 
County Councils 9411 
Metropolitan Districts 82 
Non-Met Districts 52 26 422 
Total 91 39833 
Percentage 62.3 26.7 5.5 2.1 2.1 
91 council leaders (62.3% of respondents) indicated that their 
administration's political objectives were incorporated into the performance 
review system and a further 3 (2.1%) indicated that such a development was 
on-going. 39 (26.7%) council leaders reported that the objectives of their 
group were not incorporated into the review process whilst a further 8 (5.5%) 
indicated that they were not systematically encompassed into the 
2 
1.4 
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performance system. 3 respondents indicated that the question did not apply 
in the context of their council again presumably because of the apolitical 
nature of the administration - in one Scottish Region and in one Scottish 
District, the Independents were the majority group and in one County 
Council, there was no political control in the authority. 
At first glance, it is surprising to see over a quarter of council leaders 
reporting that the performance review system does not accommodate the 
political objectives of the ruling group. However, closer scrutiny reveals that 
in 26 out of the 39 negative responses given, the council leader represented 
either a hung council or one in which no overall political control was 
exercised. However, there was also a small number of apolitical 
administrations (4 in total) in which the council leader indicated that the 
objectives of the administration had been incorporated into the review 
process and there were 7 councils which were controlled either by Labour, 
Conservative or Liberal Democrat members where political objectives had not 
been accommodated by the review system. However overall, in the majority 
of cases where an authority is politically-controlled, the political objectives of 
the ruling group are encompassed into the review mechanism. 
For council leaders indicating that the objectives of their administratiofi were 
part of the performance process, they were asked to indicate how this had 
been achieved. Appendix 7.3 contains the full set of responses but a 
selection of the answers is indicated in box 7.3 overleaf. 
In general, according to council leaders, the political objectives of the ruling 
administration form the basis of the targets within the performance review 
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system. Alternatively, the objectives translate into key tasks with 
performance in relation to these tasks being monitored. This is in keeping 
with the responses given by chief executives to the question `how were the 
policy targets set for the performance review system? ' although chief 
executives considered there to have been some officer involvement in the 
process (see pages 180). 
BOX 7.3: HOW ARE THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION 
INCORPORATED INTO THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM? 
Through (i) committee agreement of targets for services; and (ii) each committee's 
Three Year Plan details strategic developments which translate into targets for services. 
Political objectives form the basis of the system of targets. 
The majority party has established ten tasks. The system is designed to provide 
information on the extent to which these are being achieved. 
The review of performance relates to the objectives of the County Council as detailed in 
the County Council's Policy Budget. The Policy budget contains the overall strategy of 
the County Council, its service bloc strategies, policy objectives and medium-term action 
programme and annual plans. Performance review enables an assessment of the progress 
of the medium term action programme and of the Council's overall strategy. 
Only in the sense that key objectives for the year are identified and these are related to the 
high priority tasks which committees (upon which the Conservative Group form the 
majority) identify as requiring particular attention. 
The performance targets are geared to the policy objectives of the controlling group. 
In ensuring that the underlying ethos is maintained throughout the review of the service. 
Quality Audit mentality. 
We ensure that budget allocations and monitoring is focused on our priorities.. 
Through strategy and service plans. 
Within the councils corporate strategy, each committees aims and objectives, through a 
series of targeted key tasks, and in the establishment of working groups. 
There is little in the responses given by council leaders to indicate any officer 
input but this can reasonably be attributed to the different phrasing of the 
respective questions. Two of the responses contained in box 7.3 consider 
that the budget in conjunction with the review process ensures that political 
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objectives are the focus of council activities. The responses to the chief 
executives questionnaire also provided evidence of fully integrated systems in 
operation. The strange answer of `quality audit mentality' was given by one 
council leader which could be interpreted as the achievement of quality and 
value for money constituting the objectives of the administration and that 
pursuit of their attainment underpinned all council activities. Another 
respondent indicated that their policy objectives were encompassed into the 
review system by ensuring that the underlying ethos is maintained 
throughout service review. Clearly such leaders are anticipating that their 
policy objectives are embedded into the organisation. 
7.3 Operational Considerations 
The first operational area considered in terms of council leaders' attitudes to 
performance review, is how they perceive the system dealing with conflicting 
and multiple objectives. Although this could feasibly have been considered 
under the previous political dimensions section, it is discussed as an 
operational detail because this is the context within which the same issue was 
considered by chief executives. The full set of answers given by council 
leaders to the question `How does the performance review system cope with 
conflicting and multiple objectives? ' is given in appendix 7.4 but an 
illustrative selection is contained in box 7.4. 
Like chief executives, the responses given by council leaders vary greatly 
with some reporting that conflicting and multiple objectives have not been an 
issue in their council, some indicating that they have been but that the review 
system can deal with them adequately, and yet others reporting that whilst 
they exist, the review system cannot cope with them. 
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A number of the council leaders consider that the review system highlights 
conflicting and multiple objectives whilst a number of others indicated that 
the review system has facilitated dealing with them as indicated in answers of 
the nature "by breaking down and analysing objectives" and "the 
performance review system exposes conflicting objectives in a way that helps 
clarity; it provides a supportive approach to managing multiple objectives. " 
This is an important contribution in itself. 
BOX 7.4: HOW DOES THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM COPE WITH 
CONFLICTING AND MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES? 
Dealt with at full Committee. 
The performance review system exposes conflicting objectives in a way that helps clarity; 
it provides a supportive approach to managing multiple objectives (case study is targeting 
in Right to Buy). 
By breaking down and analysing objectives. 
By separating out overall objectives from specific targets. 
The system provides the raw material for decisions and does not attempt, as a system, to 
cope with conflicting and multiple objectives. In such an event, members would consider 
the detailed figures available and make a balanced decision. 
With difficulty. 
Responsively. 
There is a flexible attitude adopted towards objectives which recognises the multi-faceted 
nature of priorities. Reports on each committees performance are presented to the main 
co-ordinating committee whose function includes the balancing of priorities. 
There has not really been a problem in this authority - all groups want to see better 
performance and greater efficiency. 
We ensure the objectives don't conflict. Multiple objectives are prioritised. 
It might highlight them, but it does not cause or solve them. Members decisions to 
resolve conflict can be advised by the performance review system. 
Multiple objectives are encouraged. Conflicting objectives (for example, planning 
against economic development) are more difficult - in theory, the Performance 
Committee should make a ruling. 
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Council leaders were asked whether the review mechanism was linked to the 
policy/strategic planning process and the budgetary process and tables 7.9 
and 7.10 overleaf contain a summary of the responses given. 
TABLE 7.9: DOES THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM RELATE TO THE POLICY/ 
STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS? 
Nil 
Yes No Partially On-going Response 
London Boroughs 9213 
Scottish Regions 11 
Scottish Districts 741 
Welsh Counties 2 
Welsh Districts 31 
County Councils 11 31 
Metropolitan Districts 631 
Non-Met Districts 60 17 531 
Total 99 28 991 
Percentage 67.8 19.2 6.2 6.2 0.7 
99 (67.8%) council leaders indicated that the performance review system in 
their authority was linked to the policy/strategic planning process whilst 98 
(67%) reported that such a link had been established with the budgetary 
system. For the policy planning system, a further 9 (6.2%) indicated that the 
development of such a link was on-going whilst 9 (6.2%) also reported that 
the systems were partially linked. For the budgetary process, 8 (5.5%) 
reported that this was an on-going development whilst 6 (4.1%) indicated 
partial linkages. 28 (19.2%) and 31 (21.2%) respondents respectively 
reported no relation between the performance review system and the strategic 
planning process and the budgetary mechanism. These figures are in keeping 
with those given by chief executives (see page 212) except that fewer chief 
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executives indicated a link with the budgetary system - this is reasonably 
explained by the responses from chief executives and council leaders 
originating from different authorities. 
TABLE 7.10: DOES THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM RELATE TO THE 
BUDGETARY PROCESS? 
Nil 
Yes No Partially On-going Response 
London Boroughs 924 
Scottish Regions 11 
Scottish Districts 84 
Welsh Counties 11 
Welsh Districts 22 
County Councils 10 212 
Metropolitan Districts 5221 
Non-Met Districts 62 17 313 
Total 98 31 683 
Percentage 67.1 21.2 4.1 5.5 2.1 
Where the review system had been related to the policy and budgetary 
processes, council leaders were asked to indicate whether they felt that the 
linkage was adequate and sensible. Amongst most authority groupings, the 
overall view was that the linkages which had been made were appropriate, 
although a number of respondents felt that it was too early to reach a 
conclusion on this matter (10 for the policy planning process and 13 for the 
budgetary system). However, 6 council leaders from non-metropolitan 
districts felt that the linkage made with the budgetary process in their council 
was inadequate. The general high level of support is ironic given that chief 
executives identified improved linkages as a development they would like to 
see in the future in relation to their performance review system. 
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Council leaders were asked to indicate whether there had been any major 
difficulties with the operation of the performance review system and the 
summary of responses received is given in table 7.11. 
TABLE 7.11: HAVE THERE BEEN ANY MAJOR DIFFICULTIES 
OPERATION OF THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM 
Too Nil 
Yes No Early Response 
London Boroughs 8511 
Scottish Regions 2 
Scottish Districts 381 
Welsh Counties 11 
Welsh Districts 13 
County Councils 3 12 
Metropolitan Districts 37 
Non-Met Districts 29 39 14 4 
Total 50 75 16 5 
Percentage 34.2 51.3 11.0 3.4 
WITH THE 
75 (51.3%) reported that no difficulties had been encountered and a further 
16 (11.0%) indicated that whilst no difficulties had been experienced, it was 
too early in the life cycle of the review process for these to have become 
apparent. In total, 50 council leaders (34.2%) indicated that there had been 
difficulties in operating performance review in their authority. The proportion 
of leaders reporting problems is noticeably high in London Boroughs where 8 
respondents (53.3%) noted operational difficulties being encountered; and in 
Scottish Regions where both the council leaders who made part 1 returns 
recorded operational problems. 
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Where difficulties had been experienced, council leaders were asked to 
elaborate on the nature of the problems. The full set of answers is contained in 
appendix 7.5 but an illustrative range is contained in box 7.5. 
BOX 7.5: MAJOR DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED WITH THE OPERATION OF THE 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM. 
Reluctance of some chief officers to introduce targeting; lack of interest of some 
members; culture not supportive of performance measurement; continual budget 
reductions; and difficulty in defining sensitive performance indicators. 
Defining performance indicators 
Recognition of the financial implications under cash-limited budgets. 
There is sometimes an absence of clear thinking and there have been problems with vague 
objectives and performance indicators. 
Members and officials don't like scrutinising in-depth - it necessarily lifts the lid on all 
sorts of things. 
The Conservative Group objects in principle and `leak' reports as they see fit; one 
department (Computer and Information Technology) was consistently obstructive. 
Changing members role in the committee structure and highlighting conflict between 
those who are involved more with education than with social services and vice-versa. 
The main difficulty was the refusal of the members to consider the policy and service 
development proposals for each service before the financial implications and the 
likelihood of being able to introduce improvements were known. This meant that to a 
large extent, this year anyway, the process became finance rather than policy driven and 
work on performance review was delayed until the priorities were established. 
Inadequate training. 
The policy objectives are not clear enough and outside situations such as CCT, Local 
Government Review and the threat of capping have had a greater impact. 
Mainly that it was seen as a time-consuming add on to the work of committees when its 
purpose was to be a central system for making policy come alive throughout the 
authority. 
Maintaining an integrated process in the face of various pressures particularly financial. 
Lack of commitment by some senior officers unwilling to be accountable and failure by 
them to adapt to a more corporate approach to management of the authority. It is 
difficult to break down the barriers of the empires that have been established over the 
years. 
Probably getting best method of recording. We want a system not just for the council but 
for the general public as well through the council's quarterly magazine. 
It has had major implications regarding the use of officers which is currently at a 
premium with the pressures of the poll and council tax, CCT and now Local Government 
Review. 
Lack of commitment; defensiveness caused by a non-performance culture. 
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A wide array of answers is in evidence but the difficulties communicated by 
council leaders can broadly be categorised as: 
* behavioural difficulties such as a lack of commitment from officers and/or 
members or defensiveness over the traditional way of doing things in the 
council or the lack of any driving force to kick-start the process. 
* technical difficulties such as defining performance indicators or as indicated in 
the response `maintaining an integrated process in the face of various pressures 
particularly financial' or `getting the best method of recording. ' There were 
also a number of technical difficulties which related to how the performance 
review system was linked in with other processes within the council particularly 
the policy and budgetary cycles. 
* resource difficulties particularly in relation to training but also regarding the 
use of officers time as evidenced in the response `It has had major implications 
regarding the use of officers' time which is currently at a premium with the 
pressures of the poll and council tax, CCT and now Local Government 
Review. ' 
* political difficulties such as a lack of clear policy objectives being forthcoming 
from councillors or the changing roles of members caused by performance 
review or an obstructive opposition. 
A number of the responses given by council leaders highlight problems from 
more than one of the above category being encountered in the operation of 
performance review within their local authority. In addition, the distinction 
between these categories is not always clear-cut. For example, lack of clear 
policy objectives creates technical difficulties in the operation of the review 
mechanism and could be responsible for a lack of commitment from both 
officers and members to performance review. These factors make it infeasible 
and inappropriate to consider how many of the responses fall into each 
category. However, it can reasonably be observed that the dominant type of 
response was behavioural difficulties but there was a spread of all categories 
of answers. 
No pattern was distinguishable according to authority grouping. However, 
most of the councils which highlighted resource difficulties as an operational 
problem had introduced their performance review systems post-1988 and this 
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is in keeping with the pressures which local authorities were under towards 
the latter end of the 1980s both financially and in keeping abreast of the 
changes occurring in this sphere of the public sector. 
In terms of operational issues, council leaders were fmally asked to indicate 
whether overall they considered the performance review system to be 
successful. Table 7.12 summarises the responses given. 
TABLE 7.12: OVERALL, DO YOU THINK THAT THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
SYSTEM IS SUCCESSFUL? 
Too Nil 
Yes No Early Partially Response 
London Boroughs 10 14 
Scottish Regions 11 
Scottish Districts 525 
Welsh Counties 11 
Welsh Districts 22 
County Councils 11 121 
Metropolitan Districts 721 
Non-Met Districts 59 6 16 41 
Total 96 13 28 72 
Percentage 65.8 8.9 19.2 4.8 1.4 
96 (65.8%) council leaders considered that the review system operated in 
their council was successful. A further 28 (19.2%) felt that it was too early in 
the life of their system to make judgement on this and 7 (4.8%) council leaders 
indicated that the system had only been partially successful. The review 
system was considered to have been unsuccessful by 13 (8.9%) council 
leaders. These figures are approximately in line with those given by chief 
executives where the proportion of respondents indicating successful, 
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partially successful and unsuccessful review mechanisms is respectively 
61.4%, 3.3% and 5.2% with 24.8% of chief executives indicating that it was 
too early to judge the success of the review process (see page 225). 
For most authority types, this distribution of answers approximately holds but 
in 1 of the 2 responses received from council leaders in Scottish Regions and 2 
of the 4 from Welsh Districts, it was indicated that the review system had not 
been successful. In all cases where an unsuccessful or a partially successful 
system was reported, operational difficulties had also been identified but with 
no one particular type of operational problem being particularly associated 
with a lack of overall success. More significantly, a not insubstantial number 
of council leaders, 43 in total (29.5%), reported operational difficulties but 
indicated successful performance review systems. However, the majority of 
these (39 of the 43) were systems which had been introduced before or 
during 1990 and there had therefore been sufficient time for the difficulty to 
be resolved. 10 of the 13 council leaders indicating unsuccessful review 
processes and 5 of the 7 reporting partially successful processes had also 
communicated that the political objectives of their administration had not 
been incorporated into the performance review mechanism and none reported 
the majority group as having an active role in the review process. 
For 80 of the 89 authorities where a response was supplied by both the 
council leader and the chief executive, both indicated the same response in 
terms of success: 78 considered the review system to have been successful; 
in one case both the chief executive and the council leader considered the 
performance process to have been partially successful; and in one further 
case, both respondents felt that performance review had operated 
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unsuccessfully in their authority. In 6 cases, either the chief executive or the 
council leader felt that performance review had been successful whilst the 
other felt that it had only been partially successful. In a further 2 cases, one 
respondent considered the system to have been successful whilst the other 
reported an unsuccessful operation and in one case, the chief executive 
considered the review mechanism to have been unsuccessful whilst the 
council leader from the same authority thought that it was partially successful. 
In all of these latter cases where a difference of opinion between the chief 
executive and the council leader was evident, the system had been 
introduced post-1989. It is likely therefore that where an earlier system had 
proven unsatisfactory to either party, appropriate modifications had been 
made so that by the time the questionnaire was completed, the review system 
was satisfactory to both key organisational figures. 
7.4 Future Developments 
Council leaders were asked to indicate what future developments they would 
like to see in relation to performance review. The full set of responses made 
by council leaders is given in appendix 7.6 but a pertinent selection is 
contained in box 7.6. 
On the whole, the answers given are unsurprising given the responses to 
other questions made by council leaders. Many focus on addressing 
operational difficulties previously outlined particularly technical difficulties, 
such as the definition of performance indicators or developing or enhancing 
linkages into the policy and budgetary processes and generally making the 
review system fully integrated into the council's activities; or resolving 
behavioural difficulties such as commitment problems. 
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BOBFUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW SYSTEM. 
Extension of targeting to all major services; and the development of measures of 
consumer satisfaction within service targets. 
Refining and fine-tuning; linking it much more to sound external data - for example, the 
changing profile of the Boroughs population. 
The incorporation of our recently launched "Citizen's Charter" into every departments 
key tasks. 
Proper measurement of all functions and a system produced which will create 
improvements in these measurements. 
I would like to link it to the political objectives in the manifesto and use it for strategic 
and financial planning. 
The authority's objectives will be supported by output/outcome driven performance 
indicators. 
I would like to see an outside moderator from another authority to sit in with the panels. 
Clearly the Citizen's Charter Performance Indicators will be a leading change in 
performance review in the next few years. 
Consultation with customers. 
Further development of corporate management; to date the system has concentrated on 
short-term planning and objectives - the development of longer-term policy planning and 
objectives must be a priority together with the development of more meaningful measures 
of performance. 
We want it to be closely linked with our customer care programme so that we can monitor 
our services and take on board customer comments and so continually review and 
compromise. 
What we need is performance review of our performance review system - and we are now 
in a position where a few senior members are at long last beginning to see the importance 
of performance review. 
A comprehensive process incorporating: policy/planning and policy review; budgetary 
process; performance review within corporate strategic/business planning process; and 
the incorporation of survey and other qualitative information. 
More measures of customer perception/satisfaction. 
0 
Given the present state of local government, this performance review process will 
increasingly be called upon to indicate priorities. 
System which did not simply measure internal statistics - for example, outturn against 
budget - but also made measures in a league table type of monitoring against other 
authorities for a standard performance area. I would like the audit service to recommend 
best standard practice for most areas of service provision and organise their own 
computers to produce league tables of actual performance attained. 
Getting the role of members clarified as at present members are involved in detail about 
service plan monitoring that we see as a management role; building members 
performance into the system. 
Cascading down through the organisation and greater understanding by members. 
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However, one dimension not picked up elsewhere in the council leaders' 
questionnaire was that of the customer. A number of the future developments 
identified by council leaders focused on incorporating the customer's 
perception and satisfaction of council services into the review process and a 
number felt that there should be more consultation with customers. This is 
supported by evidence from the chief executives' questionnaire which did 
ask about the incorporation of consumer measures and customer consultation 
(see page 191). Several responses highlighted the likely changes which the 
Citizen's Charter would bring about in the context of performance review. 
At the time the postal questionnaire was being completed by council leaders, 
the Citizen's Charter was in the early stages of its inception but it was clear 
that authorities would in all probability, have to produce a standard set of 
information on services which would be publicly available. A small number 
council leaders anticipated that it would be appropriate to incorporate Citizen 
Charter measures into their performance review system. One leader whilst not 
mentioning the Citizen's Charter reported that the future development he 
would like to see was "a system which did not simply measure internal 
statistics - for example, outtum against budget - but also made measures in a 
league table type of monitoring against other authorities for a standard 
performance area. I would like the audit service to recommend best standard 
practice for most areas of service provision and organise their own computers 
to produce league tables of actual performance attained, " a council leader 
who must be much satisfied with the Citizen's Charter legislation. One leader 
felt that a performance review exercise should be undertaken on the 
performance review system and this is in fact an important consideration. The 
performance review process should match the needs of the organisation but 
given that these change over time, there does need to be some monitoring to 
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assess whether the review system is delivering what is required by an 
authority. 
7.5 Responses from Council Leaders Representing 
Authorities Not Operating Performance Review 
This section examines the returns made by council leaders representing 
authorities which had not yet established performance review systems and 
had thus completed the short part 2 section of the questionnaire. Table 7.13 
indicates the level of part 2 responses received from council leaders. 
TABLE 7.13 PART 2 RETURNS FROM COUNCIL LEADERS 
% of council 
Part 1 leader % of issued % of all 
returns returns questionnaires authorities 
London Boroughs 1 6.2 3.3 3.0. 
Scottish Regions 2 50.0 20.0 16.7 
Scottish Districts 7 36.8 14.0 13.2 
Welsh Counties 2 50.0 25.0 25.0 
Welsh Districts 5 55.6 13.5 13.5 
County Councils 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Metropolitan Districts 1 9.1 2.9 2.8 
Non-Met Districts 23 21.1 8.0 7.8 
Total 41 15.1 8.3 7.9 
It is clear from the above that council representation from authorities which 
had not implemented review procedures is minimal with only 41 part 2 returns 
being made by council leaders across all authority types. This compares 
unfavourably with the 109 part 2 responses received from chief executives 
and accounted for only 15.1% of all the questionnaires returned by council 
leaders and represented only 8.3% of the authorities to whom a questionnaire 
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was issued and only 7.9% of total local authorities. Given this low level of 
response, the results and discussion of the completed part 2 questionnaires 
will not be disaggregated according to authority grouping. 
Council leaders were again asked about the political control of their authority 
and a summary of the responses given is contained in table 7.14. 
TABLE 7.14: POLITICAL CONTROL OF AUTHORITIES NOT OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
Number % 
Labour 18 43.9 
Conservative 5 12.2 
Liberal/Democrat 1 2.4 
Independent 3 7.3 
SNP 1 2.4 
Hung Council/Alliance 2 4.9 
No overall control 11 26.8 
In comparison with table 7.4 (page 251) which indicates the political control 
of authorities operating a performance review system, it would be tempting to 
suggest that there is an increased tendency for Conservative-controlled 
councils to implement a review mechanism and for authorities in which there 
is no overall political control to not have established a process. However, on 
the basis of such a small sample of authorities, such a conclusion would be of 
doubtful validity. It is clear however, that there is no strong tendency for any 
political group not to introduce a performance review mechanism. 
In answer to the question `would your party support the introduction of a 
performance review system? ' 25 council leaders indicated that support 
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would be forthcoming whilst 2 said that support would probably be in 
evidence. One member reported that his party would be `a bit uneasy' about 
its introduction whilst 4 said that their party would not support the 
introduction of performance review to their authority. One leader intimated 
that he didn't know how such an initiative would be perceived whilst a 
further respondent indicated that they would probably not be supportive 
because they had previously had a system of measuring services against 
performance indicators but that it had been discontinued after a few years 
because it had proven impossible to monitor satisfactorily. Another leader 
reported that the performance of departments in terms of their business plans 
is reviewed half-yearly and when combined with a system of staff appraisal, 
he felt that this was adequate and there was no reason to add a performance 
review process. In comparing supportive/ unsupportive council leaders with 
the political control of authorities, no pattern is in evidence. 3 members 
reported this question as not applicable all representing authorities which had 
an Independent administration or no overall political control, and there were 
3 nil responses. 
Council leaders were also asked whether they thought that the minority 
group would support the introduction of a performance review system. 24 
reported that they expected the opposition to be supportive whilst 9 council 
leaders indicated that they didn't know what the attitude of the minority 
group would be. 3 respondents noted that the question was not applicable 
all from councils lacking political control and there were 5 nil responses, 4 
from councils which had no political control and one where the Independents 
were the main opposition group. No council leaders reported that the 
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minority group would be unsupportive of the implementation of a 
performance review system. 
In considering whether the officers of their authority would be supportive of 
the implementation of a performance review system, 29 council leaders 
reported that they would, 2 thought they probably would and 2 felt that the 
introduction of a review mechanism would meet with mixed officer support. 3 
council leaders indicated that they did not think that such an initiative would 
be welcomed by officers whilst 2 didn't know how it would be received. 
There were 3 nil responses to this question. 
Given this comparatively high level of support for the introduction of 
performance review, it is not surprising that 25 council leaders expected to 
see a performance review system in the lifetime of their administration. A 
further 5 indicated that this would possibly occur but 11 communicated that it 
was unlikely that their administration would see the introduction of 
performance review. All 4 councils leaders who had reported that their party 
would be unsupportive of the establishment of a review process fell into this 
latter group. 
Finally, council leaders were asked what factors were inhibiting the 
introduction of a performance review system in their authorities. The full set 
of responses given by members is contained in appendix 7.7 but a sub-set are 
indicated in box 7.7 overleaf. 
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BOX 7.7: WHAT FACTORS ARE INHIBITING THE INTRODUCTION OF PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW IN YOUR AUTHORITY? 
Cost to a small authority. 
Never been considered. 
Extensive legislation. 
The Accounts Commission Citizen's Charter proposals adequately address the issue of 
performance measurement for this authority. 
Development of objectives. 
Too busy with CCT. 
Satisfied with existing arrangement. 
Previous failure. 
Corporate strategy incomplete. 
Staff input since they are already overworked. 
Financial pressures (capping etc. ) have forced us to axe our performance review team. 
other priorities and the need to establish a system of committee targets as a preliminary 
step towards the introduction of a performance review system. 
Time and resources. 
None, system not desired. 
A number of the responses stress the resource implications of introducing and 
operating a performance review system with the cost to a small authority cited 
by one Scottish District as a reason for lack of progress in this area and other 
responses indicated that too much time and resources were concentrated on 
legislative changes particularly CCT, to have had the opportunity to establish 
a review process. In one case, an authority's performance review team had to 
be discontinued because of financial pressure. A number of the responses 
indicated that the authority represented by the council leader was satisfied 
with its current review arrangements and thus the factor inhibiting the 
introduction of a performance review system was that one was not desired! A 
previous failure with performance review was the response given by one 
Chapter 7, Performance Review: The Council Leaders' Perspective, page 281 
member, and council leaders also reported that an incomplete corporate 
strategy, the development of objectives and establishing a system of 
committee targets, were factors preventing the imminent introduction of a 
performance review system. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has focused on at performance review from the perspective of 
council leaders and is based on the postal returns made by leaders of local 
authorities. Analysis of the questionnaires particularly when compared with 
the responses given by chief executives to duplicate questions, reveals that 
the answers given are not always completely accurate. This could be 
attributable to two possible causes: 
* the first is the length of time between something taking place such as the 
introduction of performance review to a local authority, and the recollection of 
the event, the longer the time, the more likely for inaccuracy as the memory 
fades; and 
* the second reflects the natural tendency for people to take credit for things 
which run smoothly and successfully but not for those which do not as 
reflected in the old saying `success has many fathers but failure has none. ' 
The overall impact of these issues is difficult to quantify but the nature of the 
questions asked to council leaders suggests that they are unlikely to make a 
significant difference but they do highlight the weakness of using 
questionnaires to gather information of this type if unsupported by a 
complimentary method or technique. 
Several key findings emerged from the analysis of responses made by council 
leaders in relation to performance review. In particular: 
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* there is no evidence of one particular political party favouringlnot favouring the 
introduction of performance review with systems being operated in councils of 
all political persuasions. The introduction of performance review appears not to 
have been a party political issue; 
* council leaders and the political parties they represent have been supportive of 
the introduction of performance review and this support has been maintained 
following implementation; 
* the role played by an authority's majority group in the performance review 
process vanes considerably with some taking an active role, some a passive 
role, some delegating participation to a few key group members, and a few 
playing a minimal role; 
* on the whole, the minority group were afforded limited participation in 
performance review; 
* there is limited evidence to support the preconception that opposition groups 
use performance review for political purposes by for example, utilising the 
information emerging from the review system for political advantage; 
* in most cases where the council administration was politically-controlled, their 
political objectives have been incorporated into the review system and a variety 
of methods have been used to achieve this; 
* most of the operational areas considered, revealed similar evidence to that 
emerging from chief executives particularly in relation to how the review 
system coped with conflicting and multiple objectives, and the linkages 
between performance review and the policy planning and the budgetary system; 
* 34.2% of council leaders reported operational difficulties with their 
performance review system with a range of behavioural, technical, resource and 
political problems being identified; 
* overall, a significant majority (65.8%) of council leaders considered 
performance review to have been successful but a number (19.2%) considered 
that it was too soon after the implementation of the system in their council to 
pass judgement on this matter; 
* for those council leaders who considered performance review to have been 
unsuccessful or partially successful, operational difficulties had been 
encountered and the systems were generally recent and thus there had not been 
time for `teething difficulties' to have been sorted out. In most cases, the 
political objectives of the controlling group had not been incorporated into the 
review system and the majority group had typically not had an active role in the 
performance review process; and 
* the future developments which council leaders would like to see in relation to 
the performance review system operating in their authority. mainly emerge from the difficulties encountered in operating the existing system or relate to integrating performance review with other processes operating within the 
council. However, consideration of the customer was identified by a number 
of council leaders as significant and incorporation of Citizen Charter indicators 
was also highlighted. 
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Although the data set for council leaders representing authorities which had 
not introduced performance review systems is small and thus no definitive 
conclusions can be drawn in this domain, in only a small number of cases is 
there evidence of the authority choosing not to operate a review mechanism. 
In most cases, either the authority is working towards the introduction of a 
review process or its absence reflects competing demands on the resources of 
the authority. 
Chapter 8 
The Case Study Evidence 
8.1 Introduction 
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8.3 Case Study 2: Hertfordhsire County Council 
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IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF SOME OF THE RESEARCH MATERIAL 
CONTAINED WITHIN THIS CHAPTER, READERS INTENDING TO REPRODUCE ANY OF 
THE CONTENTS, ARE REQUESTED TO REFER TO THE AUTHOR IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the in-depth case studies undertaken to explore how 
performance review actually operates within local authorities. The detailed 
methodology employed was discussed in chapter 4 but in essence, material 
for each case study was accumulated from two main information sources: 
* documentation supplied by participating authorities; and 
* semi-structured interviews conducted with key personnel in case study 
authorities; normally the chief executive, the officer with performance 
review responsibilities, the director of a service department 
incorporated into the review process, the leader of the council or the 
chair of the committee dealing with performance review matters, and a 
leading member of one of the opposition groups. 
In identifying local authorities as potential case studies, a representative 
cross-section was sought in terms of both authority type and political control. 
However, a further critical determinant was the willingness of organisations to 
participate and a number of councils who were approached, declined either 
because of excessive work pressures or because they felt that their review 
system was too embryonic to be worthy of analysis or in one case, because 
they had just taken part in another major study and felt that they had done 
their bit for furthering knowledge. In a number of other cases, preliminary 
discussions were undertaken and in some cases interviews were conducted 
but with the performance review system proving to be disappointing or 
unrevealing or too much in its infancy to merit full analysis. There was one 
authority which agreed to be a case study and which due to its pioneering 
experimentation with decentralisation, seemed worthy of inclusion. However, 
participation was conditional upon the officer with performance review 
responsibilities being present at all interviews. Unfortunately, his personality 
was such that he was unable to be present as a silent observer which in itself, 
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would have limited the openness of the interviews but he continually 
interrupted, amended and elaborated upon the responses given by 
interviewees to the extent that the interviews were futile because an honest 
and free exchange of views was impossible. An interview with the chief 
executive of this authority was not possible and when combined with a lack 
of useful documentation, this case study which could have unveiled insights 
about performance review operating in the decentralised environment which 
is likely to characterise more local authorities in the future, had to be 
discounted. 
The authorities which are included in this thesis as case studies comprise 1 
London Borough, 2 County Councils and 2 Non-Metropolitan Districts. 
Preliminary interviews were undertaken with several Scottish authorities but 
their systems transpired to be too early in their development to be suitable for 
analysis, reflecting the general later development of review systems in 
Scotland. Three Welsh authorities were approached, 2 counties and 1 
districts, but all declined to be included in this research. Newcastled Bradford 
Metropolitan Districts were interviewed as part of the wider ESRC project 
from which this thesis emerged but these were conducted by another 
researcher on the programme and therefore could not be included. 
The London case-study is the inner London Borough of Lewisham which at 
the time of conducting this research was Labour-controlled and served a 
population of 240,000. The two county councils were Cornwall and 
Hertfordshire. Cornwall, which serves 473,400 people, has no overall 
political control and was selected to explore how review might be operated in 
the absence of strong political direction. The ruling administration in 
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Hertfordshire is Conservative and the authority encompasses 994,200 people. 
The two Non-Metropolitan authorities are Bath and Epsom and Ewell. Bath 
is a spa town within Avon County and has a heavy emphasis on tourism. It 
has a Conservative minority administration and a population of 83,900. In 
Epsom and Ewell, the controlling group is Independent comprising 
predominately Residents Association councillors. The district is located 
within Surrey County and serves a population of 68,600. An authority 
willing to participate with an interesting and developed performance review 
system and controlled by Liberal Democrats was not identified. However, the 
Liberal Democrats are the dominant group in Cornwall so it was felt that this 
particular political dimension had not been ignored. 
For each case study, there are separate sections describing the performance 
review system, the documentation supplied by the participating authority, 
and the interviews which were conducted, as well as a brief critique of 
performance review as operated in the case study council. A more intensive 
discussion and analysis of particular aspects of the systems is reserved for 
chapter 9 which presents an overall critique of performance review. The case 
studies are presented in the order in which they were undertaken. They were 
conducted between February and November 1992 in the following 
chronological sequence: 
Bath Non-Metropolitan District February 1992 
Hertfordshire County Council June 1992 
Cornwall County Council July 1992 
Epsom and Ewell Non-Metropolitan District September 1992 
London Borough of Lewisham November 1992 
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In all cases, the interviews were carried out in the course of one day. 
Documentation relating to the review system was requested prior to the case 
study visit to afford an opportunity to be partially familiar with the review 
system. Additional documentation was normally acquired whilst visiting 
participating councils and in two cases, further material was forwarded on 
after the interviews had been completed along with a brief update on 
performance review in the council. In all but one case, contact has been 
maintained with the officer with performance review responsibilities in the 
case study authorities. 
8.2 Case-Study 1: Bath City Council 
8.2.1 The Performance Review System 
The introduction of performance review to Bath City Council is closely 
associated with the appointment of a new executive to the authority. Prior to 
the current mechanism, committees routinely received financial statistics and 
general management information, normally determined by chief officers. On 
arrival, Clive Abbot, the new chief executive, felt that the authority lacked 
strategic direction and he set about instilling a more strategic orientation in the 
authority an integral part of which was the development of a performance 
review system within the Council. It was argued that "monitoring and 
review, simply stated, is the means by which the Council can measure its 
success in meeting its objectives" (Bath City Council, 1989, p13) and that in 
establishing a clear and coherent direction for the years ahead, "the essence 
of the approach is effective monitoring and review, coupled with clear and 
consistent communication to the public and to the staff of the authority" 
(p16). 
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The progressive development of performance review is marked by a series of 
documents further discussed below. However, from the chief executive's 
initial report, Bath on the Threshold of the 1990's, the purpose of which was 
to "set the context for the Council's policy direction in the years ahead" (p1); 
an agreement of Bath City Council's Goals emerged. Full definitions of the 
broad objectives as agreed by the Council, is contained in appendix 8.1 but 
the primary goals are: 
Economic Vitality 
Quality of Environment 
Excellence in Housing Provision 
Cultural and Recreational Opportunities 
Responsive Relations with the Community 
The next step in developing the performance review system in Bath was to 
generate a set of service objectives and a comprehensive document entitled 
Service Objectives for the 1990s was produced. To quote from the Chief 
Executive's introduction, the publication: 
sets out the objectives of every committee and service of the Council. It 
translates the vision set out in the Council's goals into specific objectives and 
links them with cost centres for ease of working, clarity of direction and 
accountability. The service objectives of every committee have been brought 
together in one document to reflect the Council's co&Dorate work and vision; to 
improve communication and understanding both inside and outside the Council; 
to ensure that connections are made between Council objectives and to ensure a 
consistency of approach. Finally, this is a document which will be available to 
everyone to . 
The document is divided into colour-coded sections with a section devoted to 
each council committee. Each section begins with a statement of the principal 
objectives of the committee for the next three years with these ranging from 
the 9 objectives detailed for the Environment Committee as contained in Box 
8.1 to the very brief objective set out for the Mayor's Selection and 
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Hospitality Sub-Committee (the only sub-committee afforded its own colour 
section) of `Review the ways in which the office of Mayor is utilised to meet 
the needs and traditions of the people and the City. ' Within each section, the 
Function, Position Statement normally including the 1990/91 Budget, the 
Service Objectives, the 1990/91 Priority or Priorities, and the Medium Term 
Objective or Objectives of each cost centre/service area encompassed by the 
Committee, is detailed. Appendix 8.2 contains the extracts for the Review 
Section and for Policy Development subsumed by the Policy Committee since 
these are of relevance for performance review in Bath particularly in the 
former case since this highlights the lack of policy direction in the council. 
Extracts are also given for one of the housing areas because the service 
director interviewed in Bath was the Director of Housing, and for one of the 
service areas encompassed by the Environment Committee to highlight the 
relationship with the Principal Objectives detailed in Box 8.1. 
BOX 8.1: PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF BATHS ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE 
1. Develop and implement the environmental policies brought together in July 1990 - the "greed" issues. 
2. Prepare for, and if enacted, implement legislation both on (1) litter, (ii) food hygiene 
and standards, and (iii) waste recycling. 
3. Implement the Landscape Strategy. 
4. Following public consultation, prepare a policy statement and initiate action, in 
conjunction with Avon County Council, to improve traffic management in the City Centre to give greater priority to pedestrians. 
5. Achieve return to Bath of traffic management powers. 
6. Develop policies for the effective monitoring and control of tourist coaches and buses in the City to ensure that those operations do not adversely effect the quality of life in the City. 
7. Secure further Park and Ride sites on the approach roads to the City. 
8. Deliver to the customer a responsive service to achieve a cleaner, greener City. 
9. Effectively monitor expenditure on highways maintenance and repairs generally. 
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With service objectives established, the final stage in the development of the 
review system was determining relevant performance indicators and targets 
and in December 1991, a report by the chief executive went to the Special 
Review Sub-Committee entitled Performance Indicators for the 1990s. The 
document set outs "examples of performance indicators which have been 
developed by service areas. " It maintains that these should be directly linked 
to the stated service objectives and that in some instances targets have also 
been set but that "in many cases, a record of performance needs to be 
established in order more accurately to gauge a realistic target. " The report 
urges: 
When looking at these indicators, members need to ask themselves `Are they 
relevant and are they useful? ' The indicators will therefore be dynamic - subject to constant scrutiny, review and revision to make sure that they really are going 
to provide meaningful information which will help decision-making, which 
will highlight problems early on, and which will give members confidence that 
services are being delivered with efficiency and effectiveness to the agreed 
standards. 
The pages relating to the cost centres whose service objectives are contained 
in appendix 8.2, are reproduced in appendix 8.3 except for Policy 
Development since no corresponding performance indicators were included in 
the indicators document. 
In essence therefore, the performance review system operated by Bath City 
Council comprises a set of Council Goals cascading down to service 
objectives and then down to performance indicators and related targets. In a 
booklet produced by the Council's Review Section, Guide to Designing 
Good Performance Indicators, the overall planning framework was set out as 
indicated in figure 8.1 overleaf. Within this document, it is argued that: 
Performance review is an integral part of the planning and management of the authority and in future it will become even more relevant as pressures on local government increase. 
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The figure highlights that performance review is only one strand of the overall 
planning framework. Whilst the framework as reproduced from the 
publication, suggests a somewhat static approach to planning with 
performance measurements, indicators and targets not feeding into anything; 
elsewhere in the same document, the dynamic nature of performance review is 
stressed with the `performance review management cycle' being described as 
`a continuous loop' and depicted by a set of inter-related cogs as reproduced 
in appendix 8.4 (the diagram is included as an appendix because of poor 
reproductive quality). 
FIGURE 8.1: BATH CITY COUNCIL'S PLANNING FRAMEWORK 
Bath City Council Goals 
Economic Vitality 
Quality of the Environment 
Excellence in Housing Provision 
Cultural and Recreational Opportunities 
Responsive Relations with the Community 
WHAT MUST BE A-alii . D? 
I HOW CAN 1IÜS BE ACHmVED? 
SERVICE 
OBJECIIVES FOR TIE 
1990s 
ACTION PLANS, 
SERVICE STRATEGIES 
WHEN WILL WE KNOW rr HAs 
BEEN ACHIEVED? 
PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENTS, 
INDICATORS, TARGETS 
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8.2.2 Documentation Supplied by Bath City Council 
Much of the documentation relating to performance review in Bath City 
Council has already been referred to. Box 8.2 contains a summary of all the 
documentation supplied. 
"Box-8.2: DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED BY BATH CITY CbOUNCIL 
Bath on the Threshold of the 1990s 
A report prepared by the Chief Executive for the Policy Committee in September 1988. 
The paper seeks to: 
* suggest the broad policy framework for the years ahead 
* establish the means by which resource allocation can be policy based 
* provide a yardstick against which to monitor and review progress 
Service Objectives for the 1990s 
A comprehensive internal publication which sets out Bath City Council's Service 
Objectives for committees and service areas. 
Performance Indicators for the 1990s 
A report by the Chief Executive for the Special Review Sub-Committee in December 
1991 providing examples of performance indicators which have been developed by 
service areas and identifying targets where these have been set. 
The Review Section's Guide to Designing Good Performance Indicators 
As the title suggests this publication was prepared by the Council's Review Section and 
its primary purpose is to assist managers through the process of designing indicators. 
However, it also attempts to present the case for performance review restating it as a 
means by which the Council can measure how successful it is in meeting its stated 
objectives. It also argues the case for performance review in terms of it proving to be a 
useful management tool arguing that "a manager's time can be used up in trying to 
control problems, rather than monitoring the progress towards objectives. By 
providing the minimal amount of relevant information, a performance review system 
can help a manager think clearly about results, guide future decisions, and report 
back. " 
Also supplied but of limited relevance to the performance review system operated in 
Bath: 
Bath City Council Annual Report 1991 
Bath -A World Heritage City Information Pack 
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The principal problem with the performance review material supplied by Bath 
City Council is a lack of clarity and consistency. Nowhere, is it categorically 
stated what constitutes performance review. Through my case study visit, I 
was able to piece together the `review picture' but apart from senior 
management and members who were involved in setting service objectives 
and defining performance indicators and targets, it is unlikely that others at 
Bath City Council will be aware of the details of performance review 
operations. Given the lack of a comprehensive publication delineating the 
review mechanism, it is particularly unlikely that the residents of Bath City 
Council will have any relevant knowledge of performance review yet this was 
clearly intended from the outset with "clear and consistent communication to 
the public and to the staff of the authority" being identified in the initial 
report Bath on the Threshold of the 1990s. 
This preliminary document does not in fact refer to performance review but 
talks of `monitoring and review' and at one point talks of monitoring and 
review as a theme and proposes: 
There needs to be a willingness to review constantly that the right means are 
being used to tackle the right ends, recognising that the Council operates in a 
market place even in areas where there is no competition as such: a market 
attitude is essential. 
Ignoring the confusion which the latter part of this quotation arouses, the 
report fails to significantly detail how monitoring and review is to be 
achieved. Almost as a footnote, there is a `Next Steps' paragraph which 
proposes that: 
If the Committee agrees with the approach of the paper, it should then go to Council. Thereafter, it will fall to this Committee and other committees to 
consider and, as necessary, refine their objectives taking the attached paper as 
the base. This should be a pre-requisite to setting priorities within cash-limited budgets, setting targets, measuring success against those targets, and 
contributing towards regular review of the Council's policies. 
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However, there is nothing in the report which justifies this particular 
approach nor in fact any discussion about targets or measuring success 
against these targets. The roles which officers and members will respectively 
have to play in the development and operation of performance review in Bath 
is not specified. Overall the document is poorly focused and difficult to follow 
and the case for the introduction of performance review is neither clearly nor 
explicitly made. 
The subsequent document, Service Objectives for the 1990s is considerably 
better although it contains a significant number of obvious minor errors (for 
example, the 1990/91 budget for Pest and Dog Control Services is £115.080) 
and visually, it could have been better presented (there is no consistency in 
the typeface or page layout used by each committee). What is lacking in this 
document is any mention of how the service objectives link into performance 
review or vice-versa even though the delineation of service objectives had 
been proposed as the next step in the `monitoring and review' approach. As 
mentioned earlier of this publication: 
The service objectives of every committee have been brought together in one 
document to reflect the Council's c=g= work and vision; to improve 
communication and understanding both inside and outside the Council; to 
ensure that connections are made between Council objectives and to ensure a 
consistency of approach. Finally, this is a document which will be available to 
everyone to consult. 
At the end of his introduction to this publication, Clive Abbot the chief 
executive, details the timetable for the sequence of events related to 
establishing service objectives: 
This document sets out the Council's service objectives. In the Spring, 
Committees will decide on the strategies for achieving them including costs and 
timescales. With this information they will be able to put their service 
objectives in order of priority. In the Autumn, the Policy Committee will 
recommend Council-wide service priorities, so that the Budget for 1992/93 can be settled accordingly. 
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There is thus no reference either directly or indirectly to monitoring and 
review or performance review in the service objectives document. Yet ten 
months later, a report Performance Indicators for the 1990s went to the 
Special Review Sub-Committee the first section of which was entitled 
`Performance Indicators Linked to Service Objectives' and whose opening 
paragraph is: 
The document sets out examples of performance indicators which have been 
developed by service areas. These indicators should be directly linked to the 
stated service objectives. 
This suggests that service objectives are of relevance to performance review at 
Bath City Council. 
In the committee brief which accompanied the performance indicators report, 
the chief executive reports that: 
The Council is already committed to a system of monitoring performance and 
developing performance indicators. This is in line with Audit Commission 
proposals about the use of performance review for local government services. 
The principle is to measure Council services objectively through the use of 
numerical indicators and also through the use of surveys, with targets related to 
a set of policy objectives. In essence, the development of performance 
indicators is a necessary corollary of developing and reviewing service 
objectives. A good performance review system is valuable in monitoring 
service delivery, in targeting resources and in providing information to update 
Council policies and services. The main benefit lies in using the information to 
gain a better appreciation of what has actually happened and what to expect. 
Again however, the actual performance review system to be utilised, is not 
described. The above passage highlights the assumed numerical nature of 
performance and in the same document, it is proposed that 
A number of key questions can be asked about indicators: - 
(a) Is the target quantifiable (customer satisfaction reports require a different 
approach)? 
(b) Is the target realistic and is there a real commitment to achieving it? 
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As well as observing the confusing interchangeable use of indicators and 
targets, this quote highlights the fact that in Bath, performance indicators are 
all quantifiable and this is reinforced by looking at the examples given in 
appendix 8.3. However, it must be conceded, that regardless of desirability, 
review processes which systematically encompass qualitative indicators, are 
rare. 
The publication produced by Bath's Review Section, Guide to Designing 
Good Performance Indicators proposes that: 
High on the agenda for local government in the 1990s is the need to deliver the 
right services at the right cost and at the right time. To deliver these services 
effectively, the Members and Officers of the Council have three over-riding 
responsibilities: 
1. Planning what services to provide 
2. Providing/overseeing delivery 
3. Reviewing the performance achieved 
Performance review is an integral part of the planning and management of the 
authority and in future it will become even more relevant as pressures on local 
government increase. 
This is line with the Audit Commission's perception of the management of 
local authorities (1989, p2) and is proposing that local authorities actually 
have a responsibility to their electorate to review performance. It is 
considered that: 
Performance indicators are the raw material for reviewing performance. There 
are three main types of indicators - of Economy (the cost), of Efficiency (how 
resources were used), and of Effectiveness (what happened). 
This publication was clearly produced after Performance Indicators for the 
1990s since most of the indicators contained within the latter report do not 
obviously fall into either the economy, efficiency or effectiveness categories. 
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Despite some shortcomings, this latter publication from Bath is probably the 
most revealing. It is user-friendly and the succinct text is supported by 
creative cartoons such as those reproduced in appendix 8.5. 
Overall, the performance review documentation supplied by Bath City 
Council suggests that performance review has not been well conceived. A 
system has not been devised which meets a recognised need or gap in the 
organisation. The authority appears not to have considered what it is seeking 
to achieve through the introduction of performance review and then 
proceeded accordingly. Rather, the review system appears from the available 
documentation, to have evolved haphazardly and quite rapidly without any 
clear description of the system being drafted nor with any justification given 
as to why it was designed in the way it was. There is no sense from the 
documentation of officers and/or members working towards some considered 
and collective objective. 
8.2.3 Interviews Conducted at Bath City Council 
The questionnaires completed from the semi-structured interviews conducted 
at Bath City Council are presented in appendix 8.6 in the order in which they 
were conducted. Namely: 
Julie Martin, Head of Review 
Clive Abbot, Chief Executive 
Councillor Rhymes (Conservative), Chair of Special Review Sub-Committee 
Richard Kitson, Director of Housing 
Councillor Clark (Liberal Democrat), Leader of the Opposition 
Julie Martin was seen at both the start and at the conclusion of the day after 
the other interviews had been conducted but the material generated in the 
interview is not separated out. 
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8.2.3.1 Interview with Officer with Performance Review Responsibilities 
Julie Martin moved to Bath City Council in May 1990 to take up the newly 
created post of Head of Review. In addition to herself, the Review Section 
comprises 2 senior review officers and an assistant review officer. The main 
function of the Review Section is "to measure the Council's success in 
meeting it's stated objectives and obtaining value for money" (Bath City 
Council, 1991, p6) and much of its activity is focused on conducting 
workshops introducing performance review to officers and members and in 
assisting service managers to develop appropriate performance indicators and 
also in conducting ad hoc in-house reviews and customer surveys. The 
Review Section also deals with quality and communication issues. 
The interview with Julie Martin confirmed that Clive Abbot had been the 
motivating force behind the introduction of performance review to Bath City 
Council and indicated that whilst some officers had been supportive of this 
initiative, others had not: 
The Chief Executive assumed that because he was keen on this idea, that his 
chief officers were also - this was not always the case. Whilst a few were 
enthusiastic, many were indifferent viewing this as a `vague' technique and a 
few were hostile and suspicious. I did do some seminars in an attempt to 
secure participation but I don't think I was given enough time or legitimacy to 
do this properly. 
In response to the question `Do officers continue to support and participate in 
the performance review process? ' the interviewee indicated: 
With varying degrees of enthusiasm and commitment. They have no real choice but to participate because of the Chief Executive's disposition to the system. However, some are still unsupportive regarding performance review as interference from the centre. However, what is encouraging is that support is 
gaining rather than dwindling and some who were indifferent at the start are 
now keen advocates. 
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On the member-side, a Special Review Sub-Committee was set up to lead the 
initiative and it was reported by Julie Martin: 
I did a presentation to them on the overall picture demonstrating the uses to 
which performance review could be put. I talked to them as much as I could 
and continue to do so. Some are keen supporters and want to use this kind of 
tool, some don't understand what it is all about, but no actual resistance has 
yet been encountered. 
In terms of their current disposition, it is reported that: 
Some members participate in the Special Review Sub-Committee but I suspect 
that many still do not understand the full value of performance review and the 
potential that it has to offer them in terms of informed decision-making. 
However, none have been obstructive in any way but a few have been 
lukewarm. 
She also indicates that she seems "to have to be having to persuade people of 
the value of performance review rather than advancing its usefulness in 
Bath. " It is thus of little surprise that ownership, commitment and enthusiasm 
were reported as difficulties encountered in setting up the review process. It 
is considered unlikely that whilst Clive Abbot remains in post, the system 
would collapse. However, the review officer considers that "in his absence, I 
don't think it is sufficiently embedded into the organisation to guarantee its 
long-term viability. " She also considers that: 
The culture of the organisation was not ready for performance management. I 
think in a way we went too fast. If we had gone more slowly then perhaps it 
would more readily have been absorbed into the authority. 
It was clear from the documentation that the Council was devoid of 
significant strategy, policy or performance orientation prior to the arrival of 
the new chief executive. In the absence of any major reorganisation or 
equivalent shake-up, to have introduced a performance review system so 
rapidly and driven by one organisational figure without clear specification of 
its detail or purpose, seems unwise. The fact that performance review is 
reported as well down chief officers agenda lists and that members do not 
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really understand either the principal or the practice of performance review, 
suggests that it has achieved little on the officer and member side. 
Furthermore, to date the focus is considered to have been predominately on 
operational measures not the strategic perspective sought from the outset. 
In considering the main strengths of the performance review system, Julie 
Martin considers that 
I think it has provided us with information that we can understand and has 
supplied those people making decisions with relevant information. It has 
provided a fresh way of looking at service areas and has I think moved us 
towards thinking more of our customer needs and of the standard of service 
required. Our clients do not need a Rolls Royce service but they need 
something reliable. It's about matching demand with supply. 
In assessing its weaknesses, she reports: 
If you're not careful it can become too complicated and can lose its focus. 
Performance review is not an end in itself and there is a danger that reviewing 
performance will occur as a matter of course but without changing anything. Its 
limitations must be recognised. In this authority it is too early to specify other 
weaknesses but I suspect that in time it will be used for political purposes by 
senior managers bidding for resources as well as councillors of differing 
political persuasions. I hope political purposes do not dominate. 
On the latter point, in an earlier question asking how the review process is 
linked to Bath's budgetary system, it was argued that: 
At present, there are no formal links but the process of setting objectives and 
generating performance information for the performance review system, should 
give chief officers the data they need to bargain for a larger share of the cake, 
and should lead to more informed resources decisions. 
There appears to be some inconsistency in these two responses. 
The interviewee considered that it would be premature to conclude whether 
performance review had been successful but proposed that: 
In the final analysis, if chief officers perceive performance review to be a 
useful tool then they will use it. If not, they won't. I think we have some way 
to go on this front. 
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It is clear from this, that performance review in Bath City Council is 
considered by the officer with performance review responsibilities, to be a 
management tool with the evidence suggesting that it may be perceived by 
these managers to be of questionable value and benefit. 
8.2.3.2 Interview with the Chief Executive 
Clive Abbot, the chief executive of Bath City Council at the time this case 
study was undertaken, took up post in 1986. He was the only interviewee in 
all the case study visits who declined the use of a tape recorder during the 
interview indicating that it may limit the openness of discussions. Copious 
notes were taken during the discussion and the questionnaire was completed 
two days after the visit to maximise accuracy. 
In answer to the opening question concerning the chief executive being 
supportive of the introduction of performance review, the following response 
was offered: 
Prior to my appointment in 1986, no review system was operational. On 
arriving at the council, I felt that the simple numerical criterion being used for 
evaluating performance was inadequate. Additionally, there was a lack of 
strategic thinking as demonstrated for example, by the lack of any vision for 
the 1990s. On taking up post, I steered the council in a more strategic direction 
part of which ultimately involved establishing the Review Unit to facilitate 
performance review. The Units responsibilities encompass monitoring 
departments progress in achieving Medium Term Objectives and Priorities and 
thus as well as appraising past performance, it also has a strategic orientation. 
In short, not only was I actually supportive of the introduction of performance 
review, I was instrumental in its genesis in this authority. 
It is clear that the chief executive also considers himself to be the driving force 
behind establishing a review mechanism. Reference is made to the previous 
utilisation of simple numerical criterion and in answer to another question, 
Clive Abbot reported that: 
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No review system was operational in Bath. Previously, evaluation only 
utilised relatively crude, numerically-based performance indicators for some 
departmental activities. 
After my visit I did request to see what information had previously been used, 
to compare this with the current set of performance indicators particularly 
since as already noted, the latter seem to have to be quantifiable. However, 
these were not received presumably because both the Chief Executive and 
the Head of Review arrived after such information was used. 
The Chief Executive recognises that there was some resistance to establishing 
performance review reporting the following difficulties in setting up the 
system: 
The biggest difficulty was the general resistance from the bureaucracy to a new 
initiative or fundamental change. Many officers were uncomfortable with a 
system which could potentially criticise them and there was difficulty in getting 
recognition that performance review is more about getting feedback than 
criticism. Any criticism that does come out is constructive. It marks the 
progress towards goals and demonstrates achievements. Some chief officers 
felt it was an attempt at improving big brothers ability to watch over them. 
Officers had to be forced to stand back and see that it was an attempt to 
rationalise service delivery and recognise that performance review is not about 
criticising the past. It is about moving into the future. 
However, he also reports that: 
Departments were generally co-operative in setting up the performance review 
process primarily because a more strategic culture had been generated in the 
council and the value of performance review in a strategic context was 
increasingly recognised. However, departmental progress differed with some 
chief officers initiating considerably more progress than others. Although 
conflict might be too strong a word to apply to the situation, animosity might 
not. 
The fact that the progress made by departments in relation to performance 
review differs is recognised by Clive Abbot but is attributed to: 
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.... the 
fact that chief officers are designing their own indicators and some will 
be more adept at this than others. However, in the longer term, performance 
review is likely to be more robust if the officers design these themselves rather 
than having them thrust upon them by a central unit. This approach enhances 
ownership of the system as well as allowing them to take account of factors 
affecting their services. 
He considers this to have been successful: 
Chief officers effectively own and operate the system themselves and 
ownership and goal attainments should thus permeate the whole organisation so 
that junior management want to achieve results as much as senior officials. 
and reports that "staff increasingly recognise what it is all about and members 
are becoming more enthusiastic. " This attitude is clearly at odds with that 
expressed by Julie Martin which implied that ownership and commitment of 
performance review was lacking. Clive Abbot does indicate that ownership 
might not be absolute throughout the organisation by indicating that he 
would like to see the following future developments in relation to 
performance review: 
On the people front, I would like to feel that everyone saw the relevance of 
performance review and were enthusiastic. They should require less help and 
support in developing and operating the system. I would like to see greater 
ownership and consistency. On the technical side, I would like it to be more 
sophisticated and more able to incorporate non-numerical information. I would like it to be more intuitive - able to stand up without the data. I would like 
understanding, not just measuring from staff and customers and I would like 
more account taken of quality. 
Whilst reassured by the recognition that non-numerical indicators can have a 
role to play in performance review, I am uncertain what a system without data 
would look like! 
One area of inconsistency in Clive Abbot's responses relates to the culture of 
the authority. When asked whether the introduction of performance review 
had been associated with any changes in corporate values or culture, he 
indicated: 
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The culture of the organisation has changed in recent years becoming more 
progressive and specifically more strategically-orientated. However, this did 
not arise from the introduction of performance review. The system's birth is a 
symptom of the change in culture. The values of Bath City Council have 
become more focused, again arising from the general change in 
emphasis/attitude. 
However, when asked whether he thought the review system had been 
successful in Bath, the Chief Executive reported that: 
The performance review system has contributed to changing the culture of the 
authority. It has helped make activities more focused and facilitated officers 
having a clearer idea of future targets, The organisation as a result, is more 
strategic. 
Clive Abbot considers the main strengths of the performance review process 
to be: 
It clarifies what activities people are doing and why. It brings greater meaning 
to their work and makes them realise what bit of the jigsaw they are and how 
the whole thing fits together. It leads to better quality decision-making and 
better quality/more informed complaints. 
and the main weaknesses to be: 
It is open to abuse. It places an undue emphasis on trust in developing 
meaningful and not misleading performance indicators. There is a tendency for 
it to be repetitive so it is difficult to keep fresh but if it is to be successful then it 
cannot be static. 
The interview with Clive Abbot like that with Julie Martin underlined the 
minimal role played by members in performance review and at one point he 
says of the trade-off between quality and cost that chief officers can use 
judgement in this respect. Arguably, these tasks should be done by 
councillors possibly in consultation with officers. The general impression is 
again that performance review is considered to be a management tool. 
8.2.3.3 Interview with the Chair of the Special Review Sub-Committee 
The political balance of Bath City Council when the case study occurred was: 
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Conservatives 24 
Liberal Democrats 13 
Labour 11 
The Conservatives having been the largest party for a long time are reported 
"as effectively the ruling group. " Councillor Rhymes who was interviewed, 
is the Chair of the Special Review Sub-Committee, a sub-committee of the 
Policy Committee. 
When asked of his party's disposition towards the introduction of 
performance review, he indicated: 
We were the largest party but to be quite honest we had some doubts and I 
particularly was quite cynical. I have been a councillor for 24 years and I've 
seen quite a few initiatives in my time, none of which have survived or have 
added anything to the organisation. However, whilst I wouldn't say we were 
supportive of its introduction, the chief executive was very enthusiastic and 
most chief officers seemed keen so we were not obstructive. My reaction is 
fairly typical but some of the younger members particularly those that work in 
the public sector, were more favourably disposed towards performance review. 
He recognises the irony of being chair of a committee whose activities he is 
cynical about, but he took on the chairmanship when he thought that the 
committee was winding down rather than intensifying. However, he does not 
consider the problem to be acute because the system introduced in Bath is 
"mainly officer-driven demanding very little input from members. " Members 
were consulted about the introduction of performance review but "were not 
involved in the creation of the system" but "accept the adequacy of what 
has evolved. " 
The Chair of the Special Review Sub-Committee clearly considers 
performance review to be a management tool giving the following response to 
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the question `What part does the majority group play in the performance 
review process? ': 
Member input is generally minimal but I don't regard this as a problem. 
Performance review is a management tool and as such should be operated by 
senior officials. I don't think councillors ought to get involved in the 
management of the authority - our officers are paid for this and poking around 
isn't really going to contribute much. Member involvement is really confined to 
looking at the targets and indicators etc. which go before the service 
committees annually. 
This is far cry from the plea to councillors in Performance Indicators for the 
1990s to look at indicators and ask `are they relevant and are they useful' 
thereby ensuring their dynamism. However, this apathy is not surprising 
given the lack of clear policy direction in the Council. When asked how the 
political objectives of the administration are determined, I was informed: 
Well, it is really a matter of the prevailing climate and the factors which need to 
be considered. It is a passion to maintain and improve the city of your birth or 
residence which makes you become a councillor and this permeates your whole 
approach to political decision-making. I don't think that national politics should 
play a significant role at the local level and our group certainly doesn't receive 
dictates from the centre. 
When asked how the emergent policies were incorporated into the review 
system, the following response was given: 
I suppose our policies are widely known in the authority and it is up to officers 
to take them on board when organising their department's activities and setting 
indicators and targets. If there were any suggestion or evidence at committees 
that policies were being ignored then we would rapidly take action. 
Councillor Rhymes does concede that the linkage between the performance 
review system and the policy planning process could be tightened up. 
However, he argues that no such linkage should be made with the budgetary 
process proposing that "performance review is for management but the 
budgetary process is political. " This is tantamount to saying that financial 
considerations are more important than policy issues in Bath City Council. 
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When asked what he regarded as the main strengths of the performance 
review process, the Chair of the Special Review Sub-Committee considered 
that: 
It offers the opportunity of proving that things are cost-effective. If it can prove 
that certain activities are done because they need to be done and not just because 
they have always been done or are too difficult to stop doing, then this will be a 
strength. Its success is dependent on there being the will throughout the 
organisation to use it and get the most out of the system. 
The review system operating at Bath City Council does not do that nor is 
there any evidence that that was what it was intended to do. Councillor 
Rhymes reported the following weaknesses: 
The weakness will be in the human element and how certain individuals 
respond. At present, it is too quantitatively driven and I'm not sure of its 
ability to answer specific questions, for example, why was there a queue at the 
Sports Centre. Not all of the measures are meaningful, for example, the 
number of tourists visiting the Baths does not tell us anything about the 
performance of the attendance staff at the Baths. 
He would like to see the following developments in the future: 
At present, I feel that it is a bit too much a master of management rather than a 
tool and I would like to see the balance change. As long as policies are carried 
out and there are figures available to demonstrate it, that's good enough for me 
but for this to happen, the measures need to be tightened up. I would like to 
see performance review linked to staff appraisal. 
It was apparent from the interview with the Chair of the Special Review Sub- 
Committee, that most members have minimal interest in performance review. 
When asked whether the review process had been used for political purposes, 
Councillor Rhymes indicated that this possibility had never even been 
considered and whilst it might provide the opposition with ammunition, it 
hadn't happened yet nor was it likely to in Bath. There was no obvious 
understanding of how the system worked nor why it had been introduced nor 
what might be achieved by its operation. This could be partly explained by 
the lack of a comprehensive document explaining performance review but if 
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the chair of the committee dealing with review is unaware of these issues, 
there is little likelihood of other members being more informed. 
8.2.3.4 Interview with Service Director 
Richard Kitson was appointed to the post of Director of Housing shortly after 
the publication of Bath on the Threshold of the 1990s. Housing is the largest 
and busiest department in the Council and the interviewee thought that he 
was selected by the chief executive to participate in the case study because 
housing has had to produce service/performance indicators for a number of 
years and thus "the current initiative has come as less of a shock as compared 
with some other directors in the council. " 
In his view, Bath City Council is "a long way from having a system up and 
running - we are only at the very early stages. " Given that the authority's 
Chief Executive and Head of Review consider a review mechanism to be 
operating, this view is somewhat disconcerting. Furthermore, he considers 
that the Housing Department is more advanced than other sections of the 
Council primarily because of having to produce statutory indicator 
information. However, even within Housing, progress differs amongst units: 
Once the service objectives have been agreed at committee, it is left to officers 
to determine and use performance measures to assess progress towards targets 
and less-specific service objectives - members are not involved in the 
monitoring process. Most unit managers in housing have used the legislative 
indicators as the basis for this, but a few sections have worked with Reynolds 
of the Review Unit to devise meaningful and appropriate performance 
indicators. This is indicative of the preliminary stage that we are at - even 
within housing there is not a consistent approach. 
He also considers that there is considerable differences in the standards of 
service objectives and performance indicators set for service areas throughout 
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the Council because this was left to the discretion of officers. However, he 
also believes that: 
Performance review and particularly service objectives have been very useful at 
pinning down members to clearly think about what they want and to be more 
strategic in decision-making. The mechanical process of reporting to committee 
and producing performance review information will help directors sharpen up. 
However, he also warns that whilst the exercise of developing performance 
indicators and service objectives is good at focusing minds, "there is a risk 
that you get so bogged down in collecting information and developing 
precise terms that you are missing getting the actual work done. " He is 
uncertain that the balance has been correctly struck in Bath and concludes 
that "You can't measure everything. " He thinks that the system is too paper- 
driven and "ignores many aspects of service delivery which are difficult to 
measure. " Other negative outcomes are: 
Others see it as an irrelevance and resent being tied down to specific objectives. They might even argue that it has made them unresponsive. You cannot 
underestimate the bureaucracy of our system and the resultant time pressures 
this has placed on many senior managers - we all feel this but the level of 
resentment generated varies. The problem with formality is that it stifles individual flair and a number of our more innovative officers resent that. 
Furthermore, he considers that performance review is a system of "dragging 
those at the bottom up a bit but you risk dragging those at the top down a 
bit. " These problems seem to stem from the lack of ownership which chief 
officers feel towards performance review. The Director of Housing argues: 
The idea of service objectives being produced and associated performance information being generated, has been centrally imposed.... I think the Chief Executive who has driven the introduction of the process in Bath, should have 
consulted with chief officers and members much more. If he had, I think we 
would perceive that we own the system much more and would not feel it had been imposed. It would also have effected a much needed change in culture. If 
consultation had occurred, then I think the system would be different because 
our needs would have been recognised and we would have defined a different 
role for performance review. Many of us have useful experience that could have been drawn on. 
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Another contributory factor appears to be the Review Section: 
The Review Team did not have the best of starts. They were marketed as 
watchdogs so directors were reluctant to let them into their departments. Only 
those who were very keen on performance review in principle used them. You 
need someone more forceful than Julie to breakdown resistance from the rest. 
I'm not sure the climate is right for review here anyway - it is still viewed as an 
imposition. 
He also considers that "they seem unclear about what they have to do 
although I'm not sure if that is their fault or unclear direction from the Chief 
Executive. " 
Richard Kitson highlights the lack of a corporate perspective as a difficulty 
and in his view, the authority lacks a clear corporate vision or mission. In 
answer to the question `Has the review system contributed to the 
achievement of corporate goals? ' he gave the following response: 
I suppose it will help in time but the extent to which it makes a difference is 
limited by our lack of corporate perspective at this point in time. I suppose that 
it should ensure that we are all pulling in the same direction but the lack of open 
management in Bath and our generally compartmentalised approach to service 
delivery makes it an awesome task. The simple answer is that at present we do 
not have clear corporate goals but once these have been established I think the 
review system will help their achievement. 
He considers that: 
I don't think we have the correct climate to do meaningful performance review 
since this requires the officers collectively to be supportive of each other so that 
we can openly discuss failings and problems in achieving objectives. We can't 
really go to members for discussion on aspects of review. They don't really 
understand the process and are not particularly supportive of the initiative. 
As to the future of performance review in Bath: 
We are only half-heartedly doing performance review. If we are going to 
continue with the process then we must do so with enthusiasm. It will never 
work whilst so many are lukewarm towards the process. 
He proposes that: 
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I think we need to step back and decide what direction we want to go in and is a 
performance review system part of that. If it is, then what do we want from 
that review system? The system must have an objective and the nature of this 
will determine what form the review process takes. I would like to see 
commitment and enthusiasm from members and officers but think that the role 
of the Review Team should be seriously considered. I don't think that they are 
cost-effective and I'm more favourably disposed to the idea than most chief 
officers. 
It was clear from this interview that the performance review system being 
operated in Bath City Council has some serious shortcomings. It is probable 
that the Chief Executive will have selected a chief officer whom he considers 
will be favourably disposed towards performance review to participate in the 
interviews. It would have been interesting to hear what those less inclined to 
support performance review would have said! Clearly, the Director of 
Housing did not feel any ownership of, or commitment to, the review system 
established in the Council. 
8.2.3.5 Interview with the Leader of the Opposition 
Councillor Clark is leader of the Liberal Democrat group at Bath City Council. 
He argues that: 
At the time performance review was introduced, a Liberal Democrat/Labour 
coalition marginally held the balance of power. We were very supportive of its 
introduction seeing it as the means of identifying opportunities for improving 
efficiency and identifying savings. 
This is at odds with Councillor Rhymes recollection of events since he 
contended that the Conservatives had been the largest group for some 
considerable time. However, it was reassuring to see at least one group of 
councillors in the authority welcoming the introduction of performance 
review. Like Richard Kitson, Councillor Clark considers that performance 
review has not been fully implemented in Bath and would like to see the 
current system overhauled. He confirms that members had little input to the 
Chapter 8, The Case Study Evidence, page 312 
development of the system and that little information feeds through to 
members beyond the indicators and measures going before service committees 
annually and considers that the measures "only scratch the surface. " He 
describes the role of the Special Review Sub-Committee as to "look at ad-hoc 
issues rather than the systematic monitoring of performance as defined by the 
performance review process" and considers that this committee "is not 
powerful enough and still tends to be officer-driven. " 
The Leader of the Liberal Democrats is conscious of the opportunity which 
performance review should have offered his Group: 
Potentially, performance review should make us a more effective opposition by 
giving us the tools to demonstrate the shortcomings of the Conservatives, but 
currently the indicators are produced too infrequently and lack sufficient depth 
for this to occur. We are desperate to be given the tools for this but 
performance review does not currently offer them. 
He also contends that certain of the measures could be used by the opposition 
to embarrass the ruling group but that such information existed prior to the 
performance review process. 
Councillor Clark considers the lack of policy direction in the council to be 
attributable to the "steady as you go - don't rock the boat" attitude of the 
Conservatives and that the Liberal Democrats are the only policy-driven party 
in Bath. He proposes that if his party came to power, whenever a policy was 
proposed, "the objectives, targets and indicators associated with the policy 
would be delineated and these would regularly be reviewed. " They would 
also be keen to introduce zero-based budgeting because of the complacent 
culture which has emerged: 
Bath's problem is that it has too much money such as the income generated from the Roman Baths and therefore it has become slap-happy at expenditure. There is no impetus to search for savings. 
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Neither Councillor Clark nor indeed Councillor Rhymes were aware of 
resistance from chief officers which reinforces the remoteness of members from 
the process. He considers that chief officers were given "too much autonomy 
in the development of the indicators" and he has "serious doubts about the 
suitability of many that are being used. " A recurrent theme in the interview 
was the inadequacy of the indicators used so it is of little surprise that the 
main weakness identified by this particular member is "the current measures 
and indicators are inadequate and afford us little opportunity for changing 
things in this authority. " He also indicates that the current system creates too 
much meaningless data and would like more incorporation of qualitative 
material. If the Liberal Democrats came to power in Bath, the review system 
would be integrated into a Medium Tenn Planning Process and the policy 
planning and the budgetary process would be linked to the performance 
review system. 
8.2.4 Performance Review in Bath City Council: A Critique 
Performance review as operated in Bath City Council is clearly replete with 
difficulties. Review is considered to be a management tool but a primary 
problem appears to be a lack of ownership from the managers who should be 
using the tool. This seems to be partly attributable to a lack of consultation on 
the design or purpose of the system with senior managers in the organisation, 
this in turn generating a feeling amongst chief officers of having review 
imposed upon them. Evidence of commitment to performance review or even 
understanding is lacking in the member domain. A lack of enthusiasm or even 
hostility towards operating the process is in evidence with the consequences 
of this negative disposition more acute in Bath because the organisation 
seems to lack a consistent and consensual corporate perspective and a clear 
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policy-direction from members with the consequence that operating 
performance review involves more effort from officers who have to 
compensate for the lack of councillor input, for example, by having to 
determine service objectives. There are also undertones of a watchdog culture 
operating. 
What the Council intended to achieve by introducing performance review 
and why the particular system which is in operation emerged, remain 
unclarified. However, whilst one might consider the review system in Bath to 
be less than successful in terms of what might reasonably be anticipated by 
the operation of any performance process, all the interviewees were able to 
identify some strengths in the review system particularly in focusing on 
activities that are being undertaken in the Council. One could conclude from 
this that the operation of performance review in Bath City Council has 
therefore brought some benefits. However, overall, it seems to be doing little 
to progress the organisation in any obvious way. 
8.3 Case Study 2: Hertfordshire County Council 
8.3.1 The Performance Review System 
The performance review system operated in Hertfordshire County Council 
emerged from a major review of Council activities conducted by external 
consultants (Kinsley Lord Limited) and reported in November 1990. The 
purpose of this review was "to assist the County Council in a review of its 
operations to enable it to meet the challenges of the 1990s and beyond" 
(Kinsley Lord, 1990, pl). The terms of reference required that this was done 
in a way that: 
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* shifts the focus of the organisation towards meeting customer needs 
* enables Members to better agree and achieve their political objectives 
* ensures that changes to management arrangements result in improved and more 
efficient service delivery. 
Four main outputs emerged from the Review: 
*A Statement of Corporate Principles 
* Principles of the Member Structure 
* Principles of the Officer Machinery 
* Reports of the Officer Capability Working Groups. 
It was argued in the consultants report, that the manner in which the Council 
is managed and does its work, largely depends upon how "Members decide 
and communicate, both externally and internally, what they want to 
achieve" (p3). The adoption of a statement of corporate principles was 
considered as going some way towards achieving required changes but that a 
fundamental overhaul of the committee structure would also be necessary. 
The new structure had to: 
* help Members focus on strategy and policy-making (an area which Members felt needed improvement) 
* increase efficiency in the use of officer and Member time 
* allow Members to concentrate on what they are best at (i. e. articulating 
constituency views, deciding policy, assessing performance) 
* let managers manage (i. e. decreasing Member involvement in day-to-day 
operational decisions) 
* be outward-facing, emphasising customer needs. (Kinsley Lord, 1990, p4) 
The Consultants recommended a Committee Structure which: 
* creates a Policy Committee, reflecting the political composition of the Council, 
which will adopt a strategic view of the Council's activities, assess client needs 
and determine overall resources accordingly and allocate resources between (but 
not within) services 
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* introduces a simplified structure of four service committees which, within the 
overall framework laid down by the Policy Committee, will have the freedom 
to determine service policy and allocate resources 
* creates policy and performance review panels which will enable in-depth 
analysis of specific issues, the evaluation of policy operations, and a 
judgement on how well the Council is meeting its policy objectives and the 
needs of specific client groups 
* drastically reduces the role and number of sub-committees. 
(Kinsley Lord, 1990, p4) 
It is considered that these changes should "allow Member time to be 
deployed to better effect. " 
The emergent committee structure is shown in appendices 8.7 and 8.8 but of 
significance here is the fact that the Policy Committee and the 4 service 
committees - Police, Education (including libraries), Social Services, and 
Environment (including fire, planning, highways and transport) - each have a 
Performance Review Panel attached which has the responsibility "to monitor 
and evaluate" the performance of the associated service committee. The 
Consultants report proposed that the Review Panels should include: 
Members with an independent and objective view of performance as well as 
Committee Members who have experience of the particular service area. 
Potential conflicts would be avoided through careful planning of Committee and 
Review Panel membership. The Chairman of a Service Committee should not 
be a member of the Performance Review Panel looking at his/her Committee's 
performance, but the Vice-Chairman of the Service Committee should be. 
Performance Review Panels should ideally be either seven or nine Members. 
Their work would be on-going, a major issues agenda would need to be determined between the Service Committee and the Panel and a formal reporting 
mechanism would need to be established. The Panels should have the 
opportunity to bring in outside opinion when circumstances require. The 
Panels should be serviced by officers drawn from central departments. 
The performance review system in Hertfordshire County Council is thus a 
member-based system which reviews the performance of committees. In 
tandem to this member-operated process, the consultants review also 
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highlighted changes which would be beneficial in the officer machinery. It 
was proposed that: 
The key to bringing about cultural change is a means of managing the 
performance of chief officers and subsequently, by cascade, that of all 
officers. This will in turn drive the changes in structure and systems which the 
organisation needs to make. In brief, performance management aligns the 
business plan (budget), the responsibilities of jobs, the objectives which 
individuals at all levels are seeking to achieve, the basis on which their 
performance is appraised, and the way in which they are rewarded. 
The appropriate sequence for change was considered to be: 
1. Chief executive and chief officer group discussions to understand the kind of 
organisation Hertfordshire has to become, the part which chief officers play in 
this, the implications for their own jobs, and the role of performance 
management. 
2. introduction of performance management for chief officers (and perhaps 
simultaneously third tier) 
3. if successful during the first year, introduction of performance related pay for 
the first group and cascade of performance management to the next officer 
tranche. 
(Kinsley Lord, 1990, p3) 
However, at the time the Hertfordshire case study was conducted (June 
1992), little progress had been made in this latter performance management 
area since energy had been channelled into getting the new member structure 
up and running and there had also been a significant number of new chief 
officer appointments due to resignations, retirements and restructuring. It was 
thus felt by the Council that the investigation of Hertfordshire's performance 
review system should be confined to the policy performance review process 
operated by members through the Review Panels. 
8.3.2 Documentation Supplied by Hertfordshire County Council 
A full list of the comprehensive documentation supplied by Hertfordshire 
County Council is contained in Box 8.2 overleaf. The key document in terms 
of the development of the performance review system in Hertfordshire is the 
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report by Kinsley Lord summarising their findings of the Review of the 
Council. Eighteen months after this report, the Chief Executive prepared a 
document Reviewing the Review. This publication begins: 
The County Council considered and agreed the management review in late 
November 1990. The Review established four corporate principles to underpin 
the work of the authority, identified the need for restructuring of member 
arrangements and required changes to the structure and culture of the officer 
system. This report reviews progress in implementing the Management Review 
up to April 1992. 
The report shows that a great deal has been achieved in a period of less than 18 
months. However the programme identified by the Review is for long term 
change in the way in which the authority conducts its business and, whilst 
much of that change has commenced, there is much more still to be done. 
(pl) 
Box : DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED BY HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL 
Consultants Report on the Review of the Council, Kinsley Lord, November 1990 
Reviewing the Review, internal report produced by the Chief Executive in April 1992 
Performance Review News, internal newsletter, February 1992 and July 1992 issues 
Agenda and committee papers for the Environment Performance Review Panel, 12th 
May 1992 
Agenda and committee papers for the Police Performance Review Panel, 22nd May 
1992 
Agenda and committee papers for the Policy Committee, 25th June 1992 
Notes of a meeting of Performance Review Lead Officers, 29th January 1992 
Memorandum about the Policy Performance Review Panel from the Director of Law 
and Administration, 7th October 1991 
Memorandum about the Social Services Performance Review panel from the Director of 
Law and Administration, 11th March 1992 
Overheads from training presentations to Performance Review Panels 
Hertfordshire Citizen's Charter, a publication distributed to all households in 
Hertfordshire providing a summary and contact details for all services provided by the 
County 
Hertfordshire County Council Information Pack 
In terms of the revised member structure including the Performance Review 
Panels, the chief executive reports: 
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We have discussed the member arrangements with the Audit Commission, the 
District Audit and the Local Government Management Board, and it is clear 
Hertfordshire's arrangement is one of the most radical in the country. Both the 
District Auditor and the Audit Commission believe the principles underpinning 
our system are good and will be pursued by others in the next year. It is to be 
expected that we will need to fine tune the system as a result of the first year's 
experience. 
(p4) 
One of the most interesting pieces of documentation supplied was 
Performance Review News. The first issue opens as follows: 
This newsletter is produced as an information service for all members and Chief 
Officers to keep them aware of activities by the Panels. It is intended to be a 
biannual publication and will contain reports on Panels' activities and other 
items of interest on Performance Review particularly developments on 
Performance Indicators. 
A copy of an issue of this inventive document is contained in appendix 8.9 
but there is a section devoted to the activities of each Panel, and the times 
and dates of Panel meetings and the contact details of Panel Chairman and 
Lead Officers, is given. The article contained in Box 8.3 appeared in the July 
1992 newsletter. This suggests that the first stage in the process of 
establishing performance review has been to get the revised committee 
structure operating and that attention is subsequently being focused on how 
to make these work effectively. The article pinpoints certain emerging 
difficulties. In particular, performance review had not attained the profile 
amongst members which was required to make it operate effectively and that 
more officer support and member training was required. 
Much of the rest of the documentation took the farm of internal working 
papers from the Review Panels such as that contained in appendix 8.10 which 
is the agenda and committee papers for a meeting of the Environment 
Performance Review Panel on 12th May 1992. This was selected for inclusion 
because it was the Lead Officer of this Panel who was interviewed as a service 
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director. This particular set of papers includes "statements of service 
objectives for each Department and service area reporting to the Environment 
Committee together with a selection of performance indicators which are 
intended to go some way towards meeting the criteria referred to in paragraph 
1" which was that they should be "both meaningful to customers and related 
to service objectives. " The committee papers also flag up the imminent 
publication of the Audit Commission's draft Charter Indicators and 
acknowledges that "there is no way of knowing at this stage how closely the 
Audit Commission's proposed indicators will coincide with those members 
would wish to develop. " 
BoX ARTICLE IN THE JULY 1992 ISSUE OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW NEWS 
Performance Review has been under scrutiny itself in recent times. As part of the 
continuing review of progress in the Management Review, the Member Implementation 
Group (MIG) have looked at how it has worked so far. The group was concerned to raise 
the profile of Performance Review which they thought needed to "flex its muscles" rather 
more in the future. 
Performance Review Reviewed 
It was agreed that we need a concerted effort to raise the profile of Performance Review 
Panels over the next twelve months to ensure their importance is recognised. This will 
need greater officer support and more Member training or induction. 
MIG felt Performance Review was a powerful machine which was not yet fully flexing its 
muscles, and considered the following ways of improving its performance: 
regular standing item on service committees (Performance Review feedback by 
Performance Review Chairman) 
if necessary, Chairmen of service committees being prepared to be `interviewed' by 
Performance Review Panel 
codified policies for the service committees in a readable form so that Performance 
Review Panels have an almost automatic agenda for scrutiny 
increasing members' confidence in their role and officers preparedness to have an open 
scrutiny in uncomfortable areas. 
It was felt that the original objective of trying to get self scrutiny by services via their own 
Performance Review Panel (as opposed to one centrally-controlled Performance Review 
exercise) was still valid and worth trying to achieve, but that more visible 'independent' 
officer support would be useful. This would be helped by greater publicity about the 
corporate officer role (each Panel having a service lead officer and a 'corporate' officer 
as resource). 
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Overall, the documentation supplied by Hertfordshire was comprehensive, 
detailed and internally consistent and gave a useful insight into the workings 
of the Review Panels. 
8.3.3 Interviews Conducted at Hertfordshire County Council 
The interviews at Hertfordshire County Council were conducted in the 
following order: 
Kay Hopwood and Lin Homer respectively Policy Manager, and Assistant 
Chief Executive and Lead Officer to the Policy Performance Review Panel 
Councillor Robert Gordon (Conservative), Deputy Leader of the Council 
Nick Cull, Director of Trading Standards and Lead Officer to the Environment 
Performance Review Panel 
Brian Briscoe, Chief Executive 
Councillor John Metcalf (Labour), Group Leader 
The questionnaires completed from the semi-structured interviews conducted 
with these key personnel, are contained in appendix 8.11. 
8.3.3.1 Interview with Officers with Performance Review Responsibilities 
Kay Hopwood and Lin Homer are the two officers with overall officer 
responsibility for the operation of the performance review system at 
Hertfordshire County Council although Review Panel Lead Officers have 
responsibility for the running of their own Panels. 
In the interview is was revealed that there had been a review system 
operational prior to the one under scrutiny but that this had comprised of a 
Performance Review Sub-Committee, a sub-committee of the Policy and 
Resources Committee. Studies were undertaken by teams of officers, mainly 
accountants according to a work programme and the results fed back to 
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members, The old system is described as "undoubtedly internal, 
organisationally-based and focused on what we did and how we did it. " In 
contrast, Hertfordshire is "now seeking to be much more strategic in our use 
of review, shifting right away from operational details towards the broader 
policy dimension. " In particular, "the role of members within review is 
considerably enhanced" because the review system operated in this case 
study authority is about the review of policies. However, it was also noted 
that "officers were keener to see it take root in Hertfordshire than members 
because they have a better understanding of its potential. " 
Of the Review Panels, it was reported: 
We want them to be persistent, curious, independent and thorough. We want 
them to be investigative and thus have sought to give them a high level of 
freedom. Centralist intervention and demands would I think, stifle innovation 
and ultimately their operation and they would fade into the background. Their 
responsibilities are clear but how they meet these is at their discretion. 
The review officers considered that it took a long time to clarify with members 
what their role was and then to equip them with the necessary skills and 
confidence to then operate the review process. However, it was also revealed 
that: 
Our member profile is gradually changing. It no longer reflects the 
Hertfordshire `squirearchy' of the past. We are seeing active members coming 
in with more business and commercial understanding and with a far clearer 
political will to drive policies through. The new breed are very supportive of 
performance review seeing it as a useful tool for demonstrating success. 
The main weakness of the review system identified by Kay Hopwood and Lin 
Homer is that 
Some of our members feel insecure about not receiving tons of data on 
performance and I think we are at risk of succumbing to pressure and becoming 
paper-driven in our approach to review. If this happens, I think it will become 
a mundane exercise and achieve nothing. They have struggled with a role which 
really is about testing things intellectually as opposed to mechanically. 
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The time taken to develop the system appears also to have been an issue. In 
considering major difficulties or problems encountered in setting up the 
system, the interviewees reported time as the biggest constraint: 
Many of us would have liked to have developed quicker and be at a more 
advanced stage now. But we wanted to take officers and members with us and 
this slowed the pace down. There was also a degree of member uncertainty 
about what was actually going on and some suspicions that this was actually a 
ploy for pushing them to the periphery rather than the oppose. I suppose 
change is always resisted. 
The system is considered to be still evolving: 
We have given the system some time to find its place in the organisation and 
having consolidated that we are now developing the weak areas. In particular, 
we are focusing on policy targets and performance indicators for the foreseeable 
future. 
This in turn has generated some incidence of frustration from officers in the 
organisation that things haven't changed more immediately. However, it is 
considered that progress in the right direction has been made: 
Those officers and members that think it is working, think it is a wonderfully 
powerful tool but in order to be successful that core group of believers needs to 
be widened. I suppose it has changed some of the things that we do and the 
way that we do them and has required officers to be more explicit about what 
they think the policies are that they are responsible for delivering and thus 
members have had to clarify what their policies are. This is quite a significant 
achievement but needs to be sustained and built upon. 
The operation of the review system was also considered to be gradually 
changing the role of members in the authority "forcing them to become 
policy-orientated. " 
The most important future developments were considered to be raising the 
profile of performance review even further making "those involved in its 
operation feel that they are making an important contribution. " It was 
proposed that this could be partially done by providing more training and 
workshops for members "to enhance their understanding of the process. " It 
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was felt appropriate to seek greater consistency of approach amongst the 
Review Panels and the officers were conscious that keeping performance 
review fresh would "be a challenge. " 
8.3.3.2 Interview with the Deputy Leader of the Council 
Councillor Gordon is Deputy Leader of the Council and Leader of the 
Conservative Group, the ruling administration. He is Chair of the Education 
Committee and therefore excluded from sitting on the associated Review 
Panel. As Deputy Leader, he was a key participant in the consultants review 
of the Council and feels that what has emerged does reflect what members 
wanted. 
He reports that a Performance Review Panel is attached to each of the Service 
Committees to "scrutinise what the committee does and to report on the 
impact of the relevant activities and to question whether this was what was 
intended. " He does however concede, that "some policies are so long-term 
and vague that it is difficult to make such a link. " He admits that "most of our 
policies are inherited" and only change very gradually. He feels that: 
Establishing corporate principles has been good for helping us focus on what 
we as an administration want to do and the whole new approach being 
introduced should help us as a political group determine clear policies. 
Councillor Gordon indicated that Hertfordshire had established a framework 
which allowed members to move away from operational issues towards more 
strategic considerations and that the emphasis should now shift to policies 
and outcomes, with management being left to managers. Like Kay Hopwood 
and Lin Homer, the Deputy Leader considers that the time factor may prove 
problematic: 
Chapter 8, The Case Study Evidence, Page 325 
The way we have approached becoming more strategic, the results will take a 
long time to feed through but there is likely to be some rumblings about lack of 
progress when these are not fairly immediate. 
He also highlights a problem with membership of the Review Panels: 
I am concerned about the calibre of members to serve on the Review Panel. 
Some members have turned down the opportunity to serve on Panels preferring 
a back seat on principal committees. Whilst this continues, the Review Panels 
are not being given the best start or chance of success. 
It is thus not surprising that he highlights an improvement in members' 
understanding of the role of the Review Panels as a future development and 
would like to see councillors "seeking a place on them rather than the 
currently dominant service committees. " He also recognises that in the future, 
"we as an administration have to tighten up the clarity of vision and 
expression in our policies so that their implementation can be reviewed. " 
8.3.3.3 Interview with Service Director 
Nick Cull is the Director of Trading Standards at Hertfordshire County 
Council and he is also the Lead Officer on the Environment Review Panel. He 
considers that performance review is only in its infancy in the authority and 
that "we have only really set the framework in place namely the Review 
Panels and are beginning to learn how these will operate in practice, basically 
by doing. " However, he is in favour of proceeding with relative caution 
rather than searching for an instant, overnight solution considering that 
"these things should be approached pragmatically, the ultimate solution 
should not be sought in one swoop. " 
Nick Cull recognises the threat which the Audit Commission's Charter 
Indicators pose but argues that: 
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They are devoid of contextual information and it is likely that the policy 
dimension will be ignored so I would encourage members to concentrate on our 
own indicators rather than focusing on those of the Audit Commission. 
He guards against the authority changing course but recognises that "if there 
are to be inter-authority comparisons, then the temptation to focus attention 
on these is undoubtedly strong. " 
He considers that 
The new system of operating, including the review process through Panels 
should make sure that all the bits of this large organisation pull in the same 
direction and are looking at the same distant horizon. 
This particular chief officer has confidence that the review system will 
"promote and provoke" relevant questions. He identifies a number of 
strengths which the review system has. Of particular relevance, he feels that 
since the review system emerged from a major Council review, then it is likely 
that the system will address the needs of the organisation and that since 
members were consulted extensively in the review process, then they should 
"feel ownership and commitment" a factor which is known "to be lacking in 
other approaches. " He also feels that there is a lack of pressure for instant 
results which allows officers and members "to feel their way through the 
process" and also allows the core business of the Council, namely service 
delivery, to continue with minimal disruption. He feels that Hertfordshire's 
system fosters partnership between members and officers, encourages joint 
growing and learning, and prevents conflict and confrontation. Nick Cull 
also considers the avoidance of a number-driven system to be a strength of 
Hertfordshire's review process. 
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However, he does recognise that the long timescale before benefits emerge 
may cause some frustration amongst both members and officers. He considers 
that members are likely to be anticipating more rapid and transparent results 
than are feasible. On the officer-side: 
Officers will become restless I think if the review system and the new 
committee structure does not change, albeit slowly, the role which members 
play in the council. I actually think that down the line when officers find that 
review pushes them out of the driving seat and members do control strategy in 
their departments more, they are likely to become a little more resistant or down 
on the process. 
Nick Cull considers that members are being asked to take a huge step: 
In the past it has been easier for them to be focus on the operational, the small 
scale details and the short term. We are asking them to become strategic, to 
look at the overall picture and to set policy direction for this large organisation 
within that. This is a big step for them to make and they need to feel that it is 
okay to take time to bridge the enormous gulf between the two. 
He does however question whether there are sufficient members conversant 
with performance review, who understand what it is all about, to actually 
serve on the Panels. 
8.3.3.4 Interview with the Chief Executive 
Brian Briscoe arrived at Hertfordshire County Council towards the end of the 
Management Review conducted by Kinsley Lord. He was afforded the 
opportunity to input to the process and indicated that "the shape of the final 
document and thus the review system introduced here does reflect my 
understanding, knowledge and disposition. " He is very much in favour of 
performance review seeing it as vehicle for "redefining the proper political 
role for members. " The Chief Executive reports that it took time to get the 
distinction between policy performance review and the measurement of the 
performance of individuals within the organisation, clearly drawn. He 
considers the latter to be a managerial task. 
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Brian Briscoe reports that there were lots of minor difficulties initially such as 
members understanding of their responsibilities and that it has felt like "an 
uphill struggle to get us to where we are now. " Part of this he attributes to 
the fact that the way things are done in Hertfordshire "owes a lot to tradition 
and experience" and the new system "has challenged some of these 
traditions. " However, he also reports difficulties with the players in the 
review process: 
People are the biggest weakness. They have motivations which are not 
necessarily in accord with improving organisational performance. Additionally, 
we have drawn a notional line between scrutinising the performance of 
managers and the performance of policies. If a policy is not having the desired 
impact, it may be because it is being poorly implemented or it may be because it 
is an ill-conceived policy. It is a convenient line to draw but not altogether 
appropriate and I think in time we will run into problems in this domain. 
He also considers that insufficient progress has been made in the development 
of policy targets and performance indicators and that "this is hampering the 
effectiveness of performance review" and should be given a high priority to 
"sustain the process" in the future. He also communicated that the review of 
the new arrangements had suggested that more resources needed to be put 
into the performance process and in particular, that members needed more 
support. However, the chief executive considers that there is a risk that the 
centre would take over whereas ideally, they are only there to "lubricate the 
process. " He also felt that members needed to frame their policies more 
coherently and he wanted to see the Review Panels given "better quality 
members" reiterating the view that they are currently considered by 
councillors as "the poor relation to the standing committees and a place for 
relatively junior members. " 
The Chief Executive did not feel that performance review had significantly 
embedded into the organisation with senior officers still providing the 
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momentum and if that this were removed, it is questionable whether members 
would continue to operate performance review in Hertfordshire. 
8.3.3.5 Interview with the Opposition Leader 
Councillor John Metcalf is the leader of the Labour Group, the largest 
opposition group to the Conservatives, holding 27 seats against the 
Conservatives 45. He indicated that: 
The decision to appoint consultants and initiate a fundamental review of Council 
activities was taken without consultation with the opposition. This makes it 
difficult for us to support what has emerged even though I believe some of the 
new structure may have something to offer the authority. Our non-involvement 
was a mistake. Should the authority become hung again in the future, it would 
have been better that the structure that had been put in place was one that we 
could all work with. 
He reports that two Labour members resigned their Panel memberships 
because they felt that little was being achieved, particularly given the lack of 
clear policies to review. He also indicated that: 
I have had difficulty persuading our better members to consider taking or 
retaining a role on the Review Panels and I know that this is also the case for 
the Conservatives since all their front-line councillors are chairs and vice-chairs 
of the service committees. 
He also proposes that review will have only a short life in Hertfordshire: 
To be honest I don't think that the current system will survive because I think it 
will achieve too little over too long a time period. This is particularly so whilst 
the Panels cannot attract the better quality members. Members from all the 
parties on the whole seem indifferent to performance and the new structure. I 
don't sense commitment and this does beg the question why bother. The case 
for performance review has not really been made. If it is too stay then I think 
the biggest tightening up must be a clarification of policies. 
He feels that the system is just a framework and is unlikely to change the way 
things are done particularly addressing the underlying problems of 
complacency and the lack of clear policies which he feels exist in the County. 
The Leader was asked whether his party would operate performance review 
differently should it come to power after the next election. He responded: 
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If we were in power the policies would be clear and so there would be less of a 
problem with the existing system. I think we would need to think carefully 
about the role which performance should and could take and how best this 
could be achieved. The current system ignores the performance of officers in 
implementing policies and this needs to be addressed since this is a significant 
aspect of the performance of Hertfordshire County Council. 
He also feels that the electorate and customers have largely been ignored in 
the process and they would commission surveys of their views including non- 
users of service primarily because "we are not performing for ourselves but for 
them so it is only right and proper that we consult them about their views. " 
8.3.4 Performance Review in Hertfordshire County Council: A Critique 
In agreeing to participate as a case study, Hertfordshire had specifically 
requested that any observations made on their system should be fed back to 
them. The letter sent shortly after the visit, detailing a number of points that 
needed to be considered, is contained in appendix 8.12 but the following 
points were raised: 
* there is a lack of clear, coherent policies from the ruling group. It is difficult to 
assess how far the activities of an authority are advancing it towards the 
achievement of goals, if it is unclear what the goals are. Comprehensive 
objectives and a clear statement of policy aims are a necessity for next year's 
incoming administration; 
* members regard performance review as a peripheral function and thus a low 
priority is given to membership of the Review Panels. Whilst this continues, 
the Panels will be peripheral - the poor relation of the Service Committees. 
Members do not really seem to understand the role of the Review Panels. 
Perhaps if this were fully explained to them, they would realise the potential 
power that the Panels have and would be clamouring to join; 
* Hertfordshire's approach to performance review demands considerable input 
from members. Even if they conceptually understood performance review and 
there is little evidence to suggest that this is the case, the Panels require 
considerable time commitment from members many of whom are unwilling 
and/or unable to make such a commitment. If there was only one Review Panel 
then it might be possible to find sufficient calibre members with the necessary 
available time to take posts but the current structure demands too much; 
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*a mechanism for communicating operational performance to Review Panels and 
service committees on at least an annual basis would be useful. Members 
would be more aware of the processes involved in delivering services after the 
decision-making stage and it would also put concern with performance more 
clearly on their agenda. Steps would have to be taken to ensure that they do not 
become preoccupied with the tangible day-to-day measures at the expense of 
more strategic matters. 
The reply letter received from Hertfordshire is contained in appendix 8.13. 
This acknowledges these points as difficulties which the authority needs to 
confront and identifies what actions are proposed to remedy them. They did 
however feel that the approach "was still valid and worth trying to achieve. " 
Hertfordshire's approach to performance review is very different from that 
seen elsewhere. It is clearly about reviewing the performance of policies not 
people or operational activity, and demands considerable input from members. 
If members can play the role demanded of them to effectively operate the 
system, then this particular process has a lot to offer Hertfordshire particularly 
if the trend towards increased enabling in service provision, continues. 
However, there remains a question mark regarding members ability and/or 
willingness to input into the system at the required level and this could 
undermine the entire policy performance review process adopted by the 
County. The fact that members were extensively consulted during this review 
so that what emerged reflected their needs and that they should feel 
ownership of the system, should have illicited a high level of commitment but 
this is not in evidence. The pace of progress with respect to performance 
review has been slow following the initial overhauling of the committee 
structure. One of the key reasons for introducing the revised committee 
system was to "enable members to better agree and achieve their political 
objectives" and to more usefully deploy their time. At present, the review 
system appears to be failing in both these dimensions. 
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8.4 Case Study 3: Cornwall County Council 
8.4.1 The Performance Review System 
The catalysts for introducing performance review to Cornwall County 
Council were a District Auditor's report which highlighted a lack of strategic 
management in the authority; and a management review which indicated that 
some things in the Council could be being done better. The Chief Executive, 
the Assistant Chief Executive with Corporate Responsibilities, and the Chair 
of Policy, set about deciding on the best review approach for Cornwall. A 
key consideration was the lack of overall political control in the Council 
which has the following balance of members: 
Liberal Democrats 29 
Independents 24 
Conservatives 14 
Labour 8 
Liberals 3 
Cornish Separatists 1 
Being the largest groups, the Liberal Democrats and the Independents share 
out the committee chairs. Essentially, an informal coalition is in operation but 
neither Group perceives themselves to be in power and the Independent Chair 
of the Education Committee who was interviewed, indicated that voting 
directions could not be guaranteed. The significance of this for the 
performance review system is that there is a lack of strong political drive and 
clear policy direction in the Council. 
Given this, the review system which was considered to be most appropriate 
begins at committee level, with each committee deciding on its overall aims, 
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objectives and priorities over a four year period. These are pulled together for 
all committees into a Medium Term Plan for the Council, a document which 
did not exist prior to the review process in the authority. The extract for the 
Education Committee is contained in appendix 8.14 because the Chair of this 
Committee and the Director of Education were both interviewed as part of the 
case study. In implementing the Medium Term Plan, each committee also 
establishes an Annual Action Plan but these are only used departmentally and 
are not pulled together in any aggregate form. 
Chief officers then have to produce Performance Management Statements for 
their departments in conjunction with their Committee Chairs and the Chief 
Executive. These have to identify 6 to 8 `accountabilities' for the 
department and should attach measures to these accountabilities. The 
Performance Management Statements should be related to the overall strategy 
and objectives agreed at Committee. The Performance Management 
Statement for Education is contained in appendix 8.15 and it is apparent that 
in Education, the measures attached to the accountabilities are referred to as 
key objectives rather than measures. Once the Statements are established, it is 
a matter of discretion how much information is fed back to committees, 
Significantly, there is no automatic reporting mechanism. However, the staff 
appraisals of senior managers in the Council were increasingly being related to 
performance information at the time of the case study visit and therefore, in 
the future it will be more in the interests of chief officers to be able to 
demonstrate their performance and the performance of their departments. 
The use of performance indicators in departments and service areas is also 
determined individually at the discretion of senior managers and committee 
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chairs. Consequently, in some Council areas these are well-developed, useful 
and informative whilst in others they are very basic and communicate little. 
This particular area was being tightened up at the time of the visit to Cornwall 
but it was clear that performance indicators were a problematic area for the 
Council. The indicators for Education were not provided but for illustrative 
purposes consider the measures in reported use by the Council's Property 
Department: 
(a) Analysis of Property Department staff by function 
(b) Property maintenance costs for Administrative Offices 
(c) Property Valuation and Estate Management (number of cases, staff 
(d) 
(e) 
(0 
(g) 
involved etc. ) 
Number and value of property organisations 
Rental income for non-operational property 
Property insurance - claim record 
Capital Building Programme (number of projects etc. ) 
All of these are management information statistics and communicate little 
about the performance of the Property Department. The examples of 
performance indicators from other departments were similarly spurious. 
The review system at Cornwall basically comprises a series of departmental 
Performance Management Statements which should be related to the 
objectives, aims and priorities incorporated into the Medium Term Plan. 
Following this, responsibility for reviewing the performance of service 
activities is devolved to committee chairs and chief officers. 
Ad hoc reviews are also conducted occasionally but these predate the review 
system described above dating back some fifteen years. Areas for scrutiny are 
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normally suggested at Chief Officers Group usually because there is an 
indication that something is wrong or it is felt that an opportunity is being 
squandered. Members have an open invitation to propose areas for one-off 
reviews but have never been known to put any suggestions forward. 
8.4.2 The Documentation Supplied by Cornwall County Council 
The documentation supplied by Cornwall County Council is indicated in box 
8.5. It mainly comprises internal working papers relating to performance 
review. 
Box 8.5: Documentation Supplied by Cornwall County Council 
Medium Term Plan 1992-96, this document pulls together the objectives, aims and 
priorities of all Council Committees for the medium term period. 
The Performance Management Statement for Education, an internal paper detailing 
accountabilities and associated objectives for the Education Department. 
A report to the Performance Review Working Party about the Review of European Co- 
ordination. 
An initial and a follow-up report to the Performance Review Working Party about the Review of Corporate Image. 
A report to the Performance Review Working Party about Organisational Value from 
the Centre based on a seminar held for members in February 1991. This recommended 
that committees review the achievements of the previous years Medium Term and Action Plans and focus attention on setting targets and monitoring performance. 
A report to the Performance Review Working Party about the Review of Waste Disposal. 
Draft performance indicators as notified to the Policy Co-ordinator from a range of Council departments. 
Staff Review and Development Scheme Information 
0 
A considerable proportion of the documentation supplied related to the ad 
hoc reviews which have been undertaken and a sample report is contained in 
appendix 8.16. This was a Review of the Council's involvement in Europe. 
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Some senior managers felt that Cornwall was missing out on some European 
initiatives and a review of European opportunities and how these could be 
pursued, was activated. Subsequently, on the basis of the findings of the 
review, the Council established an office in Brussels and it is felt that the 
authority has benefited considerably from this action. 
From the documentation provided by Cornwall County Council, no strong 
image of what performance review is about, is forthcoming. As in the case of 
Bath, there is no one document summarising the performance review system, 
nor the underlying concept of review, nor what the Council was hoping to 
achieve by adopting a review process. 
8.4.3 The Interviews Conducted at Cornwall County Council 
The following interviews were conducted at Cornwall County Council: 
Richard Ellsworth, Policy Co-ordinator 
Pat Crowson, Assistant Chief Executive with Corporate Responsibilities 
Councillor Hurst (Liberal Democrat), Group Leader 
Councillor Nelson (Labour), Opposition Member 
Councillor Whiting (Independent), Chair of the Education Committee 
David Fryer, Director of Education 
The Assistant Chief Executive with Corporate Responsibilities was 
interviewed rather than the Chief Executive because all responsibility for the 
management of the review process had been delegated to her. 3 councillors 
were interviewed since no party has overall political control. For the 
interviews with the Liberal Democrat and Independent councillors, the 
questionnaire for the council leader was completed whilst the questionnaire 
for the Opposition Leader was compiled on the basis of the interview with the 
Chapter 8, The Case Study Evidence, page 337 
Labour member. The completed questionnaires are contained in appendix 
8.17. 
8.4.3.1 Interview with Officer with Performance Review Responsibilities 
Richard Ellsworth is the Policy Co-ordinator at Cornwall County Council and 
is responsible for the operation of the review process as opposed to its 
management which falls to Pat Crowson. He arrived in mid-1987 after the 
decision to approach review in the particular way that Cornwall has, was 
taken but before the process of implementation had begun. He indicated that 
"it (the review system) is only one part of my job description and does not get 
as much of my time as it merits. " He reports that: 
some individual departments were beginning to instigate mechanisms for 
enhancing strategic management within their areas of responsibility, including 
reviewing past performance. 
Officers from these departments were perceived to welcome the push from the 
centre since it helped them "to convince their members and cynical senior 
managers of the value of review techniques. " Others were more resistant 
however, seeing it as intervention from the centre and there was a general 
tendency to resist change and the concept of performance review and some 
chief officers resented the implication that things could be done better and 
their management practices improved. Richard Ellsworth felt that resistant 
chief officers may have been less opposed to the review system if it had come 
from consultants. However, the authority wanted a system which "fully 
reflected the organisational environment and existing culture and was tailored 
to meet these" and it was felt that this could best be delivered by in-house 
development. It is recognised that as a consequence "we relied on chief 
officers to drive the system too much with the result that in some departments 
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review progress has been slow" and that the energy put into review varies 
considerably across Council departments. It was reported that some chief 
officers had procrastinated for "as long as they got away with it" and that 
there was limited uniformity of approach amongst departments. 
On the member side, the review officer reported that: 
The members found it easier to accept the initiative because it was precipitated 
from an external source that is, the District Auditor. At an early stage of 
developing the performance review process, a Performance Review Working 
Party was set-up to initiate member involvement and we encouraged all service 
committees to set-up Performance Review Sub-Committees. Some did and 
some didn't but most have petered out or are dormant. Most members are not 
yet ready for performance review or don't take it seriously enough to make the 
necessary commitment. 
He felt that members lack of understanding of the significance of performance 
review had hampered the ability of the centre to get the system off the ground 
and that there was a general dearth of appreciation for what is trying to be 
achieved in introducing a review system. He indicated that the Chair of the 
Performance Review Working Party is however very enthusiastic and has 
forced the issue of performance review onto the agenda "for a number of 
reluctant chairs. " However, her approach "has antagonised several chairs 
who resent the intrusion into their affairs. " 
Additionally, the members in Cornwall are not considered to be policy-driven 
but rather "tend to react to suggested policies according to how they will 
impact on their electorate. " As a result most of the review system's indicators 
and targets tend to be operational rather than strategic in nature. Both the 
quality and consumer dimension of performance is considered to be largely 
ignored. Members are resistant to consumer surveys proposing that "they 
know the attitudes of their consumers and electors. " Richard Ellsworth 
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anticipated that both the quality and consumer areas would be focused on 
more in the future as a result of external pressure and legislation. 
The introduction of review was intended to force a more strategic orientation: 
One of our reasons for introducing performance review was to force senior 
management and members to consider what it was that they actually wanted to 
achieve and what action would be necessary to be successful. 
It was hoped that the introduction of performance review would initiate a 
change in culture with the Council wanting to "move from being financially- 
led to policy and strategy-led. " It would appear from the operational 
emphasis to date that this is far from being achieved. 
Weaknesses were also perceived by the review officer in the performance 
indicators being proposed by departmental managers. Some were considered 
to be fairly well developed but most were input and crude output measures - 
"there are a few efficiency measures but none which relate to effectiveness"- 
and it was considered that "the measures do not really relate to the sorts of 
things we should be measuring. " In addition to inadequacies in the 
definition of measures, it was also felt that the indicators had not been fully 
integrated into the management process with both managers and councillors 
considering them separately from the annual Action Plans. He also felt that 
overall, performance review is neither significantly integrated into the 
operation and management of the authority nor secured sufficient commitment 
to survive major organisational change should it occur. Despite these 
difficulties, the review officer felt: 
It is useful to refine the system in the light of experience rather than bring in 
rigid structures at an early stage, particularly since review is not associated with 
other changes in this authority. 
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In considering whether performance review had been successful at Cornwall 
County Council, Richard Ellsworth felt that initial progress had been 
disappointing. He thinks that maybe the authority wasn't "quite ready for 
review" or "lacked the driving force to secure commitment and the necessary 
cultural change. " Performance review however, is considered to have a 
number of strengths: 
I think it has helped us develop our strategic management system. It completes 
the circle between policies and actions and has helped both officers and 
members get beyond the basic budget implications of potential decisions. It has 
helped make staff more accountable and has given them some sense of purpose. 
We have laid the first stone of strategic management and it gives us a basis to 
lay the other building blocks. 
Richard Ellsworth indicated that he was keen to be innovative but was 
struggling to see ways of "keeping the system fresh and dynamic. " He also 
felt that if the chief executive were to get behind the system, it might make a 
difference. 
8.4.3.2 Interview with the Assistant Chief Executive 
Pat Crowson is the Assistant Chief Executive with Corporate Responsibilities 
and she held this post when the proposal to introduce a review system first 
emerged from the District Auditors report. She was very supportive of the 
introduction of review seeing it as a way of facilitating effective strategic 
management in the authority. She reports that in large authorities like 
Cornwall, it is difficult to generate a corporate management perspective but 
that the process of review has helped "ensure that chief officers are all going 
in the same direction. " However, it was also intimated that "the historical 
lack of a strategy or vision for this County has meant that they (chief officers) 
are not entirely sure where that direction/route is taking them. " 
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Like Richard Ellsworth, she records a mixed response from officers but 
additionally reports that a small number of officers who had already 
established review type processes, "were peeved at a central initiative forcing 
them to change their approach. " Of reluctant chief officers, she observes that 
,, if they are uncommitted, it is difficult to force them to take the process 
seriously and give it the room needed to develop in their department. " She 
also indicated that it was difficult to get members persuaded that performance 
review had something to offer the County and that it had been sold to 
councillors as "a tool to improve the management of the authority. " 
Members' lack of understanding and enthusiasm had generally prevented 
Chairs from putting pressure on resistant chief officers. She indicated that: 
the biggest difficulty in operating the system has been keeping the momentum 
going and driving the reluctant chief officers into action. In an authority which 
is neither performance nor strategically-orientated, the process of getting 
objectives, targets and measures specified, has been awesome and I think we 
have only taken the first step but will improve with time. 
Whilst feeling that progress had been made "in inculcating corporate 
responsibility to chief officers, " Pat Crowson would like to see more of a 
focus on securing a performance culture permeating the whole organisation 
and becoming part of day-to-day management. At the time of the case study 
visit, she felt that there was a tendency for targets and indicators to be 
selected which reflected how the organisation is rather than "how we would 
want it to be or indeed how it should be. " She recognised that Cornwall had 
not yet tackled fundamental policy review. Like the review officer, despite 
the shortcomings, the assistant chief executive was able to identify strengths 
in the review system: 
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I think it has substantially changed the way that we as an authority think about 
things and has been an important factor in the gradual cultural change that is 
taking place. I think it has given and will continue to give, the authority a 
clearer sense of direction and purpose and we will be able to demonstrate 
achievements both to members and to the public. This must enhance service 
delivery and I think it will help us be more efficient and effective in time. 
8.4.3.3 Interview with the Leader of the Liberal Democrat Group 
Councillor Hurst is Leader of the Liberal Democrat Group at Cornwall County 
Council, the largest group on the Council. His disposition towards 
performance review is emphatic: 
I am very unenthusiastic about performance review, quality control and 
performance indicators. I regard the whole thing as part of the government's 
obsession with cost as opposed to service quality. I am very unsympathetic 
towards the whole process and I'm cynical about its likely effect in this 
authority. I would like to have seen a cost-benefit analysis of what you get out 
of it compared with the officer time put in. It is undoubtedly an attempt from 
central government to cut local authorities down to size. 
He reports that whilst there was opportunities for members to contribute to 
the development of the review system, participation was minimal and he 
indicated that perhaps if members had been more involved then "the process 
would be more embedded into the organisation. " He intimated that 
performance review is not given much committee time and that members are 
not exactly "queuing up" to serve on the Performance Review Working 
Party. He indicated difficulties on the officer-side reporting that some were 
cynical like himself, and resented the time that review consumed and that 
generally, senior management was not committed to either the principle or 
practice of performance review and that this was likely to hamper its progress. 
He also indicated that the Chief Executive is not actively involved in review. 
Councillor Hurst considered that not actually having political control 
prevented the Liberal Democrat's political objectives necessarily being 
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adopted as the council objectives but he feels that "they do influence the 
policies which are adopted at full committee. " However, he also 
communicated that: 
The objectives of the Council, be they ours are not, are part of the Medium 
Term Plan and each committee has its own Performance Statement and Action 
Plan which should reflect stated objectives. But when it comes to reviewing 
what has been done, I'm not sure that the monitoring process is sufficiently 
related to monitoring progress towards these. I think we just measure what we 
have done and report it but don't relate it back to whether it is what we planned 
to do. 
He reiterated this point indicating that he was unconvinced that "the 
monitoring process and our quantification of performance is systematically, if 
at all, related to policies. " However, he does indicate that review "has 
helped us concentrate our minds and might make clearer the balance of 
priorities" and has forced the Council to put together the Medium Term Plan. 
He feels that it has systematised activities which he considered to be 
particularly useful in a large fragmented non-political authority such as 
Cornwall. This member also reported that the review system had made certain 
things explicit "particularly the role and goals of chief officers" and that this 
would improve accountability. However, he does feel that: 
It is taking up far too much officer time and to a lesser degree member time for 
something that we are not sure what it is going to do for us. I don't actually 
think it is changing what is done. I think it was introduced too quickly and 
without recognition of our environment or situation. We are being asked to 
operate a system in which we don't believe in so it is not surprising that it is 
floundering. I think it is too number driven. 
Councillor Hurst indicated that the objectives of review and the role which it 
is to play in the authority "need to be clarified before we can go any further 
with review, " and he did in fact conclude "I'm not sure it has a future. " 
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8.4.3.4 Interview with an Opposition Member 
Councillor Nelson is a member of the Labour Group which is one of a number 
of smaller groups on the Council and he communicated that Labour "are a 
fairly small pawn in Cornwall and our political agenda is not prominent. " He 
neither actively supported nor opposed the introduction of performance 
review and "knows very little about its operation. " However, he indicated 
that the more he learned, the more he felt that "it could be useful for 
improving the effectiveness of the Council. " He indicated that at Cornwall, 
the review process is "an officer tool and members are only really rubber 
stamping management decisions" and that the information emerging from the 
review process was not the stuff that political debate is made of. He feels that 
the review system is remote from the Medium Term Plan and departmental 
Action Plans and that quite significantly, if the political make-up of the 
Council did not change so that clear policies emerged, then the policy base 
necessary to make review effective would not be achieved. He feels that the 
review system should offer some advantages: 
In the past, I have not always known what staff are doing or what they axe 
responsible for. I gather that review will change this and make responsibilities 
explicit. It should prevent chairs and chief officers from colluding on certain issues and them not even reaching committee. It should keep you on your toes but I have insufficient experience of its operation to know whether it does. 
Councillor Nelson felt that if performance review had been left to members "it 
would have petered out" and that if Labour were to come to power then 
operating the review system would not be high on their agenda: 
I don't think review would be our top priority. We would need to begin with clear policy orientation and having given strategic direction to the Council 
perhaps we may decide that review could help monitor progress but I think 
current experience has put us off a bit. 
He did however, indicate that Labour's small minority meant that this was too 
hypothetical a situation to take seriously. 
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8.4.3.5 Interview with an Independent Member 
Councillor Whiting is an Independent member of the Council. The 
Independents share the committee chairs with the Liberal Democrats and 
Councillor Whiting holds the key position of Chair of Education. He 
indicated that he wasn't against the introduction of performance review but 
was not sure "what role it can play in Cornwall and whether we are actually 
ready for it. " He feels that: 
If review can help us demonstrate what we've done and can help us towards 
our objectives then it has to be a good thing. However, if it is going to happen 
then it must be done properly and I don't think we have thought through our 
system comprehensively and it doesn't seem to be being well received by the 
officers. 
He feels that if member consultation had occurred then perhaps this would 
have forced councillors to think more about what it could offer the County. 
He reinforces the view that performance is an officer tool in Cornwall and that 
members in receiving relevant review information for the committees which 
they sit on, are just endorsing "officer suggestions and recommendations. " 
For his own Committee, he indicated that: 
The Director of Education is a first-class manager though so I leave the process 
to him but comment on related documentation as requested. I therefore play a 
minimal role. 
However, he indicated that officers have to generally play a more prominent 
role in driving the organisation forward than in a more politically-motivated 
council and that in fact "officer input to objectives is substantial. " He feels 
that in some departments, individuals are just going through the motions and 
he does question "whether the energy could be more effectively expended 
elsewhere. " Councillor Hurst does however feel that the system should be 
given a chance but communicates that "having said that, it is too complex 
and I think many of us don't yet understand what its purpose is. " He feels 
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that for the future, the purpose and role of review needs to be clarified and 
the system simplified. He does question whether the Council "can plan as far 
ahead as review demands because of the turbulent environment in which we 
are working, particularly in Education. " In considering strengths which 
performance review offers, this member felt 
It ought to give us a target to work to and it should give us the means to 
demonstrate our achievements. If it improves management practices within the 
authority, or if chief officers perceive themselves to be more effective 
managers as a result of its operation then this has to be good. 
8.4.3.6 Interview with Service Director 
David Fryer was the Director of Education at the time the case study visit was 
conducted. He was very supportive of the introduction of performance 
review and was one of the chief officers who had already begun to make 
progress in the review area in his department before the central initiative. He 
reported: 
I don't think you can effectively manage unless you have some notion of 
standards and targets and then find a mechanism for monitoring whether you 
are achieving them. 
However, whilst fully supportive of the principal of review, he is now less 
keen "because of inadequacies in the system we have implemented. " He 
indicated that he is a bit cynical about the way things are being done in 
Cornwall and reports that "those of us who were supportive have been 
disappointed" and that those who were sceptical "are not surprised and 
there are a few smug smiles. " He feels that much more consultation with chief 
officers should have occurred before the system was designed and that "this 
might have instilled a greater sense of ownership amongst managers who have 
to operate the system. " He feels that the centre did not think through the 
interconnections of the key elements which when taken together constitute 
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performance review. He indicated that the components, the Medium Tenn 
Plan down to Performance Management Statements, are "good in their own 
right, but because they don't add up, performance review is ineffective. " He 
also feels that "it is too complex whilst at the same time being mechanistic. " 
He considers that it is not an integrated part of management and indeed the 
organisation as a whole. To have a future in Cornwall, David Fryer thinks 
that it is essential that the interplay between the strands making up review, is 
made explicit and that the system is simplified. He also feels that a higher level 
of ownership needs to be secured and that members must come to understand 
its purpose. 
However, the Director of Education does feel that review has brought some 
benefits to the authority: 
I would say that it has structured what we were doing anyway. It has 
formalised the informal and given us a framework to hang the review activities 
on. However, it has not pulled together the bits coherently and that would 
have been of most benefit to my department. Overall, it has improved things 
and I think it has legitimised my management practices which some of my 
members thought were over-complex and pernickety. 
He also feels that Cornwall County Council is "a bit of a conglomerate with 
each department acting almost as an independent business" and that the 
authority is held together "because we are providing services to the same 
area. " He thinks that that the review system may help give Cornwall a 
degree of corporate identity. He also considers that: 
It has forced the County Council to identify what it is all about in the form of 
the Medium Term Plan and it has potentially given managers a mechanism for 
improving practice. Potentially it will make us more strategic but the rate at 
which the local government environment is changing, I'm not sure if this is 
possible especially given the way it is operated here. 
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8.4.4 Performance Review in Cornwall County Council: A Critique 
Clearly the review system operated at Cornwall County Council is also 
experiencing difficulties. There is a significant ownership problem. Officers 
exhibited a mixed response from the outset but those who were initially 
supportive, apparently feel that the system has not matched their 
expectations and are thus disappointed particularly those who had already set 
out on their own review approaches and had to alter or abandon this because 
of the central initiative. Senior managers who were not well-disposed to 
review in the early stages, appear not to have given review a chance and the 
lack of impetus from senior members and the Chief Executive allowed their 
lack of enthusiasm to continue unchecked. On the member side, there is 
evidence to suggest that there was opposition to the proposal to introduce 
performance review from some councillors and at best, a lukewarm reaction 
from the others. Commitment and ownership to performance review is minimal 
and there is a paucity of understanding, particularly amongst members, about 
why it was introduced to Cornwall County Council and what the objective of 
the review system is. 
These difficulties have been exacerbated by the lack of policy direction in the 
council with the identification of objectives, aims and priorities for services, 
heavily reliant on input from senior officers. Once these have been 
established, they unfortunately seem to be quite distant from the Performance 
Management Statements and performance indicators, information on which 
should be fed back to Committees. The interrelationship between the 
constituent parts which theoretically make up the review system has not been 
thought through and considerable discretion has been afforded to chief 
officers in reviewing performance and feeding back the information to 
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members. This has resulted in significant disparity in the level of meaningful 
performance review occurring amongst departments but with most only 
inputting minimal effort and consequently achieving only a satisfycing level 
of review activity. 
Perhaps some of these problems could have been overcome by seminars and 
workshops communicating what review is all about at Cornwall County 
Council or the creation of a document describing such details. However, 
even if either of these suggestions were taken up now, redressing the level of 
resentment and despondency which has built up in this authority would be 
quite an up-hill battle - this case study perfectly illustrates the need to take 
people with you from the outset. Consultation in the design of the system 
with both members and officers might also have secured a greater sense of 
ownership and if the system had been tighter with performance statements 
and indicators clearly and directly related to the Medium Tenn Plan, then 
there would have been less scope for reluctant participants to effectively 
ignore reviewing performance. 
Despite these major operational difficulties, most of the interviewees were 
able to identify not insignificant benefits which review had brought to the 
Council particularly the creation of the Medium Term Plan with its previously 
unidentified service objectives, priorities, aims. Whilst it could be argued that 
this achievement alone makes the review system worthwhile, it would have 
been sensible to introduce a medium term plan initially and then introduce the 
additional elements as appropriate. Doing that would have prevented or at 
least minimised, the alienation of a set of officers and members to the practice 
of performance review and the forward plan would still have been achieved. 
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The process certainly seems to have failed in facilitating effective strategic 
management which was one of the reasons for introducing it. The ad hoc 
reviews previously focused on, seem to have played a useful role and perhaps 
it would have been more appropriate and beneficial to have built on that type 
of review perhaps by introducing a rolling programme of scrutinies but then 
hindsight is a wonderful thing. 
Cornwall County Council was used as a case study authority to see how 
performance review would operate in a Council lacking political control. It is 
quite ironic that the authority's apoliticisation has played but a minimal role in 
the dysfunctioning of its review system. 
8.5 Case Study 4: Epsom and Ewell Borough Council 
8.5.1 The Performance Review System 
The performance review system operated at Epsom and Ewell Borough 
Council emerged from a major organisational review and subsequent 
restructuring of the Council undertaken by external consultants (Peat 
Marwick). This was precipitated by the observation in the late 1980s, that 
the Council had been "hanging onto the way it had always done things" 
(Epsom and Ewell Borough Council, 1993, p2). With the bombardment of 
changes confronting local government, this was deemed to no longer be 
appropriate and that if the authority was to be able face the challenges ahead, 
then a fresh approach was required. This case study authority has produced a 
publication, Continuous Improvement - Managing Performance at Epsom 
and Ewell, which traces the development of the council's performance 
system and details all the stages involved in performance review. It is reported 
that: 
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The Council embarked upon a process of cultural change. Performance 
Management was the vehicle to drive through changes; to bring in new values, 
develop more services, reduce costs, become responsive and improve the 
quality of services. The Council recognised that cultural change would not 
happen in just one or two years, it would require new attitudes and fresh 
commitment to a new direction. 
The process of change is recorded as follows: 
We took the first tentative steps back in the late 1980s. Our point of entry into 
the system was to introduce the concept of cost centres and identify objectives 
and targets for each. 
We followed that with the introduction of service committee plans to try and 
pull the cost centre objectives into an integrated framework. 
Next came a thorough review of the Committee and officer structure, and the 
detailed introduction of a performance review system based on performance 
indicators. At this stage, we also introduced Performance Related Pay, which 
we regarded as essential as a means to reinforce our commitment to improving 
performance. 
(1993, p2) 
The Council proposes that it adopted performance management based on 
target-setting and performance review, as a means "to translate its broad 
vision into goals and these into particular actions. " The overall system is 
based on four key principles: 
Planning for Performance 
Performance Review 
Training and Development 
Continuous Improvement 
Planning for Performance begins with the Council's Vision which is 
considered to be the basis for all work: 
Epsom and Ewell Borough Council believes that the local authority is best 
served by local people making decisions locally. It will continuously improve 
the service it provides by responding to those it represents in order to enhance 
the quality of life in the borough and to secure a thriving community. 
Epsom and Ewell also has a set of corporate policies (now referred to as 
values) "which state areas of key importance in the Council's work" and 
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when combined with the authority's vision, "provide a framework for 
planning" with each subsequent layer of planning feeding into the next: 
Service Committee policy statements cascade into Cost Centre objectives, 
which in turn cascade into targets and performance standards for individual staff 
members. Each lower level supports the level above, showing how the 
objectives will actually be achieved. 
This is diagrammatically represented in figure 8.2 which shows how Planning 
for Performance works in a relatively simple way. However, in some 
instances, particularly central services, business units rather than cost centres 
manage services with objectives, indicators and targets being included in the 
business plan and reported to, and monitored by, the relevant sub-committee. 
This gives the more complex Planning for Performance structure shown in 
Figure 8.3 overleaf. 
The relevant information on cost centres is all pulled together into The Policy 
Book which is updated annually. For each cost centre, on the left hand side 
of the page is financial information (in the 1992/93 Policy Book, 1990/91 
actual expenditure, 1991/92 original and revised estimates of expenditure and 
probable out-turn, and the 1992/93 expenditure estimate) and on the right 
hand side of the page, identification of the cost centre manager and reporting 
committee, and delineation of the centre's function, objectives, performance 
indicators and targets. The document is colour-coded according to Committee 
and is contained in an easy-to-use A4 ring-binder. 
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FIGURE 8.2: PLANNING FOR PERFORMANCE 
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The link between planning and action "is made at the level of individual staff 
members. " Managers take cost centre or business plan objectives and targets 
into account when setting performance standards and targets for staff. This is 
the basis of the second part of the performance management system which at 
Epsom And Ewell is actually called Performance Review but which is 
essentially a system of performance appraisal and performance-related pay. 
Figure 8.4 depicts this process but in essence, managers and staff review 
progress over the past year and set performance standards and targets for the 
coming year. The award of performance-related pay is tied to the achievement 
of specific work standards and targets. 
FIGURE 8.4: THE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS 
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A personal development (the 3rd principal of performance management) 
meeting also takes place where staff training and development requirements 
are discussed with managers and a personal development plan agreed. The 
final strand in performance management is the recognition that continuous 
improvement is being striven for in the authority. Unlike the other 
components, this does not follow a clear formula or process but rather is a 
commitment from the Council to seek to: 
* improve accountability to customers through better communication; 
* listen to customers needs, through market research, community consultation, 
complaints monitoring and other means; 
* improve responsiveness by ensuring that customer needs feed into the 
Council's goals and objectives; and 
* develop the involvement of service users in the review and development of 
services through their involvement in working groups and review panels. 
Thus, the review system at Epsom and Ewell Borough Council begins with 
the Council's vision and values which then cascade down to objectives, 
performance indicators and targets for cost centres and business units. On the 
basis of aggregate objectives, managers then determine individual standards 
and targets for staff and these are reviewed and performance-related pay 
awarded or otherwise according to performance. Training and development 
are given to staff where it is identified as being required. It is also recognised 
that `continuous improvement' is needed rather than complacently relying on 
the review framework which has been put in place. 
Epsom and Ewell refer to their review process as a performance management 
system rather than as a performance review process and given the extensive 
interrelationship between the strands cascading down from the Council's 
value statement to individual performance-related pay, this seems appropriate. 
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This authority actually terms the staff appraisal component of its performance 
management system as `performance review. ' Since this is likely to lead to 
some confusion with the terminology used elsewhere in this thesis, 
performance appraisal for staff will not be referred to as `review' here but 
rather as appraisal and the overall system will be referred to as either the 
performance management system or the review process, mechanism or system. 
8.5.2 The Documentation Supplied by Epsom and Ewell Borough 
Council 
A comprehensive set of documentation relating to the review system was 
supplied by Epsom and Ewell Borough Council as indicated in Box 8.6. 
BOX 8.6: DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED BY EPSOM AND EWELL BC 
Continuous Improvement - Managing Performance at Epsom and Ewell, a summary 
document describing why performance review was introduced and describing the way 
the system operates. 
The Policy Book 1992193, the complete set of information relating to all cost centres in 
the authority describing their objectives, performance indicators and targets. 
A draft version of revised Values for the council established after seminars where 
members with some chief officers support were given the time and opportunity to think 
about what they wanted their fundamental values to be. 
Epsom and Ewell Borough Council 1992193 Annual Management Reports, this is a 
document which summarises performance information produced by officers and 
reported to committee. It produces data over two years but is intended to be updated 
annually with further trend information. It was circulated widely amongst the Council 
area to promote improved accountability. 
An internal paper produced in 1990 summarising the authority's current position in 
terms of performance management and assessing what the next steps need to be. 
A consultants (P-E International) summary of performance management, appraisal and 
performance related pay and the inter-relationship between these components. 
Epsom and Ewell's Response to the Government's Consultation Paper, The Structure 
of Local Government in England. 
Epsom and Ewell Borough Council's Annual Report 1990/91 and 1992/93 
Epsom and Ewell Borough Council's Service Directory 
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Since no individual appraisal or training and development reports were 
supplied for confidentiality reasons, the principle pieces of relevant 
documentation are the first two described above. The first which summarises 
the authority's approach to performance review was forwarded to me a year 
after the case study visit had taken place and had been compiled by the 
Council because they were getting so many enquiries about their process. 
However. it was also felt that this publication acted as a useful aide memoir 
for officers and members - for information. It is contained in appendix 8.18. 
Whilst the process described in Continuous Improvement - Managing 
Performance at Epsom and Ewell is very similar to that utilised when the case 
study was undertaken, there seems to be greater clarity as though the Council 
had now comprehended how all the bits of the puzzle fitted together. The 
final strand in the Epsom and Ewell system, that of continuous improvement, 
is new reflecting concern expressed by several participants in the interview 
about the system going stale or stagnating by its relatively mechanistic nature. 
The other change is that `corporate policies' are now termed as `values' and 
there has been some refinement in their content. 
The Policy Book 1992/93 is comprehensive and informative and provides a 
reference point for all council activities operated around cost centres. The 
Service Policy Statement for the Housing and Personal Social Services 
Committee is contained in appendix 8.19 (it was the Director of Community 
Services, who has responsibility for housing and personal social services 
amongst other things, who was interviewed) and illustrative cost centre 
information for the Housing Advisory Service and for Homeless Families is 
contained in appendix 8.20. 
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The rest of the material provided generally refers to components of the overall 
structure and provide little additional insight into the operation of 
performance review at Epsom and Ewell. 
8.5.3 Interviews Conducted at Epsom and Ewell Borough Council 
The following key personnel were interviewed at Epsom and Ewell Borough 
Council: 
Graham Petty and Keith Homer, respectively the Assistant Chief Executive 
(Policy) and Head of Management Services 
Richard Harris, Director of Community Services 
Councillor Ron Gee (Residents Association), Chair of Policy and Resources 
Committee 
David Smith, Chief Executive 
30 of the 39 council seats were held by Resident's Association members 
when the case study was conducted, with the opposition comprising 6 
Liberal and 3 Labour members. No members of the opposition were willing to 
be interviewed but the Leader of the Liberal Group agreed to complete the 
relevant questionnaire. However, on the whole he only supplied one-word or 
very minimal answers and so it is only included in appendix 8.21 with the 
other questionnaires for information. 
8.5.3.1 Interview with Officers with Review Responsibilities 
Graham Petty and Keith Homer were both in post in late 1989 when the 
process of establishing the review system was begun. It took 6 months to get 
the basic system up and running. They report that: 
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When we decided to embark on the consultants review, we set up a working 
party of members and chief officers and this group determined the specifications 
of the consultants exercise. We worked through the exercise with the 
consultants. What came out of the review, was a report written by consultants 
but which had been developed by the joint working party and thus reflected 
their needs and aspirations. A few officers were a little lukewarm but because 
of the drive behind the review, they were overshadowed and I think we now 
have nearly full ownership of the system on the officer-side. 
Although commitment from officers and members would appear to be non- 
problematic in Epsom and Ewell, it was conceded that whilst members 
recognised the value in going down this route, they would probably have 
been "quite happy to continue along the same path indefinitely simply 
because they don't like upheaval or change. " This high level of ownership is 
undoubtedly linked to the development process which emphasised 
involvement from senior managers and councillors. However, it is likely that 
the centre allowing time and space for the system to evolve is also a 
contributory factor. Additionally, the fact that performance appraisal and 
performance-related pay extends to all staff in the Council (excluding 
operative grade staff) is perceived as having "helped the effectiveness of the 
system: " 
Everyone has identified for them, their key result areas, the standard for their 
key result areas and their targets. In this way performance management should 
permeate the whole organisation. 
The system is considered to be "an integral part of the management of the 
revamped authority" so much so that below senior management level, officers 
might not be aware that a review system is actually in operation. It is 
sufficiently embedded into the organisational culture of Epsom and Ewell that 
it is not expected that its viability is questionable although the review officers 
did admit that "if central co-ordination didn't occur, then the process might 
drift a bit. " It was recognised that the review process needed to be dynamic 
and it was considered that this authority's system would "evolve and 
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improve as the organisation develops and in particular, becomes more 
strategic. " 
The authority's lack of strategic direction was highlighted as a problematic 
area but it was recognised that this was not a fault in the review system but 
rather reflected the apolitical orientation of councillors: 
The political make-up at Epsom is unique being predominately Residents 
Association, and as a result our members have not clear policies but tend to 
concentrate on nitty-gritty things like holes in the road. They seem quite content 
to leave policy-making to the officers which is good in some ways but I feel the 
lack of member commitment detracts from our effectiveness. 
It was considered that these problems are compounded by the fact that 
service activity is organised around small cost centres making strategic 
formulation difficult. It was anticipated that as the council moves towards 
larger business units, this should become easier. " It was considered that: 
The majority of our review system is operational reflecting the lack of political 
drive in Epsom and Ewell because of our Residents Association councillors. 
We are gradually moving towards a stage where we are more strategic in 
approach but are a long way from having set strategic targets as such. Review 
in this authority is about the level of service provision to our customers/clients 
so we naturally concentrate on detail. 
The political make-up and absence of policy-orientation in the authority is 
also reported as having made the identification of effectiveness indicators 
infeasible at this stage. 
Whilst theoretically, individual targets and objectives should cascade down 
"from the Vision Statement and Corporate Policy Statements through the 
Service Policy Statements and the Cost-Centre Objectives" it is suggested by 
the review officers that although a linkage undoubtedly exists, it may not 
work quite so systematically. It was also felt that there could be more 
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consistency in the setting of objectives, indicators and targets for cost 
centres. 
The performance review system is considered by Graham Petty and Keith 
Homer to be "slowly changing for the better what is happening" and thus to 
be successful. Performance management is seen as the way the organisation 
manages itself "rather than a process which overlays the way we work. " It is 
"a management tool that gives you a discipline. " It is also seen as having had 
a positive effect on the officer/member relationship: 
I think it has helped officers deal more effectively with members. They can set 
objectives and demonstrate progress towards the objectives. There is a much 
more comfortable, respectful officer/member relationship which is partly 
attributable to the operation of performance review. Members now know what 
officers are doinglachieving. Previously they only knew what they weren't 
achieving. 
Additionally, the review system is considered to have provided the council 
with a base from which strategy can be developed and initiatives such as CCT 
and the Citizen's Charter, responded to. It also provides a "means of 
rationalisation should that be necessary. " Should redundancies be required, 
then the officers indicated that "you can look at how people perform and 
weed out poor performers. " 
In considering the weaknesses of the review system operated at Epsom and 
Ewell Borough Council, the review officers felt that caution was needed so 
that review did not take over since it is "only a means. " Consistency in 
approach was also felt problematic with the balance not yet struck right 
between facilitating and directing the process from the centre. It was 
considered that as the system develops and "feeds into the budgetary process 
and resources are reallocated" then more squabbling will occur but that 
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"perhaps it will generate a more useful activity. " The fact that potentially the 
system gives members "a stick to beat officers with" and that there is "a risk 
that managers will work predominately towards targets rather than delivering 
the service per se" were recognised but thought unlikely to develop into 
problems in this authority because of the predisposition of members and the 
operation of performance appraisal. 
In the future, it was felt that the organisations activities needed to be based 
more around business units rather than cost centres and that the corporate 
statement and policy planning document could be improved so that "we have 
more of a framework to hang review onto. " The officers: 
Would like us (the authority) to be able to stand back a bit and catch our breath 
and see how we could have done better but there never seems to be any time - 
we have to work extremely hard at the moment just to stand still. 
It was hoped that members would take a more active role both in developing 
and operating the system since "currently they are too preoccupied with 
nitty-gritty. " 
8.5.3.2 Interview with Service Director 
Richard Harns is the Director of Community Services at Epsom And Ewell 
Borough Council. This department is responsible for the delivery of housing, 
environmental health, recreation and personal services. He was Director 
when the reorganisation took place and the review system emerged. He 
considers that it is "axiomatic that you have to review and evaluate what you 
are doing" and that review is part of a comprehensive management process. 
He indicated that his fellow chief officers are supportive and keen to see the 
current momentum continue and that consultation with senior officers was 
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adequate. However, he thinks that it is the tier below directors "which is 
experiencing the most cynicism because it is these managers who have to do 
most of the detailed work" but he considers that "in time they will reap the 
benefits. " 
He indicated that for Community Services: 
I draft a report for each of the cost centres in my department outlining the 
objectives of that centre, relevant performance indicators and identify targets. 
The Committee then has a chance to consider these before they are finalised. 
He also reported that his department had also held a series of seminars where a 
set of policy issues were taken and considered "in a more open-ended way 
than is possible in Committee. " Substantial officer input was reported in 
setting both targets and indicators but in the latter case, Richard Harris 
intimated that "I don't see officer dominance in this domain as a problem 
since it is a manager's jobs to monitor and demonstrate progress towards 
goals. " He considers that: 
What we are not doing particularly well is having a systematic process of 
review whereby we are actually measuring the impact of some of our policies. 
We tend to focus on operational matters in our review process. Part of this is 
the difficulties of quantification in a lot of what we do but I'm not sure that this 
is being addressed by the authority and part of the problem is that you don't 
have a strategy driven by political ideology. 
He also feels that when the review system first came into operation, objectives 
and targets established at committee level were "not actually being followed 
through all that precisely into individual targets. " He feels that there is now 
much more of an attempt "to marry the two together now" and that the 
cascade effect will be much greater. He feels that it has provided a structure 
to most people's jobs and made them understand their role within the 
organisation - how they fit into the jigsaw. 
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He intimated that it is difficult to isolate the impact of the review system when 
the organisation including the Community Services Department, has 
undergone such radical change with an entire new management system and 
ethos emerging. However, he feels that the review mechanism has given his 
senior managers a framework within which to operate - "it may not have 
drastically altered what is done but it has legitimised it. " In considering the 
main strengths of the system, The Director of Community Services reported: 
I think it is the discipline of providing the structure for ensuring that managers 
go back and evaluate what they have done and can justify their actions. It 
provides a mechanism for improving accountability - anybody can now check 
up to see if I am doing and have done what I set out to do. It is fairly simple 
which means that its operation does not impinge on other activities but even if it 
did, it is an essential part of management and would be worth doing. It has 
helped all members of the organisation focus more. 
He considers the inability to formulate and activate strategies to be the main 
weakness and one which is "hindering the impact of performance review 
which consequently concentrates on day-to-day matters. " He thus felt that in 
the future, it was important that members "be more visionary and decide 
where the authority should be going. " He would also like to see the review 
mechanism more closely linked to customers reactions and needs particularly 
since he considers that "the future of local government will lie in enabling. " 
8.5.3.3 Interview with the Chair of Policy and Resources 
30 of the 39 council seats are occupied by Independent Residents 
Association members at Epsom and Ewell Borough Council. Within this 
group, "a loose group system" is reported as in operation where members 
meet to discuss policies. It was indicated that "we don't have the discipline 
of the big political parties and within the group nobody is in charge or can 
direct policies from on high. " In the absence of a leader of Council, the Chair 
of the Policy and Resources Committee was the leading member interviewed 
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for the ruling administration. Councillor Gee indicated that Residents 
Association councillors have dominated the Borough for a long time and that: 
The reorganisation exercise and the performance management initiative have 
both been driven by officers but we are supportive of both the principle and 
practice of performance review. I think this support is strengthening as the 
benefits of review become increasingly apparent even though it has forced us to 
address issues we may rather not have, for example, objective-setting. 
Although members were part of the joint working party which developed the 
system, Councillor Gee feels that it has predominately "been devised by the 
consultants and officers" but considers that this "is appropriate given that it 
is a management tool. " He also intimated that he tried to avoid interfering 
since "officers are paid to manage. " His personal role in performance review 
is confined to chairing Policy and Resources which approves the Policy Book 
"which forms the basis of the review system" and also allocates the budget 
which he considers will "heavily impinge on the objectives and targets 
identified for each cost centre. " He reports that: 
Each chairman has a fairly generous freedom of action of setting policies within 
his committee but these obviously reflect the opinions of other members and 
most chairmen know the parameters in which they can operate. If they are 
uncertain, they will bring the issue to Chairman's Group. The review 
mechanism has helped us as members to think more about objectives of our 
services but we still rely heavily on officer advice in this respect. 
He indicated that the lack of political affiliation makes the development of a 
more formal policy planning process, which he thinks chief officers are keen 
to see, problematic. He does feel that the policy aspect of performance review 
could be strengthened. 
In his view, at committee level, the review mechanism has helped members 
and senior managers identify "objectives and to specify actions needed to 
achieve the objectives and the means of monitoring progress. " He also feels 
that officers now know their roles within the organisation and that "this has 
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helped give the authority a consensus direction. " He considers that "it has 
encouraged dialogue between chairman and chief officers or at least provided 
a structure for discussion. " However, he also considered that the review 
system at Epsom and Ewell, has a number of weaknesses: 
Individual committees perhaps don't sufficiently oversee target progress and a 
more consistent approach is needed - some chairmen are more severe with their 
senior managers than others and I think some officers set targets that they know 
they can achieve - they need to be challenging if they are going to improve 
activities. I think we may take the system for granted and assume that if we go 
through the process everything will fall into place. This is not the case - the 
system needs to be continually worked at and developed. 
In the future, he would like to see the budget linked to review and indeed 
may establish a Budget Review Group. However, he "would strongly advise 
against moving too quickly too fast" and thus he wanted to "let officers get 
confident with the review system" before changing it. He does however, 
recognise that the process cannot be static or it will become stale. Like 
Richard Harris, Councillor Gee felt that the review process should incorporate 
more "customer feedback. " 
8.5.3.4 Interview with the Chief Executive 
David Smith is the Chief Executive at Epsom and Ewell Borough Council and 
initiated the major review of the authority and "was favourably disposed 
towards a performance management system emerging from the exercise. " He 
sees performance review as an essential ingredient in effective management 
but does not think that you can consider it in isolation: 
Performance review is successful here because we also have performance 
appraisal and performance-related pay. On their own, none of these tools 
would have taken us as far as we have come. 
Prior to the review and performance management system, the Chief Executive 
felt that the authority was "just drifting along, continuing to deliver the 
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services we had always delivered without question. " He felt that the 
authority had just got complacent. 
He feels that because the review process emerged from a radical restructuring 
rather than being overlaid onto existing management practices, resistance was 
minimised. However, he also thinks that the joint officer/member working 
party which significantly contributed to the development of the system, 
contributed to the high level of ownership, Whilst securing commitment has 
not been a teething difficulty encountered in Epsom and Ewell, the Chief 
Executive feels that their were some initial difficulties in setting objectives, 
targets and indicators for cost centres with these tasks often left to officers 
because of the non-political and non-policy orientation of Residents 
Association councillors. He feels that operating the system "is forcing senior 
managers to think why they provide the services they do at the levels they 
do. " He also feels that the process has provided the authority with a 
corporate management perspective "which was previously elusive" and that 
all managers are now "pulling in the same direction. " 
The Chief Executive feels that the review system "permeates all areas and all 
levels" of the organisation not least because of the simultaneous operation of 
performance appraisal and performance related pay systems: 
It is now possible for relatively junior staff to see clearly how their targets fit in 
with what the section is trying to achieve and what the committee is trying to 
achieve. People know how they fit into the big corporate picture but this area 
still needs worked on. 
He indicated that the review system, which he considers to be a powerful 
tool, is now part of the Boroughs culture and that the system "has rooted 
down and is fully incorporated into our activities. " He feels that because of 
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this and the fact that performance review is not peripheral to council activities, 
the process would survive change, but he also recognises that "we will 
always need somebody like Keith to assist the process and to ensure smooth- 
running. " 
David Smith reported: 
The review process was given initial impetus from the other changes which 
were taking place but in a while that momentum will be lost and the system 
must be driven on its own merits - it will also be evident in a while that the 
operation of performance management is going to have budgetary implications 
and I think that this will illicit some resistance. 
He feels that it is difficult to isolate the impact of performance review from the 
performance management philosophy which came into place at the same time. 
However, the system is considered to have helped "focus more on our service 
and has given us the basic foundations for effective management" and thus 
has been beneficial. He also records the following additional strengths: 
It has enabled the organisation to cope with some external pressures that we 
otherwise would not have coped with. We have focused on the things that 
matter. It has enabled us to manage the process of increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness with few broken bones. I think it does actually change the 
organisation because it changes people's perception of their units/organisation. 
On the downside, he feels that the authority will have to be careful that 
performance review "does not become an end rather than a means. " He is 
also concerned with the dynamism of the mechanism observing that the 
council had not really thought about what came next or even how to sustain 
the current system. He indicated that: 
The system we currently operate, highlights our lack of overall strategy for the 
authority and the deficiencies in our budgetary process - but these are not 
weaknesses of the system but rather this organisation and the performance 
review process is helping to address these inadequacies. 
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Consequently, he identifies finding strategic direction and improving the link 
between the budgetary process and performance review as imperative future 
developments. He would also like to see the system simplified arguing that 
"at present, we are substantially verbose in the documents which form the 
foundations of our system. " 
8.5.4 Performance Review in Epsom and Ewell Council: A Critique 
The review system at Epsom and Ewell Borough Council appears not to have 
encountered many of the difficulties experienced in the other case study 
authorities considered. A relatively high level of ownership, particularly from 
officers, is apparent and members seem to have an understanding of what 
review is about and be relatively committed to the process albeit whilst still 
leaving much of the work to officers particularly objective and target setting 
and performance indicator definition. This comparatively high level of 
ownership can be attributed to the fact that officers and members significantly 
input into the design of the system through collaborative work of the joint 
working party and the consultants. However, members' views were also 
extensively sought by the consultants reviewing the Hertfordshire situation 
yet the system which emerged there did not match their needs. Perhaps the 
critical difference at Epsom and Ewell is that the input to the review process 
demanded of members is much less and the system allows officers to 
undertake tasks for member approval but should a member seek a higher level 
of involvement then this can be accommodated in the system. The process at 
Hertfordshire has no such safety-net and to function at all demands a high 
level of input from councillors. Additionally, since it is a function of all 
committees to address performance matters systematically at Epsom and Ewell, 
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there was not the problem of the calibre of members involved in review issues 
experienced at Hertfordshire. 
On the officer-side, the cascading down from cost-centres to individual 
performance through appraisal and performance-related pay, ensures that 
officers cannot ignore performance, and it has facilitated a performance- 
orientated perspective permeating throughout the organisation. The fact that 
the chief executive is openly supportive of performance review may also have 
inculcated general support. At Epsom and Ewell, performance review is 
clearly not a peripheral activity, an impression formed at other case study 
authorities. The fact that it was introduced as part of a package of 
organisational change may have favourably influenced its acceptability to 
officers and members. 
The review system at Epsom and Ewell has undoubtedly been successful and 
is changing what the council does. It seems to have been well thought out 
particularly to meet organisational needs and leading members and officers 
clearly have an understanding of the system, a factor lacking in the other 
organisations. However, it is undoubtedly mechanistic and focused on 
operational detail. In the latter case this reflects the fact that the members are 
independents without a strong political orientation. Of significance, the 
review system was tailored around this rather than assuming that the 
introduction of a review system would in itself make members more strategic. 
The mechanistic nature of the process may increase the likelihood of the 
system becoming stale but the operation of performance appraisal and 
performance-related pay suggest that this is unlikely to become a problem. 
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8.6 Case-Study 5: London Borough of Lewisham 
8.6.1 The Performance Review System 
The London Borough of Lewisham reviews performance in two ways. The 
first is through undertaking reviews of specific aspects of service delivery. In- 
depth reviews have a long history in the authority but were used extensively 
during the 1980s normally to identify non-essential activities ripe for budget 
cuts. Lewisham was capped in seven consecutive years and faced extreme 
financial crisis over an extended period. The Council decided to curtail less- 
critical activities rather than impose steep cuts across the board. Scrutinies 
were operated by the Finance Departments to identify those areas which 
could be curtailed. However, as the financial pressure has eased, or as one of 
the review officers indicated "everyone else has caught up, " the in-depth 
reviews have been used to promote good practice and to help address weak 
areas many of which have been caused by legislative changes. These reviews 
are still carried out under the auspices of the Finance Department but under a 
new director and great effort has been made to loose what was described by 
the officer responsible for this area of work, "the hatchet man image. " Areas 
for review are proposed by chief officers and members normally for the service 
areas for which they have responsibility. However, if there is evidence of 
something being amiss, for example if a service area were consistently 
overspending its budget, then an uninvited review may be initiated. 
The second component Lewisham's approach to performance review is 
through service programmes which were introduced in 1988. It was proposed 
that: 
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The Lewisham Service Programme grew out of Members and officers 
dissatisfaction with the Council's performance, particularly the gap between 
policies and actual achievements. Frustration with the rigidity of a large 
bureaucracy and its apparent inability to respond quickly and imaginatively, 
fuelled a demand for change. Work done by INLOGOV on developing a 
`public service orientation' seemed to reflect Lewisham's concerns. The Local 
Government Training Board offered a useful distinction between a `closed' and 
an `open' authority. We were identifying ourselves as being closed but wanting 
to change to become `open. ' The difference between the 2 types are shown 
below. 
CLOSED ALIT_H_ORTTY 
Bureaucratic and slow 
Inward looking 
Inaccessible 
Hierarchical 
Unfriendly 
Preoccupied with administration 
and systems 
OPEN AUTHORITY 
Responsivelaction based 
Outward looking 
Accessible 
Flexible 
Delegating authority 
Concerned about people 
We found we were talking about a radical transformation of our organisation. 
This would not be an easy task. Recognising the need for change was an 
important first step. There was a world of difference though between 
identifying the problem and achieving the changes wanted. The Lewisham 
Service Programme was set up as a means of making the necessary changes. 
Our basic starting point was that we had to plan across the whole Council, set 
short term and longer term objectives and monitor our progress. 
(The London Borough of Lewisham, 1988, p2) 
The transformation began with discussion of the overall direction which the 
Council was pursuing and agreement of the following core values: 
Putting services to the public first 
Local government serving local communities 
Equal opportunities for the people of Lewisham 
Taking action to be more efficient and effective 
Valuing Employees 
Aiming for Quality 
In 1990, in response to growing local and national concern, Lewisham added 
, Caring for the Environment' as an additional core vale. A full description of 
what is meant by these core values is contained in appendix 8.22. 
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The next step was for departments to draw up service plans/programmes 
which embraced these core values. In relation to their service plans, chief 
officers have to identify key results areas, relevant targets for these areas and 
appropriate measures of success for ratification by committee and then report 
on these measures at least twice a year. Although the Central Policy Unit, 
which oversees the service programmes, ensures that each department has 
drawn up such a plan and that it has received the approval of the relevant 
committee, there is no mechanism for pulling all the plans together nor for 
their circulation around the authority and there is no central co-ordination of 
the subsequent reporting of performance. This reflects Lewisham's strong 
emphasis on devolved management and indeed departments have the 
discretion to review performance beyond this process. It was indicated 
however, that most had confined themselves to using the service 
programming process but that there was considerable variation in the effort 
and subsequent detail of these across the Council's departments. 
Additionally, whenever an in-depth review is undertaken, indicators of 
performance are defined for reporting to committee but there is no central 
follow-up on this. 
An Employee Development Scheme is also in operation and evolved from the 
core value of `valuing employees. ' Key tasks/objectives are agreed for each 
member of staff in discussion between the member of staff and his/her 
manager. What actions will be needed to achieve these tasks is then 
considered and any associated training needs identified. At subsequent 
meetings, performance in relation to key tasks/objectives is discussed and 
areas where performance has been strong and weak are highlighted and the 
reasons for this considered. The staff member is encouraged to identify major 
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achievements as well as disappointments and asked whether they feel that 
their skills and strengths are being used in their current post and also how 
they see their career progressing. Key tasks/objectives are refined if necessary 
and the staff member is given an opportunity to raise any concerns which 
they have. Two formal meetings have to occur each year but it is considered 
that "there should also be an on-going dialogue between manager and 
postholder. Additional informal review meetings may be held at any time" 
(The London Borough of Lewisham, 1992a, p2). It is implicitly assumed that 
the key tasks/objectives for individual staff members will reflect the 
departments service plan. This scheme is very similar to a system of 
performance appraisal but with the emphasis on developing staff not 
evaluating past performance. 
At the London Borough of Lewisham, performance review thus comprises in- 
depth reviews undertaken by the Finance Department and reviews of 
performance in relation to pre-determined measures of success which relate to 
the service programme's key results areas and reported to service committees 
twice a year. 
8.6.2 Documentation Supplied by the London Borough of Lewisham 
The documentation supplied by the London Borough of Lewisham is 
indicated in box 8.7 overleaf. 
Lewisham received so many enquiries about its Service Programme that it 
produced a summary information pack for general distribution most notably 
to other local authorities. This provides a brief summary of the Lewisham 
approach, defines the core values and highlights some of the successes which 
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have been achieved through the operation of the service programme. In 
putting services to the public top of the agenda, the Borough undertook a 
number of studies of areas where the Council comes into close contact with 
the public, for example, council entrance and reception areas and a summary 
of these is contained in the information pack which is reproduced in appendix 
8.23. 
BOX 8.7: DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED BY THE LONDON BOROUGH OF LEWISHAM 
The Lewisham Service Programme: Public Service Orientation - `Ideas into Action' 
Produced in 1988 and describes the Lewisham's service programming approach. 
The Lewisham Service Programme. This pack was produced in 1991 in response to the 
large number of enquiries which the Council was receiving about this area of activity. 
The Employment Development Scheme Guidance Booklet. This booklet outlines the 
purpose of the Employee Development Scheme operated by Lewisham and explains how 
the process operates and contains the pre-meeting questionnaire to be completed by the 
postholder and the manager. 
Lewisham's Leisure Services Development Plan 1990-94 which is the medium term plan 
for Leisure Services whose director was interviewed as part of the case study. 
The Leisure Services Programme 1992/93 prepared for approval by the Leisure Services 
Committee. 
The Lewisham Service Programme: Playing Safe -A Survey of Playgrounds. A report of 
one of a number of studies undertaken as part of the Service Programme. 
Lewisham Housing - Building Works Division: An Introduction to the Customer Care 
Code for Housing Repairs. A report which describes how customer care is being 
implemented in one service area. 
Lewisham's Environmental Services. A newspaper which is circulated to all the residents 
of Lewisham describing the various activities subsumed into Environmental Services and 
describing the standards of service which the Council will endeavour to provide and the 
targets which are being pursued and the complaints procedure to be followed in cases of 
dissatisfaction. 
Lewisham's Equal Opportunities Policy Statement. 
Chief Executive's Department Information Pack containing facts and figures on the 
Council and samples of the newspaper which is produced for all Lewisham's council 
employees. 
Lewisham - Your Council. A guide to services and departments within the Borough 
Council produced by the Public Relations Unit. 
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As previously indicated, there is no document pulling together all the service 
plans for the departments within the London Borough of Lewisham. 
However, because the Director of Leisure Services was interviewed as part of 
this case study, a copy of the Leisure Services Development Plan 1990-94 
and Leisure Service's Programme 1992/93 were supplied. These are both 
substantial documents prohibiting their reproduction within this thesis. In the 
former case, the Plan opens by providing a historical context of Leisure 
Service's in Lewisham. It proceeds by outlining the reasons for planning, the 
aims of the plan and then giving a description of the sections contained within 
the plan which are: 
Changing Needs - Diminishing Resources?: will look at Lewisham Leisure's 
response to the changes of the last decade and will set the scene for the new 
plan; 
Leisure Services for the Future: will identify the plans for Recreation, Arts, 
Entertainments, Libraries, Parks and Open Spaces, Contracting Services, and 
Corporate Services; 
Strategy for Success: will develop policies based on the key aims for the 
Directorates; 
Planning into Practice: will relate the key service objectives to the policies 
developed in chapter 4 and will suggest ways in which these can be put into 
practice over the Plan period. 
(The London Borough of Lewisham, 1990, p4) 
The Service Programme begins by applying the core values to Leisure 
Services as indicated in appendix 8.24. It then highlights the key results areas 
for leisure services and identifies the officer responsible for each area, the 
overall service aim, the background of the service, the targets being pursued, 
the core values which these targets relate to and the measures of success to be 
applied. The extract for Lewisham Theatre is contained in appendix 8.25 for 
illustrative purposes. The Service Programme also contains the results for key 
results areas for 1991/92 and the Lewisham Theatre extract is reproduced in 
appendix 8.26. In preparation for the Citizen's Charter, a first draft of 
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performance indicators for the areas encompassed by Lewisham's Leisure 
Services Department was also included in the Service Programme but it was 
anticipated that these could well change after the Audit Commission publishes 
its draft list The Committee report accompanying the Service Programme 
made the following recommended that the Leisure Services Committee should: 
1. Note the results of the 1991/91 Programme 
2. Agree the draft Leisure Services Programme 1992/92 
or 
Agree the draft Programme pending the incorporation of any changes 
agreed by the Committee 
3. Call for a monitoring report at the six month stage and at the end of the 
1992/93 programme. 
The material relating to Leisure Services is extremely comprehensive but it is 
not known whether other departments will have been as rigorous and it was 
in fact suggested that Leisure Services has made more progress than many 
other Council departments which was why they were selected for inclusion in 
the case study. However, what was not clear was how different were the 
service programmes from directorates which had not advanced as far or as 
fast. The other documentation supplied by Lewisham was provided as 
examples of activity in other areas or as background information and were 
unrelated to Lewisham's approach to performance review. A copy of an in- 
depth review undertaken by the Finance Department was not supplied 
despite being requested. 
8.6.3 Interviews Conducted at the London Borough of Lewisham 
The following interviews were undertaken at the London Borough of 
Lewisham: 
Dr Barry Quirk, Assistant Chief Executive 
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David Webb, Performance Review Team, Finance Department and David Riley, 
Principal Policy Officer, Central Policy Unit 
Ken May, Director of Leisure Services 
Councillor Steve Tennison (Labour), Chair of Policy and Resources 
The questionnaires completed on the basis of these interviews are contained 
in appendix 8.27. Lewisham has a long tradition of Labour domination with 
Labour holding 58 of the 67 Council seats at the time the case study was 
conducted. None of the opposition were willing to be interviewed or even 
complete the interview questionnaire on this occasion. This was not 
considered to be a significant problem given how small a minority they 
comprised particularly since it was reported that they were an ineffective 
opposition. 
8.6.3.1 Interview with the Assistant Chief Executive 
Barry Quirk is the Assistant Chief Executive at the London Borough of 
Lewisham and his areas of responsibility include the Central Policy Unit 
which oversees the process albeit that minimal central co-ordination is actually 
required at Lewisham. The chief executive is not involved in the process and 
therefore Barry Quirk was interviewed instead. He has worked at Lewisham 
for five years having been employed in a total of 6 London Boroughs 
including Bexley where he helped with the establishment of their review 
system. Although he has responsibility for the Central Policy Unit and thus 
the Service Programmes, Barry Quirk indicated that: 
The only central co-ordination of the programme is through a check on each 
department's Service Programme. Beyond this, it is up to committee chairs to 
make sure that they are receiving the relevant information twice a year and that 
the department has implemented the service programme as envisaged. 
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It was reported that David Riley did most of the Central Policy Units service 
programming work and kept the Assistant Chief Executive informed of 
progress but alerted him if there was an indication that anything was not as it 
should be. 
He reported that: 
The problem with most-purpose authorities such as the London Boroughs, is 
that they deliver such a wide spectrum of services and you have to get the 
message across to a wide spectrum of people with vastly different backgrounds 
and experience. Inevitably, there will be some who will be unsupportive and 
not co-operative particularly of anything which they see as central interference. 
We have been increasingly emphasising devolved management and there were 
some chief officers who thought that this initiative w the centre trying to 
regain a foothold. However, as this has been demons ted to not be the case, 
there has been a gradual warming to the notion. How ver, I would say that we 
did not meet with as much resistance as I thought might be the case and I think 
that this reflects the fact that so much discretion was left with departments. 
However, he also acknowledges that this discretion has resulted in 
considerable disparity in the progress made within the Borough's departments 
and that in fact "the management rhetoric is ahead of reality" and that the 
pace of change is lagging behind that which he desired. But the assistant 
chief executive indicated that you cannot devolve management responsibility 
and power and then prescribe how things are done or make chief officers 
progress at a uniform, centrally-specified rate particularly given the challenges 
which some service areas are facing. He felt that despite the drawback in 
terms of disparate progress with service programmes, the authority would not 
change its devolved management approach in the foreseeable future and 
would continue to empower departments. 
Barry Quirk considered that performance review at Lewisham is "really just 
an activity to support policy implementation.... a mechanism for ensuring that 
officers actually follow through on delivery once a policy has been 
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determined. " However, it could be suggested that given the minimal 
involvement which members appear to have in the process which is largely 
confined to committee approval of the relevant reports prepared by chief 
officers, service managers still have the opportunity not to follow through on 
policy implementation. The member profile was reported to be relatively 
young with a number actually working for other London Boroughs and the 
assistant chief executive was surprised that members had not demanded more 
of a role for themselves. Barry Quirk therefore felt that a strengthened role for 
members in the future would be an appropriate development. 
Given the significant break from past practices which was being sought 
through the introduction of service programming, some training was 
provided. All middle managers were put through a training programme on 
core values indicating how these could inform service delivery and 
emphasising that the values were not just something that Lewisham had on 
posters. Some training on service and business planning was also given using 
an external consultant. It was reported that not too much guidance was given 
on defining targets and indicators because if they evolved independently then 
this would maximise ownership. 
In considering Lewisham's approach, Barry Quirk concluded that: 
I think that we wanted a system which was a loose overcoat. Some of the 
systems which I have seen are more of a strait jacket, stifling innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Although they look impressive from a distance, they are 
actually flawed particularly if one considers a longer time horizon. They are 
good at getting things kick-started but often stagnate after a relatively short 
period. Although the process introduced at Lewisham appears to be 
comparatively unstructured and perhaps a bit haphazard, it is well-suited to the 
needs of this organisation. It reflects and accommodates our devolved 
management approach. The chief executive was appointed on an enabling ticket 
and his role is to enable, empower and police boundaries for service departments. The review system here fully acknowledges this. 
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He feels that Lewisham has been given back its sense of purpose which had 
been eroded because of the sustained financial cuts - "we had lost sight of 
what we were trying to achieve as an organisation. " He considers that 
service programmes have forced all departments to think about what they are 
trying to achieve in their service areas. However, the assistant chief 
executive acknowledged that the system lacked rigour but didn't know how 
this could be rectified without "inducing a lot of alienation and resentment 
and probably some loss of ownership. " He also felt that the information 
generated by the service programmes "only scratches the surface" and he 
would like to see more depth to the analysis of services particularly relating to 
the process of service delivery which he considers can be just as important as 
the end product. 
Not being his area of responsibility, Barry Quirk did not discuss the in-depth 
reviews but indicated that the staff from the Finance Department involved in 
that area of work "are perceived by most quarters of this organisation to be 
unbiased and independent. I think they have been very fair in the work 
which they have done. " 
8.6.3.2 Interview with Officers with Performance Review Responsibilities 
Since the review system at Lewisham comprises two aspects, interviews with 
officers representing each strand were sought and David Webb was 
interviewed as the officer from the Finance Department with the main 
responsibility for the in-depth reviews and David Riley participated as the 
Principal Policy Officer at the Central Policy Unit who oversees the Service 
Programmes. 
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The officers reported that: 
Performance review has emerged from the continued fiscal crisis which faced 
this authority throughout the 1980s - we were capped seven years in a row and 
were down to the bare bones, no reserves or balances remained. The in-depth 
reviews were helping us to identify what could be done better in specific areas 
and was assisting the rationalisation of cuts. However, we were beginning to 
lose sight of our overall purpose and the Service Programmes which forced 
departments to consider what their purpose was, was seen as a way of 
addressing this. It also reflects the increased profile of performance in local 
government. The Audit Commission had been promoting performance review 
for some time and although our system is very different from the Commission's 
model, it put the issue onto our agenda for consideration. This authority has 
progressed enormously in terms of devolved management and we wanted a 
system which accommodated rather than reversed that. 
It was considered that the initiative was originally suggested by members, in 
particular the Deputy Leader of Policy but its introduction was subsequently 
driven by officers particularly central officers with the Director of Finance 
proving to be a significant motivating force. 
It was indicated that the system "really became an officer instrument" but 
that this was not pre-planned but rather the way the system evolved. 
However, this is not indicative of a lack of commitment on the part of 
members. It was reported that: 
Members were enthusiastic and at one stage set up a Members Performance 
Review Working Group to undertake reviews of particular service areas. The 
initial area focused on was Lewisham's interaction with the public and the 
Group went to swimming pools and libraries etc. The exercise was very 
productive but because it demanded so much member input and officer support, 
it was not repeated on anything like that scale. Now, member involvement 
varies depending on the service area they are involved in and how developed 
performance review is in that service area. 
No specific measures were taken to draw support from either members or 
officers. On the officer front, it was reported that: 
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The original scrutiny system caused a great deal of resentment with officers 
because it was really intended as a cost-cutting exercise and it was the then 
Director of Finance sending his boys in to see where cuts could be made. We 
did what we could to get departments to work with us and make the cuts as 
painless as possible and least likely to affect critical service delivery. This went 
some way towards dispelling our hatchet-man image but at the end of the day 
cuts did have to be made and it was easier to blame us. By the time we came to 
overlay the Service Programming system, a much better relationship had 
emerged and there was a new Director of Finance. 
In considering the inter-relationship between the two review strands, the 
review officers indicated that the two elements inform each other and if 
something looks wrong on the Service Programme then it would probably be 
recommended for in-depth review but whether that actually took place would 
be dependent on resources being available to conduct a scrutiny. Conversely, 
when a review is undertaken, indicators of performance are defined for 
subsequent monitoring and reporting. 
In discussing the indicators and measures used in Lewisham, it was intimated 
that Lewisham is devoid of strategy indicators: 
Most of the measures are operational and include economy and efficiency 
indicators but effectiveness remains an area largely uncharted. This is generally 
the harder area to generate measures for but additionally here, it has been 
impossible to take a strategic perspective during the past few years, because of 
the financial strait jacket we have been sporting. I think it will be some time 
before effectiveness indicators are part of the system here. 
It was reported that the Citizen's Charter was providing departments with an 
impetus to define measures because they had been told that if they did not, 
then the Audit Commission's indicators would be applied. The officers 
reported that there had also been a reluctance to specify key service areas lest 
money should be cut from other areas. 
Like Barry Quirk, the review officers felt that more consistency in approach 
across the departments would be advataguous but felt that "this would be 
Chapter 8, The Case Study Evidence, page 384 
done at the expense of the centre having to interfere" and that it would be 
detrimental in the longer term and could possibly jeopardise all the progress 
made to date. They also noted the absence of any mechanism for pulling all 
the policy information together and felt that there was a case to be made for 
introducing council objectives in addition to the core values: 
We are traditionally compartmental here and this has been reinforced by the 
prolonged fight for resources between departments so I think we would 
particularly benefit from a collective statement of Lewisham's objectives but as 
yet we don't have one. 
In fact one of the weaknesses which the officers reported in Lewisham's 
review process is that "it has reinforced compartmentalism, the remoteness of 
the authority's departments from one another. " It was also felt that its 
devolved nature had allowed those chief officers who didn't really want to 
bother with review to do the minimum However, it was also indicated that 
performance review had increased the effectiveness of devolved management 
by "giving progressive managers a tool to demonstrate all that they are 
achieving with their resources and to highlight what could be achieved with 
additional amounts. 
In identifying the main strengths of Lewisham's process, the officers with 
review responsibilities reported: 
It has helped Lewisham face successive Government challenges particularly on 
the financial front. It has helped us rationalise cuts and has assisted in our 
devolved management system. It has instilled a sense of what is a good 
manager. Because of our very small central core, Lewisham is dominated by 
professionalism but I think the review system has identified some issues which 
were previously considered to not be of relevance in service departments. The 
change in culture which has slowly taken place owes a lot to the operation of 
service programming. Defining a set of core values and getting officers to link 
their targets and indicators to them is progress in itself. 
Whilst it was felt that it had done a lot for the authority, the officers felt that 
since a clear objective for performance review had not been set, it could not 
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be concluded whether performance review had been successful or not and 
there were some things which they had hoped would be achieved through its 
introduction which had not, for example, an improved corporate identity. 
Indeed, the officers felt that Lewisham had to address its lack of 
corporateness in the future. However, overall, it was reported that if the 
authority was compared now with when it had started out on the process in 
1988, "the difference is astounding. " 
8.6.3.3 Interview with Service Director 
Ken May is Director of Leisure Services at the London Borough of Lewisham 
and had been with the Council for eleven years at the time the case study was 
undertaken. In terms of his disposition towards the introduction of 
performance review, he indicated: 
I was completely behind the introduction of service programming and 
performance review to Lewisham. Being a relatively small, non-essential 
department, I have had to bear more than my fair share of the budget cuts that 
have faced the Council during the past years. This has forced me to take a 
fundamental look at the services provided by this department and to prioritise 
accordingly and to ensure that we squeeze as much out of each £1 as possible. 
We have become highly innovative in the fight for survival and were in essence 
operating a form of performance review prior to the formal introduction of the 
system at Lewisham. I suppose other departments are just gradually catching 
up with us and only now face the challenges that we have had to confront for a 
considerable time. 
However, he concedes that he is far more positive than some chief officers. 
He feels that the real divide in terms of favourable attitudes towards service 
programming comes between departments such as education and social 
services which he reports as "dominated by professionalism, and a long 
tradition of professionalism at that" and departments like his which he 
perceives as being "more innovative and which bring people together with a 
range of different backgrounds and who have a bias for action. " He confirms 
that the system at Lewisham leaves a lot of discretion with departments and 
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indicated that as long as they demonstrate that performance review is 
occurring "then they are more or less left alone apart from the in-depth 
reviews which occur across all service areas. " He contends that: 
Although such an approach improves ownership throughout the organisation, at 
Lewisham some departments, such as my own, take review very seriously 
whilst others are doing very little, if even going through the motions. An 
organisation the size of this would struggle to make progress in the same 
direction at the same rate across all its constituent parts but I think there should 
have been more of an effort to streamline what has taken place. 
The Director of Leisure Services feels that in introducing Service Programmes, 
Lewisham was recognising that it could not just continue tobe reactive. He 
indicated that the authority was "down to the bare bones and could not just 
keep cutting the marginal, non-essential bits. We had to decide what we 
wanted to do and then to do it. " He considered that the review framework 
provided the necessary tools but like the review officers, felt that the council 
needed to address its corporate strategy in the near future. 
In considering contact he had had with the review officers, Ken May 
reported that: 
The dealings which I have had with both David Riley and David Webb have 
been very positive particularly for commissioned reviews of service areas. 
They have the right balance of impartiality coupled with the ability to listen 
carefully and be incisive across a wide spectrum of areas. I think that it would 
be better if David Webb were not in the Finance Department since this still 
implies that Lewisham's approach is about savings -I hope we have moved 
away from that. 
In response to the question `How has the review system affected your 
department? ' the interviewee concluded that Leisure Services was "thriving 
rather than surviving" and that the service programme had provided the 
framework to determine policies and then to focus on their implementation. 
Overall, he feels that Lewisham now delivers better services, more relevant 
services to more people whilst spending less and that the Council has stopped 
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just reacting to everything that confronts them. He indicated that there was a 
time when Lewisham couldn't really plan because every development was 
thwarted by budgetary reductions but he feels that the authority is gradually 
becoming more strategic and that the service programmes are helping "to 
stabilise departments agendas. " In terms of future developments, this service 
director reported: 
I would like to see the big departments radically improving their input and the 
resultant progress made. I think we need to strengthen our corporate identity 
although this may be at odds with devolving responsibility, trust and 
accountability to departments. I think we need to address what the role of the 
centre actually is now because this has become fuzzy. I think the current 
system emphasises quantitative aspects of service delivery and we need to 
address the incorporation of qualitative information. There is a tendency in this 
authority to look within London for best practice but not all the solutions are 
centred in London and I think we could trawl around outwith the boroughs and 
see if we could find examples of best practice which could help us develop. 
He also felt that members could be more involved in the process and was 
concerned that "given the pace of legislative change in local government, we 
need to make sure that we do not let the approach make us unresponsive. " 
Given that the system was introduced to make Lewisham more responsive to 
its public this seems an unlikely outcome but there is an inherent danger in all 
systems where performance is measured, that the emphasis will shift to those 
areas being measured whether or not they address the needs of the public. 
Perhaps a mechanism which allowed chief officers to modify targets and 
measures of success for key results areas in the light of unanticipated 
legislative or other significant changes, at the interim reporting meeting, could 
address this problem. 
8.6.3.4 Interview with the Chair of Policy and Resources 
Councillor Steve Tennison is Chair of the Policy and Resources Committee 
and is a member of the Labour Group at Lewisham. Labour dominates the 
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political scene in the Borough holding 58 of the 67 seats with the opposition 
comprising 6 Conservatives and 3 Liberal Democrat councillors. As Chair of 
Policy and Resources, he has the opportunity to comment on departments 
Service Programmes. Through that committee, he also has a say in the 
decision of areas for scrutiny reviews. Of the input from other committees, he 
reports that all committees have responsibility for reviewing performance: 
The way the system operates here is that responsibility for service reviews is 
devolved to departments and service committees. Although there is some 
variation in the way departments and committees have responded, overall most 
committees receive information twice a year on the areas which were agreed as 
the key results areas and on the targets and indicators determined for that 
service. 
He reports that members were supportive of the introduction of Service 
Programmes because it was a way out of the short termism which had emerged 
from the extreme budgeting pressure the Council had had to deal with in the 
preceding years. It was a way for Lewisham to become more strategic. 
Like the previous interviewees from Lewisham, he acknowledged that there 
had been a wide variation in response across the Council. He felt that too 
much discretion had been given to chief officers and that somehow the 
Borough needs "to find a way of retaining our devolved management system 
but securing a more coherent and consistent approach. " However, he 
considers that: 
Officers at a general level, have responded well but this authority is still 
traumatised from the effects of the past few years and I think many are just beginning to stop operating on a reactionary basis and considering what service 
programmes might offer Lewisham. 
The Chair of Policy and Resources also feels that Lewisham's approach has 
reinforced compartmentalism and that perhaps the Borough ought to consider 
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having a layer above the service programmes defining what the Council 
wants to achieve overall. He also proposes that: 
Although we have made enormous progress in the area of devolved 
management, this has been at the expense of innovative budgeting which is 
basically operated incrementally in this borough. For us to move away from 
our current budgeting system would mean that we would have to take a much 
more corporate look at what we wanted to achieve and then to determine a 
budget which supported that. I don't even think that is desirable but it is almost 
certainly infeasible at Lewisham. However, although the service programmes 
are unrelated to the budgetary process at Council level, most departments are 
prioritising their resource allocations on the basis of the key results areas agreed 
by service committees. 
However, he feels that Lewisham has become a bit complacent with the 
service programmes and that there is an assumption that the services being 
provided are those which the public want. He proposes that even when there 
is a high level of take up, this does not necessarily follow and may merely 
reflect the lack of an alternative and Councillor Tennison suggests that the 
Borough needs to take a thorough look at the contents of the service 
programmes and to assess whether these meet the actual needs of the people 
of Lewisham. 
Overall, he feels that service programmes have helped achieve policies by 
providing the framework for demonstrating what is being done and achieved. 
This member also proposes that: 
I think all the nooks and crannies of Lewisham are thinking about strategy albeit 
in varying degrees and that we have a framework to become a strategically- 
focused council again. You cannot imaging the pressure we have been under 
and I think that this has helped us put our heads above the parapet. 
8.6.4 Performance Review in Lewisham: A Critique 
Lewisham's approach to performance review is very different from that seen 
in the other case study authorities. However, given the extreme financial 
crisis and devolved management approach not evident in these other councils, 
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this is hardly surprising. In terms of the evidence accumulated in undertaking 
this case study, this approach to performance review appears to be 
comparatively successful. 
The process accommodates Lewisham's devolved management system and 
was not set the unrealistic goal of making Lewisham strategic. It is gradually 
dispelling the reactionary ethos which has been engendered by the fiscal 
stress evident throughout the 1980s in Lewisham and is giving a focus back 
to the Borough activities and slowly reintroducing a strategic perspective. 
This is acceptable because it was recognised from the outset that instant 
results would not occur. 
On the negative side, the devolved management structure whilst increasing 
officer ownership, has allowed departments not to take the process seriously 
if that is what they want to do and there does actually seem to be a problem 
with the consistency of response across Lewisham's departments. However, 
most of the interviewees seemed to be willing to accept this rather than 
change the devolved management culture of which it is a consequence. A 
lack of member involvement was also indicated but whilst this does not reflect 
a lack of interest or commitment to review from councillors, it was considered 
that this area could be strengthened in the future. 
Chief executive input to the process was never mentioned but appeared to be 
non-problematic. Additionally, it would have been interesting to interview a 
director of a service department which had not made as much progress as 
Leisure Services. Whilst performance review activity was very comprehensive 
in this service area, it was clear that this was not the experience throughout 
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the organisation. But what was not made explicit was just how different 
progress had been in other directorates. It would also have been useful to 
hear more about the in-depth reviews even though this area of work was not 
intimated by any of the interviewees at Lewisham to be problematic. 
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9. l Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with synthesising the strands of evidence generated 
in undertaking research for this thesis so that a critique of performance review 
can be made, founded on the experiences of local authorities operating 
review systems. It is broadly structured around the research questions and 
there are separate sections relating to types of review system, attitudes to 
performance review, establishing a review system, operating a review system, 
sustaining a review system, the political dimension of performance review and 
finally good practice recommendations. The research question `how many 
local authorities operate performance review systems? ' was dealt with in 
chapter 5, The Scale of Performance Review, and is not further considered 
here. Similarly, the question concerning authorities not operating 
performance review systems was dealt with in chapters 6 and 7 and there is 
little to add to the observations already made since all of the case study 
authorities had in fact implemented review systems. 
9.2 Types of Review System 
The case studies revealed a disparate range of review systems in operation 
none of which closely conformed to the approaches to performance review 
considered in chapter 2. To recall from chapter 8, the review system at Bath 
City Council comprises a set of Council Goals cascading down to service 
objectives and then down to performance indicators and related targets; and 
is considered to be but one strand of the overall planning framework adopted 
by the Council. The review system at Hertfordshire is member-based with 
Performance Review Panels attached to each Council committee to scrutinise 
the performance of that committee. The emphasis is on monitoring 
performance in relation to policies rather than operational issues. The review 
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system at Cornwall County Council comprises a series of departmental 
Performance Management Statements which should relate to each 
department's objectives, aims and priorities as incorporated into the Council's 
Medium Term Plan. Once these Performance Management Statements have 
been determined, responsibility for reviewing performance in relation to these 
is devolved to committee chairs and chief officers and is not centrally 
monitored or co-ordinated. At Epsom and Ewell Borough Council, the 
review system begins with the Council's vision and values which then 
cascade down to objectives, performance indicators and targets for cost 
centres and business units. On the basis of aggregate objectives, managers 
then determine individual standards and targets for staff and these are 
reviewed and performance-related pay awarded or otherwise according to 
performance. In the final case study authority, the London Borough of 
Lewisham, performance is reviewed in two ways. The first is through reviews 
of specific aspects of service delivery being undertaken by the Finance 
Department and the second is through Service Programmes. Chief officers 
have to draw up Service Programmes for their departments which reflect the 
authority's core values and identify key results areas, relevant targets for 
these areas and appropriate measures of success which are then either 
approved or modified by the relevant committee to whom information on 
performance in relation to the measures is reported on twice a year. However, 
as in Cornwall, there is no central co-ordination of the monitoring process 
rather just a check that the Service Programmes have been generated by each 
department. 
In considering the Audit Commission's advocated approach outlined in 
chapter 2, there are some areas of similarity with review processes examined 
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within this research project but there are more areas of difference. There was 
no evidence amongst the case study authorities of performance being 
reviewed according to the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness or 
indeed cost, the resources provided or outputs and outcomes or the level of 
service provided or service take-up. In most instances, the performance 
indicators utilised seemed more related to what could be easily quantified or 
what information was felt to be useful by chief officers and sometimes 
members, for reporting to committee. There was certainly little evidence of 
indicators being classified according to the value for money criteria although a 
modest number of chief executives responding to the postal questionnaire 
indicated distinctions being drawn between the 3Es but in most of these cases, 
the examples provided suggested that the distinction was far from clear. 
The case study evidence lends support to the Audit Commission's assertion 
that effectiveness is difficult to measure and the experiences of case study 
authorities suggests that the emphasis is very much on operational information 
rather than the impact of policies. However, this seemed to reflect a lack of 
clear policies and policy-orientation rather than a pre-occupation with 
operational matters. 
There was little evidence to support the Audit Commission's performance 
monitoring pyramid perspective. Indeed, in two of the five case study 
authorities, Cornwall and Lewisham, responsibility for monitoring results is 
devolved to departments and committees and in the case of Hertfordshire, the 
Commission's monitoring and reporting approach is irrelevant because of the 
Review Panels. However, in keeping with the Commission's suggestion, in 
most instances, targets had been set for indicators on which information was 
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gathered but these were generally internally-determined rather than referring 
to external criteria such as the Audit Commission's benchmarking figures. 
The Commission recommended that the chief executive be made responsible 
for the process to give it the necessary impetus. Within the case studies, the 
chief executive was responsible for the review system in Bath and in Epsom 
and Ewell but had delegated overall responsibility in Cornwall and Lewisham, 
with the system at Hertfordshire being member-based with co-ordinating 
responsibility resting with the assistant chief executive. The evidence 
gathered within the context of this thesis, suggests that chief executive 
responsibility does not necessarily mean that review will be taken seriously 
throughout the organisation as in the case of Bath, and equally that a system 
can be run relatively successfully without chief executive involvement as in 
the London Borough of Lewisham. 
The Commission also advocated that a performance review team be 
established to act as a catalyst for the process. The only case study authority 
which had a review unit was Bath but the review team seemed to be 
perceived as watchdogs by some parts of the authority and questions were 
raised concerning their cost-effectiveness. In the other authorities, there was 
normally an officer whose responsibility it was to co-ordinate the system. In 
Hertfordshire, Cornwall and Lewisham this was a policy officer whilst in 
Epsom and Ewell it was the Head of Management Services. The only problem 
that this seems to have created is that the officers felt that they were often 
unable to devote the time to their responsibilities regarding performance 
review that they would have liked because of competing demands. This does 
Chapter 9, A Critique of Performance Review, page 396 
not appear to have been a significant determinant in the success or otherwise 
of review systems. 
The Audit Commission recommended that performance review should be an 
integral part of the work of each councillor and whilst the issue of member 
input is further considered below, the evidence gathered here suggests that 
this is simply not realistic and systems which demand considerable input from 
members are unlikely to be successful. Overall, it would have to be concluded 
that the Audit Commission's prescribed approach to performance review bears 
little relation to what actually happens in local authorities. 
Given that none of the case study authorities are Scottish, it would be 
unreasonable to expect their review systems to correspond to the approach 
espoused by the Accounts Commission. However, if we revisit the Accounts 
Commission framework (page 48), although none of the processes adopted by 
the case authorities are identical, the review systems of Bath, Epsom and 
Ewell and Lewisham have similarities particularly the cascading down from 
the Council's overall aims down to service objectives or programmes and then 
down to performance indicators and targets. Epsom and Ewell's approach, 
where operations are organised around cost centres and business units, is not 
entirely removed from the Accounts Commission's vision of an integrated 
performance budgeting - performance review framework (page 51). 
Comparing the case study review systems with Butt and Palmer's approach to 
organising for value for money in local authorities, few commonalties are in 
evidence lending support to the view that their framework is over-ambitious 
for most councils, particularly concerning zero-based budgeting. Lewisham's 
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two-pronged review mechanism is however, in keeping with the distinction 
drawn by Butt and Palmer between on-going review and in-depth reviews of 
particular service areas. 
Jackson and Palmer's performance measurement system is not dissimilar in 
structure to the review system operated in Epsom and Ewell but the emphasis 
in the former is on policies whereas in the case authority, because the Council 
is controlled by Residents Association members, the focus of the review 
system is operational. Epsom and Ewell were the only case study authority 
which had implemented a system of performance-related pay which was in 
accordance with Jackson and Palmer's vision of performance management. In 
their discourse, these authors also suggested that indicators should be related 
to intermediate and final outcomes and economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
but as previously intimated, limited evidence of performance review being 
organised in this mechanistic way was identified within this piece of research. 
It would have to be concluded that none of the approaches to performance 
review postulated as best practice in chapter 2 bear a close relationship to the 
review processes actually operating in the case study authorities. This point is 
particularly pertinent with regards to the Audit Commission since given their 
status, it was anticipated that their recommended approach would have 
influenced review practice in local authorities. What the case studies also 
demonstrate, is that contrary to what might be expected on reading any of the 
approaches to performance review outlined in this thesis, there is more than 
one way of reviewing performance. 
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In considering what forces have led to different review systems being 
introduced in different councils, it would have to be observed that in 
Hertfordshire and Epsom and Ewell, the systems emerged from major reviews 
of council activities and careful consideration was given to what type of 
system was needed and could be accommodated by the particular 
characteristics of each authority. Unfortunately, in the case of Hertfordshire, 
despite such postulations, the system which emerged demanded too much 
input from members. In Lewisham, although a major external review did not 
occur, the authority carefully considered what it wanted to achieve in 
introducing Service Programmes of which performance review forms a part, 
and introduced a system which reflected their devolved system of 
management. 
In Bath, the chief executive felt that things should be done differently and 
introduced a system which he thought would address weaknesses in the 
authority's operations. There was not a careful consideration of the nature of 
perceived problems, nor was their consultation with officers or members to 
solicit their views. There was no sense of what was trying to be achieved in 
introducing the process which was implemented and the impact has 
accordingly been limited. In the case of Cornwall, although there was not 
widespread consultation on the introduction of performance review, senior 
officers and members did consider how best to proceed in establishing 
performance review and then introduced a process which they considered to 
be appropriate but which transpired to be unsuitable. 
It would thus seem that a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
successful performance review, is that careful consideration is given to what 
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the organisation is trying to achieve in introducing a performance review 
system and what organisational characteristics are likely to affect the design of 
that review system. A process which reflects these concerns should then be 
introduced but it seems reasonable to postulate that a review mechanism 
which is bolted onto existing operations because it was thought to be a good 
idea, is unlikely to meet with much success. 
All of the different types of review system considered in the context of this 
thesis, highlighted that disparate progress will be made by different parts of an 
organisation. Even within those approaches where uniformity might be 
expected, particularly Bath, Hertfordshire and Epsom and Ewell, the fact that 
different people respond differently to new initiatives, in this instance 
reflecting varying dispositions to review and different levels of experience and 
exposure to the concepts of performance and measurement, resulted in 
dissimilar progress being made. In Cornwall and Lewisham, responsibility for 
monitoring performance was left with departments and committees resulting in 
significant variations in monitoring activity. In the latter case, this reflected 
the devolved management approach adopted by the Council and it was 
indicated by the interviewees from that authority that it would be wholly 
inappropriate to have centralised the process given their tradition of devolved 
management, even though it was anticipated that this would have resulted in 
more progress being made in some service areas. In the case of Cornwall 
County Council, there was no obvious reason for not centralising the 
operation apart from the fact that the policy officer with responsibility for 
review matters probably would not have had the additional time to co- 
ordinate the monitoring stage of review. However, the fact that this allowed 
departments not well disposed towards performance review to do the 
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minimum once they had drafted their Performance Management Statements, 
undoubtedly contributed to the limited success of performance review in this 
authority. 
More generally, it has to be observed that within the case study authorities, 
the introduction of performance review was not solely been about improving 
performance and typically it has been expected that the introduction of 
review will improve the strategic-orientation of the Council and force members 
to think about what they want to achieve as councillors. Indeed, in the case 
of Hertfordshire, the Review Panels reflect a move to rationalise the use of 
members' time rather than a driving concern with performance. This was 
certainly not expected and there was no hint of this amongst the advocated 
approaches which were considered. Rather, it was assumed that the 
authorities would be concerned with performance, either operational or in 
relation to policies and would be seeking a means of monitoring it. However, 
it would appear that review has actually been used as a tool by some councils 
improve strategic direction and the policy-orientation of members. It has also 
been used as a means of clarifying accountabilities. This unexpected facet 
was evident irrespective of the type of review system considered. 
9.3 Attitudes to Performance Review 
All of the approaches to performance review examined in chapter 2, stressed 
that commitment from officers and members was an important factor in 
establishing and operating a review system. The evidence gathered in 
undertaking this research highlights just how critical support and ownership 
are. 
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It was anticipated that support from the chief executive would be fundamental 
to the introduction of a performance review system and only 5 postal returns 
were received from chief executives who had been unsupportive of the 
implementation of review systems to their authorities and in 3 of these cases, 
the chief executive also reported that the system had been unsuccessful. 
Chief executive support can be the means of driving the review system 
forward particularly when it is not universally embraced with enthusiasm 
amongst officers which will typically be the case. In Cornwall County 
Council, it was indicated that some of the resistance evident amongst chief 
officers might have been overcome if the chief executive had visibly been 
driving the system as for example was the case in Epsom and Ewell. In 
Lewisham, the chief executive although supportive of the Service 
Programmes, was not actually involved in providing impetus to the process 
and in this particular authority this appeared not to present a problem. 
However, this is likely to reflect the devolved management approach which 
characterised this London Borough and it could in fact be postulated that 
perhaps if the chief executive had had a higher profile in the review domain, 
then more progress might have occurred in those departments which were 
only doing the minimum amount of work on reviewing performance in their 
key results areas. Whilst chief executive enthusiasm for performance review is 
a significant motivating factor in getting a review system introduced, it is not 
sufficient to ensure success. In the case of Bath City Council, the chief 
executive assumed that because he was in favour of the introduction of a 
review system, that this would spread throughout the organisation. Not 
surprisingly, this did not transpire. 
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Despite a high level of officer support for the introduction of performance 
review being reported by chief executives participating in the postal 
questionnaire, the case studies revealed that some resistance from chief 
officers will normally be encountered, and that in some instances, this 
unsupportiveness might be quite widespread and deep-seated. One factor 
which seemed quite significant in determining the level of opposition 
encountered was whether officers were consulted about the introduction of 
performance review and about the design of the system. In Epsom and Ewell, 
a high level of ownership amongst officers is in evidence but this reflects the 
significant level of consultation which took place with a joint officer-member 
working party being set up to work with consultants on the major review of 
the organisation. Contrastingly, in Bath, the lack of ownership left chief 
officers with a feeling of having performance review imposed on them from 
the centre which caused considerable resentment and a lack of ownership of 
the system. Similarly in Cornwall, chief officers who had been making 
independent progress in introducing methods of examining their department's 
performance, were unhappy at having to change course and introduce a 
different process for reviewing performance without being consulted. It was 
also indicated that they did in fact have a lot of experience which had not 
been drawn on, further intensifying the resentment they felt. 
Instilling a positive attitude towards performance review amongst chief 
officers should facilitate enthusiasm permeating throughout the organisation 
and certainly in Lewisham's Leisure Services, the enthusiasm of that chief 
officer had dissipated throughout his department. However, some fonnal 
mechanism such as the Employee Development Scheme, ensures that all 
employees are aware of performance. The high level of officer commitment to 
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review at Epsom and Ewell cannot be disassociated from the performance- 
related pay scheme. However, this is not to suggest that a system of 
performance-related pay will ensure that review in an authority is taken 
seriously. There are few authorities where accountabilities are clear enough to 
make performance-related pay a feasible option and indeed little support was 
found for pay related to performance in this programme of research. Many 
chief executives felt that it rewarded the wrong people, for example chief 
officers when it was the front-line staff who had delivered improved 
performance, and that it led to a preoccupation with those aspects of an 
employee's remit where performance was monitored. A higher level of 
support was however in evidence for staff/performance appraisal. 
Hertfordshire's newsletter, Performance Review News, revealed another way 
of keeping all bits of an organisation informed about performance issues. 
In the member domain, the case studies revealed that many members do not 
understand what performance review is about and although there were some 
instances of seminars being conducted with councillors, the evidence 
suggests that much more needs to be done with members in getting them to 
understand the purpose of performance review and what is hoped to be 
achieved by introducing it in their authority. This problem is particularly 
highlighted in Hertfordshire where the review system introduced emerged 
after major consultation with members, but which demanded far more of them 
than they had anticipated and could in fact deliver. The case studies also 
revealed that many members consider performance review to be a peripheral 
activity and there were several examples of this giving rise to difficulties in 
getting high calibre members to sit on committees which deal primarily with 
review matters. Indeed, in Bath, the Chair of the Special Review Sub- 
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Committee, was quite cynical about the introduction of performance review, 
a cynicism which persisted following the implementation of the review 
process. 
The Audit Commission suggests that review should not "be hived off to a 
separate Performance Review Committee" (1989, p18) since it should form an 
integral part of each members work. The evidence accumulated here suggests 
that review should not be the responsibility of a separate committee because 
such a committee will be given inexperienced or poor quality members and 
will consequently achieve little. Making it the responsibility of all committees 
does not guarantee that members will give prominence to performance review 
but at least performance will appear on all committee agendas and hopefully 
some will regard the matter seriously and progress will gradually be made. 
The balance appears to have been best struck at Epsom and Ewell where 
members are supportive and enthusiastic about performance review whilst 
leaving much of the work to officers. Whilst the same situation notionally 
exists at Lewisham where Service Programmes and performance results are 
presented to committees for ratification or modification, the lack of central co- 
ordination of the system affords chief officers much more discretion in the 
degree of vigour they exercise in preparing the information for committee. 
The postal questionnaire revealed that amongst both officers and members, 
their disposition towards performance review can change following the 
implementation of the system. Sometimes those not fully supportive prior to a 
system being established become so following the implementation stage but 
there were also trends in the other direction and arguably Hertfordshire 
presents the archetypal case of this where member support dwindled rapidly 
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when the extent of the input required of them became apparent. Thus, an 
authority which has a generally high level of support for performance review 
should monitor this to make sure that it does not falter. 
In terms of attitudes towards performance review, one of the most significant 
findings of this research is that a negative disposition can in fact prevent a 
review system from operating effectively. Arguably, the lack of support and 
ownership felt by officers in Bath and Cornwall were clearly major factors in 
preventing the review processes from achieving very much. This suggests 
that much should be done to ensure that all parts of the organisation are 
committed to performance review and understand why a review system is 
being introduced prior to its implementation. Consultation about the design 
of the system seems a key consideration in securing ownership from officers. 
Although `taking people with you' slows down the implementation process, 
not to do so may ultimately jeopardise the success of a performance review 
system and the extended timespan therefore seems worthwhile. 
9.4 Establishing a Performance Review System 
In chapter 2, it was noted that the Audit Commission had suggested that 
establishing a performance review system was relatively easy and it was 
anticipated that this was unlikely to be correct particularly since the 
turbulence which has characterised the local government environment during 
the past decade has inculcated a resistance to change amongst most local 
authorities. Jackson and Palmer contrastingly propose that the 
implementation of a performance management system is likely to take several 
years and this certainly seems closer to the experiences of the case study 
authorities. 
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In considering the case study authorities, the impetus behind the introduction 
of performance review varied. As previously indicated, in both Hertfordshire 
County and Epsom and Ewell Borough, even though the review systems are 
very different, both were a product of major organisational reviews, in 
Hertfordshire's case "to assist the County Council in a review of its 
operations to enable it to meet the challenges of the 1990s and beyond" and 
in Epsom and Ewell, the review was instigated following the observation that 
the Council had been "hanging onto the way it had always done things. " In 
Bath, the introduction of performance review was associated with the 
appointment of Clive Abbott as chief executive, whilst in Cornwall, it was 
precipitated by a District Auditors report which commented on the authority's 
lack of strategic direction. In Lewisham, the introduction of Service 
Programmes of which performance review is an integral part, was introduced 
as a consequence of the frustration felt by senior officers and members about 
operating within a large, bureaucratic organisation which was perceived as 
being unresponsive to changing demands. This in turn was a consequence of 
the severe financial constraints which capping had imposed which had 
instilled a short-termism and reactionary ethos and a loss of focus within the 
authority. 
I would have anticipated that where the introduction of performance review 
had been externally-driven, assuming that adequate consultation had taken 
place, then less resistance would be encountered. The evidence from this 
research lends only limited support to this view. In Epsom and Ewell, it was 
indicated that because the system was devised by consultants then it was 
readily accepted by officers and members. However, this was not the case at 
Hertfordshire where external consultants were again used yet the system was 
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nearly inoperable by members and indeed in Lewisham, ownership of the 
system appears not to have been a problem despite not being the product of a 
consultants exercise. However, in Lewisham, the introduction of 
performance review was part of a package of change and although the 
Hertfordshire experience indicates that this is not a pre-requisite for success, it 
may typically be a contributory factor. Indeed in Cornwall, the fact that 
performance review was appended onto existing practices and did not emerge 
from either an externally-conducted review or a wider organisational shake- 
up; seems to have been part of the problem. In Bath, the introduction of 
performance review was internally-driven and whilst not part of a package of 
change, it was the end point in a series of developments which began with 
the delineation of a set of Council Goals, followed by the identification of 
service objectives and finally determination of relevant performance indicators 
and targets. However, the lack of ownership and commitment to the process 
appears to be the principal factor preventing this process from being accepted 
by most of the organisation and perhaps if the initiative had been precipitated 
externally, then some of this unsupportiveness might have been overcome. 
Thus it would seem that generally, performance review is more likely to be 
comparatively easily established where its introduction is part of wider 
organisational change rather than appended to existing organisational 
arrangements. 
Many of the issues significant in establishing a performance review system will 
be determined by the type of review system introduced and thus have already 
been considered. However, within the postal questionnaire sent to chief 
executives the issue of establishing policy targets and performance measures 
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for the review systems was explored. It was revealed that in most instances, 
policy targets emerged from the Council's strategic and operational plans such 
as strategy statements and business plans but occasionally more innovative 
processes were in evidence, for example, consultation with the public about 
what services they wanted to see provided and at what standard. Members 
were reported by chief executives as being involved in the process of setting 
policy targets in 64.7% of cases and where officers were involved in their 
delineation, this was normally because the authority had no overall political 
control or where there was a minority administration. In contrast, the setting 
of performance measures was reported as being dominated by officers with 
members having an involvement in only 41.2% of cases. The postal 
questionnaire responses also revealed that the determination of measures was 
often undertaken independently from the generation of targets despite the 
Audit Commission's implicit assumption that their setting would occur in 
tandem. An interpretation of this unexpected finding may be found within the 
case study evidence. In the case study authorities, officer input into policy 
formulation was substantial but was normally undertaken collaboratively with 
committee chairs and was always subject to committee approval. However, 
councillors were less concerned with the drafting of performance measures 
and thus much more discretion was afforded chief officers in this domain. This 
does however infer, that performance review will be weighted towards 
operational performance rather than the arguably more significant 
performance in relation to policies. Whilst the case study evidence would 
confirm such a trend, this normally reflected vague policies rather than an 
unwillingness to assess policy attainment. In Hertfordshire for example, the 
Panel system was set up precisely to focus on policy achievement but even 
the Deputy Leader of the Council conceded that policies were typically too 
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long-term and vague for this objective to be attainable, a view supported by 
the opposition member interviewed. 
In the postal questionnaire, 80.4% of chief executives reported that 
establishing a review system led to a focus on the objectives of service. There 
was also a high incidence of this leading to a reappraisal of the service and a 
redefinition of the customer. This is in keeping with the case study evidence 
where the introduction of performance review had been associated with the 
generation or `tightening-up' of service plans. Indeed in the case of Cornwall, 
prior to the introduction of their review process, the authority did not actually 
have a Medium Term Plan. Only in Hertfordshire is review unrelated to a 
statement of service objectives. Whilst not questioning the value of drafting 
or revamping service objectives in any way, it is an arduous process 
providing further contrary evidence to the Audit Commission's assertion that 
the introduction of performance review is relatively easy. 
Given the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that the major difficulties 
encountered in establishing a performance review system relate to 
engendering ownership, commitment and enthusiasm amongst officers and 
members; and technical problems relating to the determination of adequate 
and acceptable targets and indicators. However, resource difficulties were 
also in evidence particularly concerning the number of induction seminars and 
training workshops which were required in the early stages of introducing a 
review mechanism and also in `freeing-up' the required officer time needed to 
lubricate the process. 
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Amongst the case study authorities, pacing the introduction of performance 
review also appears to have been problematic. There is a natural tendency 
amongst those driving forward a new initiative to want to see progress being 
made and sometimes tangible results at an early juncture can legitimise change. 
However, people need time to adjust to change. The service director at 
Hertfordshire particularly highlighted this as a contributory factor to the 
limited impact of the Review Panels proposing that members were being asked 
to take a huge step in moving from an operational focus in their council work 
to becoming strategic and policy-directed and that it would inevitably take 
time to achieve such a transformation. The introduction of performance 
review cannot be expected to deliver quick results but a number of the 
interviewees from different case study organisations indicated that if results 
didn't transpire quite rapidly then frustration and disillusionment would 
quickly set in. Of equal significance, if too much time and flexibility in 
adjusting to a new process is afforded, this allows reluctant officers to 
procrastinate for as long as possible as was evident in Cornwall and 
Lewisham, and could ultimately threaten the viability of the process if it 
consequently appears to `not be getting off the ground. ' 
The evidence accumulated in the course of conducting this research suggests 
that establishing a review process is a complex, and often protracted, process 
with the degree of difficulty dependent on a number of factors. The case 
studies illustrate that it is critical that ownership and enthusiasm from officers 
and members is instilled from the outset. Wholesale commitment will never be 
feasible but a high level of support is a pre-requisite for a successful review 
system and thus effort should be made to foster a positive disposition towards 
performance review. 
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9.5 Operating a Performance Review System 
As with establishing a review system, many of the factors significant in 
operating a performance review process will be determined by the type of 
review system implemented. However, in undertaking a critique of 
performance review, reference has to be made to the linkages between the 
policy and budgetary processes and the review system 
74.5% of chief executives reported a linkage existing between their 
authority's policy planning process and performance review system with a 
further 7.2% indicating that such a development was either planned or on- 
going. In their description of the linkages, many chief executives reported 
that this was typically through service plans or equivalent type documents or 
through committees setting targets, but occasionally more dynamic linkages 
were in evidence with the results of reviewing performance reported as 
feeding into the replanning and modification of policies. However, a deeper 
analysis of this issue through the case studies suggests that in most cases, the 
links are tenuous since the actual measurement of performance is typically 
concentrated on operational activities rather than policies. 
61.4% of chief executives reported that their review system was linked to the 
budgetary process and 5.9% indicated that such a link was either an on-going 
or planned development, but the description of these linkages revealed that 
they were normally of an elementary nature and indeed there was no example 
of a comprehensive linkage having been made. Within the case study 
authorities, the budgetary systems were incremental with the significant 
majority of the budget allocated according to the previous year's distribution 
and with only a limited amount of reallocation around what Elcock et al. 
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describe as `the margins' (1989). However, there was evidence of attempts 
being made to move towards prioritised budgeting amongst the case study 
councils. Within prioritised budgeting, the authority determines its priorities 
and then allocates its resources accordingly. However, there were two factors 
limiting the progress made on this front. The first was a paucity of clear 
council priorities. Although most departments had determined their service 
priorities, this had not occurred on an authority-wide basis. The second 
inhibiting factor concerns the severe financial pressure which most local 
authorities have had to contend with during the last decade. Fiscal stress has 
made budgetary decisions highly-charged in both the officer and member 
domain and the division of council resources has typically been particularly 
contentious. It has thus been easier to base each year's allocation on the 
previous year's distribution. However, the case study material suggested that 
the introduction of performance review, by forcing councillors to consider 
what policies are to be pursued, would eventually lead to a more rational basis 
for distributing council monies. 
In the postal questionnaire sent to council leaders, they were asked whether 
they felt that there had been any major difficulties with the operation of the 
performance review system - it was anticipated that all systems would have 
some minor associated difficulties. Only 34.2% of council leaders reported 
major operational difficulties but a further 11.0% indicated that it was too early 
in the life cycle of the review process operated in. their authority for these to 
have become apparent. In elaborating on these difficulties, a wide array of 
responses was in evidence but they could be broadly categorised as: 
* behavioural difficulties such as a lack of commitment from officers and/or 
members or defensiveness over the traditional way of doing things in the 
council or the lack of any driving force to progress the process. 
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* technical difficulties such as defining performance indicators or as indicated in 
the response `maintaining an integrated process in the face of various pressures 
particularly financial' or `getting the best method of recording. ' There were also 
a number of technical difficulties which related to how the performance review 
system was linked in with other processes within the council particularly the 
policy and budgetary cycles. 
* resource difficulties particularly in relation to training but also regarding the 
use of officers time as evidenced in the response `It has had major implications 
regarding the use of officers time which is currently at a premium with the 
pressures of the poll and council tax, CCT and now Local Government 
Review. ' 
* political difficulties such as a lack of clear policy objectives being forthcoming 
from councillors or the changing roles of members caused by performance 
review or an obstructive opposition. 
These are all recurrent points which have previously been highlighted within 
this critique and all were apparent, albeit in varying degrees, in the case study 
authorities. Of far more significance than difficulties being encountered in the 
operation of the system, is how they are dealt with. In Hertfordshire for 
example, it was clear during the case study visit that the operation of the 
Review Panels was hampered by the high demand placed on members time 
and the Council was in the process of responding by seeing how officers 
could be used to alleviate some of this pressure whilst still retaining the 
essence of the system. 25% of chief executives reported that changes had 
been made to the review system following its implementation and most of 
these were in fact rationalisations of the system, for example, focusing on 
fewer but more appropriate measures or by refocusing the review system to 
concentrate on more strategic issues. 
Some of the most commonly occurring operational problems can be avoided if 
careful consideration is given to the needs and idiosyncrasies of the 
organisation prior to the system being designed and a process introduced 
which accommodates rather than challenges these organisational 
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characteristics. However, when a system is floundering, this is unlikely to 
improve with time and positive steps need to be taken to address difficulties 
and at as early a stage as possible lest they should become entrenched. 
9.6 Sustaining a Review System 
The research question concerning the sustainability of performance review 
systems was founded on my expectation that performance review would be 
likely to play a more dominant role in councils in the future and that it would 
therefore be worth securing a dynamic perspective of performance review. 
Unfortunately, none of the review systems in the case study authorities had 
been operating for a sufficient period of time for their dynamism to have 
became apparent. 
It was clear from both postal questionnaire returns and the information 
accumulated from the case studies, that developments can be made to 
performance review systems after their introduction and indeed, there is a case 
to be made for introducing a non-complex system initially and once that is 
reasonably embedded into the organisation, to develop and enhance it 
according to the authority's needs as for example was intended by those 
authorities indicating a move towards prioritised budgeting. A number of the 
council leaders participating in the postal questionnaire indicated that they 
would like to see customers' perceptions of council services and measures of 
their levels of satisfaction incorporated into the review system to strengthen 
its usefulness and such a development can be made after the system is 
introduced. Indeed, it could reasonably be proposed that in sustaining a 
performance review system, developments are likely to be the norm. The local 
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government sector is certainly not static and it is probable that an authority's 
performance review system will need to adapt as the organisation changes. 
A pre-requisite for sustaining a performance review system is that there are 
reasons for its continued operation. Amongst postal questionnaire 
respondents, there were clearly benefits associated with the operation of 
performance review. 75.2% of chief executives reported the review system as 
being associated with a change in corporate value and culture with 
strengthened customer focus and improved clarity in the purpose and 
direction of the authority being the most frequently reported changes. 65.4% 
of chief executives reported that the operation of the review system had 
contributed significantly towards achieving a corporate management 
perspective, with 60.1% reporting a similar contribution with respect to 
corporate goals. With respect to both these questions, a further 11% of chief 
executives felt that it was too soon to reach a judgement. It was previously 
noted that implementing performance review had led to an improved focus on 
service objectives. 
Similarly amongst case study authorities, all interviewees were able to identify 
positive benefits associated with the review system. A recurrent theme was 
that it had helped focus and structure activities. Most case authorities also felt 
that it was helping to introduce a strategic orientation and by providing the 
necessary framework, would facilitate members to concentrate on policy 
formulation. It was also felt to have led to more informed decision-making and 
to have prompted and provoked the `right' questions. Indeed, even in those 
case study authorities where the performance review system was replete with 
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difficulties, all of the interviewees were able to identify benefits associated 
with the process. 
Amongst chief executives participating in the postal questionnaire, only 5.2% 
considered the performance review system to have been unsuccessful 
although an additional 3.3% reported that it had only been partially 
successful. Slightly higher proportions of council leaders reported a lack of 
success (8.9%) and partial success (4.8%). Thus the majority of postal 
questionnaire participants either considered the review system to have been 
successful (61.4% of chief executives and 65.8% of council leaders) or 
reported that it was too soon for judgement to be reached on this matter 
(24.8% of chief executive respondents and 19.2% of council leaders). This 
suggests that performance review has a future in these councils. 
In considering the sustainability of review systems, the processes operating in 
the case study authorities were too recent for much evidence to be 
accumulated on this matter but it could reasonably be concluded that in the 
case of Bath and Hertfordshire, the review systems are only viable in the 
longer teen if their weaknesses are addressed. The balance of evidence 
particularly from the postal questionnaires, suggests that given the significant 
benefits associated with performance review, the operation of processes is 
likely to be maintained. Unfortunately, the issue of keeping systems fresh and 
dynamic was not accessed because of the relative newness of systems and this 
could constitute an area for further research in the performance review 
domain. 
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9.7 The Political Dimension of Performance Review 
To recall from chapter 4, a postal survey of council leaders was undertaken to 
explore the political dimension of performance review. The results of this 
questionnaire found no evidence of any particular party favouring or not 
favouring the introduction of performance review with systems being 
operated in councils of all political persuasions. It was reported that council 
leaders and the political parties they represented had been supportive of the 
introduction of performance review, support which was maintained following 
implementation. Within case study authorities, there was no evidence of any 
political party opposing the introduction of performance review but several of 
the members interviewed were not well-disposed to performance review. In 
Bath, the Chair of the Special Review Sub-Committee was cynical about the 
initiative seeing it as the current management technique in vogue and in 
Cornwall, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, the largest Council group, 
indicated that he was unenthusiastic about the implementation of a review 
system questioning the use of officer time in relation to the process and seeing 
it as an attempt by central government to cut local authorities down to size. 
Perhaps more could have been done to explain to these members the purpose 
of review and to convince them of its value since in these instances, their 
hostility was a contributory factor to the difficulties encountered. 
The postal questionnaire revealed that opposition members were typically 
afforded only a minimal role in the performance review process normally 
having representation on committees dealing with review matters in 
proportion to their numbers. This observation was supported by the case 
study evidence. However, much greater variety was evident in the roles 
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played by majority groups and the postal responses given by council leaders 
were grouped as follows: 
* active as indicated by the response `the majority group sets direction, identifies 
objectives and decides on action resulting from review' or for example by 
setting the performance agenda for the authority and relevant committees and 
identifying areas for review; and setting and/or defining indicators of 
performance; 
* passive - for example as indicated by the response `through the committee 
process' or by the councillors role being confined to receiving regular 
performance information but with no indication given that much was done with 
the information; or by `supervising' the process; 
* delegation predominately to group officers as in the response `the Chair of 
Policy oversees the performance review process; Chair and Vice-Chairs of 
Service Committees present relevant information on their departments to the 
Chair of Policy'; 
* minimal where the council leader considered that the majority group played no 
meaningful role in the review system. 
Approximately half of council leaders reported that the majority group's role 
was passive. Within the case studies, variety was also evident and with the 
exception of Hertfordshire, was confined to approving or modifying reports 
submitted to committees. In the only authority where an active role was 
delineated for members, there were clearly difficulties in getting members to 
fulfil this role. The lesson from Hertfordshire has to be that careful 
consideration needs to be given to the role to be played by members 
particularly when this is demanding. In several of the case authorities, 
performance review was perceived to be a management tool with 
consequently limited input from members. 
In the postal questionnaire, 62.3% of council leaders indicated that their 
political objectives were incorporated into the performance review system 
normally by forming the basis of performance targets or by translating into key 
tasks with performance in relation to these tasks monitored and reported on. 
In the case study authorities, service programmes and objectives normally 
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provided the link but as previously noted, much of the information gathered 
in reviewing performance is more concerned with operations rather than 
policy attainment. 
With reference to the political dimension of performance review, perhaps the 
most interesting finding to emerge from the research is that there is limited 
evidence to support the preconception that performance review will be used 
for political purposes particularly by opposition groups, for example, by 
utilising the information emerging from the review system to embarrass the 
ruling group. This observation held for both postal questionnaires responses 
and case study visits but in the latter case, it could be proposed that this 
reflected the lack of involvement, and perhaps even interest, of members with 
regard to performance review matters with the calibre of members being 
allocated to special review committees, sometimes proving to be problematic. 
9.8 Good Practice Recommendations 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is possible to make the following good 
practice recommendations: 
* careful consideration should be given to the type of review system to 
be introduced to a local authority. Reference should be made to what 
the organisation is trying to achieve in introducing performance review 
and what organisational characteristics exist which are likely to affect 
the design of the review system. Only a process which accommodates 
rather than challenges the authority's idiosyncrasies should be 
considered for introduction. 
*a recurrent theme in the critique of performance review was that it was 
critical to secure a high level of ownership and enthusiasm towards 
performance review from officers and members and that in fact, their 
unsupportiveness, could jeopardise the viability of a review system. 
Consequently, a concerted effort must be made to foster a positive 
disposition before embarking on the introduction of a review system. 
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* in engendering commitment, consultation is a key mechanism. As well 
as improving support because people feel that their views have been 
sought, the emergent system is more likely to reflect the needs of the 
organisation and it is probable that some who are consulted will 
actually have relevant experience of reviewing performance and can 
thus make a positive contribution to the design of the system. 
* there is evidence that the introduction of performance review is more 
readily accepted if it is part of a package of change rather than 
appended onto existing management practices. This is not to suggest 
that a council wanting to establish a review mechanism need embark on 
overhauling its organisational arrangements but where the 
implementation of performance review is not part of a restructuring or 
other major change, careful consideration needs to be given as to how 
best to introduce it particularly with regard to ensuring support from 
officers and members. 
* where a review system is floundering, this is unlikely to improve of its 
own accord or given time. Positive steps need to be taken to address 
the difficulties before they get any worse. 
* developments and refinements can be made to a review system after it 
has been introduced and thus it is not necessary to introduce an 
elaborate process which addresses all possible organisational needs 
initially. There is a strong case to be made for establishing a relatively 
simple review framework and once this is embedded into the 
organisation to build and adapt it according to requirements. Indeed, it 
can be postulated that adaptations will inevitably be required given the 
turbulent nature of the local government environment. 
Chapter 10 
Conclusions 
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This piece of research was precipitated by the observation that little is known 
about performance review activity in this country despite the introduction of a 
performance review system being proffered as one solution to the value for 
money requirement placed on auditors of local authority accounts to ensure 
that authorities have made proper arrangements for securing economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, the research was not merely 
undertaken to fill an information vacuum. It was proposed that delineating 
what lessons can be learned from performance review operations would assist 
local authorities embarking on the introduction of review systems in the future 
particularly the `new' authorities emerging from Local Government Review 
and most notably in Scotland where the statutory responsibility for ensuring 
value for money arrangements are in place, falls to the unitary authorities on 
the 1st of April 1996. Additionally, it was proposed that performance review 
could provide the framework in which policy achievements could be 
demonstrated thus strengthening local government by reinforcing its policy 
role. It was also speculated that this latter characteristic would become more 
critical if the current trend towards enabling and decentralisation continues 
within the local government sector. 
A major investigation of performance review activity was thus initiated. This 
began with an assessment of the few approaches to performance review 
which are in the public domain, followed by preliminary discussions being 
conducted with local authorities which both had and did not have review 
systems to identify key issues and concerns within the review domain. 
Contact was made with the Policy and Performance Review Network, the 
practitioners organisation in this area, to illicit their views on what the main 
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review issues were and similar discussions were undertaken with the Audit 
and Accounts Commissions. 
On the basis of the information accumulated at this stage, a set of research 
questions was generated and the search for an appropriate methodology to 
address them was begun. This student found the literature relating to 
methodology unhelpful and dominated by concerns which bear little relation 
to the reality of conducting research. Sufficient evidence was however found, 
to suggest that to answer the research questions which had been postulated, 
a two-pronged methodology would be required comprising a postal 
questionnaire issued to all local authority chief executives and council leaders 
to secure a breadth of experience on review activities and a series of case 
studies to access the required depth of information. 
Postal questionnaires were issued to 492 local authorities and 262 responses 
were received from chief executives and 187 from council leaders resulting in 
a major data management exercise involving the answers to closed questions 
being put onto spreadsheets and open-ended responses being transcribed 
onto word-processing files. 5 case studies were undertaken with different 
types of local authorities and of differing political persuasions all of whom 
operated a performance review system. Documentation relating to their 
review systems was accumulated and interviews were conducted with key 
organisational figures in each case study. Over 33 hours of interviews were 
conducted with the case authorities and an immense volume of case study 
material was generated. 
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From the research material, it was calculated that 43.8% of local authorities 
had implemented performance review systems whilst 24.9% were known not 
to have done so and it was observed that there was a higher incidence of 
performance review activity amongst authorities such as the London 
Boroughs and County Councils which have the more strategic remit as 
compared with district authorities. 
Given the scale of performance review activity revealed through this 
investigation, it is incredible that more research has not been conducted in 
this field but this is likely to reflect the wide range of legislative changes 
within the local government sphere which have competed for research 
attention. However, this comment also has to be extended to the Audit and 
Accounts Commissions whose attention in recent years has been preoccupied 
with preparation for and implementation of the Citizen's Charter. The 
Accounts Commission is currently updating its review guide but there is no 
suggestion of the Audit Commission following suit and the evidence from this 
thesis indicates that the Audit Commission's recommended approach to 
performance review needs to be revisited at an early juncture since it has little 
in common with the review practices of local authorities. 
Given its volume, the presentation of the research material had to be 
subdivided and separate thesis chapters were devoted to discussions of the 
postal questionnaire responses received from chief executives and council 
leaders, and the case study evidence. However, the research evidence was 
amalgamated and a critique of performance review was made founded on the 
experiences of councils operating review systems and this was organised 
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around the research questions, culminating in the delineation of good practice 
recommendations. 
In response to the research questions, a number of observations can be made. 
Evidence was found of a range of different types of review system in 
operation and a key finding of the research concerning the design of review 
systems, is that they must be tailored to meet organisational needs. The 
attitude to performance review from within councils, was revealed to be 
variable but a consistent theme in the research material was that a lack of 
support for performance review can be extremely detrimental to the 
effectiveness of a system and thus every effort should be made to foster a 
favourable attitude from the outset. A wide array of factors was in evidence 
with regards to establishing and operating review systems but since the type 
of review system introduced will significantly influence both of these 
dimensions, this is not surprising. A political dimension to performance review 
was detected but was less forceful than anticipated and there was little 
evidence of the findings of performance review being used as political 
ammunition. For authorities not operating a review system, it was clear that 
performance matters still had a place on the council's agenda and frequently, 
some of the constituent parts of a review system were in evidence but were 
either unstructured, informal or too embryonic to amount to a review system. 
The relative newness of the review systems explored in the case studies, 
prevented a picture emerging concerning the sustainability of performance 
review and thus further research, focused on securing a dynamic perspective 
and in particular concentrating on how systems are prevented from going stale 
and with regard to their adaptability in the face of change, would seem 
appropriate. 
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One of the unexpected findings of this research was that performance review 
was actually being used as a tool for improving the policy-orientation of 
councils. Prior to conducting this research, it was proposed that performance 
review could provide a means of demonstrating policy attainment. The 
evidence gathered here suggests that this is typically not the case with 
performance information being dominated by operational details. However 
within the case study authorities, this reflected a lack of clarity in the 
expression of policies rather than a reluctance to address service effectiveness. 
It was clear that performance review was associated with improving the policy 
and strategic direction of councils and future work exploring progress in this 
domain would seem appropriate. Future research which explored the inter- 
relationship between Citizen's Charter indicators and council review systems 
would also seem pertinent. 
It was clear from the research evidence that the operation of a performance 
review system has brought significant benefits to authorities. Even in those 
case study councils where the review system had major design and/or 
operational faults, interviewees were able to identify positive attributes 
associated with the review process. The high level of success reported by 
chief executives and council leaders suggests that performance review has a 
future in local government. It is hoped that the findings of this research can 
make a contribution to that future and it is intended that a guide to good 
practice based on the research material will be generated for dissemination to 
local authorities. Whilst no blueprint exists for effective performance review, 
lessons can be learned from the experiences of councils but these are only of 
value if communicated to local government. It is to be hoped that local 
government also has a future to reap the benefits of this research. 
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